`The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. have increased concern that terrorists supported by rogue states may use weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including chemical, biological or nuclear devices, to achieve their goals. [1] Faced with a potential threat of WMD use against it or its allies, the United States has moved to make its historically hedged commitment to first nuclear use more explicit.

In February 2002, State Department spokesman, Richard Boucher, while reiterating Washington’s long-standing official position on no-first use of nuclear weapons, remarked that:

“…U.S. policy says that we will do whatever is necessary to deter the use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, its allies and its interests. If a weapon of mass destruction is used against the United States or its allies, we will not rule out any specific type of military response.” [2]

In his June 2002 speech at WestPoint President Bush questioned the efficacy of the use of deterrence against transnational terrorist organizations: “Deterrence – the promise of massive retaliation against nations – means nothing against shadowy terrorist groups with any nation or citizen to defend [3]

The Bush Administration’s National Security Strategy of September 2002 explicitly argued that deterrence is of limited relevance and effectiveness in dealing with these new and emerging threats:

“…deterrence based only upon the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people, and the wealth of their nations….In the Cold War, weapons of mass destruction were considered weapons of last resort whose use risked destruction of those who used them.  Today, our enemies see weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice.  For rogue states, these weapons are tools of intimidation and military aggression against their neighbors. These weapons may allow these states to attempt to blackmail the United States and our allies to prevent us from deterring or repelling the aggressive behavior of rogue states. Such states also see these weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the United States. Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents…Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means…The greater the threat, the greater the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.  To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively. (Emphasis added). [4]

On December 10, 2002, the Bush Administration published a statement that the United States “will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force – including through resort to all our options – to the use of [weapons of mass destruction] against the United States, our forces abroad and friends and allies.”

The conclusions of a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) conducted in 2001, which sought to transform the US strategic posture for the 21^st century, explicitly called for planning for possible nuclear escalation under the following conditions:

·        Retaliation against chemical or biological attacks

·        Unspecified “surprise military development”, which could presumably encompass US nuclear escalation in the face of an enemy’s conventional operations of an alarming nature

·        In cases were it was necessary to destroy “targets able to withstand non nuclear attack.”

The leaked excerpts from the classified NPR suggested that specific nuclear planning contingencies could, include, for example, an Arab-Israeli war, a confrontation over Taiwan, an Iraqi move against its neighbors, and conflict on the Korean peninsula. The countries mentioned in these scenarios of nuclear war-fighting included Russia, China, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya.

 The enunciation of a “unilateralist” security doctrine by the Bush Administration in December 2002 coupled with its pursuit of the notion of preemptive use of force [5] , both in policy and military action has not only lowered the bar on the use of nuclear weapons in certain situations, but also reinforced the impression that US commitment to negative security assurances have now been virtually repudiated. [6]

Four factors seem to have converged to highlight preventive war and preemption as preferred policy options for the Bush Administration. First, the feasibility of defense by denial strategies. [7]   Second, the conclusion that deterrence generally does not work against terrorists. Savage reprisals in kind can actually play into the hands of the terrorists. Third, the commitment to the idea that the United States should take action to stop dangerous groups or states before they can acquire weapons of mass destruction or launch some nefarious scheme. Fourth, the salience of the belief that nonproliferation and disarmament efforts in the 1990s failed to stop several serious threats to international security. [8]

By advocating preventive war and preemption, the Bush Administration has conveyed three unsettling messages to the rest of the World.

The first is that as the world’s only superpower, the United States is not bound by all its treaty commitments and thus can itself determine what the current rules of the international game are. More specifically, Washington would support only those treaties that limit the capabilities of other states, not its own. In doing so, the Bush Administration has embraced the assumption of the classical realist perspective on international relations which argues that justification for preventive war is embedded in the anarchical nature of the international system.

The second is that existing norms and agreed international rules of arms control and nonproliferation are unable to prevent proliferation and thus do not necessarily serve U.S. international security interests.

The third is setting an intolerable precedent for the overall tenor of international relations in terms of conflict resolution. By waging a “preventive war” against Iraq, Washington has signaled to the rest of the international community that use of force rather than diplomatic instruments is a useful guide to strategic behavior.

The United States has long maintained that its possession of nuclear weapons is meant to "deter, dissuade, and defeat" a range of "immediate" and potential conventional and WMD threats. However, since 1978, the United States has pledged not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states that are members of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), except if attacked by such a state that is allied with a state possessing nuclear weapons. Yet, successive administrations [9] have maintained a policy of "strategic ambiguity" by refusing to rule out nuclear weapons use in response to attacks involving biological or chemical weapons. This policy of strategic ambiguity has evoked a sharp reaction from the proponents of a strong no first use policy. Their case for an un-hedged no first use policy by the United States rests on four grounds:

1)      The United States does not need nuclear weapons to deter or to respond to attacks on us or our allies, including attacks by chemical or biological weapons.

2)      The actual use of nuclear weapons by the United States would have calamitous consequence for global security, including the likely shattering of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

3)      An explicit no first use policy would help strengthen an already powerful taboo against nuclear use.

4)      Holding open the option for first use makes the actual use of nuclear weapons more likely. By stating or implying that the United States, despite its overwhelming conventional military superiority, needs nuclear weapons to respond to a non-nuclear attack or to carry out a pre-emptive strike against a potential nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons threat, the United States may undermine global nuclear nonproliferation efforts by persuading other states that nuclear weapons are necessary for their protection.

The Bush Administration has countered these powerful “no first use” arguments by maintaining that it serves U.S. interests to keep potential adversaries uncertain of expected U.S. responses, thereby extending deterrence considerably beyond limits that would likely apply were the policy articulated in a more clear-cut manner.

As Secretary of State Colin Powell said to the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 12, 2002:

“… for those nations that are developing these kinds of weapons of mass destruction, it does not seem to us to be a bad thing for them to look out from their little countries and their little capitals and see a United States that has a full range of options and an American president that has a full range of options available to him to deter, in the first instance, and to defend the United States of America, the American people, our way of life, and our friends and allies.”

Washington’s advocacy of nuclear use in the post-9/11 period to counter the WMD threats associated with non-state actors and rogue states found its echoes in South Asia both at the doctrinal as well as policy levels.  In January 2003, New Delhi published a brief official nuclear doctrine. The January 4, 2003 official statement said the following:

1. Building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent;
2. A posture of "No First Use": nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere;
3. Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.
4. Nuclear retaliatory attacks can only be authorised by the civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority.
5. Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states;
6. However, in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons;
7. A continuance of strict controls on export of nuclear and missile related materials and technologies, participation in the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty negotiations, and continued observance of the moratorium on nuclear tests.
8. Continued commitment to the goal of a nuclear weapon free world, through global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament.

The January 4, 2003 official statement also announced the setting up of the Nuclear Command Authority. It “comprises Political Council and an Executive Council. The Political Council is chaired by the Prime Minister. It is the sole body, which can authorize the use of nuclear weapons.”

While reiterating some of the elements of the DND including a posture of no-first-use, wherein ‘nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere,” the January 4, 2003 statement significantly weakened the NFU policy by claiming the right to nuclear retaliation if India was attacked using chemical and biological weapons. “In this it appears to be following the lead of the USA, which had also announced that it would consider responding to CBW attack with nuclear weapons. This policy may also reflect the advice of the National Security Board, which had argued that India should drop the no-first use policy. The caveat about CBW attacks may well be the first step in completely repudiating the no-first use policy.” [10]

President Bush announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in Krakow, Poland, on May 31, 2003.  The initiative initially brought together eleven nations to agree to practical steps to interdict shipments of missiles, chemical and biological agents, and nuclear components traveling through their national territories. The PSI has now expanded to fifteen core members, including Russia; the United States claims that more than 60 other states support the initiative.  The United States has also signed boarding agreements with the leading flag states Liberia and Panama, to allow their vessels to be stopped and searched. [11]  

PSI participants call on all states concerned with this threat to join in similar commitments. The PSI will utilize existing national and international legal authorities and seek to strengthen these authorities to meet today's WMD proliferation challenges.

Regional exercises will be held in the coming months to practice international cooperation to implement PSI interdiction principles. PSI activities will be consistent with national legal authorities and existing international treaties and regimes. It will involve all states that have a stake in nonproliferation and the ability and willingness to take steps to stop the flow of such items at sea, in the air, or on land. The Initiative is consistent with and a critical step in the implementation of the UN Security Council Presidential Statement of January 1992, which states that the proliferation of WMD constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and underlines the need for member states of the UN to prevent proliferation. Participants are committed to 9 interdiction principles. Regional exercises will be held in the coming months to practice international cooperation to implement PSI interdiction principles.

PSI participants committed to the following interdiction principles:

v     Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, for interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials.

v     Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant information.

v     Work to strengthen their relevant national legal authorities to accomplish these objectives and work to strengthen international law and frameworks.

v     Not transport or assist in the transport of any cargoes of WMD, their delivery systems or related materials to or from countries or groups of proliferation concern.

v     Board and search any suspect vessels flying their flags in their internal waters, territorial seas, or areas beyond the territorial seas of any other state.

v     Consent under the appropriate circumstances to the boarding and searching of their own flag vessels by other states, and to the seizure of such WMD-related cargoes.

v     Stop and/or search suspect vessels in their internal waters, territorial seas, or contiguous zones, and enforce conditions on suspect vessels entering or leaving their ports, internal waters, or territorial seas.

v     Require suspect aircraft that are transiting their airspace to land for inspection and seize any such cargoes, and deny aircraft transit rights through their airspace.

v     Prevent their ports, airfields, or other facilities from being used as transshipment points for WMD-related cargo.

The PSI is a supply-side measure that, unlike traditional export-control suppliers’ regimes, directly addresses second-tier as well as first-tier proliferation.  The success of the PSI will depend strongly on intelligence; its best-known success claimed by U.S. officials is the interdiction and seizure by German and Italian authorities of centrifuge parts aboard the BBC China, the German-owned ship bound for Libya that originated in Malaysia, via Dubai. [12]  All the same, the PSI’s limitations should be recognized: some high-consequence types of nuclear smuggling could involve small-volume packages either transported by means not inspected by the PSI members or that could prove very hard to detect and track; despite U.S. efforts to enlist more countries into the initiative, important countries along the transfer routes may choose not to participate; intelligence is imperfect, and timely “actionable” intelligence may be scarce.  The PSI is but one supply-side component in what must be a web of measures to counter proliferation, but by speaking directly to second-tier proliferation, it represents an important new step.