Introduction
Although confidence building
among nations has been practised for many years, the term 'confidence-building
measure' (CBM) entered the vocabulary of international relations only
in the early 1970s. Since the CBMs subsequently discussed and agreed
upon have come to accentuate security aspects, they are also referred
to as 'confidence- and security-building measures' (CSBMs).
The objective of CSBMs
is to translate certain principles of international law into positive
action so as to provide credibility to states' affirmations of their
peaceful intentions. Such action means implementing measures aimed
at: (a) reassuring states of the non-aggressive intentions of their
potential adversaries and reducing the possibility of misrepresentation
of certain activities; (b) narrowing the scope of political intimidation
by the forces of stronger powers; and (c) minimizing the likelihood
of inadvertent escalation of hostile acts in a crisis situation.
In general, CSBMs do not
directly affect the strength of armed forces or arms inventories,
but in facilitating progress towards disarmament they constitute a
separate category of arms control measures. They also make less likely
the use of force for settling disputes. To have the intended effect,
CSBMs must be significant in scope and binding. A mere exchange of
solemn declarations is rarely sufficient.
For a great majority of
states, threats to national security arise from conditions within
their own region. Hence attention is most often devoted to regional
approaches. For confidence-building purposes, a region could embrace
states, which do not meet the geographical criteria of a 'region'
but are linked economically or politically. Arrangements initiated
by neighbouring states may subsequently attract more distant states
as well. Regional confidence-building measures cannot be imposed by
outsiders; they must be freely negotiated and agreed to by states
in the region. It is only these states that can address the causes
of their specific security problems and determine the type, scope
and area of application of the required undertakings. In one region,
distrust and tension could be generated by a lack of reliable information
about the military activities of neighbouring states and the inadequacy
of channels of communication among political decision-makers. In another
region, distrust and tension could be generated by the absence of
agreed restraints on the behaviour of the armed forces and uncertainty
about compliance with international obligations.
Confidence building to
promote better communication and understanding among the parties may
include: (a) exchange of information about military expenditures,
strength of armed forces, arms production and arms transfers; (b)
open presentation and clarification of defence doctrines; (c) prior
notification of military manoeuvres and major military movements,
including their scope and extent; (d) the establishment of a mechanism
to check the accuracy of the data provided; (e) the presence of foreign
observers at military exercises; (f) exchanges of visits by military
officers; (g) exchanges of cadets between military academies; and
(h) the establishment of direct, rapid communication links - 'hotlines'
- for crisis management.
Confidence-building measures
that impose military constraints may include: (a) abstaining from
certain specified military activities in border areas; (b) disengagement
of armed forces by establishing zones between neighbouring countries
that are partly or fully demilitarized; (c) voluntary submission to
inspections to demonstrate compliance with agreed standards of behaviour;
and (d) formalized commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes.
Security cannot be obtained
by promoting measures solely in the field of military affairs; it
embraces economic and social factors as well. However, the military
factor is of prime importance, as the absence of war constitutes a
prerequisite for non-military CSBMs. Since the 1980s CSBMs have been
adopted in relations among several Asian states, mainly in order to
diminish military tensions along the disputed borders. Those considered
most important are described below.
The 1988 Indian-Pakistani
Nuclear Agreement
On 31 December 1988 India
and Pakistan reached an agreement not to cause the destruction of
or damage to each other's nuclear installations. The parties exchange
annually information about the location of their nuclear-related facilities.
The 1992 Indian-Pakistani
Chemical Weapons Agreement
On 19 August 1992 India
and Pakistan adopted a joint declaration, by which they committed
themselves not to develop, produce, or otherwise acquire, or use chemical
weapons. They also undertook not to assist, encourage or induce anyone
to engage in development, production, acquisition or use of these
weapons.
The 1996 Shanghai
Agreement
On 26 April 1996 Russia
and three Central Asian republics bordering on China - Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan - constituting the Joint Party and China
signed, in Shanghai, the Agreement on Confidence Building in the Military
Field in the Border Area. The signatories committed themselves not
to attack the other party or carry out any military activity threatening
the other party and disturbing the tranquillity and stability in the
border area between Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan,
on the one hand, and China, on the other. They decided to exchange
information on the agreed components of the armed forces and the border
troops; not to conduct military exercises directed against the other
party; to limit the scale, geographical scope and number of military
exercises; to give notification of any large-scale military activity
and troop movements resulting from emergency situations; to give notification
of the temporary entry of troops and weapons into the 100-kilometre
geographical zone on both sides of the border between the Joint Party
territories and China; to invite observers to military exercises on
a reciprocal basis; to give notification of the temporary entry of
the parties' river-going combat vessels of navies or naval forces
into the 100-kilometre geographical zone on both sides of the eastern
part of the Russian-Chinese border; to take measures to prevent hazardous
military activity; to make inquiries about unclear situations; to
strengthen friendly contacts between military personnel of the armed
forces and the border troops in the border area and carry out other
confidence-building measures agreed upon by the parties.
Moreover, the border troops
should not use inhuman or rough treatment in dealing with border violators.
The use of weapons by the border personnel would be determined by
the domestic legislation of the parties and the corresponding agreements
of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan with China.
The Agreement was concluded
for an indefinite period of time, but each party has the right to
terminate it. Also each state of the Joint Party has the right to
withdraw from the Agreement, but the Agreement will remain in force
as long as at least one state of the Joint Party and China remain
parties to it.
The 1996 Sino-Indian
Agreement
On 26 November 1996 China
and India signed the Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in
the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China
Border Areas. It was a follow-up to their Agreement on the Maintenance
of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the
India-China Border Areas, signed on 7 September 1993.
The signatories to the
1996 Agreement agreed that neither side should use its military capability
against the other side. No armed forces deployed by either side in
the border areas along the line of actual control, as part of their
respective military strength, may be used to attack the other side
or engage in military activities that threaten the other side or undermine
the peace, tranquillity and stability in the India-China border areas.
The two sides reiterated their determination to seek a fair, reasonable
and mutually acceptable settlement of the boundary question. Pending
an ultimate solution to this question, they reaffirmed their commitment
to strictly respect the line of actual control. They also reaffirmed
that they would reduce or limit their military forces, within mutually
agreed geographical zones along the line of actual control in the
border areas, to minimum levels compatible with the friendly and good-neighbourly
relations and consistent with the principle of mutual and equal security.
Reductions or limitations concerned the number of field army, border
defence forces, paramilitary forces and any other mutually agreed
category of armed force deployed in mutually agreed geographical zones.
The major categories of armament to be reduced or limited were: combat
tanks, infantry combat vehicles, guns (including howitzers) with 75-mm
or larger calibre, mortars with 120-mm or larger calibre, surface-to-surface
missiles, surface-to-air missiles and any other weapon system mutually
agreed upon. Data were to be exchanged on the military forces and
armaments to be reduced or limited. The ceilings on military forces
and armaments to be kept by each side within mutually agreed geographical
zones were to be determined with due consideration given to parameters,
such as the nature of terrain, road communication and other infrastructure,
as well as the time needed to induct troops and armaments.
China and India undertook
to avoid holding large-scale military exercises, those involving more
than one division (approximately 15,000 troops), in close proximity
to the line of actual control in the border areas. However, if such
exercises had to be conducted, the strategic direction of the main
force involved was not to be towards the other side. If either side
conducted a major military exercise, involving more than one brigade
group (approximately 5,000 troops), in close proximity to the line
of actual control in border areas, it would have to give the other
side prior notification with regard to the type, level, planned duration
and area of exercise, as well as the number and type of units or formations
participating in the exercise.
Both sides must take adequate
measures to ensure that air intrusions across the line of actual control
do not take place. Combat aircraft (to include fighter, bomber, reconnaissance,
military trainer, armed helicopter and other armed aircraft) may not
fly within 10 kilometres of the line of actual control. If either
side is required to undertake flights of combat aircraft within 10
kilometres, it must give the relevant information to the other side
through diplomatic channels. No military aircraft of either side may
fly across the line of actual control, except by prior permission.
Unarmed transport aircraft, survey aircraft and helicopters are to
be permitted to fly up to the line of actual control. Neither side
is allowed to open fire, cause biodegradation, use hazardous chemicals,
conduct blast operations or hunt with guns or explosives within 2
kilometres of the line of actual control.
Detailed implementation
measures were to be decided through mutual consultations in the India-China
Joint Working Group on the Boundary Question. The India-China Diplomatic
and Military Expert Group was to assist the Joint Working Group in
devising implementation measures under the Agreement.
The 1997 Moscow
Agreement
On 24 April 1997, as a
follow-up to the 1996 Shanghai Agreement, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan, constituting the Joint Party, and China signed, in
Moscow, the Agreement on the Mutual Reduction of Armed Forces in the
Border Area. The signatories agreed on the following measures.
The parties' armed forces
stationed in the border area should not be used to attack another
party or to conduct any military activity that threatened the other
party or disturbed the tranquillity and stability in the border area.
The parties should reduce
and limit the number of personnel and the quantities of basic types
of armament and military equipment of the ground forces, air forces
and air defence aviation, deployed within the geographical zone of
application (GZA) of the Agreement, that is, in the geographical area
extending to a distance of 100 kilometres from either side of the
border between Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, on the
one side, and China, on the other side. Certain limited areas within
the GZA of the Agreement are to be considered sensitive areas. In
the Eastern Sector (the eastern part of the state border between Russia
and China), on the Russian side, these are the Khabarovsk sensitive
area and the Vladivostok sensitive area.
Upon expiration of the
reduction period (see below) the maximum level of personnel of ground
forces, air forces and air defence aviation remaining for each party
in the GZA of the Agreement should not exceed 130,400 persons, including
115,400 in ground forces, 14,100 in air forces and 900 in air defence
aviation. The maximum level of personnel for the Eastern Sector should
not exceed 119,400 persons; for the Western Sector (the western part
of the state border between Russia and China, as well as the state
borders between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and China), 11,000
persons. From the date of entry into force of the Agreement, the maximum
number of personnel of the border forces for each party within the
GZA of the Agreement may not exceed 55,000 persons, including 38,500
for the Eastern Sector and 16,500 for the Western Sector.
The maximum levels of
armaments and military equipment remaining for each party within the
GZA of the Agreement should include armaments and military equipment
located in combat units as well as in storage. Upon expiration of
the reduction period, the maximum levels remaining for each party
within the GZA should not exceed: 3,900 battle tanks, 5,890 armoured
combat vehicles, 4,540 artillery systems, 96 tactical rocket launchers,
290 combat aircraft and 434 combat helicopters.
The reductions provided
for in the Agreement had to be brought about within 24 months from
the date of its entry into force. The reduction of military personnel
was to be carried out by disbanding entire military formations, by
reducing the staff size of military formations or by removing military
formations from the GZA of the Agreement. The reduction of armaments
and military equipment was to be carried out by destroying, dismantling,
converting to civilian purposes, placing on permanent display, using
as ground or aerial targets, reclassifying into training materiel,
or partially removing from the GZA.
In order to reinforce
mutual confidence and ensure control over the implementation of the
Agreement, the parties should exchange information about the troop
formations, the number of personnel in these formations, and the quantity
of main types of armament and military equipment deployed within the
GZA of the Agreement. The information exchanged must be treated as
confidential. Each party has the right to conduct and the obligation
to accept inspections within the GZA, with the exception of the specified
sensitive areas. The inspecting party should bear the expenses related
to the transportation of the inspectors to the established entry/exit
points. The inspected party should bear the expenses related to the
visit of the inspectors. A Joint Control Group supervises the implementation
of the Agreement.
The Agreement does not
affect the obligations previously undertaken by the parties in relation
to other states and is not directed against third states or their
interests. Each party is allowed to terminate the Agreement by notifying
the other party of its intention to do so at least six months before
the date of the Agreement's expiration, which was set for 31 December
2020. In the absence of such notification, the duration of the Agreement
is to be automatically extended for successive five-year periods.
Each state belonging to the Joint Party may withdraw from the Agreement
by notifying the other party and the other states of the Joint Party
of its decision. After such notification the parties should conduct
negotiations on the maximum levels of armed forces and border forces
in the border area.
The 1997 Sino-Russian
Statement
As a result of the meeting
held in Beijing on 10 November 1997, the Presidents of China and Russia
issued a statement on the development of relations between the two
countries. In particular, the heads of state stated that all points
of contention regarding the demarcation of the eastern section of
the Sino-Russian border had been resolved and that the demarcation
of the western section would be completed within an agreed period
of time. Hope was expressed that a fair demarcation of the border
would enhance friendship and good-neighbourly relations between the
two countries and contribute to regional stability.
Exchanges of visits by
heads of state, regular meetings between prime ministers and consultations
between foreign ministers were found conducive to improving mutual
communication and understanding, as well as to expanding and deepening
cooperation between the two nations in various fields. It was noted
that cooperation in the field of military technology was an important
component of Sino-Russian relations and that it was not directed against
a third country.
The 1998 Almaty
Joint Statement
In the joint statement
issued on 3 July 1998 at Almaty as a result of the five-nation meeting
of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan, the participants
undertook to take all the necessary measures to ensure the implementation
of the 1996 Shanghai Agreement and the 1997 Moscow Agreement. They
valued the positive impact of these agreements on the security in
their region and the world at large, appreciated the initiative of
the Central Asian countries for the establishment of a Central Asian
nuclear-weapon-free zone and reaffirmed the importance of holding
regular consultations among themselves.
The parties expressed
concern over the tensions in Afghanistan and noted that greater effort
should be made to promote a peaceful settlement of the conflicts in
that country under the auspices of the United Nations and with the
participation of the states concerned. They also expressed concern
over the growing tension in South Asia following the nuclear test
explosions in that region and called for stopping the nuclear arms
race there.
The 1999 Lahore
Memorandum of Understanding
On 21 February 1999 the
Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan signed a Memorandum of Understanding
identifying measures aimed at promoting an environment of peace and
security between the two countries. The parties undertook to engage
in bilateral consultations on security concepts and nuclear doctrines
with a view to developing measures for confidence building in the
nuclear and conventional fields; to take national measures to reduce
the risks of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under
their control; to notify each other immediately in the event of an
incident that could create the risk of a fallout with adverse consequences
for both sides or an outbreak of a nuclear war between the two countries;
to adopt measures aimed at diminishing the possibility of such incidents
being misinterpreted by the other side, and to identify or establish
appropriate communication mechanisms for this purpose; to abide by
their moratoria on nuclear test explosions, unless either side decided
that extraordinary events had jeopardized its supreme interests; to
conclude an agreement on the prevention of incidents at sea; to periodically
review the implementation of the CBMs and, where necessary, set up
consultative mechanisms; and to review the existing communication
links with a view to upgrading them. The Lahore Memorandum of Understanding
has not been carried into effect.
The 2001 Sino-Russian
Good-Neighbourliness Treaty
On 16 July 2001 Russia
and China signed, in Moscow, a Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness, Friendship
and Cooperation. The contracting Parties reaffirmed their commitments
not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other and
not to target strategic nuclear missiles on each other; pledged to
expand and deepen confidence-building measures in the military field
so as to consolidate the security of both countries and strengthen
regional and international stability; promised not to be members of
any alliance or bloc nor embark on any action which compromises the
sovereignty, security or territorial integrity of the other party,
nor allow its territory to be used by third countries to the detriment
of the other party; and undertook to cooperate in combating terrorism,
separatism and extremism and in fighting organized crime, illegal
trafficking in drugs, psychotropic substances and weapons. Should
a situation arise which, in the view of either party, might endanger
or undermine the peace or affect its security interests, or should
either party face the threat of aggression, the parties shall immediately
contact and consult each other with a view to averting the danger.
The ASEAN Undertakings
In the 1990s the Regional
Forum of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) adopted
a series of CBMs covering, inter alia, military and defence-related
issues. In particular, the Forum's members have developed bilateral
exchanges on security perceptions; expanded high-level defence contacts
and military exchange/training; submitted annual defence policy statements;
prepared defence White Papers; invited observers to and provided notification
of select military exercises on a case-by-case basis; and exchanged
views on defence conversion programmes. None of these measures is
mandatory.
Assessment
Unlike in Europe, the
CSBMs in Asia do not cover all the militarily important countries
of the continent and have not been followed by substantial, verifiable
cuts in the military potential of the participating states. Nonetheless,
the CSBMS taken by China, Russia and the Central Asian Republics helped
to set aside the disputes over large sectors of their common borders
and to put off the final delineation of these borders for an unspecified
period of time.
On the other hand, the
CSBMs adopted by India and Pakistan have not helped to resolve the
most contentious issues, in particular, the issue of Jammu and Kashmir.
The continuous armed clashes between the two countries can lead to
a large-scale war fraught with disastrous consequences for both regional
and extraregional states, including a nuclear exchange, whether deliberate
or accidental. It appears therefore necessary for both India and Pakistan,
to agree on CSBMs more substantial and more binding than those agreed
hitherto. In other words, a new security agenda is needed. Such an
agenda would have to be incorporated in a formal, duly ratified document
and include the following undertakings by India and Pakistan:
· To give up nuclear-test
explosions and refrain from test-firing ballistic missiles of any
range without prior notification.
· To reduce the conventional armed forces significantly enough
to attenuate Pakistan's opposition to adopting the posture of no first
use of nuclear weapons.
· To thin out the forces stationed on both sides of the common
borders so as to diminish the risks of armed incidents.
· To entrust impartial observers with the determination of
facts in case of alleged breaches of the Line of Control in Kashmir.
· To improve communications at both political and military
levels.
The above undertakings
could prepare the ground for meaningful talks about the settlement
of the several-decades old disputes on the basis of the generally
recognized principles of international law.
