NATO Enlargement and Pugwash


George Rathjens

WHEN the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO, was proposed, George Kennan, the dean of American diplomatic historians, and a former American ambassador to Moscow, called it "the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold-War era". Other American diplomats and most of the distinguished American scholars of Soviet/Russian affairs joined him in denouncing the proposition, but there has otherwise been little effective opposition in the United States and, as best I can tell, even less in Europe. Particularly after the other fifteen NATO governments agreed in Madrid to go along with expansion, these three countries' becoming NATO members has been widely viewed as a fait accompli; again, more so in Europe than in the United States: all this, notwithstanding the fact that taking additional states into NATO requires the ratification by the parliaments of all sixteen current NATO nations of the "Protocols of Accession" which were signed by their foreign ministers last December.

The parliaments of four (Canada, Denmark, Norway and Germany) have given their consent, and debate is now underway in the United States, where approval by a two-third majority of the Senate is required. It is widely expected that the needed majority will be achieved, probably in the coming months, but it is not certain, particularly given the likelihood that amendments to the Administration's proposal will be offered. Some of these will certainly be contentious, as for example, one which the Clinton Administration and many Senators would oppose that would require a three-year pause before any additional states (Romania? Slovenia? The Baltic states? Ukraine?) would be offered NATO admission. At least twenty amendments have so far been proposed, and though unlikely, it is conceivable that one or more might survive, requiring the four parliaments that have acted to reconsider their decisions. But whether the Madrid proposal is amended or not, the parliaments of eleven more European NATO members must agree to enlargement if it is to occur. Concurrence by the other fifteen NATO countries in whatever the United States decides might be seen variously as abject, feckless acquiescence to the harsh realities of power politics, or as routine acceptance of, or deferral to, U.S. leadership on an issue that seems, at least to some states (in my view, mistakenly) of no great moment to them.

What has been the Pugwash position on enlargement, what should it be at this point in the process, and what about the roles that individual Pugwashites have played or might play? It is clear that NATO enlargement is an issue of at least some significance to many in Pugwash, for it commanded considerable attention at the Lillehammer conference and in the Geneva and New Delhi workshops since then, -- and a small workshop devoted explicitly to the subject is now scheduled for late May in Paris. Opinion has, however, been divided as to whether enlargement should on balance be considered favorable or unfavorable for European security and world peace. This notwithstanding, the view of the Council has been that enlargement would clearly be detrimental in the short run to the cause of nuclear disarmament; and it included in its Lillihammer statement the following observations.

• The decision taken at the July 1997 Madrid Conference to enlarge the NATO alliance to include new states has serious implications for international security. Whilst recognizing that these countries have a strong and legitimate desire to be accepted into the European community of nations as full and equal members, thereby enhancing their security, it seems wholly deplorable that the path to integration should be taken through a military alliance, especially when there are a multitude of alternatives, such as accession to the European Union. Among the certain or highly probable effects of NATO enlargement the Pugwash Council recognizes the following negative aspects:
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  • deterioration in the cooperative relationships developed since the end of the Cold War between the Russian Federation and the United States and other NATO countries;
  • the roadblock to nuclear disarmament through the linking of NATO enlargement to the Russian refusal so far to ratify START 2 and to the argument now made in Russia on the need to emphasize nuclear weapons as a primary counter to NATO conventional strength;
  • encouragement of political elements in the Russian Federation that support militaristic policies as a solution to Russia's current difficulties;
  • the damaging effect of extending a nuclear umbrella to new countries on efforts to achieve a nuclear-free world;
  • the creation of a new division in Europe between those countries accepted into NATO and those left out;
  • the diversion of resources from civilian development in order to pay the costs of the military reforms and modernization programs that are required of the aspirant states.

  
  

• Many of these negative aspects could be lessened if NATO enlargement were to occur with the full cooperation of Russia, and every effort should be made to engage Russia in the process.
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• Although these issues deserve thoughtful analysis, little public debate has occurred so far. This is unfortunate, not least because the costs from NATO enlargement will affect all member countries, old and new. The Pugwash Council urges that concerned citizens and groups undertake extensive discussion of these issues in national and international forums so that the final decision -- which requires a ratification by all NATO member states -- can be made on the basis of an informed public opinion.

I would highlight and elaborate on the last sentence. With the break-up of the Soviet empire and the end of ideological conflict between the Soviet bloc and the West, we have had, in my view, a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to possibly replace the costly and frightening bipolar confrontational relationship that plagued Europe for two generations by a cooperative, inclusionary one in which interstate war would be rejected as an instrument for dealing with conflicts of interest. Never a sure thing, that possibility has regrettably been eroding in the last couple of years. And for the reasons given in the Lillehammer Council statement, the American NATO enlargement proposal has been a contributing factor in this: perhaps, the most symbolic and significant one for which any government can reasonably be held responsible.

But others feel very differently. Professing that it could be enormously significant in bringing stability to Europe, the Clinton Administration has seen enlargement as a key foreign policy initiative, perhaps its most important. Still others, agreeing that the initiative was ill-conceived and unwise, contend that, with the process having gone as far as it has, rejection at this point could be more damaging than admitting Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, though not others, to NATO membership. But whether one believes, with Kennan, that NATO enlargement would be a serious mistake or with Robert Hunter, a strong supporter and until recently U.S. Ambassador to NATO, that the decision is the most consequential foreign policy one to face the U.S. Senate since the Congress authorized Desert Storm in 1990, no American who is seriously concerned about international relations and world peace can reasonably dismiss the subject as unimportant. Nor can any European.

For Pugwash, NATO enlargement is, I believe, a very special kind of issue -- perhaps, in our history, sui generis -- for we have not previously, in my recollection, been confronted with a situation where any one of sixteen parliaments could block action of such portentous consequence. On what other major military/foreign policy issue could Iceland's Althing have a vote as conceptually decisive as that of the U.S. Senate; this, notwithstanding that the populations of the two countries differ by a factor of one thousand?

Pugwash can have influence on world affairs through its public statements and publications, and because of the press coverage its activities occasionally command. I do not wish to downplay any of this, but the other mode of influence -- mutual education of participants and their consequent writing and interacting as individuals with those in other interest groups and particularly with those who inhabit the corridors of power -- can be, with respect to many issues, at least as effective; often more so. It can be hard work, requiring considerable initiative and persistance -- and often expertise, not to mention at least some degree of receptivity on the part of decision-makers to reasoned argument, and just plain lobbying, but a number of Pugwashites have done this very effectively; I think particularly on nuclear issues and those of biological and chemical warfare. But I wonder about activities relating to the NATO enlargement question. Have we, as individuals, whether in favor or opposed to the concept, done as much as the significance of the issue and the opportunities for influence would seem to justify? I think not. I am, I believe, reasonably familiar with the activities of the American intellectual community -- Pugwashites and others -- in trying to affect the U.S. decision, and believe we should have done, and should still do, more. And where are the informed activists from the other NATO nations -- and, for that matter, other European states? I know of only a few, all too few.