Workshop
Report
by Samina Ahmed
The workshop's primary
objective was to assess the threat of an India-Pakistan nuclear confrontation
and to identify ways of preventing such a conflict. The workshop's
deliberations and discussions reflected a range of mainly Pakistani
perceptions on the
potential of an India-Pakistan
conventional conflict and possible nuclear escalation. India and Pakistan's
nuclear doctrines and directions were analyzed with the objective
of identifying ways of minimizing nuclear risks. Finally, the workshop
examined options of resuming a dialogue between the two nuclear-armed
neighbors.
 |
| Alexander
Nikitin (Russia), Robert McNamara (US) and Abdul Sattar (Pakistan). |
The workshop was attended
by 32 participants from five countries. Pugwash expresses its thanks
to the Pakistan Pugwash Group for hosting the meeting, and to Ambassador
Aziz Ahmad Khan of the Foreign Ministry of Pakistan for facilitating
many of the logistics of the meeting
Avoiding a Pakistan-India
nuclear confrontation
From December 2001 until
July 2002, Indian and Pakistani forces confronted each other across
the international border and along the Line of Control. Concerned
about the potential for a conventional conflict that could escalate
to the nuclear level, the United States played a pro-active role in
walking both states back from the brink of war. Although the withdrawal
of troops from offensive positions has reduced the prospects of imminent
conflict, India and Pakistan's cold war continues unabated. India
refuses to resume a dialogue with Pakistan until it takes decisive
steps to end all "cross border infiltration" into Indian
Kashmir. Insisting on the centrality of the Kashmir dispute for the
resolution of India-Pakistan tensions, Pakistan continues to support
the anti-Indian insurgency in Kashmir. In the absence of high-level
and institutionalized contacts between India and Pakistan, the risk
of a conventional conflict remains high. While the potential for conflict
escalation to the nuclear level might appear low, the very fact that
it cannot be ruled out underscores the importance of minimizing nuclear
risks. Clearly, the resumption of an India-Pakistan dialogue is the
first step towards crisis de-escalation.
Nuclear doctrines and deterrence stability
There was near unanimity
among participants that tensions between India and Pakistan are at
their highest since their last war in 1971. However, many believed
that the current diplomatic standoff, defined by one participant as
a mutually assured deadlock, would not result in armed conflict. This
confidence was based on the belief that a stable nuclear deterrence
is already in place. The discussion on deterrence stability focused
on India and Pakistan's nuclear doctrines and controls, covering,
among other issues, the advantages of doctrinal transparency versus
opacity and first use over no-first use postures.
Nuclear optimists supported
opacity on the grounds that declared thresholds and redlines undermine
operational flexibility and increase nuclear risks during crises.
Proponents of opacity also argued that transparency only works in
the absence of conflict and with at least a semblance of communications
between nuclear adversaries. Absent these preconditions, as in the
case of India and Pakistan, transparency can be counterproductive.
In any case, nuclear doctrines are often misleading and at variance
with operational plans. By keeping deterrence vague and by avoiding
explication of red lines, Pakistan can also avoid a nuclear arms race
with India and keep its weapons un-deployed. This nuclear restraint,
reflected in Pakistan's policy of minimum nuclear deterrence, has
helped to buttress nuclear crisis stability in South Asia.
However, the impact of
bilateral tensions and suspicions on India and Pakistan's nuclear
directions were evident in the discussion on nuclear and conventional
force structures. While one participant pointed out the links between
India's conventional spending and Pakistan's nuclear directions, others
believed that a nuclear triad in India would force Pakistan to follow
suit. Disputing the argument made by a participant that economic constraints
would prevent Pakistani arms racing, others stressed that a nuclear
arms race already exists. The Chinese factor would also make it near
impossible for India and Pakistan to reach an agreement on what would
constitute a minimum nuclear deterrent.
In fact, Pakistan's emphasis
on opacity and its rejection of a no-first use doctrine reflects its
concerns about conventional inferiority vis-à-vis India. Nuclear
opacity and nuclear weapons capability are regarded as means of deterring
conventional war. Senior officials have implied that Pakistan could
resort to nuclear use in the event of an Indian attack, conventional
or nuclear, on its territory. However, Pakistan refuses to officially
define its nuclear threshold even as it rejects nuclear first use.
While a nuclear no-first-use policy was a luxury for Pakistan, a participant
pointed out, India would likely reverse its no-first-use posture during
a military conflict. In any case, India has already revised that policy
to cover other unconventional attacks by weapons of mass destruction
on Indian troops within or outside Indian territory.
Critics of opacity warned
that deterrence stability would elude South Asia in the absence of
greater doctrinal transparency and clarity. A participant stressed
that transparency is an important element of predictability. It is
therefore an inherent element of policy if the primary objective of
nuclear weapons capability is to deter conflict. Pakistan shunned
a declared nuclear doctrine, implied one participant, since Pakistan
military circles believed that nuclear weapons were indeed instruments
of war fighting, to be used against high value targets during the
course of conflict. A nuclear proponent who made the argument that
Pakistan's nuclear doctrine did not rule out pre-emption in the event
of even a conventional attack on its territory inadvertently supported
this thesis.
Conventional confrontation and possible nuclear escalation
Since India and Pakistan's
cold peace threatens to deteriorate into a hot war, it is important
to assess the potential of a conventional conflict escalating to the
nuclear level. Four major crises have occurred since India and Pakistan
acquired nuclear weapons capability. These recurrent crises show,
said one participant, that the assumptions on which nuclear deterrence
is based in South Asia lack substance; that both sides have repeatedly
resorted to irresponsible nuclear brinkmanship; and, depending on
external actors, mainly the United States to pull them back from the
nuclear brink, Indian and Pakistani leaders have been desensitized
by these multiple crises to the dangers of future conflict. Moreover,
in Pakistan's case, the utility of nuclear weapons goes further than
deterrence since nuclear weapons capability is used to advance Pakistan's
strategic goals in Kashmir.
Countering these arguments,
other participants argued that the manner in which earlier crises
were successfully contained is proof of the relative stability of
nuclear deterrence in South Asia. The 1990 crisis, for instance, was
resolved because Pakistan conveyed and India accepted as credible
the threat of nuclear use. In 2002, war was prevented and India forced
to withdraw its troops from offensive positions along the international
border and the Line of Control in Kashmir because of Pakistan's coercive
nuclear diplomacy. Another participant added that the 2002 crisis,
the most severe between the two states since the 1971 war, was prevented
because of four factors: Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability; international
pressure on both India and Pakistan; Pakistani restraint; and India's
successful coercive diplomacy that forced President Musharraf to ban
a number of militant groups operating across the Line of Control.
Dismissing the proposition that Pakistan's nuclear deterrent had prevented
India from escalating the 2002 crisis, and linking crisis de-escalation
instead to Indian restraint, another participant warned that enhanced
Indian legitimacy in Jammu and Kashmir following the 2002 state elections,
a buoyant economy, and the BJP government's aggressive mindset could
collectively tempt India to up the ante for Pakistan.
Concerns were also voiced
that the post-11 September international environment has adversely
affected nuclear deterrence in South Asia, both in terms of the evolution
of terrorism and the ways in which India reacts and mobilizes its
forces. Regardless of divergent assessments of nuclear deterrence
stability, there was consensus that India-Pakistan crises could keep
on recurring because of the linkage between political disputes and
military strategies. Divergent Indian and Pakistani policies towards
Kashmir and attempts to challenge the status quo increase the risk
of war. Nuclear capability is here to stay in South Asia, said a participant,
but it is embedded in and must be detached from India and Pakistan's
political relationship. If Pakistan continues with its efforts to
compel India to negotiate on Kashmir through sub-conventional warfare,
increasing costs might compel India to respond militarily. Indian
and Pakistani attitudes towards nuclear weapons are maturing, noted
another, but they don't have the luxury of a long maturation process
to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used. A more optimistic participant
believed that nuclear weapons capabilities might have made conflict
resolution more difficult, but nuclear deterrence has facilitated
conflict prevention.
Nuclear risks and risk reduction
Indian and Pakistani officials
have repeatedly assured the international community that their nuclear
assets are not threatened because of secure command and control systems
and foolproof safeguards of fissile materials and warheads. While
many participants expressed concerns about accidental or inadvertent
use, they also believed that existing nuclear safeguards and Material
Protection Control and Accounting (MPC and A) could adequately protect
India and Pakistan's nuclear assets. Hence, they resisted suggestions
that Pakistan and India adopt a broader, cooperative approach to threat
reduction. Apart from cooperation in best practices, these suggestions
included a bilateral India-Pakistan dialogue on nuclear risk reduction;
utilizing IAEA practices in civilian facilities under full-scope safeguards
and transferring that knowledge to military installations; learning
from precedents, particularly in the Russian-US context; and benefiting
from non-intrusive measures such as transfers of security technologies
through turn-key kits, as in the case of the US-Russian relationship.
US supplied kits are installed by Russia, eliminating the need for
physical intrusion by the US government, companies and experts. Some
exchanges of best safeguard practices are already underway with the
US. These include track two activities such as visits to US facilities
like the Cooperative Monitoring Center at Sandia National Laboratories.
Given Pakistan and India's
opaque nuclear weapons programs and their status as non-nuclear weapons
states within the NPT regime, not surprisingly the discussion on cooperative
approaches to threat reduction included concerns about US intentions
as well as opposition to physical intrusion. The US-Russian loose
nukes initiative aims at securing Russia's nuclear assets, said a
participant. Pakistan is not recognized as a nuclear weapons state
and would therefore oppose such intrusive US involvement. Other participants
pointed out that Pakistani stockpiles of enriched fissile material
were too small to warrant such cooperation with the US, which was
thus far limited to best practices. Insider threats and the diversion
of nuclear materials were also discounted on the grounds of adequate
safeguards and security. Participants were reminded that insider threats
must be taken seriously by all nuclear-capable states. The value of
lessons learnt from outside one's own experience and the benefits
of cooperation in safeguarding stockpiles and warheads were also reiterated.
Defense officials, said a participant, don't always have all the answers
and hence the importance of high-level political and military exchanges
to understand the gravity of these issues.
Some participants defended
the robustness of Pakistani command and control. Since a National
Command and Control authority was well in place, they argued, the
dangers of accidental, unauthorized, or inadvertent use were minimal.
However, even nuclear optimists admitted that false warning and panic
launchings could pose a threat, particularly at time of crises. Deterrence
stability will be ensured, said a participant, if both sides are reasonably
sure that their nuclear assets are survivable; if they do not use
them as instruments of coercion; and if they do not panic in case
of a false alarm. The importance of non-deployment, knowledge of mutual
capabilities and effective signaling of intentions, particularly during
crises, were added to this list of nuclear 'dos'. Others, however,
warned that poor intelligence and weak, insecure command and control
structures and centralized command increased pressures for dispersal
and delegation to commanders in the field, and hence heightened risks
of unauthorized or inadvertent use. While there was unanimity about
the importance of good intelligence to prevent war by miscalculation,
a participant advocated a technical dialogue between India and Pakistan
warning about the poor quality of intelligence.
Linkages between nuclear
risks and informed nuclear decisionmaking were also explored. It is
intellectual arrogance, said a participant, to assume that military
and intelligence services fully comprehend the dynamics of crisis
escalation. Nuclear adventurism would be forestalled if the political
leadership and the public fully comprehended the implications of nuclear
war. In both India and Pakistan, the public is poorly informed and
political leaders are ill advised by the bureaucracies that control
the nuclear weapons establishment. Apart from the need of greater
public understanding of nuclear risks, governments must refrain from
using the nuclear card to gain domestic legitimacy and to justify
defense and foreign policy directions. Leaders must understand the
importance of preventing misunderstandings that could result in nuclear
escalation during crises and ensure that avenues of communication
are kept open. There is also a need for a rigorous policy debate between
the civil and military leadership on means of bolstering crisis stability.
In Pakistan, said a participant, civilian leaders have thus far, despite
official claims, been largely excluded from nuclear decision making
by a military establishment that controls the country's nuclear assets.
Above all, Indian and Pakistani officials must rethink the premise
that there is little risk of crisis escalation since past conventional
crises have been effectively contained. In the absence of doctrinal
transparency, it would take just one misunderstanding for a future
crisis to spin irrevocably out of control.
India and Pakistan were
warned that their nuclear weapons do not ensure security since they
have little grounds for confidence in their first strike capability;
they were reminded of the nuclear risks that the United States and
the Soviet Union confronted during the height of the Cold War, and
that the US and Russia still face such risks despite technologically
superior nuclear risk reduction mechanisms and procedures. The importance
of pursuing the goal of nuclear disarmament through Article VI of
the NPT was also emphasized in response to a comment that a South
Asian nuclear rollback was not in the cards. An alternative proposal
to the NPT regime was presented. Under the aegis of the UN Security
Council, all nuclear weapons states would commit themselves to a time-bound
process of nuclear disarmament; non-nuclear states would not be permitted
to acquire nuclear weapons; failure to comply would result in inspections;
and a failure to comply would be countered by UN Security Council
authorized use of force.
Resuming an India-Pakistan dialogue
The rapidly deteriorating
relationship between India and Pakistan underscores the importance
of a resumed dialogue but neither state appears willing to compromise.
Pakistan continues to insist on the centrality of the Kashmir dispute
for the resolution of India-Pakistan tensions and is equally adamant
in its support for anti-Indian Kashmiri groups, although it insists
that its support is limited to political and diplomatic measures.
Equally insistent that Kashmir's inclusion in the Indian Union is
legitimate, and amply demonstrated by Kashmiri participation in Jammu
and Kashmir's 2002 state elections, India accuses Pakistan of supporting
cross-border terrorism in the disputed territory. While India refuses
to resume a dialogue with Pakistan until all Pakistani-sponsored cross-border
militancy ceases, Pakistan rejects Indian allegations as cynical attempts
to exploit international concerns about terrorism in the post-11 September
international environment.
The extent to which the
bilateral relationship is marred by mutual mistrust, suspicion, and
hostility is evident in the ways in which some participants viewed
Indian policies towards Pakistan. Reading India's refusal to resume
a diplomatic dialogue as the continuation of conflict through political
and psychological means, a participant said that the BJP government's
objectives were to undermine the Pakistani economy; to force Pakistan
to accept Indian hegemony; and to gain and consolidate its control
over Kashmir. Other participants believed that India had already successfully
pressured Pakistan to make concessions, referring to President Musharraf's
ban on several extremist organizations, as a result of military coercion
and diplomatic pressure. The dangers of an Indian pre-emptive strike
against Pakistan were also raised (author's note: soon after the Iraq
war began on 19 March 2003, India's Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha
said that India had a better case to initiate a pre-emptive strike
against Pakistan than the United States had against Iraq).
Although most participants
agreed that India and Pakistan would stand to gain from a resumed
dialogue, not least because it would minimize the risks of conflict,
the Kashmir issue was perceived as the most serious challenge to the
normalization of relations. The issue, said a participant, was not
one of initiating a dialogue but of strategic change, which India
translates into an end to militancy within Kashmir and Pakistan construes
as Indian willingness to enter into negotiations on the Kashmir dispute.
If only procedural talks were held, then the process would prove as
unproductive as prior dialogues such as Lahore (1999) and Agra (2001).
While some participants believed that India was exploiting the issue
of cross border terrorism to avoid negotiations, others warned of
the political, diplomatic, and military costs for Pakistan if it failed
to rethink its priorities in Kashmir. India, said a participant, was
not only more optimistic about containing the militancy within Kashmir
through political and military means but was also the beneficiary
of international support, while Pakistan was increasingly isolated.
The international community, warned another participant, will not
countenance militants who target civilians. Pakistan should thus restrict
its support to Kashmiri political forces, best placed to mobilize
the Kashmiri people and to assert political pressure on India.
The change in government
in Islamabad was seen as both a constraint and an opportunity to the
resumption of an India-Pakistan dialogue: a hindrance because of Indian
aversion to continued military dominance in Pakistan and an opportunity
because it was at the very least a political opening. Despite some
skepticism about the utility of an official as opposed to a people-to-people
approach, a number of concrete measures and mechanisms were identified
to facilitate conditions for the resumption of official talks and
to ensure their success. Three 'don'ts' were identified: don't wait
for the ideal time to engage since that would only benefit spoilers;
don't set preconditions for negotiations; don't accuse each other
or else negotiations are bound to fail; and a possible fourth don't:
don't leave negotiations to military or civil bureaucrats. Highlighting
the role of spoilers, another participant warned that the military-industrial
complex in both India and Pakistan had a vested interest in conflict
and would thus oppose the normalization of relations.
Concluding thoughts
While differences were
voiced over an agenda that would reflect the Lahore or the Agra processes,
there was general agreement on the need for quiet, low profile official
talks and for sufficient groundwork to precede a high level summit.
However, a dissenting voice warned that only summit level talks between
the political leadership would neutralize spoilers who, given the
opportunity, would try to derail the process. There was also consensus
that multi-tiered processes would prove most constructive, including
track two activities, a government-to-government dialogue and the
use of multilateral regional forums such as the South Asian Association
of Regional Cooperation (SAARC). A number of participants believed
that influential international actors, in particular the United States
but also Russia and China, could play a meaningful role, not necessarily
as mediators but as facilitators.
A wish list of useful initiatives included the following:
