Making Progress: Opportunities for Improving Space
Security
by Theresa Hitchens
Vice President, Center for Defense Information
Introduction
In 1957, the Soviet Union
launched Sputnik, the space age and the world's first space race.
But despite the intense competition of the Cold War, space has remained,
up to now, primarily a venue for peaceful international cooperation
and global commerce.
This relatively peaceful
history may, however, be nearing an end - and another space race may
be beginning. The increasing ability to harness space as a military
asset, and the increasing reliance of the U.S. military on space,
is driving a fundamental change in how U.S. military leaders and top
policymakers view the future of space: as a likely zone of economic
competition and military confrontation rather than a sanctuary for
scientific and commercial cooperation.
While most other nations
of the world have been agitating for a global agreement fostered by
the United Nations that would bar the weaponization of space ? for
fear it would create new threats to international peace and security
as well as undercut the global development and prosperity being engendered
by advances in commercial and civil activities in space. ? U.S. policy
and technical development is headed in the opposite direction. Therefore,
largely due to U.S. unwillingness to participate, international discussions
about space arms control are foundering.
While the current administration
of President George W. Bush is particularly loath to discuss new treaties
of any sort, even previous U.S. administrations have been reluctant
to countenance a ban on space weapons as proposed by many nations
participating in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.
Much of the impulse behind
the drive for space weaponization in the United States comes from
a deep-seated fear about the vulnerability of U.S. space assets -
the loss of which would seriously undercut the U.S. conventional military
edge. U.S. policymakers and many in the military see a looming threat
that enemies, as they become technically more proficient in space
operations, will see U.S. space assets as a "soft underbelly"
ripe for attack.
The U.S. threat assessment
may be exaggerated, but at the same time there are others who are
becoming concerned about the potential for conflict in space not only
because of U.S. plans, but also because of increased competition among
the skyrocketing numbers of users and uses for the limited environment
of space. Even the international space industry recognizes the potential
for "trade wars" in space, and is calling for better "rules
of the road" covering such issues as the allocation of orbital
slots and spectrum and the determination of collision liability.
Given these widespread
worries about the security of space-based assets, opportunities and
incentives for cooperation that could help stave off future confrontation
in space now exist and should be rapidly exploited. While there is
certainly value in continuing efforts at space arms control, there
is also value to consideration of near- and medium-term approaches
that could foster cooperation and dampen fears about space security.
Such near- and mid-term approaches could, in fact, help lay a foundation
of trust among the world's space powers that would ease future discussion
of stronger arms control measures.
I want to talk about three
overlapping, but somewhat separate, "baskets" of cooperative
activities that might be furthered developed by the international
community. These are: 1. Debris Mitigation and Elimination; 2.
Space Access and Traffic Control; and 3. Transparency and Confidence
Building Measures. In combination, new measures under each area
would constitute a space management regime that could form the cornerstone
of future space cooperation, and help avoid space weaponization and
a global space arms race.
Debris Mitigation and Elimination
The problem of space debris
affects all users of space, and is recognized by every space-faring
nation (including their militaries) as a potential problem.
Earth is already surrounded
by debris - NASA tracks approximately 9,000 objects larger than 10
centimeters in diameter, and there is an estimated 100,000 pieces
of orbital debris larger than a marble. Even tiny pieces of debris,
as small as 1 centimeter in diameter, can disable a satellite or damage
space vehicles such as the International Space Station and the U.S.
Space Shuttle. The fear among space scientists is that without new
measures, the population of debris (including inoperable satellites)
larger than 10 centimeters could skyrocket.
Indeed, of all ongoing
international cooperative efforts, debris mitigation is the most advanced.
Voluntary mitigation activities have been discussed in the 65-nation
Committee for Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) with some success,
and the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordinating Committee (IADC) -
made up of the space agencies of nine countries plus the European
Space Agency - has finalized a draft set of voluntary international
guidelines. COPUOS hopes to reach a consensus on the debris mitigation
guidelines between 2003 and 2004, with implementation to begin in
2005.
While this is an extremely
welcomed development, the guidelines under discussion are just that:
voluntary guidelines that space-faring states, and multinational consortia,
would be urged to make. Obviously, an improved regime would include
further codification of the guidelines - into national regulations
or domestic laws - as well as development of enforcement measures.
One positive factor here
is that the United States is a leader in the debris mitigation field,
having enacted a number of measures domestically. Current National
Space Policy (PDD-NSC-49/NSTC-8), dating from 1996, makes minimizing
debris a domestic imperative and, in December 2000, the U.S. government
issued formal orbital debris mitigation standard practices. The United
States, through NASA, is also at the forefront of the IADC activities
- indeed the IADC draft guidelines very closely mimic the U.S. standard
practices and NASA regulations.
Therefore, with creative
thinking about incentives and disincentives, the opportunity exists
to create an international legal regime with more teeth. As a first
step, nations signing up to the new IADC guidelines should be urged
to enact those guidelines through regulatory processes, laws or licensing
arrangements. They also should be required to report annually to COPUOS
about their activities to implement the guidelines.
One obstacle might be
concerns among emerging space powers that such operating standards
might secretly be aimed at slowing their entry into the space marketplace
as competitors to today's leaders (similarly to how some developing
nations have felt about meeting international environmental standards).
The answer here might then be providing incentives for them to join
such a regime. For example, using the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
as a template, could the more developed space-faring powers share
mitigation or other sorts of technology, and invite less advanced
space powers into new technology developments, as a quid pro quo?
There also may be possible
market-based approaches, such as lowering insurance costs for those
complying with such standards and enacting some sort of "debris
tax" on those who do not. The current Liability Convention might
also be improved and strengthened, making not only direct damage to
another spacecraft (or airborne or ground-based asset) a trigger for
damages, but also the creation of debris that might in future damage
someone else's assets. Extra harsh penalties could be assessed for
those who cause damage and had not been following the COPUOUS guidelines.
One serious issue in crafting
such a regime is that many satellites are launched not by nations
but by international consortia, raising the question of how to assign
responsibility for registration and liability - similar to the problem
of assigning liability to international oil tankers. Indeed, the space
industry itself has recognized this problem (as well as the potential
for "license shopping"), and called for better coordination
of national and international standards.
If such a regime required
national licensing, for example, some determination would have to
be made as to how to assign a "nation of license" for a
consortium. Another approach would be applying a licensing regime
through a transnational body, although that might be more politically
difficult. Finally, space-faring nations could ensure participation
in any international regime by consortia by simply barring trade with
unlicensed or non-participating entities, in the same way that members
of the Missile Technology Control Regimes do not sell to non-members.
Further, a more formal
debris management regime might also involve the creation of a multinational
body for developing and using new technologies for actually removing
dangerous debris. Removing debris is particularly a problem for the
finite, already crowded and highly important Geosynchronous Earth
Orbit, GEO, where, like diamonds, "debris is forever." Technologies
are already at hand, or nearly at hand, for such debris removal missions,
such as Canada's space arm or the U.S. "space tug." But
there is a danger that if such technologies are developed nationally,
other nations may be suspicious of the intent - as any technology
developed to eliminate debris might also have applications as an anti-satellite
(ASAT) weapon. So it would seem that all nations would benefit from
a multilateral approach to debris elimination, as it would dampen
fears about others' intentions as well as hold the obvious benefit
of finding ways of cleaning up the ever more polluted heavens.
Finally, in order for
a debris management and mitigation regime to work, the international
community must find ways to improve today's cataloguing and tracking
of space objects. There has been progress in this - mostly in the
United States with the improvement of the Space Surveillance Network
that has catalogued 2,000 new space objects since March 2003.
Still, there is room for
more formal cooperation among current providers of space tracking
data (primarily the U.S. and Russian militaries, but also the European
Space Agency and private companies) - through linking sensors perhaps,
or developing a joint database accessible to al
l.
Space Access and Traffic
Control
Another set of measures
(albeit significantly related to debris mitigation) could be lumped
together as space access and traffic control, or "rules of the
road" for utilizing space. While the International Telecommunications
Union (ITU) is responsible for allocating spectrum, there seem to
be very few hard and fast rules for how to manage issues such as future
orbital crowding, access to slots, avoiding collisions, etc. A recent
industry report makes a number of recommendations in this area, noting
that "self-interest alone is often insufficient to encourage
safe and responsible operation of space systems" and noting that
the current U.N. space treaties do not provide enough "clear
legal guidance." It is indicative of a serious problem when industry
is calling for more regulation and control not less!
Such a space traffic control
regime might include improved coordination and approval of orbital
slots; provide tracking of satellites once they were in orbit to ensure
that they did not move in an unauthorized way (limiting fear of "cling-on"
ASAT systems); create standard practices for de-orbiting; impose sanctions
for those who do not comply; and assess liability damages for collisions.
Another space traffic control idea has been raised by Air Force Col.
John Hyten, now chief of Air Force Space Command's Space Control Division.
He has suggested the creation of a "Law of the Sea" for
space. This might include creating "territorial" space around
satellites - others have called these "keep out" zones -
similar to a nation's territorial waters, as a means for ensuring
against physical crowding and radio interference, but also boosting
confidence against possible space-based ASAT attack. For example,
if a satellite or space object crossed into such "territorial"
space during its orbit or maneuvers, damages could be assessed - or,
at the extreme end, the owners of the space asset whose territory
was violated might have the right to disable and/or remove the violating
object (though not in a manner that would create debris).
Again, a key to such a
regime would be keeping tabs on orbital objects, since avoiding collisions
with other space objects requires the same sort of space object tracking
as does debris. Therefore, space traffic control would need to be
underpinned by more transparency among space-faring nations about
space launch and orbital parameters, leading to the third related
set of initiatives.
Transparency and Confidence Building Measures
This may be a much more
politically difficult arena for international cooperation, in part
due to understandable concerns within the U.S. military and the National
Reconnaissance Office (as well as among other nation's militaries
and spy agencies) about giving away secrets of their spysat capabilities.
Although the United States is "ahead of the pack" in such
technologies and may be concerned it has little to gain by being more
open (i.e. others will learn more about U.S. assets than the United
States will learn about those of others), there is a strong argument
that there might be important indirect benefits of increased transparency
for the United States. Increased transparency could dampen fears among
potential competitors about U.S. intentions and lower chances that
others might consider developing weapons against U.S. space assets.
One key approach to transparency
might be the establishment of a pre-launch notification regime - rather
than the current U.N. registry of space launches, which in practice
receives only post-launch information. This is not as radical a concept
as it may seem; indeed, it was the basis of the June 2000 U.S.-Russian
Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) concept and subsequent U.S.-Russian
Pre- and Post-Launch Notification agreement in August 2000 for sharing
early warning data on missile and space launches. These two agreements
were quite far-reaching in the kinds of data to be exchanged.
That effort has stalled
(for a variety of reasons, but mostly lack of political will on both
sides) - but consideration should be given to expanding those two
concepts to include all space-faring powers.
As noted above, monitoring
and tracking objects in space ? or what the U.S. military calls space
situational awareness ? is also crucial to building confidence among
international military space bureaucracies. For example, one central
concern in U.S. military space circles is that satellites once in
orbit might be maneuvered out of their parking orbit and used as ASATs.
Space situational awareness is also a major issue for industry, due
to concerns about the possibilities for satellite collisions or interference.
In addition to the data
sharing ideas mentioned above, there are other approaches to improving
space situational awareness (and hopefully avoiding collisions). For
example, industry groups have suggested that rules be developed governing
the physical location of satellites, especially applying to on-orbit
maneuvering. These include so-called "right of way" rules
for satellites passing near others in a manner that might cause interference;
"zoning rules;" and requirements for communications between
satellite operators when one satellite is about to pass through the
orbit of another.
Another option here, albeit
a less attractive one from a legal standpoint, might be for NGOs in
various countries to band together to create an informal space-tracking
network. There is much data freely available from amateur observers
already - as noted with some alarm by Tom Wilson in his annex to the
U.S. Space Commission report on threats to U.S. capabilities. These
include the Kettering Space Observer Group of England, the Canadian
Space Society of Toronto, and the University of Surrey's Electronics
and Amateur Radio Society. This open-source tracking data might be
gathered into an international, non-governmental clearinghouse, freely
available to the public, especially if governments themselves were
unwilling to provide confirmed data.
Other, classic elements
of confidence building in the military and arms control arena could
further be applied to space. This could include exchanges among the
military space officers of all space-faring nations (either on a bilateral
or multilateral basis) to discuss national doctrine, development and
procurement programs, capabilities, and joint concerns (such as debris).
While there are fora for international space scientists in the civilian
realm, there has been little such contact in the military space sphere.
A further option that
should be considered would be the creation of a new forum to discuss
space security issues writ large, a forum that could bring together
scientists, military officials, diplomats and industry representatives.
At the moment, various aspects of space asset management are discussed
in widely different fora with little crossover in participation. Given
that space security involves commercial, military, scientific and
political aspects, it might be worthwhile to consider how to ensure
that space security efforts in the different realms are coordinated.
The answer may simply be to reinvigorate the U.N. Office of Outer
Space Affairs; although consideration could also be given to the development
of a voluntary annual gathering of stakeholders, including NGOs.
Obviously, the above agenda
is large, technically difficult and fraught with political obstacles.
On the other hand, all space stakeholders - military, industry, and
the scientific community - have reasons to want to address these three
basic problem areas. Therefore, it behooves the international community
and NGOs to put more time and energy into developing ideas for making
progress towards cooperative security in space.
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