Pugwash
Meeting no. 280
Pugwash Workshop
Avoiding
an India-Pakistan Nuclear Confrontation
Lahore,
Pakistan, 11-12 March 2003
Doctrinal
Doublespeak
by Lt Gen Asad Durrani
Declared doctrines are
seldom, the nuclear ones even less, the real or the practiced precepts.
During the Cold War, NATO's nuclear doctrine, progressively called
massive retaliation, flexible response, and lastly, unpredictable
response; remained in essence always ambiguous. It was also eminently
sensible. "Ambiguity deters" is the canon of all nuclear
creed. India and Pakistan, too, have propounded some elements of their
nuclear doctrines. These often have to be deciphered, and often differently.
'Maintaining minimum
essential deterrence' has been set forth as the first principle by
both the countries. Neither has given the number and type of weapons
it believes would do the job. Rightly: as these are dynamic aggregates,
and also because transparency mitigates the concept of deterrence.
Both are not essentially thinking about minimum deterrence.
Pakistan understands the
concept in terms of its ability to ensure, in case of an Indian first
strike, survival of sufficient number of its assets to inflict "unacceptable
damage" on the aggressor. It therefore intends to build a capacity
that would create at least a "reasonable doubt" that it
could do so. India on the other hand argues that since it faced nuclear
threats from Pakistan, as well as from China, it must have the ability
to deter both of them. Implications for Pakistan of the two-front
argument are two-fold. It makes assessment of the likely Indian holding
more difficult. And, in case the two countries agreed to negotiate
a nuclear balance, Pakistan would have a hard time finding a comfortable
arrangement.
India's declared no first
use of nukes is prudent. It helps mollify the detractors, unhappy
with its nuclear path, and it registers the Country's confidence in
its conventional deterrence. Of course, if India were ever to get
desperate, the policy alone would not hold it back from firing the
first nuclear salvos. Pakistan does not have the luxury of this "best
of both worlds" option, militarily or psychologically.
To start with, a Pakistani
policy of no-nuclear-preemption would not be credible. If we suspect
that in a crunch, India could renege on its promised no first use;
and if the US, despite its preeminent conventional power, was unwilling
to forego this option; who would believe that Pakistan, if in trouble
against a much larger adversary, would not use or threaten to use
its "force equalizer"? Moreover, the nuclear abstinence
prevents only a nuclear conflagration. If taken too seriously, it
may actually encourage a major conventional conflict that Pakistan
was equally keen to avoid. The people of a smaller country are also
blissfully happy in the knowledge that if their "core interests"
were threatened, the leadership had the will to defend them, as a
last resort also with nuclear weapons.
Pakistan does not identify
those core interests that, if threatened, could trigger a nuclear
retort. That is hardly surprising. These are elements of operational
planning, and stating them could betray a country's conventional limits.
Defining nuclear thresholds is also hazardous business. It suggests
to the other side when to preempt, and provides it ample justification
if it did so. Starting a nuclear war is too hard a decision. In real
life, one would be looking for any possible excuse not to make that
choice. Laying down redlines can make such avoidance more difficult.
Indian strategic plan,
the infamous Triad, to implement its apparently defensive doctrine
(minimum deterrence and no first use), sounds rather aggressive. The
contradiction can be explained if India's China argument was accepted.
However, as the Soviet build-up to meet the perceived threats from
east and south affected the West; the Triad, if developed, would create
certain effects in Pakistan. It would be seen here more as an instrument
of intimidation and preemption, than as minimum deterrence.
The magnitude of an arsenal
matters. But the nuclear game, aptly described so often, is more than
a matter of numbers. Even when preempting with superior arms, one
must consider the consequences of any enemy weapons surviving the
strike and hitting back. Mercifully, there does not seem to be a fail-safe
method to eliminate the odds.
To make sure that all
nukes in the enemy inventory were neutralized, one had to know their
exact number and location at the time of attack, and ensure that the
strike was totally effective. In forty years of their ill-will, the
NATO and the Warsaw Pact developed and deployed thousands of nuclear
weapons; primarily to insure that in successive strikes, it would
be the other side that would run out of its inventory first. In the
process, they amassed a capacity that could destroy each other and
the rest of us five times over, but never got the desired assurance.
India's projected Triad, though intimidating, had little chance of
pulling it off. There must, therefore, be some other purpose that
it is meant to serve.
Nuclear weapons serve,
in the first place, a psychological purpose. When India started its
nuclear programme, it faced no serious enough a threat from any country.
During the worst phase of its relations with China, none of its core
interests were at risk. Its hostility with Pakistan hardly necessitated
a nuclear resort. In fact, the latter's likely response in kind- going
nuclear- stood to erode India's advantage. India went nuclear in the
belief that to be counted in the big league, or in the same class
as China, it had to have the status of a nuclear power. Pakistan reacted
primarily to give heart to its people, already a bit wary in the shadow
of the Big Brother.
Our declared resolve,
to use nuclear weapons to defend our vital interests, serves again,
though not exclusively, a psychological end. We wish to reassure our
people that we had the will to pull the nuclear trigger, and we want
them to be prepared if we did. Though it makes our deterrence more
credible, but deep-down we also know that regardless of what interests
were threatened, marshalling the super-human will to blow up the region
would not be easy. We therefore try our best not having to make that
decision, and that includes keeping a potent conventional deterrence.
The only reason that Pakistan has not carried out the much expected,
and for economic reasons the much needed, reduction in its armed forces,
is the fear that it would lower the nuclear threshold.
Contrary to the conventional
wisdom, its nuclear variant that is, both India and Pakistan seem
to have decided not to develop any tactical nuclear weapons. The main
reason, once again, is a psychological one. Induction of these weapons
would mean that not confident enough of our deterrence, we were now
planning to fight a nuclear war. There are indeed some other reasons
as well: costs; the military geography of the likely war zones- where
even battlefield weapons can create strategic effects; and the wise
conclusion by both sides that their use would rapidly escalate into
a more serious exchange.
The cost and a little
wisdom are also likely to guide the two countries in making some other
doctrinal decisions. Pakistan will not be sucked into an arms race.
It will instead concentrate on securing its nuclear assets to ensure
survival of sufficient capacity that could adequately respond to an
Indian first strike. And India would most likely build a more modest
version of its Triad. Both of them will, however, continue to refine
and improve their holdings, especially the delivery means.
Command and Control of
weapons are important components of a nuclear doctrine. We have reasons
to believe that the national command authorities on both sides are
now fully functional. One of the main concerns addressed by the two
countries right from the beginning was how best to prevent false alarms:
a signal or a launch on one side, not aimed at the other, if misunderstood
could trigger a nuclear strike. Both the militaries, I believe, have
agreed on a method to take care of this problem.
Management of a nuclearised
environment is full of contradictions. Nuclear weapons should serve
the purpose without being fired, but they cannot do so unless one
was prepared for their ultimate use. The nuclear powers, while getting
ready for the worst, try to contain even minor conflicts, lest they
acquired nuclear dimensions. To deter, the conventional capability
has to be known, at times even shown. Nuclear deterrence on the other
hand works best by influencing perceptions.
It is very unlikely that
either India or Pakistan would pull the nuclear trigger. But just
the doubt that they might do so, sends the intermediaries scrambling
as soon as the tension builds up on the borders. The result is the
ultimate contradiction: nukes preventing or containing wars, but the
conflicts that might otherwise be settled by the use or threat of
force, continuing. If nuclearisation creates such paradoxes, no one
needs wonder that the resultant doctrines are so ambivalent.
But then who needs a cut
and dried doctrine with inflexible redlines and robotic adherence!
As long as we can keep these weapons well tucked away, not dangle
them for the ends that they cannot achieve, and take a long time priming
them; the Subcontinent could do without the nuclear dogma. In this
respect, both India and Pakistan have had some useful hands-on experience.
I believe the two of them have now learnt to live with the nukes,
as well as with the problems. That is both good and bad news.
