This article has been written by International Student Young Pugwash
(ISYP) in collaboration with the Space Generation Advisory Council
in support of the UN Programme on Space Applications (SGAC). This
follows on from our paper "Militarisation of Space: A Youth Perspective"
presented at the 52nd Pugwash Conference in La Jolla,
which gave a summary of the reasons against space weapons. In that
paper we included recommendations for ways forward, both for the international
community at large, and Pugwash in particular.
Here we present a paper
which aims to address one of our recommendations in that paper to
"encourage high-level debate" on this issue. To do this,
we have been working together with a US Air Force General to develop
a critical analysis of both the pros and cons of space weapons, for
a nation considering deployment. We hope to publish this in a high-level
political journal. By developing a balanced debate, we hope to set
a framework for the discussion in which all sides can take part.
We would sincerely
appreciate feedback on this project from participants at this Pugwash
Workshop.
. .
.
Adapted
into an article Pugwash Newsletter: http://www.pugwash.org/publication/nl/nlv39n2/newsletter-dec2002.pdf
(p. 102)
Space
Weapons: The Urgent Debate
William
Marshall (UK), George Whitesides (USA), Robert
Schingler (USA), Andre Nilsen (Norway)*
Monday 13th May, 2003
The Urgent Debate
There is an urgent need
for a discussion on the future military uses of space for several
reasons. First, the technology for developing and deploying weapons
systems in space is already available in major space faring nations.
Second, conflicts are beginning to arise over space-based assets,
both for economic and security reasons. Thirdly, there are few legal
restrictions on the use of space weapons. Finally, a number of political
and military leaders in some major powers have expressed their support
for the deployment of space weapons. Deployment could therefore be
imminent. Moreover, the stakes are high since once deployed, it may
be impossible to eliminate space weapons, even if they prove unsuitable
or destabilizing. However, given that deployment has not yet taken
place, we have a unique opportunity for thinking through these issues
now.
The challenge is to find
a way of managing space that avoids the 'tragedy of the commons',
whereby the pursuit of individual rationality by every state leads
to a collectively worse outcome for everyone. The costs and gains
of space weapons must therefore be addressed in a comprehensive and
balanced debate. In synopsis, short term advantages from acquiring
offensive space weapons must be weighed against the medium and long
term consequences of deployment, most importantly the risk of a destabilizing
arms race in space.
This paper, is the result
of collaboration among a military officer, space professionals, and
a political scientist, seeks to put the question of space weapons
firmly on the security agenda of the 21st century. To that end, we
offer a framework of analysis that places the issue of space weapons
in appropriate technological, economic, political, and strategic contexts.
Diminishing Constraints,
Growing Incentives
A decision to deploy space
weapons would not face many constraints, whether technological or
legal. After years of development, the technology required for space
weapons is now feasible, albeit still expensive. Both the US and Russia
have the capability to deploy advanced space weapons in a matter of
years. Several other nations have the capability to launch lower technology
space weapons in a similar timeframe. The Reagan and Bush I administrations
funded, on the order of ten billion dollars, a variety of initiatives
which laid the groundwork for contemporary space weapons systems.
As a result, the development and deployment of space weapons, is no
longer a technological challenge, but a question of political will.
The legal framework governing
space weapons is minimal. The only explicit rules regarding space
weapons are those prohibiting conventional weapons on celestial bodies
and weapons of mass destruction everywhere in space. Conventional
space weapons are therefore legal as long as they are based on a satellite
rather than the moon. The legal framework has been further weakened
by the abolition of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Law is therefore
no obstacle to deployment.
At the same time as the
technological and legal constraints on deployment are abating, the
incentives are mounting. The critical role that space has become to
play, in both civil and military activity, has created the potential
for future conflict. The US military is now dependent on space assets
to wage its preferred style of war. Perhaps even more important, the
economic benefits of the Global Positioning System (GPS) and other
space based technologies gives the US and other countries a substantial
interest in maintaining, protecting, and augmenting those assets.
Discord between peer competitors, such as the one surrounding Galileo,
the European satellite navigation system, are seen by some as early
seeds of greater conflict. Other conflicts have arisen due to differences
of opinion over the distribution of reconnaissance data and in controversies
over the use of radio spectra. The effect of all these developments
is that space policy is being increasingly securitized and framed
as a core national interest.
Against the backdrop of
waning constraints and rising incentives, it is no surprise that political
will is emerging. There have recently been prominent voices within
the US military (US Space Command Master Plan 2001 and Air Force 2025)
and political (Commission to Assess United States National Security
Space Management and Operations, Rumsfeld, 2000) leadership in favor
of considering the acquisition of space weapons. In the US military
document "Vision 2020", for instance, it is argued that
the United States should seek capacity to operate freely within all
technological domains of land, sea, air, space, and information. A
decision on deployment could therefore be impending.
Not Business as Usual
The decision on whether
to acquire space weapons is not like any other strategic choice. One
reason is the asymmetrical nature of the available options before
and after deployment. Historically, the introduction of new weapons
systems is generally an irreversible path-dependent process. Put another
way, it is much easier not to deploy a new system than it is to withdraw
it following deployment, even if they prove unsuitable or destabilizing.
Nations will indefinitely be able to choose to deploy space weapons,
but once deployed it will be difficult ever to return to a situation
of no such weapons. This irreversibility of deployment suggests that
substantial consideration be put into debate.
The relative peace characterizing
the current international situation is a further reason why the decision
on space weapons is different. Whereas the development of many new
weapon systems, including weapons of mass destruction and many advances
in aircraft and ships, have occurred during times of war, currently
we have more breathing space to think before we act. This is a unique
opportunity to consider the costs and benefits of space weapons, including
those of the long term, prior to making a decision on their deployment.
The long term consequences are far reaching and impinge fundamentally
on humanity's prospects for a peaceful future.
All in all, given the
nascent political will, a decision that could have irreversible and
substantial long-term ramifications can happen within a few years
timescale. In the meantime, effective regulation or prohibition of
space weapons could be a rapidly disappearing opportunity. As such,
the issue of space weapons deserves immediate and careful attention.
A Brief History of Space and Defence
The military use of space
is not new. Access and utilization of space is of national interest.
In addition to the economic potential of commercial exploitation of
space and celestial bodies, space is the ultimate military high ground.
Historically, space-based military assets have been largely passive,
concentrating on activities such as reconnaissance, communications,
and navigation. Indeed, expenditure on space by the military has consistently
outweighed civil spending. Even some scientific exploration missions
have arguably been dominated by military objectives, such as the pursuit
of technological supremacy during the Cold War which led both to the
first satellite (Sputnik, 1957) and human (Yuri Gagarin, 1961) in
space and culminated in the manned lunar program (Apollo, 1963-72).
To date, no offensive
space-based weapon has been deployed. The closest it came was during
the parallel anti-satellite (ASAT) programs developed by the US and
Soviet Union that were begun in the sixties. These programs primarily
developed a variety of 'kinetic kill' vehicles, though initiatives
for ground-based laser systems were also begun. Specifically these
included initiatives such as nuclear pumped X-ray lasers, space-based
optical lasers, radiation belt weapons, ground based reflected laser
systems, and space based interceptors. While many of these initiatives
were not carried through, the technology base they developed enable
the near term deployment of space weapons. In addition, many of the
main components of space weapon systems are already used in the civilian
space sector. Telemetry, tracking, and control systems for a remote
sensing communications satellite, for example, are very similar to
analogous systems within a space weapon. Testing of such systems was
periodically prohibited or left unfunded by the US Congress during
the eighties and nineties. The US military also expressed its disinclination
to use kinetic kill ASATs that tend to create large clouds of space
debris.
Meanwhile, the broader
international community has repeatedly stated its support for space
to be used for peaceful purposes only. This position was codified
early in the space age by the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST), through
which 96 states, including the US and former USSR, recognized the
common interest of all humankind in the exploration and use of outer
space for "peaceful purposes". The OST explicitly prohibits
treaty states from placing weapons of mass destruction in space or
weapons of any kind on celestial bodies. In 2001, the UN General Assembly
approved by a 156-0 vote the basis for a treaty establishing a permanent
prohibition on space-based weapons (Resolution 56/535). Recently,
a joint working paper on preventing space weapons was introduced by
China and Russia in the UN Conference on Disarmament (UNCD).
Against this background
of inactivity and caution, new elements have in recent years begun
advocating the consideration of new space weapons with strike capabilities.
In April, 2003, for example, the US Congressman representing NASA's
Florida base stated his support for weapons deployed in space, "We
must adopt a doctrine that states that we as a nation will vigorously
pursue the ability to project power to, through and from space against
any aggressor." He also noted, "It would be inappropriate
to deny ourselves this advantage simply because of romantic notions
of some that space is some type of sacred place."
Perhaps more significantly,
elements of the US military have advocated a strategy to include the
deployment of space weapons within a matter of a few years. However,
this position has not yet been adopted at the highest level. In fact,
many military officers still regard space-based weapons with a dubious
eye. The military focus on space, however, has been reaffirmed repeatedly
in key documents such as Air Force Vision 2020 and other related strategic
planning documents.
Definitions
There is no strict definition
of a space weapon. Whether to include both weapons and targets located
in space, direct and indirect applications of force, and temporary
impairment as well as permanent destruction all shape the debate.
Below, following the theme of this paper, we characterize the generally
agreed areas as well as the grey areas.
|
Space Weapons
(Generally or historically
prohibited)
|
Intermediate Systems
|
Military activities not involving
Space Weapons
(Generally allowed)
|
|
[Key Words: Degrade, Destroy]
§
WMD
or radiological weapons
§
Space-based directed energy weapons
§
Space-based kinetic weapons
§
Anti-satellite satellites (ASAT) destruction
or degrade other satellites
|
[Key words: Deny, Disrupt]
§
ASAT
Deny access to satellite or ground system, passive measures,
encryption
§
ASAT Temporality interfere with satellite or
ground system (cyber attacks etc.) operation
§
ASAT Disrupt operations of space or ground segments
permanently
§
Ground based directed (at space) weapons
§
Nuclear weapons for NEO defense
§
Ground based jamming
§
Suborbital intercept missiles for missile defense
|
§
Communication
§
Navigation
§
Reconnaissance (space based or high altitude
platforms)
§
Space monitoring networks
§
Early warning systems ICBM with suborbital trajectory
§
Suborbital delivery of troops or equipment
|
|
Table
2: The Spectrum of Military Space Activity: What is a Space
Weapon?
|
Military space activities
are grouped into three categories highlighted in the chart above.
Activities in the white region are military applications of space
that do not entail force application from assets stationed in space.
The black region comprises technologies that fit the traditional definition
of space weapon. The weapons in the interstitial grey area are more
difficult to categorically classify because they span a range of technologies.
These technologies may blur the line between space-based and space-transiting
weapons; for example, one strategy that has been considered is the
use of temporarily-emplaced weapons that orbit for days to weeks.
A representative example
of this conception can be taken from a 1998 working group of the United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), which states:
"A space weapon is a device stationed in outer space (including
the moon and other celestial bodies) or in the Earth's environment
designed to destroy, damage or otherwise interfere with the normal
functioning of an object or being in outer space, or being in the
earth environment."
Not surprisingly, white
activities are readily employed in today's world by many nations and
some of the grey capabilities are maintained by a significant number
of nations. Systems within the black area are not fully developed
or deployed, but have been the subject of intense national and international
discussion due to their potential to create instability in international
affairs.
Though debatably outside
the traditional definition of space weapons, it may be the technologies
within the grey area that deserve the most immediate attention. They
are the most likely to be deployed in the short term, and could certainly
exert the effects of other traditional space-based weapons. A clear
line needs to be agreed upon between states.
The Economic and Security
Context
The issue of space weapons
must be assessed in light of contemporary economic and security developments
in space technology. Arguments over commercial and security, non-armament
uses of space may have important effects on the issue of space weapons.
Galileo, the European Union's embryonic satellite navigation system,
to take one example, is in direct competition with the American GPS.
GPS data is used worldwide for anything from cellular telephones to
Automated Teller Machines (ATMs). With the United States suffering
from trade (and now budget) deficits on the order of hundreds of billions
annually, the tens of billions generated by GPS in US national income
is a welcome contribution that the US Government would like to maintain
in the future. Not only does the EU aim to capture a share of the
GPS market, the Galileo system would also make the EU independent
from US military data for modern warfare. The twin drivers of economics
and security create a context of potential friction even between allies.
Another important example
of such friction comes in the area of remote sensing surveillance
satellites, and the specific issue of shutter control. The continuing
proliferation of high-resolution imaging capability has reduced the
superpowers' exclusive hold on this strategic resource. In general,
this development has been positive and has increased the stability
of the global system. However, during conflict, these capabilities
may become a source of tension. One early suggestion of this came
during the 1991 Gulf War, when SPOT, the French satellite imagery
company, began receiving increasingly stern warnings from the US military
about its data products over the Middle East.
Multiple Outcomes
It is important to understand
the strategic dimensions of the decision on whether to deploy space
weapons or not. The choice should not be reduced to a question of
whether the required technological capacity, financial wealth, and
political will is available since outcomes emerge out of the strategic
interaction between all the relevant actors. Whether a dominant state
will enhance its comparative advantage or gain national security by
acquiring a new weapons system therefore depends on how the other
states are responding.
| |
Other states do not deploy
space weapons
|
Other states deploy space
weapons
|
|
Dominant state does not deploy
space weapons
|
Outcome 1:
Likely, Stable
|
Outcome 2:
Less likely, Unstable
|
|
Dominant state deploys space
weapons
|
Outcome 3:
Less likely, Unstable
|
Outcome 4:
Likely, Uncertain outcome:
Arms race OR Stable
|
Table 1:
Strategic Analysis: Deployment Probabilities and Outcomes
As illustrated in table 1, there are multiple possible outcomes in
such a strategic situation. The worst-case scenario after the deployment
of space weapons would be an arms race in space. Other possible outcomes
include a competitive but stable system, or a unipolar stable system
akin to the current US dominance of the high seas.
Regardless of its power,
a dominant actor cannot determine the outcome unilaterally. On the
contrary, without due regard to the likely responses of other states,
the rational choice of a dominant actor to make a first move could
result in a collective outcome that makes everybody worse off, including
the dominant actor. Any potential dominant actor should therefore
carefully consider the probable response of other states to the placement
of its weapons in space, and the effect these responses will have
on global security.
In addition to the risk
of starting an arms race with space weapons, states should also consider
the likelihood of spill-over effects into other strategic areas. The
impact on nuclear strategy is particularly important to assess. Space
weapons, along with information warfare, could eventually replace
nuclear deterrence as a central strategic policy. This strategy could
provide the post-nuclear deterrence paradigm for the United States
and other nations. Such a shift could be positive or negative on overall
security: On the one hand, it could reduce the overall reliance on
nuclear weapons by the dominant state - a positive effect. On the
other hand, due to an increased military gap between the dominant
state and other nations, the move could also lead to an increased
likelihood of use of nuclear weapons by countries as a last resort
and decrease the threshold for using a nuclear weapon in a conflict.
Many Players
There is no shortage of
potential actors that might respond to a first move by a state. While
the US and Russia lead in capacity, the European Union, China and
India all have the requisite technical capabilities for at least certain
space weapons systems.
Given a first move by
another state, the US is likely to act quickly to ensure dominance
in this domain. The reaction of Russia, who's military strength still
relies heavily on its nuclear weapons capability, to such a threat
would also act to counter the initial deployment of space weapons
with those of its own since any attempt to move from the nuclear deterrence
paradigm would reduce its power.
The European Union may
move to competitive behavior as development of collective space defense
infrastructure is initiated. Efforts to reduce reliance on the United
States are considerable, as demonstrated by the effort in the Galileo
navigation system. Explicitly addressing the connection between European
Security and Space, European Research Commissioner Philippe Busquin
has said that space-based observation, communication and navigation
systems represent exceptional tools for the construction and reinforcement
of the European Union, in particular with respect to European Security
and Defense Policy.
China is also investing
heavily in space and has publicly announced plans of lunar exploration.
It is unlikely to want to be restricted and has proposed a treaty
banning space weapons in the UN Conference on Disarmament.
Moreover, history suggests
that if one strong player on the international arena gets too powerful,
then the other smaller players may combine to produce a counterbalance.
Such behavior was in clear display by Germany, France, Russia and
China, during the lead up to the war in Iraq. The dominant state should
therefore not only consider the chance of single nations countering
their actions, but the risk of many nations combining initiatives.
Short Term Gains and Costs
The judgment of whether
to deploy space weapons should be based on a detailed analysis of
their effects on stability and welfare in the short, medium and long-term.
Only by considering all of these time frames it is possible to make
an informed cost-benefit analysis of space weapons and their impact
on security. The following analysis is an attempt to outline some
of the key issues that need to be taken into consideration. The main
purpose is an impartial list of the potential pros and cons of such
weapons. We will begin by assessing some of the most immediate aspects.
In a short term perspective
of less than a decade, several advantages of space weapons can be
imagined:
1. A superior weapon: Space weapons are potentially a primary
tool for information dominance, and thus may be a key to battlefield
dominance in contemporary war. Space weapons enable an advantage in
time and space over an adversary that enable a state to acquire and
maintain the initiative. This would mean increased capability to halt
potential aggressors more effectively, with less collateral damage
and probably earlier, compared to conventional arms. [Table 1, Outcome
3]
2. First Mover Advantage: If the readiness for deployment of
space weapons is low among other countries, the first state to deploy
will enjoy a short-term advantage.
3. Protection of space assets: Assets in space are a critical
part of modern communications, navigation and information gathering,
vital to the economy, vital to security and in demand in everyday
life. Damage to these assets could seriously cripple a nation. Thus
the ability to prevent hostile attack, whether from the ground or
from space, is desirable.
4. Image of Technical Supremacy: By bolstering the image of
technology supremacy, space weapons could act as a deterrent to hostile
action.
5. Other: Military and commercial industry can be bolstered
by gains from long-term (>5 years) research and development projects.
On the other hand, a range
of short term disadvantages are possible:
1. Ineffective and Expensive: Space weapons could become the
analogue of the 19th century Dreadnaught ships; very expensive to
produce and deploy, with little tactical advantage. Worse, they could
provide a false sense of superiority that justifies unwise actions.
Actual performance of weapons placed in space may be overstated and
not cost-effective. Most critically, due to orbital dynamics, space
weapons require an entire orbit to strike (typically 90 minutes) which
may not have a fast enough response time to have any "revolutionary"
effect [Reference this calculation]. In addition, their expense is
highlighted by the fact that whilst the United States continues to
explore space solutions for missile defense, the very high cost and
low availability of such weapons as space-based lasers has led the
nation to defer pursuing space-based lasers for the indefinite future.
2. Vulnerability: Space weapons aimed at Earth targets will
need to be in Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) for a quicker response time and
greater effectiveness. Hardware in LEO is relatively easy to monitor
and is more susceptible to ground-based attack. In fact, most military
officials acknowledge that, at least for the time being, LEO-based
weapons run the risk of being orbital sitting ducks.
3. Provocation to Diplomatic and Arms Control Efforts: Unilateral
deployment of space weapons could spark an international back lash
which compromises the interests of many other diplomatic efforts of
the nations initiating such a move. This could make it more difficult
to achieve goals on other strategic interests. While the Outer Space
Treaty only explicitly bans "weapons of mass destruction"
from outer space, global political opinion tends strongly to the view
that any weapon in outer space violates the spirit of that Treaty.
4. Public Unrest: The majority of public worldwide appears
to oppose space weapons. There is also a history of civil unrest concerning
issues of military uses of space and the use of nuclear power in space.
Similar movements might accompany the deployment of space weapons.
These movements perceive an opportunity for humanity to make a psychological
leap in the way matters are solved by halting the spread of destructive
weapons to the space frontier.
Medium Term Gains and
Costs
Second, also in a medium
term perspective, looking between ten and twenty years ahead in time,
there are certain advantages of space weapons:
1. Stable Domination: Cognizant of the arms race arguments
against unilateral moves in space (see below), some argue that restraint
on the part of a nation such as the United States may not persuade
other nations from moving ahead to their own advantage. Seizing the
initiative, they argue, could enable the United States to stop an
arms race before it starts by establishing a globally dominant, stabilizing
force in space.
2. Global Stabilizing Effect on Earth: The past half-decade
has seen considerable instability and conflict throughout the world.
The latest threat is global terrorism. Space offers not only the ability
to detect threats globally on very short time scales, but some believe
it may also offer the ability to counter those threats from space
on similarly short time scales.
3. Basis for new Multilateral Security Cooperation Regime:
While military use of space is still largely dominated by the United
States and to a lesser extent a handful of other major powers, its
benefits for support of other military operations are manifest. Space-based
weapons systems might enhance these benefits even more. While such
situations could lay the seeds of an arms race (see below), they might
also be the basis of new cooperative security regimes in outer space.
If placed at the service of global coalitions and following agreed
"rules of the road" space arms might serve as a stabilizing
influence.
At the same time, there
are potential disadvantages also in the medium term:
1. Arms Race in Space: The current global perception is that
the United States has a technical lead in the military use of space.
This strategic advantage may lead other nations to accelerate their
space security efforts. This might trigger an arms race. For example,
the deployment of an ASAT could instigate the development and deployment
of a "DSAT" to counter an ASAT. Such an arms race might
also blur the distinction between conventional and mass destruction
weapons in space. [Table 1: Outcome 4]
2. Asymmetric Defense (Nitze Criteria): If there is an economic
or tactical asymmetry in the relationship between a weapons system
and that system's countermeasure, it could easily lead to an arms
race - or to a situation in which an expensive weapon is rendered
useless by a cheap defense. This is an elaboration on the point above.
For example, a ton of gravel launched in an appropriate orbit could
act as deliberate "space debris," destroying billions of
dollars in both national security and commercial space assets.
Long Term Gains and Costs
Third, some advantages
of space weapons might only emerge in a long term perspective of at
least twenty years:
1. Basis of Outer Space "Naval" Paradigm: The existence
of weaponry in global "common" areas can be a long-term
positive and welcome influence. The standard analogy of outer space
is to the world's oceans including the presence of global, weaponized
navies dominated by a single power (in the 19th Century Great Britain
and in the 20th the United States). This regime may be applicable
to space and could result in security in space akin to the world's
oceans, with all nations operating free from interference based on
an internationally recognized "Law of the Sea."
2. Economic Impetus to Large Scale Space Exploitation: Today
much of the developmental spending on space, perhaps the majority
of it, is spent on security-related expenditures. Indeed, the U.S.
Apollo program and associated "space race" was arguably
based mostly on security-related competition. Some argue that large-scale
military space spending, particularly on weapons and even with (and
maybe in light of) an arms race, will ignite rapid development of
space technologies at a pace not seen since Apollo. As with the opening
of the American West, military pathfinders and operations might presage
finance and enable large-scale civil and economic development of space
assets.
Notwithstanding, the long
term disadvantages must also be taken into account:
1. Threat to Long-term Peace: Many believe that the choice
for or against the deployment of space weapons is fundamentally linked
to whether humans will have weapons in their long-term future. Humanity
has a shared interest in a peaceful future in space. Deploying space
weapons might threaten that future rather than enable it. New strategically-important
weapons quickly become embedded into national security strategies.
Such weapons become so deeply embedded in the dominant political paradigm
that they are largely impossible to remove from the strategic arena
- and certainly impossible to remove from the global arsenal. Nuclear
weapons represent a good example, and in this regard there is no reason
to think that space weapons shall be any different. Once space weapons
are deployed, it may be impossible to eliminate them even if they
prove unsuitable and dangerous to humanity. Humanity appears to be
on the verge of expansion into space and this expansion will set precedents
for our future civilization. Whether or not future human settlements
on other planets have to deal with weapons will depend on today's
decisions
2. Proliferation of Weapons: Arguably the biggest threat to
a dominant nation's security is based on the proliferation of weapons
which it has played a large part in developing: Certainly the biggest
threat to the US has been the potential use of nuclear weapons on
the US home soil. By analogy, the first state to deploy space weapons
may find itself faced all too soon with these same weapons as they
proliferate. This is particularly true of space weapons which are
considerably easier to produce than nuclear weapons. As the current
global superpower, the US has a choice to try to use space weapons
to its advantage, but add these to its proliferation concerns or attempt
to manage them by spearheading a reliable legal and verification regime
for preventing their deployment by any nation.
3. The Unique Environment of Space: Some argue that is important
to keep in mind that space has a unique identity beyond a traditional
arena of classical balance of power politics. Space is different.
Space is humanity's shared resource and common heritage. The question
of whether weapons should be deployed in space is therefore an issue
beyond the interests of any one country or generation.
The Way Ahead
The are positive and negative
attributes of space weapons: On the one hand it is necessary to recognize
that space is integral to virtually all security operations through
its communications, surveillance and other support functions and that
there are potential advantages, particularly in the short term, of
deploying weapons in space. Conversely, not all weapons systems are
a good idea, even for the best intentioned, since they are not vastly
more effective than conventional weapons and moreover, they can have
political and unintended security ramifications in the long term which
far outweigh their benefits. Despite these seemingly conflicting issues,
there may be areas for fruitful compromise on space weapons.
Faced with a decision
on deployment that might come sooner rather than later, nations have
to think about how the international community should respond to this
extraordinary issue on the security agenda of the 21st century. Three
main options are available:
Fairly comprehensive prohibition:
A ban of space weapons would halt the potential for an arms race.
The disadvantage is that it may constrain states if a situation arises
and a state decides to abrogate a ban. A legal regime would ideally
be negotiated in an international forum such as the United Nations
Conference on Disarmament. However, if stalemate persists, a less
encompassing agreement could be agreed at an ad-hoc gathering. One
possible solution is for a country, which supports the prohibition
of space weapons, to host a treaty conference for interested nations.
This model was followed successfully in the so-called "Ottawa
Process", which lead to the successful Ottawa Land Mines Treaty.
Means of verification for monitoring compliance would be vital to
the successful implementation of a prohibition. In this regard, much
could be learned from the Chemical Weapons Convention. A great challenge,
however, would be to establish effective sanctions against violations
of the treaty. Without sanctions, it is difficult to achieve credible
commitments to the legal regime, which jeopardizes international cooperation.
A mid-ranging legal regime:
An international agreement on space weapons analogous to the International
Law of Sea could be created. This could lead to a stable situation
that avoids the earlier pitfalls. It could require an international
regime backed up by global, real-time monitoring. The downside is
that it is not concrete and might be overtaken by events.
No regime: In this current
state of uncertainty, the global security in the mid-term future is
unclear. The major concern is the potential for an arms race in space.
Without establishing the rules of the road, even the lead nations
are subject to consequences, especially in a domain as potentially
asymmetric as space.
In essence, the challenge
is to manage space in a way that avoids the 'tragedy of the commons'.
In order to avoid this self-destructive logic, we have to escape ending
up in a 'prisoner's dilemma', where cooperation is impossible due
to lack of communication and trust among the actors. Because of the
strategic nature of the situation, all states, and in particular those
with ambitions and capabilities regarding space, should work together.
A frank and open discussion should begin in the nations closest to
the possibility of much larger military uses of outer space. One possibly
fruitful area for opening international negotiations leading towards
a legal regime could be in defining hostile and prohibited acts in
space. These efforts can be directed towards building agreement amongst
the space powers of the 'Rules of the Road' in order to regulate the
use of space.
Footnotes
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Corresponding Author: wsm@physics.ox.ac.uk
* We would like
to acknowledge contributions from Bojan Pecnik (Croatia), Iole De
Angelis (France), Simone Zumbo (Italy), Jo Catena (UK), Mark Lupisella
(USA), Alan Pritchard (UK), Yuri Takaya (Japan) and advice from Sir
Timothy Garden (UK).
