Fighting terrorism: what does a military option mean?

Ejaz Haider

The Friday Times (Lahore), Sept 28-Oct 4; No 31

Ejaz Haider says a mired-down military campaign
could work in favour of the Taliban

The initial US outrage at the September 11 bombings has given way to a more nuanced approach. There seems to be a growing realisation in Washington that any campaign against terrorism will need to build on an international consensus and that enlisting the support of UN member states would require, among other things, a judicious blending of military and diplomatic options. This is commendable.

But what exactly does the military option mean in the fight against terrorism? The issue has a direct, and immediate, relevance for Pakistan and its security concerns since the military campaign for now is focussed on Afghanistan. The manner in which it may unfold could have a direct bearing on Pakistan.

Clearly, the fight against terrorism is not like going after a state, a well-defined adversary, and winning against it. Unconventional wars cannot be won through conventional means. Any campaign, therefore, must have two strands: short, focussed operations, using overt and covert means to take out elements that can be identified while accepting the fact that fighting terrorism is going to be a process and will need more than just a military response.

Care must be taken, however, to keep the process distinct from the notion of a drawn-out, mired-down military campaign against a target group or state. That would not only increase the political, diplomatic and military costs of an operation - for instance, by weakening the resolve of the coalition - but may also change the focus of the campaign with dire consequences on all sides.

The US military planners, preparing a strike against the Taliban in Afghanistan, have to remain focussed not only in operational terms but also in terms of what diplomatic, political and other options are available to the coalition in the event that the Taliban are indeed removed from power. For instance, since Pakistan is part of the coalition, in fact a major player, it must be comfortable with any post-Taliban option. This is not only because it has been the primary player in the area but also because it will remain so as part of any long-term solution. The US effort to engage it is an acknowledgement of that very fact.

Reports indicate that the US strategy may be evolving around the use of the Zahir Shah option in conjunction with ground support from the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. Islamabad, meanwhile, has indicated its opposition to engaging the Northern Alliance, which was the main opposition to the Taliban. Islamabad's response in terms of beginning a process of bargaining on the post-Taliban scenario is correct. It is not desirable that Pakistan should say aye to every strand in an evolving strategy that Washington proposes. What was important, and remains so, was Pakistan's acceptance of the broad principle that terrorism is unacceptable and must be fought. The question of how to go about it relates to complex issues of strategy and the process of identifying interests and every state has the right to do so keeping in mind its own national security concerns.

For Pakistan, therefore, the question of who gets into the driver's seat in Afghanistan after the presumed departure of the Taliban is important. But it needs to be said that the issue's significance relates not so much to the nature and hue of the dispensation per se but whether that arrangement would address Pakistan's strategic and security concerns. If this argument is accepted, then theoretically speaking Pakistan should be able to live with a government that remains alive to its sensitivities.

This essentially means that while Pakistan needs to secure its interests by retaining its leverage, it does not need to obstruct any arrangement just because of a Taliban hangover. In fact, one can argue - as indeed has been done on previous occasions - that the Taliban never showed themselves to be particularly sensitive to Pakistan's concerns and limitations. Their departure from the scene therefore may not be such a bad prospect for Islamabad, especially if any new arrangement can return Afghanistan to normalcy and remains cognizant of Pakistan's concerns, including, for instance, accepting the Durand Line as the international border between the two countries.

Moreover, Pakistan has a record of trying to create broad-based governments in Afghanistan, even though some of those arrangements would have worked better if certain internal cliques along with certain external actors had not tried to frustrate such efforts. Even the Northern Alliance looked at Pakistan for mediation until December 2000 when the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1333 and created permanent animus between the warring factions, besides a disincentive for the Alliance to negotiate with the Taliban.

The fact that there are not many options or fallback positions in Afghanistan should be clear to all sides. This is one of the reasons that both the regional as well as the international actors failed to develop viable Afghan policies. That problem will rear its head again after the presumed departure of the Taliban.

One way out of this problem could be the attempt to focus on the economic rather than the political angle. This would mean putting in place a broad-based government and then going straight to the task of rebuilding that country. A leading US scholar voiced this approach last year, stressing that reconstruction of the country and rehabilitation of the common Afghan people would require the expertise of the international community as well as Afghan ex-pats. The process would create spaces, economic as well as political, for the more talented Afghans to step into the void. While this set of proposals, the economic-first approach, was put forward keeping in mind the Taliban, the proposals are in fact likely to work better in any post-Taliban scenario, addressing also the issue of how to avoid engaging a militia wedded to abhorrent policies.

However, the approach will work only if the military campaign identifies its targets correctly and manages to achieve its objectives rather quickly. Thereafter, the US-led troops need to get out of the area.

This is where the US dilemma lies. The bombing option, a la Iraq and Kosovo, is not going to work because Afghanistan has no strategic assets, or even worthwhile infrastructure left to bomb. Using ground troops runs the risk of protracted war. Even employing Northern Alliance ground troops while providing them with logistic and close air support - which is one way of working around the problem while avoiding US military casualties - could lead to a drawn-out ground campaign.

The advantage, in this event, would rest with the Taliban. It could create problems for Pakistan along its Pukhtoon belt and even bring the coalition under pressure, especially if use of force is seen to result in civilian casualties. Besides, the security situation for the US/Coalition troops at the bases would likely deteriorate. There is also the problem of whether to go straight for the urban centres and then attempt to take control of the countryside or move from the countryside towards the urban centres. Both options have their downsides and at least on the first Washington could consult Moscow.

A better option, one that has been used before, would be to effect internal coups through change of loyalties even as the military operation kicks off from multiple directions. This is where Pakistani intelligence information and contacts could come in handy. The point really is that before the US moves in, it should be very clear about its objectives and how it wants to achieve them. The implied answer in this to the question of what constitutes a military option is that strategies will have to be worked out on a case-to-case basis even as some lessons can be drawn which can serve as broad guidelines.

Moreover, in the longer term it is necessary to see whether the international security architecture needs a rethink if a correlation, even if not direct causation, can be determined between the perceived or real imbalances in the current arrangements and the rise and sustenance of terrorism. This may not present itself as a priority at this stage, but is likely to become significant as events unfold.