

ROTBLAT CENTENARY CELEBRATION

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The Royal Society

**Developing the
Disarmament Laboratory
concept**

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Developing the Disarmament Laboratory concept

- Background to the Disarmament Laboratory idea – recent speeches and public letters
- Developing this idea - the BRINPARDI concept
- Scope of activities within BRINPARDI
- Relationship to other organisations in this area
- Possible roles for AWE within BRINPARDI
- Steps required to implement the concept

Background to the Disarmament Laboratory idea

- The possibility of a nuclear-weapons-free future is now on the political agenda
 - Letter of **George Schultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn** in the *Wall Street Journal* on 4 January 2007
 - Speech made by **Margaret Beckett** to the Carnegie Institute on 25 June 2007
 - Recent speeches made by the **Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary**
 - Letter from **Douglas Hurd, Malcolm Rifkind, David Owen and George Robertson** in the *Times* on 30 June 2008
- The Beckett concept of Britain as a 'disarmament laboratory'
- Widespread recognition that progress in this direction has to be on a step-by-step basis, and requires real work

Developing the Disarmament Laboratory
idea – the BRINPARDI concept

**British International Non-Proliferation,
Arms Reduction and Disarmament
Institute
(BRINPARDI)**

Defining the BRINPARDI concept

- To take Margaret Beckett's Disarmament Laboratory idea forward, a very large amount of work will be needed to define and implement the concrete political, financial and technical steps involved.
- To make this happen at all quickly, it would be very helpful to create a UK centre of excellence in which the necessary expertise can be built up and sustained, and the necessary international leadership can be promoted. The centre should have a single physical location, reasonably close to other UK centres with relevant expertise in this area.
- Such a centre should be both British and International, in the same way that SIPRI is both Swedish and International – i.e. located in the UK, and predominantly funded from British sources- but open to both individual experts from around the world, and to funding from outside the UK.
- It should be a predominantly non-classified institution, but should be able to draw on the advice of experts with security clearance as necessary. The US JASON model is relevant in this respect
- It should operate in such a way that it earns the respect of the international community as an objective, fair-minded organisation, not subject to undue influence from any national, political or military faction, but should be regarded by the British government as a reliable source of information and advice on policy in this area.

Scope of activities within BRINPARDI

Immediate > Short-term > Longer-term > Long-term

- **Nuclear Non-proliferation**
- **Arms Reduction, Arms Limitation and Confidence Building measures**
- **Disarmament Implementation**
- **Preventing Nuclear weapon 'breakout', both within NPT-signatory countries and post-disarmament**

Immediate

Nuclear Non-proliferation

Activities in which AWE is currently involved are highlighted in red

- International political, economic and technical data gathering related to the NPT
- Development of rationales for signing & adhering to the NPT
- Analysis of loopholes in the NPT regime, and development of counter-measures
- **Technical & political aspects of monitoring for compliance with NPT**
- **Identification of countries, groups and individuals with responsibility for non-compliance with NPT**
- Development of database on trafficking in nuclear materials and dual-use materials, and **technology relating to the detection of such trafficking**
- **Development of expertise on the potential for the creation of radiological threats ('dirty bombs' etc) and counter-measures**
- **Development and implementation of a nuclear forensic capability**
- Development of 'proliferation-resistant' civil nuclear power and an acceptable international inspection regime

Short-term

Arms Reduction, Arms Limitation and Confidence Building measures

- Development of arms reduction, arms limitation and confidence-building strategies, including test bans, regional non-nuclear zones, cut-off treaties etc
- Development of rationales to persuade individual countries to adopt such strategies (political, military and economic)
- **Monitoring/verification of compliance with such agreements, including the dismantling of withdrawn weapons in ways that avoid further proliferation, or unnecessary intrusion into matters affecting national security or commercial practice.**
- Secure management of stockpiles of nuclear materials in NW states

Longer-term

Disarmament Implementation

- Identification of political and military disincentives to complete nuclear disarmament, especially in the final stages, and finding means of countering those disincentives
- Creation of non-nuclear security regimes
- Identification of economic and social implications of winding down nuclear weapons establishments, and/or converting them to civilian missions
- **Intensification of the compliance verification regime** as appropriate for the final stages in disarmament

Long-term

Preventing Nuclear weapon 'breakout', both within NPT- signatory countries and post- disarmament

- Creation of an acceptable international inspection regime
- Development of technology to make such a regime effective in detecting breakout at an early stage
- Development of an effective international regime to deter breakout.

Relationship to other organisations in this area

- There are many UK organisations with relevant expertise. It will have to be part of the mission of BRINPARDI to draw on these resources and not to compete with them.
- For historical reasons, **AWE** has for many years been one of the lead organisations in this field. It is highly desirable that its strengths should be brought into BRINPARDI
- There are several academic centres which should also be brought into association with BRINPARDI
- There are a number of NGOs which have something important to contribute, though not all will meet the criteria for full membership.
- Several British government departments are very positively involved in the political, financial and technical aspects of this work, and a mechanism will have to be created to coordinate the activities of BRINPARDI with UK government objectives. However BRINPARDI should not become an arm of the UK government.

Possible roles for AWE within BRINPARDI

- Historically, AWE has been the key technical organisation providing leadership in this area, and because of its access to classified information and its experimental facilities deriving from its weapons development and testing work, it is clear that in the foreseeable future it will continue to have a very important part to play.
- However there are various reasons why it should not be the only player in this field:
 - Its current ‘core mission’ is to maintain the existing UK nuclear deterrent, and to undertake development work to permit the construction of a next generation of UK nuclear weapons if the UK government so decides. Its so-called ‘Threat Reduction’ work, which covers some of the work which would be undertaken in BRINPARDI, is on a much smaller scale than its core mission work, and is subject to a number of constraints.
 - It operates a rigid security policy which severely limits access to buildings within the fence to individuals who do not have full security clearance. This particularly applies to non-UK nationals.

Possible roles for AWE within BRINPARDI continued

- The majority of its staff, particularly its senior staff, are highly committed to its core mission, and do not have a track record in the disarmament field. Although it has growing links with British universities, these overwhelmingly relate to its core mission.
- It does not possess, and would probably not claim to possess, a very high level of expertise in the economic and international political aspects of this programme, or in technical aspects which have historically been funded by branches of the UK government other than MoD.
- In consequence, it is proposed that BRINPARDI should not be located within the AWE fence, though that would not exclude locating it in buildings close to AWE
- It would be highly desirable for some of the **technical activities currently undertaken by AWE** which lie within the scope of BRINPARDI to be brought into it.

Steps required to implement the BRINPARDI concept

- To be effective, BRINPARDI would need to have a leader with the outstanding management and communication skills required in a strongly interdisciplinary centre, who could command the respect of all those who would contribute to its mission.
- It should be located somewhere which is not too far from the key contributory organisations. It would need to have a significant permanent staff, and also the ability to attach staff from other organisations for specific tasks.
- Above all, it would need to have a significant budget – perhaps £10M pa initially- if it is to undertake work at a sufficient speed to make a real impact on this urgent national/international task. In view of the interest in the ‘disarmament laboratory’ concept which has been expressed by a number of senior UK government figures, it seems not unreasonable to hope that it could provide a significant fraction of the required funding.