3.
Aggressiveness and the diversity of wars
A common answer to the
question of what causes wars is “Human Aggression”. It seems obvious,
because that is what war is, people trying to hurt each other. However,
it all depends on what you mean by aggression and what sort of war
you are talking about. All wars involve aggression, in the sense
of acts directed towards destroying the enemy or his resources,
but that does not necessarily mean that the combatants are motivated
primarily by a desire to kill or destroy, that is, by aggressiveness.
In tribal and gang wars it often does, though the aggressiveness
may be the result of rituals, rhetoric, revenge, opportunism or
drugs, or to a combination of these. However, even in tribal and
gang wars generalizations are difficult. A study of gangs that resisted
the oppression of Apartheid in South Africa showed that their motivations
were diverse. While some individuals were motivated by their ideals,
others wanted to be seen as “warrior heroes”, others sought identification
with the group, and yet others were seeking a context to vent their
pathological aggressiveness. No doubt, for most of those involved,
motivations were mixed. In a sense, what united them was the opportunity
to use aggression as a tool to achieve their personal needs, but
only for some was aggressiveness a primary motivating factor.
Is
it Aggression?
Aggression: an act intended to harm another.
Aggressiveness: An individual’s propensity intentionally to harm another.
National acts of aggression are unlikely to depend on the aggressiveness
of individuals.
A diversity of motivations
is also found in wars between industrialised states, but the picture
is quite different. Whereas in tribal and gang wars the combatants
and perhaps their leaders are the only categories that matter, wars
between industrial states involve complex societies, consisting of
individuals playing many different roles. The politicians, the munitions
workers, the medics and many others as well as the combatants are
all part of the war machine. In World War 2 it was usual and appropriate
to speak of the “Home Front”.
In this context, it is helpful to think of war as an institution.
Doing so involves using an arid model to describe reality, but it
helps one understand how wars work. An institution can be thought
of as a complex of roles, the incumbents of each role having certain
rights and certain duties. In Britain, Parliament is an institution
with many different roles: Prime Minister, Cabinet Ministers, Members
of Parliament, Members of the Public to name but a few. Each of these
roles is associated with certain rights and certain duties. For instance,
most Cabinet Ministers have a duty to run a government department
– the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Defence, Home Office, and so
on. And each Cabinet Minister has the right to vote in the Cabinet.
Each Member of Parliament has a constituency, and has the duty to
keep in touch with his constituents and the right and duty to vote
in Parliamentary debates. Again, each member of the public has the
right and the duty to vote in elections.
Institutions
and roles
Institution Roles (each having rights and duties)
Marriage
Wife, Husband.
Parliament
Prime Minister, Ministers, Members of Parliament,
Voting Public.
War
Politicians, Generals, Combatants, Munition & Transport
Workers, Medics, Intelligence.
In the same way, war
can be seen as an institution with many constituent roles, each
associated with particular rights and duties. In the first place,
there are many combatant roles, soldier, sailor and airman; officer,
non-commissioned officer and other ranks; infantry, artilleryman,
pilot, navigator, gunner and so on. One duty common to all these
roles in nearly all circumstances is to obey orders, and in many
cases to give them. The roles are differentiated by the nature of
the orders they are given. Some combatants have the duty to kill
enemy soldiers. The rights of combatants are also varied, but most
incumbents of a combatant role feel entitled to equipment adequate
for the task they undertake, a certain level of pay, and so on.
They also feel entitled to a measure of respect for the risks they
run and the sacrifices they make in the common cause.
But the combatant roles are not the only ones in the institution
of war. Equally essential are the munition workers who supply the
weapons and other necessities for the combatants, and the transport
workers who convey the weapons to the front. A modern army can consume
vast quantities of munitions: an infantryman’s weapon may be capable
of firing hundreds of rounds a minute so that, in action, all the
ammunition he can carry can soon be used up. One must also not forget
the medics who care for the wounded, the generals who instruct the
combatants, the politicians who instruct the generals, and so on.
And, as stressed in chapter 1, in World War 2 virtually every citizen
in the European countries involved became part of the war effort.
The point here is that every incumbent of every role in the institution
of war does what he or she does in large measure because that is
his or her duty. The gunners fire their shells towards the enemy
positions because that is their duty, the navigator guides the pilot
of the bomber to the target because that is his duty, the infantry
advance towards the enemy because that is their duty. And the same
applies to the non-combatant roles. Munition workers keep the munition
factories going, often at considerable sacrifice to themselves,
because that is their duty. Merchant seamen face great dangers to
bring cargoes to their destination because that is their duty. The
Prime Minister guides the war because he sees that as his duty.
Duty can be blind – “Theirs but to do and die” – but to be sustained
it needs an objective. The morale that carries the combatant through
the horrors of war often depends on a belief in abstractions – the
honour of the regiment, loyalty to a buddy, freedom, religion and
especially religious fundamentalism, human rights, revenge. Each
of these can be seen as demanding aggression as a duty. In civil
wars, a similar principle applies: there may be many reasons why
individual guerillas or partisans fight, but duty to an ideal integrates,
justifies and motivates their actions. Aggression in war is generally
to be seen as a tool, rather than as due to a primary motivation
to harm or kill. Of course, combatants may be influenced also by
fear, fatigue, ambition, desire for status and many personal factors
as well as duty.
The duty imposed by the institution of war on the incumbents of
its roles may be reinforced by propaganda and training. In World
War 2 the BBC played the national anthems of the allies every evening:
a potent reminder of duty to King and Country for civilians and
military alike. Recruiting posters appeal to manliness, patriotic
duty, even to religion (“soldiers of Christ”). Military training
is such as to cause the potential combatant under training to bury
his individual identity in that of the group. In battle, abstract
duty to king and country may become insignificant and loyalty to
colleagues becomes paramount. Loyalty to colleagues, especially
potent in wartime, may lead to aggression to the enemy. Aggressiveness,
the desire to hurt or kill, may play a part but, as a primary motivation,
it plays a progressively smaller part along the continuum from gang
and tribal wars, through the civil wars like that in Rwanda and
the conflict resulting from the break-up of Jugoslavia, to major
international wars. In World War 2 aggressiveness may have played
a part for some individuals in some circumstances, but very rarely
was it a major issue for allied troops. Occasionally combatants
tried to kill their enemies simply because they were angry, terrified,
or even excited, and aggressiveness took over. In Vietnam, where
enemy and civilian were often difficult to distinguish, innocent
villagers were slaughtered at My Lai and on many other occasions,
but the killing was not condoned by those in command.
World
War 2 ... Bosnia ... Rwanda ... Tribal conflicts
----------------------------------------------------------------------->
Less ..................................................................
More
Individual Aggressiveness
In the
present context, we must focus not only on the motivation of combatants
in battle or preparing for battle, but also that of those who join
the forces. Many will have been in the Reserve, and already familiar
with military ways of thinking. Some will be new conscripts, and yet
others volunteers. The military is very effective at inculcating ideas
of duty and loyalty, and soon makes conscripts feel themselves to
be superior to those left behind in civvy street. In wartime, group
pressures become conspicuous. Uniforms are everywhere, and jeeps,
armoured cars and tanks are no longer confined to training areas.
Military aircraft are almost constantly overhead.
For volunteers, many motivations probably come into play. I have often
reflected on why I volunteered for aircrew. My father was a veteran
of World War 1, and my elder brother was already in the army: patriotism
was a real though not a major part of family life. Yet my father had
seen the horrors of Gallipoli and the slaughter at Gaza in World War
1, and was certainly not a militarist. He did not want me to volunteer,
but he felt it his duty not to try to stop me. I cannot say that duty
to King and Country was a major issue for me, but it provided a handy
rationalisation. Many of those in my school but a year or two older
than me were already involved: I have a vivid visual memory of a hand-written
notice that appeared on the school notice board: “A.B.W.Illius, killed
in action” with a date. This made me want to join myself: of course
I assumed I would be one of the survivors. If I am honest I must confess
that I was not uninfluenced by advertisments that appeared in the
papers: “Join the RAF and get a pair of silver wings and fly above
the clouds” or some such nonsense. And acceptance at 17 ¼ meant
entry into what was then seen as the most glamorous of the three services.
This does not mean that on reflection I feel the decision was wrong:
in retrospect, the use of force in World War 2 to prevent evil was
necessary. And further occasions in which this is true, or in which
force must be used to ensure peace, are certainly possible, but the
force must be under international (e.g., United Nations) control.
Does this admittedly superficial understanding of the motivations
of those who join and serve in the military help us to understand
the nature of war? In particular, if duty is such a major issue in
the behaviour of the incumbents of the many roles in the institution
of war, including the leaders, does this provide a clue for ways to
make war less likely? If we could somehow undermine the institution
of war, would not people then lack a major incentive and justification
for going to war? In democracies, politicians have immense power,
but even they could not take their country to war in the face of strong
public opposition. Institutions must be continually maintained and
supported: they do not merely exist. So in the next three chapters
I shall look at some of the factors that support the institution of
war.
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