6.
The Machinery of War
In the last chapter I discussed the importance of pervasive cultural
factors in supporting the institution of war. A more tangible issue
is what Dwight Eisenhower, formerly Allied Commander in Europe in
World War 2 and later President of the USA, called the “military-industrial
complex” and others have called the “military-industrial-scientific
complex”. Eisenhower argued that this complex had a pernicious economic,
political and spiritual influence on society and was self-perpetuating.
The complex can be seen as itself an institution, with three sub-institutions,
each of which has many sub-sub institutions. Its nature differs
greatly between countries: many countries have no arms industry
but rely on those of other countries, but everywhere the means for
obtaining weapons is one of the most important factors supporting,
and also required by, the institution of war. In a world consisting
of nation states, each state sees its primary duty to be protecting
the security of its citizens. This is almost invariability seen
as security from outside aggressors and, for that, arms and a military
willing to use them are regarded as necessary. (It is become increasingly
apparent that other aspects of security, such as the threat of the
consequences of global warming, are at least an equally important
aspect of security for many countries).
Security in the old-fashioned sense demands a military, and in those
countries that manufacture some or all of their own weapons, that
means a sophisticated industry. And because each country needs weapons
of high quality, that is weapons effective in killing people, the
industry needs scientists and engineers. The desire of the military
for ever more efficient weapons, the scientists and engineers who
develop new weapons and improve old ones, and the manufacturers
who make them, form a powerful force that drives competition in
military hardware between firms amd between states. As an outstanding
example, it was scientists who invented nuclear weapons and were
thus in part responsible for the Cold War. Once the USA had them,
the Soviet Union had to have them too, and each improvement by one
side led to imitation and counter improvements by the other. Of
course the competition in the number and nature of the nuclear weapons
possessed was insane. Their continued possession is equally so.
THE
WORLD’S TOP DEFENCE BUDGETS, 2007
USA
- $547 billion
United Kingdom - $59.7 billion
China - $58.3 billion
France - 53.6 billion
Japan - $43,6 billion
Germany - $36.9 billion
Russia - $35.4 billion
Saudi Arabia - $33.8 billion
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
The
military-industrial-scientific complex is extraordinarily stable. In the
first place, the three arms of the military-industrial-scientific complex
reinforce each other. The military wants the best weapons, and scientists
compete in producing them. Every improved weapon is seen as a necessary
acquisition by the military, and industries compete in producing them. Each
arms manufacturer tries to out-do the others. At a lower level the career
ambitions of those involved contribute to the stability of each institution.
The incumbents of each role in each sub-institution act as they do to achieve
the life-goals to which they aspire. Those in industry and in the military,
the scientists and engineers, seek recognition or promotion in their own
ways, and in doing so, they support and strengthen the institution to which
they belong. Furthermore, the whole system has strong governmental support.
Indeed it becomes intertwined with government as high-level civil servants
and retired military men are employed by arms companies.
Each sub-institution also has coercive rules or conventions that constrain
incumbents to conform: these are most conspicuous in the military, where
failure to carry out one’s duty can have dire consequences. Military regulations
and conventions are such as to legitimise the institution, with loyalty
and patriotism inculcated by propaganda and tradition. In industry, job
security and the desire for promotion and higher pay ensures that individuals
do their duty. And the hierarchical nature of the institutions ensures that
it is in the interests of leaders at every level to maintain their own sub-institution.
While the military and the scientists and perhaps even industrialists, can
sometimes see their roles as at least partly morally justifiable as peace-keeping
or defensive, it is difficult to see how this can be the case for the arms
dealers. In those countries that manufacture weapons, a large part of the
core expenses must be covered by arms sales to other countries. This is
encouraged by the governments of the countries that manufacture the weapons,
as it reduces the cost of the arms for them. That is bad enough, and the
arms trade makes possible wars in other countries without arms industries
that meet all their needs. Pakistan spends more on its military than on
health and education together. In some countries, like Israel, Colombia
and Turkey, the purchase of arms has had a disastrous effect on human security.
The UK’s declared policy is not to provide arms or military equipment to
countries where they would provoke or prolong armed conflict or aggravate
existing tensions, yet since 1997 they are reported to have done so to over
20 countries in that category.
In addition the armament industry conceals a network of operators who persuade
the representatives of other countries that they need the weapons, bribe
politicians or leaders to persuade their country to buy them, provide bogus
legitimization for their export and spurious end-user certificates. Even
worse are the arms traders who acquire weapons, often from preexisting conflicts
and sell them on without caring where they are going or to what use they
will be put. So far as small arms are concerned, the world is already awash
with weapons: arms traders make them available to terrorists, guerillas
and other non-state combatants. This is largely a result of the circulation
of weapons after wars are over, but also of countries like the USA that
have few restrictions on the possession of weapons in spite of their effect
on the incidence of homicide amongst civilians. The arms dealers see what
they are doing as purely financial transactions, and pay no regard to whether
the weapons go to legitimate police forces or terrorists, or to the killing
and suffering which may result, or even to the condition of what they sell.
The New York Times (27/03/08) has published details of how the US Government,
in arming Afghan forces to help in its war on the Taliban and Al Qaeda,
awarded a contract to a private firm operating out of an unmarked office
in Miami Beach. Much of the ammunition supplied was over 40 years old, in
decomposing packaging, largely coming from stockpiles of the old Communist
bloc, and proving to be sub-standard. Arms dealers excuse themselves by
claiming that how the weapons are used is no business of theirs.
In
2001 the UK sold a $28 million military air traffic control
system to Tanzania, although an adequate civilian control system,
recommended by the World Bank, was available at one-eighth of
the cost. At that time half of the population of Tanzania lacked
regular access to clean drinking water.
A country that produces
its own weapons soon finds that their arms interests become an near-essential
element in their economy. Arms industries can earn large sums from
third world countries who believe that the possession of weapons
brings them prestige. The armament industry also provides employment
for large numbers of workers. And once the industries are there,
it is surprisingly difficult to dismantle them. This has been well
exemplified by the 2007 decision of the UK government to acquire
a new generation of nuclear-armed submarines. The submarines are
incredibly expensive, the military leaders would mostly prefer the
money was spent in other ways, yet the Government has been unable
to specify a situation in which they might be used, and merely argues
that they must be continued for “political and industrial“ reasons.
Presumably that implies a belief that the possession of nuclear
weapons brings the country political prestige, which is clearly
no longer the case. Indeed, the UK could earn enormous international
respect if it were the first of the original nuclear states to abandon
them. And the industrial reasons presumably refer not just to the
number of individuals involved in the manufacture and maintenance
of the submarine fleet, but also to preservation of the skills necessary
for the manufacture of submarines, missiles and warheads, an argument
that quickly becomes circular.
Interestingly, there are economic arguments against arms sales.
It is more productive to invest in civilian than in military research
and development. Countries that export a lot of arms have had lower
growth rates in civilian exports, and money spent on military hardware
cannot be spent on raising the standard of living of the people.
The greater the military spending as a proportion of the Gross National
Product, the poorer the economic performance in advanced capitalist
countries. In the decades following World War 2, Germany and Japan,
with minimal military spending, showed markedly better economic
performance than the UK or USA. It would be in everybody’s interests
if arms sales were reduced, but one country cannot opt out of the
competition without disadvantaging itself relative to others. Yet
the money could be better used for the health, education and well-being
of the civilian population.
We have seen that the military-industrial-scientific complex is
self-perpetuating. Turning the manufacture of swords into that of
ploughshares is going to be a matter of extraordinary difficulty.
But there is hope. Efforts are being made to help Russian weapons
scientists to use their skills towards non-military ends. In the
UK Non-Governmental Organisations perform valiant work in discrediting
the arms trade, but economic and conservative forces make the going
tough. But this complex is both fed by and feeds the institution
of war. If we can undermine the institution of war, the military-industrial-scientific
complex must then wither.
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