This first in a planned series of Pugwash workshops on space weapons
was hosted by the Bancaixa fundacío Caixa Castelló at
the Centro Internacional Bancaja para la Paz y el Desarrollo in Castellón
de la Plana, Spain. Particular thanks are due to Prof. Federico García-Moliner
and the Spanish Pugwash Group for their assistance and hospitality
in organizing the meeting.
Thirty one people
(including a large number of International Student/Young Pugwash participants)
from 17 countries attended the workshop, by invitation and in their
personal capacity. This report of the workshop is the sole responsibility
of the rapporteurs, and while it reflects the broad array of issues
discussed, does not necessarily represent consensus on all points.
Abstract
The workshop focused on
understanding the current legal, technical and geopolitical issues
surrounding the prospects of space weaponisation. The motivation of
these discussions is to ensure space security: that is, to enable
space to have secure and equitable access and use, and for space to
be secure from threats. As the meeting progressed, the participants
discussed policy initiatives that could increase the visibility and
international debate on space weapons. The meeting closed with discussion
of ways forward toward the goal of maintaining the non-weaponisation
of space, including increasing the knowledge base on the topic, and
greater international collaboration on the issue, including the potential
role of Pugwash in that process.
A window of opportunity
The workshop was held
during a period when there is a near-term prospect of deploying weapons
in space for the very first time. As part of its National Missile
Defense (NMD) program, the US administration has stated its intent
to launch a space-based interceptor test bed by 2008. Participants
were concerned that this test bed would set a dangerous precedent
and open the door to further testing, development and deployment of
space weapons. This potential link between missile defense and space
weapons - with NMD serving as the justification for space weapons
deployment -- was raised repeatedly during the workshop.
The United States and
former Soviet Union spent many billions of dollars seeking to develop
space weapons over the past four decades. Other nations with access
to space, including India and China, have the capability to deploy
limited but effective space weapons as well. Multiple potential systems
were discussed, including space-deployed kinetic weapons, earth- and
space-based anti-satellite (ASAT) systems, and Earth- and space-deployed
laser weapons. From the discussions, it was clear that certain types
of basic space weapons could be deployed in the near-term.
Legal regimes governing
space were discussed, including the Outer Space Treaty, the ABM treaty,
and the Treaty on Conventional Weapons in Europe. With the UN Conference
of Disarmament deadlocked on the issue of space weapons, the participants
felt an urgency to approach this issue from many different angles
and involving many different constituencies, including industry, NGOs,
the scientific community, the military, the general public and governments.
Creative approaches to the legal issues involving space activities
will be called for, and are discussed below.
Many participants remarked
on the unique situation that space weaponisation presents to organizations
like Pugwash. Unlike previous nuclear arms control efforts, the challenge
(and opportunity) of space weapons is to prevent them from being deployed
in the first place and to maintain the non-weaponised status of space.
This is important both because of the short term ramifications of
weaponising space, and because once such weapons are deployed, it
will be difficult if not impossible to return space to a zone free
of weapons deployment. The uniqueness of this situation (the only
comparable analogue is the Antarctic) calls for considered dialogue
among all the parties utilizing space on the full ramifications of
deploying space weapons.
US Congress and space weapons
In order to allow sufficient
time for fully analyzing the ramifications of deploying space weapons,
a critical task will be to slow the funding for space weapons programs.
Citing the adage, "follow the money," participants noted
the importance of US Congressional oversight of budgets relating to
space weapons development, particularly as it relates to Bush administration
plans for deploying national missile defense.
While NMD plans project
the deployment of a space interceptor test bed by 2008, current funding
for this program is relatively small. Congress can strongly influence
the pace at which space weapons are developed over the next several
years. Workshop participants felt that informed dialogue with members
of Congress and their staff will be critical for developing a more
informed knowledge base on the issue and for coordinating efforts
to fully evaluate the military, political and economic ramifications
of deploying space weapons.
Building a knowledge base and consensus-building
Increasing the knowledge
base on how space weapons could impact current and future uses of
space was seen as an immediate next step by workshop participants.
Recent and forthcoming analyses from the RAND Corporation, the Stimson
Center, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Monterey Institute/
Mountbatten Centre for International Studies will need to be augmented
by additional informed analysis covering a broad array of scientific,
economic, military, commercial, and governmental perspectives from
the entire international community which has become so dependent on
space activities.
While the technical feasibility
of kinetic energy and other types of space weapons is very likely
within the reach of many space-faring nations, a more important question
is their utility when compared with earth or air-based alternatives.
As an example, space-based kinetic weapons would take longer to destroy
their intended earth-based targets than would strategically-located
earth-based missile alternatives, with no significant additional energy
or destructive power.
Moreover, there are divisions
within the US military on issues such as weapons utility and cost-effectiveness,
particularly as counter-measures against space weapons will be cheaper
and technically simpler than the weapons they are designed to destroy.
Detailed analyses of several different types of space weapons and
counter-measures are available in the workshop papers.
Finally, however, the
primary argument against the deployment of space weapons remains that
of their potential for igniting a destabilizing arms race in space.
To that end, several participants proposed that space-capable nations
adopt a 'no first deployment' pledge regarding space weapons.
In the discussion of how
to move the debate forward, particularly with national governments,
it was noted that a key early step in the Ottawa Process (the campaign
to ban landmines) was one of NGOs doing much of the research and information
gathering. In that vein, participants discussed ways compiling and
sharing documents, for use by both the expert community and the general
public, through websites, listservs, and other means.
Once this information
is compiled, and a mechanism is in place to collect new information,
the creation of documents needs to be aimed at specific target audiences
to raise awareness, promote dialogue and improve the knowledge base.
Various documents and analyses will not only have differing levels
of technical arguments, but will cover different arguments and motivations
important to the debate over weaponising space. Especially important
will be studies on the critical importance of civilian space assets
to many countries and regions, especially in the developing world,
in the areas of resource management, education, telecommunication,
agricultural production, climate/disaster forecasting, etc., and how
these could be affected by the destabilizing consequences of deploying
space weapons.
Legal options
Workshop participants
engaged in extended discussion of potential legal avenues for a treaty
covering all non-nuclear space weapons (the Outer Space Treaty of
1967 already prohibits any space deployment of weapons of mass destruction,
and also prohibits all other weapons from being deployed on the Moon
and other celestial bodies). Intermediate steps were discussed which
could build confidence between nations while creating the context
for a common viewpoint on space weapons.
One topic of vigorous
debate was whether the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) was a potential
venue for such a treaty. The US has blocked discussion of such an
agreement for several years, and has yet to indicate any public willingness
to change its position. Many workshop participants felt that the CD
would not be helpful in this context, while others felt attempts should
be made. Overall, the following options were raised:
i. General Assembly
Resolution: One avenue through which to gain international support
and momentum - while not a formal treaty - would be the UN General
Assembly. A non-binding UNGA resolution endorsing a non-interference
policy with all satellites currently in space could logically be followed
later by a UNGA resolution prohibiting ASAT testing.
ii. Moratorium:
An additional legal option to explore would be national moratoria
on space weapons. Under such a moratorium, states would pledge their
intent not to be the first to deploy space weapons or to further test
destructive anti-satellite weapons. Space-faring nations initiating
this pledge could invite other states to join. Such states could then
decide to formalize this intent into a treaty in the future.
iii. Debris Management:
Space debris management is a real concern to current and future space
activities, and could be a means of encouraging cooperation on legal
space issues with the US, which already provides substantial leadership
in this area.
iv. Protocol to the
Outer Space Treaty: A protocol to the OST explicitly banning space
weapons would be preferable to a treaty amendment, which would risk
opening a 'Pandora's box' of other treaty issues. It was also recommended
that Pugwash and other NGOs seek to increase the number of signatories
to the OST in order to universalize OST adherence. Mention was made
as well of seeking to build on obligations not to interfere with national
technical means of verification, as contained in agreements such as
the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, of which the US and
29 other countries are signatories.
v. Space Weapons Treaty:
Most difficult in the current climate would be the drafting and adoption
of a stand-alone treaty banning the development and deployment of
space weapons. Major stumbling blocks identified were those of crafting
effective compliance mechanisms and being able to update the Treaty
in light of changing technologies. While the positive experience of
the Chemical Weapons Convention was mentioned in both regards, participants
acknowledged the difficulties involved, especially in terms of dual-use
weapons systems (e.g., missile defense and anti-satellite).
It was emphasized that
legal steps to ban space weapons should not be taken without the direct
involvement of particularly those nations, such as the US, able to
deploy such weapons. Unlike the Ottawa landmines treaty, which served
a useful purpose even though rejected by the US, any space weapons
treaty not drafted with direct US involvement will be useless.
Prior to such efforts,
it is essential now to increase international appreciation of the
concept of space security that derives from the cooperative uses of
space and not the deployment of space weapons. Other states must take
the initiative and bring the US into discussions on these issues.
As noted above, space debris is one avenue to instigate these discussions,
as the United States has taken leadership in this area. Given that
many industry players are also defense providers, the issue of space
debris is a direct way to involve them as well. These discussions
could evolve into other shared concerns in space, such as satellite
crowding and collisions, and might lead to the establishment of more
regulation beyond 'rules of the road.' Efforts to identify shared
concerns will be necessary if industry and the military are to be
effectively brought into the debate on space weapons.
A timely, consolidated effort
The international community
must be ready if and when the US becomes open for a discussion of
a treaty on space weapons. This must start with a dissemination of
appropriate information globally to make the international community
well informed. Bringing together interested parties was thought to
be one potential early role for Pugwash.
The international community
also needs to be more vocal on this issue, but they must take a practical
approach to be heard. It was thought particularly important for the
European Union to develop its own position on this important subject.
While there is some interest about space weaponisation within the
European Parliament, the European Commission has yet to state its
position. The current EU Green Paper on "European space policy",
now undergoing public consultation prior to its finalization before
the end of 2003, represents an ideal opportunity to address this gap.
The international scientific
community also has a key role to play in exploring the effects of
space weapons on space science, exploration, and research. Finally,
the general public could be an important resource for the overall
process at the appropriate time. As the experience of the Ottawa Process
demonstrated, a well-known international spokesperson on the dangers
of space weaponisation could help galvanize public opinion and inspire
grassroots action on these issues.
The role of Pugwash
There was a general consensus
that Pugwash can play a valuable role in the process leading to guaranteeing
'space security', in particular in improving the knowledge base through
timely, well researched reports given to the right authorities, and
through meetings and discussions engaging policy makers.
A draft strategy for the
steps that Pugwash and the wider community might take on this issue
was drafted at the workshop and is attached as an appendix. There
is much work to be done in the next year, starting with expanding
and disseminating timely information about the current status of space
weapons development and the implications of space weapons deployment
on current and future international uses of space. National governments,
in addition to the US Congress and administration, need to be involved
in debating the pros and cons of space weaponisation.
As for Pugwash, there
will be a working group on the Weaponisation of Space and Missile
Defense during the 53rd Pugwash Conference in Halifax, Nova Scotia
in July 2003, with further plans for workshops and perhaps the convening
of an international space summit on how the prospect of space weapons
would unalterably change the character of the space environment for
the global community.
Appendix
A: The Way Forward for Pugwash
1. Engage the US Congress
in dialogue to reduce spending on space weapons development prior
to a critical debate.
2. Build analytic knowledge
base on space weapons
· Utility of
space weapons
· ASAT-DSAT and countermeasures
· Effect of space weapons, pro and con, on US conventional
military missions
· Effect of space weapons on civil uses of space (debris
management, orbital slots, liability, etc.)
3. Increase attention
of public/media/policymakers
· Use existing
reports and increase their visibility
· Describe nature of problem and possible solutions for assuring
space security for all space users
· High-profile spokesperson for public attention
· International space security summit
4. Target Audiences
· US Military,
Congress and the Bush administration
· International space/scientific community
· National Governments and the European Union
· NGOs
· Space Providers (telecom industry)
· Space consumers (those dependent on space for agriculture,
resource management, education, environmental protection, mapping,
GPS)
· General Public
A timeline for political/legal
initiatives
· On-going work
on CBMs (debris management, compliance issues, etc.)
· Track II initiatives
· Increase number of states parties (universal adherence)
to the OST
· UNGA resolution on non-interference with space assets,
building on provisions currently in the CFE Treaty
· UNGA Resolution prohibiting ASAT testing and deployment
· Negotiate OST protocol prohibiting space weapons
