On June 23, 2004, Pugwash
held a meeting at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC on the issue
of the Middle East and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Pugwash meeting no.
296).
Given the inability to attend of participants from Iran's Mission to the
United Nations, because of US government travel restrictions, Pugwash
criticized strongly these travel restrictions that have
been an unnecessary obstacle to dialogue and free exchange of ideas.
Pugwash felt it important
to hold a follow-on meeting in New York that could more fully explore
Iran's position on these issues and the prospects for moving towards
a Middle East free of weapons of mass
destruction. The July 23 meeting was held at the offices of the Rockefeller
Brothers Fund in New York,
and Pugwash is grateful to Priscilla Lewis and the staff of the Rockefeller
Brothers Fund for its hospitality and cooperation.
A total of 22 participants
from four countries attended the meeting, which consisted of a single
panel session and discussion. The panel addressed regional threat perceptions,
nuclear energy production, and international concerns over existing
and future nuclear weapons in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region.
Regional themes
Discussants argued that
the best approach to Middle East disarmament and nonproliferation is
through
incremental steps, rather than through comprehensive frameworks. Attaining
the signatures and ratification of countries in the region of the NPT,
the Additional Protocol and other treaties forbidding WMDs must
be considered as a fundamental goal. WMD procurement, as a general rule,
is counterproductive and destabilizing for states in Middle East. As
a matter of deterrence, conventional forces have
amply kept the peace, whereas nuclear weapons draw considerable negative
international attention not conducive to economic progress and social
development and most importantly to peace.
Regarding the future of
the nonproliferation regime, the situations of the various Middle Eastern
States
provide different models by which to evaluate how best to strengthen
non-proliferation strategies.
The fact that Israel already has a nuclear weapons capability only complicates
the future and represents a
formidable obstacle to disarmament in the region
With Iraq and Libya no longer
poised on the threshold of acquiring nuclear weapons,
Iran is now a central issue confronting the IAEA and the United Nations
in terms of the viability of the NPT.
With Iran asserting its right to pursue a civilian nuclear program,
in conformity with the NPT,
the issue becomes one of how to ensure that this civilian nuclear capability
does stays clearly
separated from a military nuclear capability.
Iranian policies
Iranians strongly believe
in their right to acquire and develop nuclear technologies. Despite
Iran's extensive oil and natural gas reserves and production capabilities,
the Iranian leadership asserts that nuclear power holds great promise.
While it is true that, in terms of energy yield, "one pound of
uranium has as much energy as three million pounds of coal," this
incredible generating power comes with serious drawbacks:
nuclear power plants are expensive, radioactive waste is difficult to
dispose of safely, and working on such plants without total disclosure
attracts extremely negative international attention. Despite these disadvantages,
Iran seems bent on pressing ahead to complete its nuclear reactors at
Bushehr.
Despite strong pleadings from the international community, Iran plans
to continue Bushehr, because,
as one participant noted, "Iran won't be pushed around."
At the forefront of international concerns is the belief that Iran's
nuclear facilities may be intended for weapons purposes rather than
for energy production. Some participants disagreed with these perceptions,
arguing that Iran's nuclear aspirations include only visions of efficient
energy production capabilities.
In addition to a desire for nuclear energy, motivations for proceeding
with the Bushehr reactor also stem from an Iranian aversion to being
submissive to external pressures (particularly Western ones).
Iranians purport to be ready to comply with all international demands
regarding nuclear weapons, but refuse to derail their energy production
efforts.
In defense of Iran's alleged
peaceful motivations, some discussants noted that the bomb would actually
be counter-productive for Iran's security. Informal polls taken show
that many Iranians believe that nuclear weapons have no strategic value
for Iran's security. In a country where 70 percent of the population
is under the age of 30, and where priority needs to be given to development,
jobs, and economic stability, the domestic and external costs associated
with pursuing nuclear weapons would undermine Iran's future. In this
regard, what Iran needs most is stability and a fuller integration into
the international community.
Weapons-grade enrichment
Discussion shifted back
and forth between national prestige and energy as the main motivations
for Iran's nuclear program, and both need to be taken into account in
determining how to deal with Iran's nuclear policy.
In order to ensure that
Iranian enrichment capabilities do not exceed those needed for civilian
power purposes, there have been international proposals that Iran purchase
its reactor fuel from Russia. Iranian officials have rejected such proposals,
saying they do not want to be subjected to potentially inflated prices
and the uncertainties of a single, external source of supply. There
have also been calls that Iran implement "proliferation resistant
technologies." For example, there is the once-through fuel cycle,
which lowers the amount of highly enriched plutonium produced during
energy production by eliminating the reprocessing component of the fuel
cycle. Since Bushehr already makes use of low enriched uranium (under
20%), adding another technical proliferation barrier could make Iran's
nuclear activities even safer while preserving energy production possibilities.
Providing the means whereby
Iran could pursue these more proliferation-resistant technologies would
help demonstrate whether the Tehran's main objective is civilian nuclear
power or the ability to develop nuclear weapons. On the one hand, Tehran
has indicated a willingness to send its spent fuel to Russia, and thus
Iran remains frustrated that its civilian reactor project has garnered
so much criticism, especially when Iran is a party to the NPT and has
signed (but not ratified) the Additional Protocol. On the other hand,
the fact remains that, once operational, Bushehr could produce an estimated
30 bombs worth of plutonium each year.
Exceptionalism
During the roundtable discussion,
much criticism surfaced of Western policies and especially double-standards
in dealing with Israeli nuclear weapons on the one hand and the prospect
of additional nuclear weapons states in the region on the other. Participants
criticized US policies that are seen as imbalanced in terms of sanctions
vs. incentives; i.e., that sanctions are imposed on countries like Iran
that may be moving toward acquiring nuclear weapons, when no such sanctions
are levied on Israel, which already has them. Moreover, many in the
world feel that the US and other nuclear weapons states are not moving
expeditiously enough to fulfill their NPT obligations to greatly reduce
their own nuclear weapons arsenals.
This last contention was
disputed by some, who pointed to the agreement in 2002 by Presidents
Bush and Putin to reduce their respective nuclear arsenals by two-thirds,
down to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads each, by 2013. This effort,
received in the United States with bipartisan support, will certainly
prove, it was argued, to be a positive thrust toward nonproliferation
objectives.
Whether or not one believes
that the major nuclear weapons states are fulfilling their NPT obligations
to greatly diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their defense policies,
it was pointed out other countries will find it difficult to take significant
first steps towards a Middle East free of WMD's so long as Israel maintains
its current nuclear arsenal. Not surprisingly, the issue of Israeli
'exceptionalism' dominated much of the discussion. Participants argued
that "If Israel does not have to disarm, why should Iran? Or any
country in the Middle East?" Should Arab states and Iran rethink
their participation in international treaties to which Israel is not
a full party? Regarding the issue of threat perceptions, some participants
claimed that the security environment for which Israel acquired such
weapons no longer exists. The so-called existential threat to Israel
is a myth, many argued.
Others countered that the
existential existence of Israel is still challenged by many in the Islamic
world, despite a great reduction in the conventional military threat
faced by Israel from earlier decades. Islamic extremists in a number
of political and terrorist organizations throughout the region continue
to challenge Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state in the Middle
East, and many of these organizations receive substantial support from
countries in the region. Of course, it can be debated whether Israel's
nuclear deterrent has any utility in protecting Israel from these extremists;
indeed, many argue that Israel's nuclear weapons are counter-productive,
as they provide a ready pretext for others in the region to acquire
such weapons.
Complicating all discussions
of how to reach the goal of a WMD-free Middle East is the conundrum
of whether peace in the region first requires progress on WMD, or whether
a resolution of outstanding issues between Israel, her Arab neighbors,
and Iran is the prerequisite for progress on eliminating weapons of
mass destruction.
One suggestion proposed
for resolving this conundrum was to extend the nuclear umbrella (presumably
that of the US) to all states in the region as a means of reducing the
incentives of any one state for either keeping or acquiring nuclear
weapons. Others dismissed this proposal, arguing that extending the
nuclear umbrella to the Middle East would contradict the very goal of
establishing a region free of weapons of mass destruction.
A fundamental difficulty
of dealing with nuclear issues in the region is the very different nature
of the states whose policies are key to advancing the cause of non-proliferation.
While Israel is considered 'exceptional' for the free ride it enjoys
on nuclear weapons issues, Iran in some ways is an 'exceptional' state
as well for its support of groups that deny Israel's right to exist.
In addition, policymaking decisions in Iran are far less transparent
than in many other countries, thus complicating international understanding
of basic motivations. For all these reasons, Iran is treated differently
from a Japan or Sweden when it asserts its right to full access to civilian
nuclear power technologies.
Confidence building measures
and future relations
Discussants did agree that
confidence building measures must be undertaken by the United States
and Iran to improve relations in an effort to avert a world with even
a single additional nuclear weapons state. Suggestions for cooperative
efforts between both states and non-governmental organizations included:
