A New Transatlantic Deal on Missile Defense After the Terrorist Attacks? by Therese Delpech

A New Transatlantic Deal on Missile Defense
After the Terrorist Attacks?

Thérèse Delpech*

Nine months after taking office, a catastrophic event has overshadowed all other preoccupations of the Bush administration except one: Homeland security. Not only will the preoccupation with defending America grow in the months ahead, it will without a doubt become the primary national objective.

With the terror attacks of September 11, strikes against American soil causing heavy civilian casualties are now a dreadful reality, not a mere possibility. The consequences of this for the debate on missile defense are not too difficult to predict. Although strategic defenses would have been of no help in preventing or countering the terrorist attacks which destroyed the World Trade Center, American public support for national missile defense (NMD) is likely to increase for two reasons: first, US soil is for the first time felt to be highly vulnerable; and second, the United States faces adversaries who appear merciless. Intelligence operations and airport security will certainly attract more funds and care, but so will missile defense, even if plans might develop more cooperative schemes than before the attacks.

European allies find themselves in a dramatically different situation as well. For the first time in the alliance's 52-year history, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization invoked, on the day after the attacks, the mutual defense clause of its founding treaty, where an attack on one member is considered an attack on all. Beyond demonstrating political solidarity, the declaration will have military implications, even if the allies are still unsure of what a counter-terrorism offensive might require. It will also change NATO's current position concerning potential "out of area" operations and impact the reluctance of most European nations to accept military interventions outside of Europe. Finally, it may lead European allies to recognize that they face "common threats," not only from "acts of terrorism and sabotage" as was already agreed in NATO's 1999 strategic concept, but also from ballistic missiles. This conclusion flows from a simple premise: the perpetrators of the 11 September attacks may not be limited to an international terrorist network, but may also involve a nation state. The threat over the coming years is likely to be reassessed with this possibility in mind. Such are the new realities of the transatlantic dialogue on missile defense.

What was the situation before the attacks? At the beginning of September, Washington might have believed that the Europeans had finally accepted the missile defense project they had so fiercely opposed earlier when President Clinton presented a much more limited plan. European complaints about decoupling and deterrence had receded, while the ballistic missile threat had been acknowledged. Moreover, since January 2001 some European leaders had even openly supported the initiative (in Spain, Italy, Hungary and Poland), while those opposed were more muted (in Germany and France), or even receptive (in the United Kingdom).¹

This evolution in European thinking was more limited, however, than the Bush administration tended to acknowledge. Granted, changes had taken place in Europe, and the intensity of hostile reactions had diminished. One might contend that European government officials had been more publicly willing to discuss missile threats and even that serious work had begun in some European capitals to counter ballistic missile proliferation. But opposition to both a unilateral withdrawal from the ABM treaty, and to any consideration of space-based missile defenses, still ran strong. Reservations about, or even outright hostility to, the upgrading of radars stationed in Europe and the construction of X-band radars had not diminished, whether in England, Greenland or Denmark. And the fear of nuclear buildups in Russia and China remained.

The Europeans had not been convinced by American justifications that they faced three new realities. First, the Bush administration had repeatedly declared that Washington would move forward with missile defense. If NMD was inevitable, why continue fighting against this new reality? Secondly, Washington was no longer committed to a single NMD architecture. Rather, parallel paths were being pursued, exploring air, sea, ground and space-based concepts that could intercept a wide range of ballistic missile threats in boost, mid-course, or terminal phase. Accordingly, there was great uncertainty about final NMD deployment plans. As George W. Bush himself recognized, "it is hard for any country to commit to vague notions."² Conversely, of course, "vague notions" are difficult for countries and governments to concretely oppose. Thirdly, in July 2001 Russia had agreed to hold talks with the US on both offensive and defensive forces. No European State would have dared to oppose a policy accepted by Moscow if a new "Framework" could eventually be adopted by the United States and Russia.

Nonetheless, significant changes in the dynamics of missile defense had occurred since January 2001, including the following:

After a few months of excessive rhetoric, the exercise of power had a sobering effect inside the Beltway. A desire to differentiate itself from the Clinton administration initially led the Bush administration to adopt an aggressive, unilateralist foreign policy which was challenged worldwide. A more restrained period followed. In Europe, there had been changes as well. The issue of missile defense was addressed in a more reflective and less emotional way. On both sides, the complexity of the issue in terms of threat assessment, diversity of systems, technological challenges, international law and strategic relations was clearer.
Consultations with allies had become a priority goal. A team led by Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz came to Brussels, Paris, London, and Berlin in May. Then President Bush himself came to Europe twice, in June and July. These occasions were all used to stress the importance of consultations with friends and allies. Genuine or not, this polite policy got results: Prime Minister Aznar, Prime Minister Berlusconi, and some East and Central European States came out in support of the US initiative, while Tony Blair said he recognized the need for innovative policies and would keep an open mind, waiting for details. France and Germany remained reserved, but welcomed consultations with Washington.
The Bush administration adopted a more global approach to defense. Missile defenses were presented not only as "Homeland Defense", but as a necessary condition for US military involvement abroad (global leadership being more dangerous at a time when WMD programs flourish) and as an additional US security guarantee to its allies. Given low accuracy, most missiles manufactured or being developed in Asia and the Middle East are cost effective only when armed with nuclear, chemical or biological warheads. Missile defenses to mitigate these threats would provide more security for America, its friends and allies, and for its deployed forces. At the same time, Washington was blurring the lines between theater and strategic missile defense, making it more difficult for the Europeans, who favor the development of TMD, to argue against strategic defenses.
The Bush administration also announced a more comprehensive missile defense testing program. The European view has always been that missile defense, if deployed, should at least work. A seeming "rush to deploy" having been one of the main European criticisms of Clinton's NMD in the year 2000, this apparent "shift to testing" on the part of the Bush administration was welcome. Several US technical studies had emphasized the need to adopt a more realistic testing program, incorporating more complex decoys and incoming missile trajectories. These technological challenges to missile defense appeared to be taken more seriously by the new administration, resulting in a more careful and comprehensive Pentagon testing program. The understanding in Europe is that fifteen to twenty years might still be needed before an effective missile defense system can be deployed.³ At the same time, the more ambitious US testing program was also seen as providing an excuse for a lack of transparency on a final missile defense architecture, in turn causing many Europeans to remain cautious and reserved about ultimate US intentions.
The US was also seen as adopting a more prudent diplomatic approach with Russia and China. The September terror attacks will probably only strengthen this policy. The US temptation to withdraw from the ABM treaty was initially strong, but since May 2001 President Bush seems to have been convinced that, in the absence of a genuine attempt to reach agreement with Moscow, such a withdrawal would seriously damage America's foreign policy and influence abroad, while domestic opposition would remain high, particularly in the US Senate.⁴ Thus the administration undertook a more cooperative approach.⁵ On the Russian side, there was movement as well. After having accepted, in June 2001, the possibility of amending the ABM Treaty in order to allow for tests planned by the US, President Putin agreed to hold talks on both offensive and defensive forces in July 2001. A new strategic framework with Russia was being explored, in the context of a broad political scheme that might even include the long-term possibility of Russia's integration within NATO. The US was also pursuing a less controversial relationship with China. During his trip to China in July, Secretary of State Colin Powell downplayed any mention of China as America's "new strategic competitor," apparently recognizing the uselessness of needlessly antagonizing Beijing. While China may be less important for Europe than is Russia, there is a growing awareness that in the 21st century, security will to a large extent be determined by events in Asia.
While this more prudent diplomacy was welcomed in Europe, Washington's overtures to Russia and China at times appeared to be going too far. Such is a natural assessment when the consequences of US missile defense decisions for Europe's security are evaluated. It remains the case that the Republicans' fierce commitment to missile defense is qualitatively different than that of President Clinton, whose lukewarm support for NMD was "forced" on him by the US Senate and by domestic political considerations. This decisiveness on the part of the Bush administration is compelling the Europeans to think about the specifically European implications of US policy. Thus far, they have reason to be anxious about some developments. While previously expressing a general fear about a renewed arms race, there is now a more concrete concern that Washington is quite ready to accept not only Russia's re-MIRVing of the Topol-M missiles, but also China's nuclear and missile build up, so as to neutralize the opposition of both countries to NMD. Even worse, Washington might be willing to accept the resumption of underground nuclear testing so that China could deploy new warheads.⁶

European views on NMD had been largely marginalized by early September. Following the terror attacks of September 11, the situation has changed dramatically.

Before September 11, Washington believed that the Europeans were either "won over" or less relevant. The importance of the Europeans in the NMD equation had sharply diminished once discussions with Russia had started. Although consultations with the allies continued to be on the agenda, their pace was slowing down and their substance was meagre. In short, the Europeans were seen as having little choice but to go along with US NMD preferences. Now that America needs wide-ranging support from its closest allies, more comprehensive talks on the strategic implications of September 11 will take place, including on missile defenses. In particular, the issue of defenses against cruise missiles, until now on the back burner, might also come to the forefront.
Prior to September, the Europeans had been unable to come up with a unified position on missile defense, which reinforced Washington's view of Europe as a place of many tongues. Intra-European consultations on missile defense had been minimal, even before the visits between Presidents Bush and Putin. As a result, European views were sometimes divergent and even confused.⁷ Now, the European Union, which immediately supported the United States after the attacks on New York and Washington, will need to seriously address global threat assessments and reassess accordingly their common defense policy. This does not mean the absence of differences with Washington, but such differences as appear will rest on firmer analytical ground.
For many years, US missile defense cooperation programs have been far more developed with its allies in the Middle East and East Asia than with the Europeans. The Pentagon's most advanced partnership on missile defenses, with Israel, involves the Arrow theater defense system and the Tactical High Energy Laser. Then there are US cooperative efforts with Japan, where the development of some missile defense technologies (ceramics for instance) is even more advanced than in the United States. Given priorities in Europe to remedy weaknesses in conventional forces and a reluctance to participate in TMD programs, US-European cooperative efforts on missile defense have lagged behind.⁸ This might now change as well.
The Europeans were often seen as fueling opposition by the Democrats to Bush administration policies. Having questioned the nature and the growth of the threat, the Europeans had unwittingly had an indirect influence on US domestic politics, since this criticism was then "recycled" by the Democrats at home.⁹ In fact, precisely for these domestic political reasons, European views had received an unprecedented level of interest in Washington. Now, however, facing a major global struggle against a determined adversary, American partisan politics has vanished, replaced by impressive bipartisan unity. The allies are expected to show a similar solidarity and such is their declared policy so far. Such solidarity is the only basis on which Europeans can influence the debate concerning the complex response needed to discourage future attacks.
Prior to September 11, European strategic concerns were perceived as being strikingly different from those of the US, with America increasingly interested in Asia, not in Europe, and Europeans worried more about their immediate periphery. Protecting the US mainland from missile attacks on the one hand, and protecting deployed forces and naval assets from short range missiles on the other, were priorities that did not easily match. Now, of course, the picture is dramatically altered, with a common wish to adopt a long term multifaceted strategy (involving police, intelligence, economic, diplomatic and military means) to eradicate the terrorist threat.

Thus, the Europeans have again become central to Washington's concern for meeting international security challenges, including, but not limited to, debates on missile defenses. Some of the major issues to be worked through in the months ahead including the following:

A new situation prevails concerning formulations of "common interests" and "common threats". The reluctance of the Europeans to acknowledge a "common threat" was posing a significant problem for Washington - in May 2001, for example, when Washington tried unsuccessfully to persuade its European counterparts that NATO should take urgent measures to deal with threats posed by ICBMs being developed by hostile countries - since this could have endangered future joint military operations. Now, it appears essential for the transatlantic alliance to move beyond rhetoric and to compare US and European threat assessments.¹⁰ If European and American views do differ on critical security issues, it is indispensable that these be clarified in times of crisis. The lack of a serious European effort at threat assessment, and a US tendency to shape its policies on 'capabilities-driven' as opposed to 'requirements-based' formula, have up to now been two significant difficulties in this respect. Progress needs to be made on both fronts.
Upgraded radar facilities in Europe (Fylingdales in the United Kingdom and Thule in Greenland) will be needed to protect US territory from missiles coming from the Middle East. This may now be seen as an even more important objective. The US has not yet sought formal permission from London and Copenhagen for these upgrades, but such will have to be granted. The planned X-band radars at Fylingdales and Thule would be difficult to replace with other options: radars on ships would cost a substantial amount of additional money while radars on the US northeast coast would not have the same level of performance. While there is little doubt that the UK, Denmark and Greenland will resist any decision that might severely damage the Alliance, particularly at a time of great risk, the choice will still be a difficult one domestically.
Proposals for "extending" missile defense to the Europeans will have to be based on joint US-European agreement. In the absence of any transatlantic agreement on the threat, however, such proposals will be difficult to implement. As of now, only two areas of cooperation show promise: TMD systems and early warning. Regarding TMD, limited European missile defenses for deployed forces and for point defense of critical assets appear increasingly necessary. The Bush administration hopes that TMD can eventually be expanded to form a layered shield to protect both the US and its allies, as well as deployed forces. But unless a dramatic European reassessment of the threat is adopted, defenses covering all European territory are not likely to be on the security agenda in the coming years, for strategic as well as financial reasons. As for early warning, European interest in reconnaissance and surveillance systems will surely grow, since no European country today can identify the origin of an adversarial missile launch against its territory. Whatever the future evolution of ballistic missile proliferation, significant work in this area would be prudent. Finally, if X-band radars and interceptors are deployed in Europe to protect American territory, Europe would then become part of the US system, generating new perceived vulnerabilities (such as preemptive strikes or debris from interceptors).¹¹ Similar threats were accepted during the Cold War (US nuclear bases in Europe) but might be subject to deeper challenges today, unless the Alliance's unity endures.
A new "Strategic Framework" with Russia may be more difficult to achieve than thought in Washington, as indicated by the current lack of progress on this front. How recent events will affect the talks is still hard to tell. In principle, the need for Russian cooperation on terrorism should encourage Washington to prolong the talks beyond the end of the year in order to avoid a useless confrontation with a major partner. Still, ultimate agreement could prove difficult. The US is seeking a new agreement meant to leave Cold War thinking behind. In its view, the major problem with arms control is how it locked the two major nuclear powers into the doctrine of mutually assured destruction. The new "Strategic Framework" with Russia would not regulate strategic nuclear weapons. It would be a loose and non-binding political statement, defining some broad post-Cold War principles and providing general orientations for offensive and defensive forces. No precise limitations would be adopted, leaving both sides free to structure their forces unilaterally, but the "framework" would allow a move "beyond" the ABM treaty. Such is not Moscow's official view, and the Kremlin, negotiating from a position of weakness and apparently looking for constraints more than flexibility, still appears far from signing on. The best Russian strategy is to gain time and keep the discussions alive as long as possible. According to the official view, unilateral cuts in nuclear missiles will not be acceptable to Russia without verification and without guarantees that warheads will not be used on other launch vehicles. Even if the voiding of the ABM Treaty were to be accepted, some sort of guarantee would be sought by Moscow, in a more or less formal way, on offensive and defensive forces. This is also what the Europeans would like to see. There is, however, another option, which would base an agreement on a rather ambiguous foundation. Deep down, the Russian military might well favor the possibility of withdrawing from the constraints of treaties in order to carry out a cost effective optimization of their nuclear arsenal. It goes without saying that a situation in which the United States, Russia and China would all be free to shape their nuclear forces would seriously worry the Europeans. It would, however, be a rather logical consequence for those who believe that the US and Russian arsenals should no longer be bound together by treaties, given that adversity between the two states has vanished.
In 2002, the United States might well face two important and controversial decisions in a year marked by important mid-term Congressional elections: to withdraw from the ABM treaty and to expand NATO further eastward (including some or all of the Baltic States). To this already difficult conjunction of events, a major and delicate campaign against international terrorism is now added, which could lead to significant choices. In a situation where Moscow's support appears essential, both NATO expansion and unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty might be subject to Russia's acquiescence.
Finally, Washington will probably rethink its ideological hostility to international law and multilateralism in light of present tragic events. Such a reassessment is indispensable if the United States wants to build a large coalition against international terrorism. The foreign policy approach of "à la carte multilateralism" might protect America's national freedom, but it endangers its international leadership and the international support it now needs. In six months, the Bush administration has shunned or threatened to leave a number of international treaties. Whatever the individual merits of the different texts, one of the most significant results of this policy has been to lower the American ability to shape international relations. This must change. The continued absence of an articulated foreign policy, more visible as time passes, would only attract increasing challenges. The time has come to reassess multilateral ties, not just bilateral ones, as with Russia and China. The United States needs Europe's political support to do this and it will get it wholeheartedly.

Some Conclusions

The implications of missile defense for Europe were until now far less dramatic than for Asia, where such defenses directly affect the main regional strategic problems (Taiwan, the Korean peninsula, China/Japan and China/US relations). But now, in the aftermath of September 11, Europe finds itself next to America on the front line of the fight against international terrorism (state-sponsored or not). This new reality leads to several conclusions:

Before the terrorist attacks, the Europeans appeared ready to accept a limited missile defense initiative, with a convincing testing program, fewer nuclear forces and a wider non-proliferation strategy. But the current US initiative is not limited; there are no plans to constrain nuclear reductions; and a wider non-proliferation strategy is lacking. Predictability and consistency would be encouraged by a more precise idea of the final architecture and by commitments to irreversible nuclear cuts, while the use of BMD as only one element of the US strategy to fight proliferation would be the clear preference by far. There is now a greater immediate need for a revised threat assessment, for nuclear reductions in the two major arsenals and for an enlightened foreign policy, than there is for large technological defense programs. Nonetheless, transatlantic cooperation on theater missile defenses, intelligence and surveillance is likely to grow, as will perhaps cooperation on defenses against cruise missiles.
In the short term, missile defense efforts are not likely to diminish US security commitments to Europe or undermine European nuclear deterrents.¹² But since the medium and long term objectives of missile defense are unclear, particularly under current circumstances, so too are its potential consequences. Any further destabilization of international relations will be risky and the main US objective, to deploy an anti-ICBM capability, is precisely what the European states up to now have wanted to avoid for strategic reasons. Now, however, it is likely that the Europeans' desire to maintain and even strengthen their traditional security ties with the US will decrease Europe's criticism. Policy differences might also be narrowed by a possible strategic evolution on Europe's periphery and a growing interest in protecting whatever military forces the Europeans might deploy abroad.
Over and above the problem of "underdeveloped" European threat assessments regarding ballistic missile proliferation, differences between the US and its allies may nonetheless persist. As Winston Churchill noted, "The problem with allies is that they sometimes develop opinions of their own." America appears increasingly technologically-minded at a time when its diplomatic performance in regions of tension (the Middle East for instance) is particularly weak. The Europeans would like to see exactly the opposite view emerge in Washington: a United States able to refashion international relations in such a way as to increase predictability and lessen the likelihood of major conflicts. Missile defense cannot be a substitute for a pro-active US foreign policy; the current need to drive a wedge between moderate and radical Arab countries to end the terrorist violence is a reminder of the centrality of US diplomacy. Both sides of the Atlantic will now need to put criticism aside in order to work together effectively. It is time for Europe to back its diplomacy with military force, which entails not only modernising its conventional forces but also providing a significant contribution to strategic intelligence and surveillance. In addition, more decisive policies will be needed in Europe to fight international terrorism, which currently benefits from lax security and excessive tolerance in a number of European countries. For the US, it is time for America to back its technological and military power with innovative and consistent diplomacy, particularly in regions of tension, like the Middle East and South Asia, which will be greatly affected by the on-going conflict against terrorism.
The missile defense debate has raised useful questions that Europe needs to consider carefully: Should a proper European threat assessment be undertaken? Should Europe develop its own early warning satellite system? Should cooperation not only with the United States but also with Russia be given a closer look?¹³ Should Europe broaden its strategic outlook and include Asian developments? The Europeans could acknowledge the relevance of these issues, while still considering US missile defense plans to be questionable in some respects (especially for those in Europe who believe the September 11 attacks justify their view of missile defense as little more than a modern Maginot Line). On the American side, it would be a mistake to downplay Europe's views. As Thomas Friedman rightly suggests: "The greatest danger today is not European anti-Americanism, but American anti-Americanism. The greatest danger is if America is no longer ready to play America - the benign superpower that pays a disproportionate price to maintain the system of which it is the biggest beneficiary." Recent events only reinforce this enlightened judgment at a time when Washington prepares for a long campaign to prevent terrorism from bringing chaos to the international system.

FOOTNOTES

In July 2001, during a joint press conference with George W. Bush, Prime Minister Tony Blair declared that solving the problem of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction "needs new and imaginative solutions" and "has got to encompass defensive systems and offensive systems", but his statement failed to express support for the US project. He was still awaiting "a specific proposal" from the Bush administration on missile defense; Press Conference at Halton House July 19, 2001. In August, in a briefing paper sent to members of the Labour party, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw called Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea "growing threats", giving a strong backing to the US President's missile defense shield project. This trend is likely to be strengthened by recent events.
Press Conference at Halton House, July 19, 2001.
An additional and significant advantage of the testing approach is Russia's tolerance: while in Washington, General Baluyevsky declared that "under the treaty, testing can be carried out, but only with notification." This interpretation of the treaty is generous. Experts normally consider a number of types of tests to be inconsistent with the treaty: testing either sea-based or mobile land-based interceptors against a long-range missile; testing the air-borne laser against a target missile in boost phase; and testing a space-based interceptor against any target ballistic missile.

In a poll conducted in July 2001, by the International Herald Tribune and the Pew Research Center, on European views, the responses to the question, "Do you approve or disapprove Bush's decision that the US should try to develop a missile defense system even if it means withdrawing from the ABM Treaty?" were as follows:

	Approve	Disapprove	Don't Know
Britain	20	66	14
Italy	24	65	11
Germany	10	83	7
France	14	75	11

The results in the US were also telling: Approve (39%), Disapprove (42%), and Don't know (19%).

Beyond seeking new limitations for offensive and defensive systems, Washington reportedly is offering plans to boost American investments in Russia, high tech sales, and a sharing of some missile defense technology, while Russia is expected to stop its exports of sensitive items to "states of concern". This last request will most likely be emphasized in the coming months.
See "Bush Won't Oppose China Missile Build up; Strategy Seeks Beijing's Acceptance Of a Proposed US Defense Shield", by David Sanger, International Herald Tribune, September 3, 2001. According to this article, Washington would have no objections to Chinese plans to build up its nuclear forces and might even discuss with Beijing the resumption of underground nuclear tests. A statement by the White House's Press Secretary on September 4 denied the information: "The United States will not seek to overcome China's opposition to missile defense by telling the Chinese that we do not object to an expansion of their nuclear ballistic missile force. Nor will we acquiesce in any resumption of nuclear testing by China. We are respecting the nuclear testing moratorium and all other nations should as well."
For instance, Europe's fierce support of deterrence appears inconsistent with the scepticism regarding nuclear weapons that is prevalent in many places in Europe. Although the fact that France and the United Kingdom place greater confidence in the deterrent value of nuclear weapons than does Washington is hardly surprising, this is not a common European view. In the missile defense debate, however, deterrence was widely thought to be a reliable answer to WMD threats in Europe. Concerning their effect on deterrence, it is fair to say that defenses do not automatically weaken deterrence since they can discourage ballistic missile attacks. Arguments related to coupling were equally confused in Europe. Contrary to what the Europeans first contended, defenses can strengthen coupling with the US if they facilitate joint military operations overseas. The main transatlantic divergence is related to robust strategic defenses. Limited defenses were recognized as useful tools by the allies in 1999: "The Alliance's defense posture against the risks and potential threats of the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery must continue to be improved", The Alliance Strategic Concept approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington DC on 24 April 1999, Para 56.
The MEADS (Medium Extended Air Defense System) project, conducted jointly with Germany and Italy, has been under development since 1994, but is not important either in Washington, Bonn or Rome. Technology sharing is limited and key data are not shared by the US with the two European partners, who consider the project as unequal; PAC-3 is equally sold with "black boxes". The US Navy is working with Germany, Italy and the Netherlands to look into sea-based theater missile defenses, but the project is only two years old. Finally, NATO's adoption of the Defense Capabilities Initiative in 1999 led to the NATO TMD Feasibility Study, which is meant to define the requirements of a limited missile defense aimed at protecting allied forces. The initiative is still in its initial stages with deployment scheduled to start in 2010.
The Senate majority leader, Tom Daschle, delivered a critique of President George W. Bush's foreign policy in August 2001 at the Woodrow Wilson International Center, where he emphasized the importance of US allies: "The administration seems to have forgotten an essential fact of today's global age. With the Cold War over, fear of a common enemy no longer keeps our allies by our side. Our allies will follow us only if we use our unparalleled strength and prosperity to advance common interests." The speech paralleled another address at the beginning of August to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, by the House minority leader, Richard Gephardt, who had just returned from a trip to Europe. According to experts, the financial debate in the Senate, starting in September will, in the worst scenario for the administration, still provide 6 to 7 additional billions to missile defense, allowing major objectives to be fulfilled. Recent bipartisan unity after the catastrophic attacks will lessen the divide without succeeding in eliminating the differences on the main point: the priorities of American defense policy.
Indeed, NATO has approved consultations that will include assessment of threats. The European view may evolve in the coming years if long-range capabilities emerge in the Mediterranean area. The outcome of the current campaign against terrorism and its effects in Moslem and Arab countries may be decisive in this respect.
A nuclear missile fired at the US from the Middle East and intercepted by the US might have catastrophic consequences in Europe, according to some experts. See "Intercepted missiles could fall on Europe, New Scientist August 1, 2001.
In the future, nuclear deterrence might increasingly be questioned in the United States as sophisticated conventional weaponry is developed. See "Nuclear Deterrence as a Legacy System, and What Follows" by G..A. Keyworth, paper presented at the Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, Monterey, California, June 2000; and Keith Payne, Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence, University of Kentucky Press, 2001. But deterrence might also remain the ultimate insurance of survival in case of existential threats.
The US-Russia agreement on Strategic Stability Cooperation Initiative reached on September 6, 2000 considered the possibility of cooperating on TMD systems and of involving third parties: "The United States and Russia are prepared to resume and then expand cooperation in the area of theater missile defense, and also considered the possibility of involving other states, with a view to strengthening global and regional stability." But cooperation between the United States <snip>

The author is Director of Planning, Atomic Energy Commission (CEA), Paris, France. Her paper was prepared for (and revised following) the Pugwash Workshop on Nuclear Stability and Missile Defenses, held in Como, Italy from 6-8 September, 2001.