2nd
Pugwash Workshop on South Asian Security
(in collaboration with GIPRI)
Geneva, Switzerland, 16-18 May 2003
Synopsis
of Presentation on South Asian Security
by J. N. Dixit
(Former Foreign Secretary of India and Ambassador to Pakistan)
As suggested in the agenda
for this Conference, South Asian security is to be discussed in two
dimensions. First are the general and long term concerns of South
Asian security and second are the more proximate concerns of security
hinging on issues related to Jammu & Kashmir [J&K] and its
ramifications for Indo-Pak relations.
I do not intend to elaborate
on the transformation of international power equations and emerging
trends in the international order over the last decade and a half,
since the end of the Cold War. This distinguished audience is not
only aware of these trends, but is also intellectually involved in
observing the ongoing changes.
The security challenges
for the South Asian region in the medium and long term can be listed
as follows:
i) The
requirement for countries in South Asia to structure new equations
with the important power centers of the world, given the fading away
of the leverages which all of them had for nearly 50 years, after
the end of the 2nd World War.
ii) An
important dimension of the above concern is the creation of a stable
and calibrated relationship by South Asian countries with the USA,
which in many ways has become the pre-eminent power. Managing the
prospects of a pax-Americana is a major security exercise to be undertaken
by South Asian countries.
iii) South
Asia, constituting nearly one-fifth of the world's population, also
happens to be one of the poorest areas of the world, barring perhaps
sub-Sahara Africa. Meeting socio-economic developmental requirements
through appropriate domestic and external policies is another challenge.
iv) Within
the ambit of the above concerns, particular attention has to be given
by all South Asian countries for ensuring energy security, particularly
in terms of hydrocarbons and hydro power. A rational and practical
management of energy resources in both these categories, moving away
from narrow political considerations, is imperative.
Then, there are more fundamental
security concerns affecting South Asia. These include consolidating
the identities of different countries on the basis of pluralism and
religious and ethnic diversities. The challenge is made more complex
because there are several nation states in the region. The religious,
ethnic and linguistic characteristics of civil societies in these
nation states overlap with each other. This overlapping results in
apprehensions about respective national identities. The challenge
is to resolve the contradiction between the nature of the civil societies
and anxieties about consolidating individual national identities;
i.e., promoting civic nationalism that is integrative rather than
ethno-religious nationalism which is separative.
The complexes and apprehensions
generated by the asymmetry between India on the one hand and other
South Asian countries on the other, in terms of size, population,
levels of development, technology and military power, has resulted
in tensions in inter-state relations in the region. A purposeful effort
is required to overcome these tensions. India has a special responsibility
in this regard, while the other countries need to make an effort to
overcome the burdens of the history of the last half century.
The migration of people
due to socio-economic pressures borne of the land-to-people ratio
promises to be a major problem. While South Asia is characterized
politically by different nation states, the South Asian land mass
is, normatively speaking, one economic region. Structuring cooperative
and substantive regionalism is the only solution.
The establishment of SAARC
was an attempt to promote such regionalism. It has been stalled primarily
for political reasons. The solution is, therefore, to deal with the
political problems in a pragmatic manner to move on to the more desirable
and logical objectives of regional cooperation.
Adjusting to the ongoing
process of globalisation remains an important challenge in terms of
security for all South Asian countries. This challenge is made more
complex due to the undercurrents of restrictive and acquisitive economic
and technology regimes that form part of the policies of the major
powers of the world.
Last but not least are
the internal centrifugal forces affecting the unity of the nation
states of the region. Coping with these forces will require not only
the strengthening of democracy in each of the nation states, making
them safe for diversities, but also the establishment of harmonious
relations between the South Asian states.
Indo-Pak
relations
The tense relations between
India and Pakistan are the most important negative factor affecting
South Asian security. I have no intention of going into the history
of Indo-Pak relations or the rights and wrongs of the attitudes and
issues involved.
The last six weeks have
seen once again a revival of some positive initiatives by the leaders
of India and Pakistan to recommence an effort at normalization of
relations between the two countries. This initiative is both logical
and necessary given the following factors:
i) The
confrontation between India and Pakistan constitutes an unacceptable
trend, draining away resources which can be devoted to the more important
and urgent tasks of development and economic well being of the people
of India and Pakistan.
ii) The confrontation contributes to centrifugal impulses disrupting
the harmony and cohesion of civil societies in both countries.
iii) The phenomena of terrorism and ethnic religious extremism has
to be stemmed by cooperation between India and Pakistan, in such a
manner that the latter is persuaded to not only stop whatever residual
support is being provided by its agencies but also that it takes all
other steps to discourage this. This poses a danger to the unity and
territorial integrity of both countries.
iv) India and Pakistan having become nuclear weapons powers, continuing
confrontation between the two countries has dangerous implications.
v) The international community in general and the major powers in
particular, are more directly and incrementally concerned about hostile
relations between India and Pakistan.
vi) This adversarial relationship constitutes a hurdle against India
and Pakistan becoming fuIl participants in the mainstream of economic
and technological developments in the world, preventing them from
achieving their undoubted respective potentialities.
Positive trends in operational
terms which could contribute to a process of Indo-Pak dialogue, and
some preparatory steps which would help the initiative, include:
i) India
should accept that issues related to J&K constitute a core issue
in Indo-Pak relations. There can be agreement that this is a core
issue but from different points of view, for Pakistan and India.
ii) There should not be too much focus on procedural details about
the agenda for bilateral talks. The previous discussions about having
a "composite approach" and priorities of one item or the
other, has proven to be an empty and detrimental factor against meaningful
discussions.
iii) The agenda should cover all issues affecting Indo-Pak relations
which have been part of the discussions since 1983.
iv) The priority given to different items on the agenda should be
worked out at official level discussions, but these priorities should
not inhibit either side from having parallel discussions on various
items.
v) The framework for the discussions need not be based on one specific
agreement or specific series of meetings of the past. The framework
should be extracted from the positive elements of previous agreements,
meetings and summits, on which there is a general consensus between
India and Pakistan. In fact, both sides should undertake a specific
exercise for this purpose and work out such a consensus.
The process of reviving
the dialogue should be gradual, spread over perhaps a period of one
year or 18 months. The engagement should be devoid of hype and should
display perseverance by both sides. Senior middle level officers should
commence the process, then moving on to Foreign Secretary level talks,
other Secretary level talks and finally graduating to the highest
political levels. A summit meeting should take place only when prospects
for agreements are clearly on the anvil. The process leading to the
Summit should be demystified. It should be acknowledged by both India
and Pakistan that J&K is more than a territorial dispute for both
countries and, therefore, a profound political approach transcending
the attitudes and advocacies of the past has to be adopted.
Some points of detail
are suggested:
A) India
should not hesitate to acknowledge that, to some extent, the disturbances
inside J&K are a result of alienation of the people from the Government
of India and the Government of Jammu & Kashmir.
B) Pakistan should acknowledge that there has been not just political
and diplomatic but material support to the separatist agitation from
Pakistan. There is no point in insisting that this is not so.
C) In fact, I would venture the opinion that the credibility of the
indigenous separatist movement in J&K since 1989-90 has been eroded
by active participation from Pakistan in that violent agitation. This
kind of acknowledgement of objective realities would clear the air
for meaningful discussions.
D) As far as the issue of trans-border terrorism across the Line of
Control, it is a major concern of India. There are technological means
which can be put in place to monitor this phenomena and be preventive,
if they are put in place by mutual agreement between the Governments
of India and Pakistan. This may not require the presence of external
personnel physically on the Line of ControI.
E) India should take note of assurance given by Pakistan about not
supporting militant groups. India need not insist on a complete stoppage
of all violent activities which may not be possible. If there is sufficient
evidence on the ground substantiating Pakistani assurances, India
should be responsive in conducting a dialogue.
F) Pakistan should take note of the fact that the new Government of
the state of J&K has been elected in a free and fair election
in the presence of foreign observers. There was 65 to 75 per cent
voting in the elections. The Government of Mr. Mufti Mohd Sayeed is
taking serious steps to gain the trust and confidence of people of
J&K. This process should not be questioned or disrupted. The political
stabilization of J&K can become the basis for a reconciliation
between India and Pakistan.
G) Apart from issues of J&K and separatist violence, India and
Pakistan should give particular attention to stabilizing nuclear weapons
related to the security environment in the sub-continent. The agreements
embodied in the Lahore Memorandum of February 1999 should be followed
up as early as is feasible.
H) As far as the basic issue of J&K goes, suggestions put forward
by Mr. Pervez Hoodbhoy are worth examining at the Track II level of
Indo-Pak interaction.
I) There should be conscious and assiduous attempts by the Governments
of India and Pakistan to educate public opinion on the imperative
need for the normalization of Indo-Pak relations.
I would like to make two
points in conclusion on the basis of having been a witness to the
ups and downs in Indo-Pak relations over the last 45 years:
-
First,
it occurs to me that assertive nationalism based on purely historical
memories militates against the genuine national interests of the
countries concerned.
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Second,
that it is wrong to hold the well being and future of nearly 1.3
billion people hostage to a single problem like J&K which is
not insurmountable.
