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March 2004, Amman, Jordan Iran's Nuclear Program: The Question of Non-Proliferation By Nasser Saghafi-Ameri
[Nasser Saghafi-Ameri is a former diplomat and a freelance writer and commentator on international relations. This paper will appear in the forthcoming issue of Discourse, an Iranian quarterly journal.] Introduction
After the 8-year war and
during the reconstruction period in Iran a revision of the abandoned
nuclear power projects convinced the authorities that such plants were
necessary, considering the growing energy need of the country and grim
prospects for depletion of oil resources in a not too distance future.
The initial approach to the German contactor of these nuclear power
plants for the resumption of their activity proved not successful due
to U.S. administration's opposition and through their diplomatic efforts
with the German government. Iran's other attempts in persuading China,
India and Argentina among several other countries with the nuclear technologies
also failed due to the same U.S. pressures. Finally it was Russia that
after a period of political humiliation after the disintegration of
the Soviet Union and while its nuclear industry was in dire need for
new contracts, declared its readiness for the completion of the first
unit of the Bushehr nuclear power plant with the capacity of 1000 mwh.
The agreement was signed in 1995 between the Iranian and Russian authorities
and the project was supposed to be completed by the year 2000. Although Iran's nuclear program has been opposed by the U.S. administration since its revival in the mid-1990s, the U.S. challenges have grown substantially since late 2002 when Iran's achievement in acquiring new technologies in the field of nuclear fuel cycle were disclosed. Those nuclear programs have now attracted the attention of many countries demanding Iran to sign the additional protocol for the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In their policies, some countries like the members of the European Union have taken a collective approach, declaring that the implementation of the additional protocol by Iran as prerequisites for the conclusion of new trade agreements under negotiation with the country. Threat
Perceptions Some experts believe it
would be easier for Iran to build a nuclear bomb from uranium, rather
than from plutonium, which requires the reprocessing of spent reactor
fuel. But even the plutonium route could be open if Iran were determined
to use it and build a reprocessing plant. As with uranium, Iran can
do this without breaking the treaty as long as international inspectors
are able to monitor each plant and track the material produced. 2
Furthermore, the critics, with reference to legal
aspects of Iran's nuclear program, suggest that the NPT also has an
escape clause. Any country that declares its "supreme interests"
to be in jeopardy can drop out on three months' notice. So the critics
of the NPT believe that, any country like Iran can walk right up to
the edge of nuclear weaponry while a full partner in the non-proliferation
treaty. Once their nuclear program matures, they would have a good chance
of crossing the line and fabricating a bomb without being discovered.3
Iran indicates that its nuclear program is benign,
legal and meant only to provide energy. It has cited its membership
in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which guarantees "the
inalienable right . . . to develop . . . nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes." But again the critics maintain
that the equipment and raw material Iran is able to use for power generation
can also give Iranians an ability to build a bomb. They claim that Iran
is moving purposefully and rapidly toward acquiring the capability.
In this regard, they point to a confidential report prepared by the
French government in May 2003 delivered to Nuclear Suppliers Group,
an organization of governments with nuclear programs; it concluded that
Iran is surprisingly close to having enriched uranium or plutonium for
a bomb.4 The French warned other
governments to exercise "the most serious vigilance on their exports
to Iran and Iranian front companies," according to a copy of the
report provided by a foreign intelligence service. The French report
said that "Iran undoubtedly controls the manufacturing process
of centrifuges and seems even able to improve it." 5
Many foreign experts as well as Iranians say that
even reformers linked to Iranian President Khatami believe that Iran
needs a deterrent against its nuclear neighbors -Israel, Russia and
Pakistan- and possibly against the United States. In this regard, reference
is often made to some unofficial opinions that support Iran's intention
to acquire nuclear weapons.6 However,
none of these revelations refutes Tehran's claims of peaceful intentions
and moreover there are differing views on Iran's nuclear capability.
Gary Samore, director of
non-proliferation programs at London's International Institute for Strategic
Studies and a former Clinton administration's security official, believes
that "They {Iranians} have made the decision to develop a breakout
capability, which will give them the option to leave the treaty in the
future and complete a nuclear weapon within six months or a year."
He concluded that "I think the program is probably unstoppable
through diplomatic means." 7 But Perkovich, the nuclear weapons expert at the Carnegie Endowment says that "I don't believe they have passed the point of no return. We should try to reverse Iran's direction by providing better, low-cost options to fuel the Bushehr electricity plant and by easing the security concerns that make Iranians, reformers and hard-liners, interested in getting a bomb.8 Also Khlopkov, the Russian nuclear expert, says the recent disclosures about the Iranian program surprised Moscow and might cause Russia to cancel a second planned reactor unless Iran agrees to stricter international inspections of its nuclear facilities.9 Daniel Ayalon, Israeli ambassador to Washington, says Israel has shortened its estimate. "The point of no return - where they are on the verge or on the way to get nuclear capabilities - is much, much smaller now, could be even a matter of a year or so." 10 The critics say there are
evidences that make Iran's nuclear ambitions very hard to deny. For
instance, Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is quoted in
a radio broadcast on August 7, 2003 saying that "Iran is among
the ten countries which have been able to produce the nuclear-fuel cycle."
He said: "Of course, it is only natural that when there is such
success they should make a commotion about it. They say 'Yes, they want
to do this and do that, they want to build [nuclear] bombs, ' and they
say other things. But this is not important. This progress has been
made as a blessing of the Islamic system." In another occasion and
in a gathering of Iranian ambassadors on August 19, 2003 Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei said "the positions of the United States and certain Western
countries, which require Iran to give up nuclear technology are unsuitable,
unjust and oppressive, and the Islamic Republic of Iran will never accept
these requests." "Iranian nuclear science is indigenous and
peaceful, and the Islamic Republic of Iran, based on religious principles,
will never use weapons of mass destruction," he added. 11 Also in a move to show its
readiness for cooperation, in an August 19, 2003 letter to the IAEA,
Iran acknowledged that it had conducted "uranium conversion experiments"
in the early 1990s that it should have reported but did not. Iran is
"taking corrective action," the letter said. 12 In response to the aforementioned accusations about Iranian nuclear program and the allegations that Iran is covertly in search of nuclear weapons, the Iranian authorities have made it clear in several occasions that Iran does not have any intention to develop nuclear weapons and its need for nuclear technology is for peaceful purposes and a rightful and legitimate policy that is pursued under the terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. For instance, it is argued that the preservation of scarce oil and gas resources for the next generation and opting for cleaner and safer sources of energy encourage Iran to seek alternative sources of energy including nuclear, solar, etc. Moreover, As far as the nuclear technology is concerned, access to nuclear technology provides Iran with the capability to develop advanced technologies for various purposes such as medical treatment, agriculture, and so on. Regional
Impact The perception of Iran's
nuclear capability is not similar in the region. The Arab world does
not share the deep distrust of Tehran's nuclear program felt in the
United States and many other countries.13 In
fact, according to a political analyst Mohammad Kamal, who also teaches
political science at Cairo University, Iran would likely increase its
popularity among Muslims in the region if it developed a nuclear bomb.
"It might add to Iran's ideological appeal," said Mr. Kamal.
"People will perceive it as the country that is capable of defending
the interests of the Muslims. So it might emerge as the leader of the
Muslim world because of its possession of nuclear weapons." Mr. Kamal says Iran does
not have what he called an evil image in the Arab world and in fact,
claims many Arabs view Iran as a friendly country.14
But not everyone agrees. Sami Baroudi, who heads
the political science department at the American University in Beirut,
says that if Iran develops nuclear weapons, it will likely be for the
defense of Iran, not the entire region. "They think this is sort
of a balance to Israel having nuclear weapons," said Mr. Baroudi,"
but I don't think anyone here expects Iran to extend its nuclear umbrella
over Lebanon and Syria. They will think that those weapons are for Iran's
own defense and not part of the political game in the Middle East."
Mr. Baroudi says while the
general population of the Arab world might favor Iranian development
of nuclear weapons, the governments of countries like Saudi Arabia,
Egypt, Jordan and most of the Gulf States would be adamantly opposed. "I think the (Persian) Gulf States will oppose that Iran has nuclear weapons and they will call for the region, the Indian Ocean and the (Persian) Gulf and the Middle East to be free of these nuclear weapons at this stage," Mr. al-Musfir said. 15 And Israel would view Iranian development of nuclear weapons as a threat. In 1981, Israel bombed and destroyed a nuclear reactor that was under construction in Iraq. But according to Mohammad Saleh, the Cairo bureau chief for the London-based Arabic newspaper al-Hayat, there are several reasons why Israel should not fear a nuclear attack from Iran. For instance, Mr. Saleh said a nuclear strike against Israel would cost the lives of Palestinians and Muslims living in and around Israel. He also pointed to the fact that despite the deep-rooted disputes between India and Pakistan, neither country has ever used its nuclear weapons. 16 Iran-US
Relations The White House, in a September
2002 global strategy report, threatened to stop North Korea and other
hostile nations before they are able to attack the United States with
weapons of mass destruction. Bush said in his 2003 State of the Union
address," The gravest danger facing America and the world is outlaw
regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons."18
At present, the question before the US administration
is what it should do about Iran's efforts to become a nuclear power.
The US government is faced
with contemplating three options. These options are intervention, pre-emption
or deterrence. Mark N. Katz in an article clearly analyses these options: Alternatively, the Pentagon
could launch pre-emptive strikes to destroy Iranian nuclear facilities.
This would also elicit outrage in many countries, but would avoid the
much greater costs that invading and occupying Iran would entail. It
is argued that under this scenario, though the hardliners would remain
in power, and would presumably seek nuclear weapons more intensely than
ever. Russia would be unlikely to stop selling both missile technology
and nuclear know-how to Iran after an American pre-emptive strike. Indeed,
a successful strike might make Iran eager to buy replacements for whatever
Russian supplies and expertise the Americans have destroyed Some American analysts believe
that the remaining option is deterrence. They argue that the United
States has pursued such a strategy with nuclear-armed adversaries for
decades. The Soviet Union, under Joseph Stalin, acquired nuclear arms
in 1949; Mao Zedong's China has owned them since 1964. These regimes
were much more powerful than Iran and much more hostile to Americans
and to the United States' democratic model. Under the knowledge that
a nuclear attack would lead to devastating nuclear retaliation, Soviet
and Chinese leaders kept their arms docile. Therefore there is every
reason to believe that Iranian leaders would do the same. Whatever their
rhetoric, Iran's leaders are neither as reckless nor as isolated from
reality as Saddam Hussein and North Korea's Kim Jong Il. Indeed, their
desire to acquire nuclear weapons could only be based on the assumption
that America is less likely to attack if Iran possesses them than if
it does not. 19 From the other side the
hard liners in the United States are pressing for pre-emptive operations
in Iran. They argue that we ought not to deceive ourselves about the
chances diplomacy can stall Iran's quest for nuclear weaponry. They
claim that Iran is now sufficiently advanced in its nuclear program
that foreign assistance is not required for building a bomb. It's just
a matter of Iranian engineering and time--in other words, the Manhattan
Project in 1943. Therefore, Washington should certainly proceed on all
fronts diplomatically against the Islamic Republic, encouraging, cajoling,
and threatening Iran's trading partners to cut off technology transfers.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should also be encouraged
to become as rigorous as possible toward the Islamic Republic, and a
massive diplomatic effort ought to be launched to arm-twist the Iranians
into signing the 1993 protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which
would allow for more intrusive inspections of their nuclear sites. Advocates
of a military option say a gap anywhere in the technological cordon
sanitaire might well be sufficient to give them the bomb. And Europeans,
Russians, and the Chinese are all now trying to expand trade with the
Islamic Republic, not shrink it. Russian atomic energy minister Aleksandr
Rumyantsev declared on May 19, 2003 that Russia has no plans to freeze
its nuclear-energy cooperation with Iran, which "has not violated
any international agreements in this sphere so far." (It is also
claimed that it is a good bet that Tehran wouldn't appear to be violating
any non-proliferation agreements until it tests its first weapon.) Iran's
critical trading partners could of course become fastidious about selling
nuclear-related technology to Iran, particularly the ever-tricky dual-use
items, at a time when they are hoping for expanding trade. Then again,
past history may hold. It seems clear that the only thing that could
compel such trading partners into a more rigorous stance toward Iran
is the certain knowledge that (1) the United States will commercially
retaliate in a massive way against them if they do not and (2) Washington
will pre-emptively bomb Iran's nuclear facilities if it does not get
maximum compliance. As Reuel Marc Gerecht suggest,
this leads to the last option: a pre-emptive military strike against
Iran's nuclear facilities. It is obviously an unappealing choice. But
it is the only option that offers a good chance of delaying Iran's production
of nuclear weapons. 20 What is also neglected in the pre-emptive military option is that although the United States might have the military power to take out whatever state it chooses, it still lacks the ability to precisely locate and preemptively target WMD, despite all the technical wizardry of its intelligence. Israeli
Factor Certain pronouncements by
the high-ranking Iranian officials have also been quoted in support
of a policy for portraying Iran's nuclear program as a threat to Israel
or to the international security has been frequently cited recently.22
Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani, head of an influential
governmental body and president of Iran between 1989 and 1997, gave
a speech on December 14, 2001, that has been interpreted widely as both
a signal that Iran wants nuclear weapons and a threat to use them against
Israel. Describing the establishment of the Jewish state as the worst
event in history, Mr. Rafsanjani warned," In due time the Islamic
world will have a military nuclear device, and then the strategy of
the West would reach a dead end, since one bomb is enough to destroy
all Israel." Mr. Rafsanjani apparently
in a bid to remove any misinterpretation of his previous statement on
the nuclear threats to Israel, noted in a sermon on Friday Prayers,
"because of religious and moral beliefs and commitments that the
Koran has created for us, we cannot and will not pursue such weapons
that destroy humanity." On July 20, 2003 Iran unveiled a new ballistic missile, the Shahab-3 that brings Israel within its range; the event was hailed as an important step in protecting Iran's security. Experts said a successful test of the Shahab-3 missile, which can carry a 2, 200-pound payload as far as 1,500 kilometers suggest that the missile is intended to carry a nuclear warhead. 23 Terrorism
and Nuclear Weapons Also it is falsely and unrealistically claimed that, philosophically, clerical Iran and al-Qaeda aren't incompatible. They say for 25 years, there has never been a real moral debate among the ruling clergy about terrorism. The cause of this tendency is attributed mainly to the enormous influx of left-wing Western thought into Iran from the 1950s onwards which has taken a terrible toll on the traditional Muslim understanding of right and wrong, because terrorism for any devout traditional Muslim is an egregious sin. Beside, the "reformist" clergy are nearly all children of the left, who have, more than their elders, soaked up the Third World political theories that countenance terrorism against "Western imperialism." These "reformist" clergy tend to be ferocious when it comes to Israel and "Zionists" abroad. 25 Iran's Security
Concerns Harald Mueller, executive
director and head of disarmament research at the Peace Research Institute
of Frankfurt, a think-tank, said "Iran has good security reasons
to be worried and to look for a deterrent," Mueller said. "It
was attacked (by Iraq) in 1980 . . . It was attacked with chemical weapons
without the international community helping." Rather than helping,
he said the "East and West" simply supplied Iran's neighbor
and enemy Iraq with "dual-use" items that could be used to
build WMD." The United States has been hostile since 1979, and
the present US government has put Iran in the 'axis of evil' - that
is, as a candidate for forced regime change. 26 In reaction to reports about
possible military attack against its nuclear plants, a member of Iran's
top security body said Tehran would pull out of the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) if any of its nuclear facilities came under military attack.
"Because we have obtained the essential (nuclear) technology, if
they attack our facilities, we will withdraw from the NPT," the
Kayhan daily quoted Dr.Ali Larijani, member of Iran's Supreme National
Security Council, as saying. "If that case arose, our activities
would go underground." 27 On the issue of additional
protocol Larijani said: "There is no reason to accept signing the
additional protocol because they (NPT members) did not help the Islamic
republic of Iran to develop nuclear technology," he added that
there is "no guarantee that the Americans, after the signing of
the additional protocol and inspections of nuclear installations, will
not invent other pretexts to accuse Iran of developing weapons of mass
destruction." 28 This is while there are some who believe that signing the protocol would harm Iran's security. For instance an Iranian expert on national and international security from the Iranian Ministry of Defense is quoted as saying that the Additional Protocol to the NPT is absolutely discriminatory and signing it would affect the sovereignty of the country! 29 But officially Iran has not yet come to a conclusion. Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman as late as August 2003 said: "We are still discussing the additional protocol" to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty."30 NPT Discrimination The New York Times warned recently in an editorial that "The international controls that contained the spread of nuclear weapons for decades are crumbling." It further advocated that the United States should lead an urgent international effort to repair the torn fabric of nuclear proliferation controls. 31 NPT Facing
New Challenges The pressures on the NPT
once again rose substantially when North Korea finally and after many
negotiations with the US and other concerned countries in the region
namely South Korea and Japan opted to formally withdraw from the NPT.
This was the first time that a country had withdrawn from the NPT and
to many analysts this marked an ominous trend, which could be followed
by other states. This alarming trend somehow also reflects the approach
toward Iran's nuclear program. Much has been said about this issue and
the potential threats that its nuclear program might pose to the peace
and security without much attention to the facts. Indeed in an objective
review of the history of the NPT there are many good reasons for concern.
However the root causes of NPT's weakness and its probable demise have
been seldom addressed. Since its inception, the
NPT was considered to be an instrument for preserving the status quo
in the form of an exclusive club for nuclear powers of that time. But
later, it was changed into a regime that was best characterized as "proliferation
management" instead of non-proliferation! With this notion, Israel
was allowed to enter the club although clandestinely and through the
back door. The same rule was applied for India and Pakistan reluctantly.
In other words once the countries established their friendship with
the US and other major powers and demonstrated their 'eligibility' for
having nuclear weapons they were allowed to join the 'nuclear club',
although reluctantly and unofficially.33 It
is with that approach and logic that countries who are considered as
'rouge states' are not even allowed to pursue their legitimate rights
for peaceful use of nuclear technologies stipulated in the NPT. The nuclear power states in the NPT have also undermined the present regime of non-proliferation by emphasizing on the nuclear weapons in their own military doctrines and by insisting on the reliance on these weapons as the main instrument for deterrence. The same countries are also not acting according to their commitments for a timetabled nuclear disarmament. Adding to this adverse policy is the America's new program for considering developing mini-nukes and other types of nuclear weapons. American
Dual Policy Conclusion The existing nuclear non-proliferation
regime established under the NPT was developed in the 1960s in a bipolar
world system. Things have changed dramatically since then. There are
now three new nuclear powers although not recognized by the NPT. In
the recent years the NPT has been seriously challenged and under heavy
strains. North Korea's decision to abandon the NPT, and news since last
February about the advanced nuclear programs of Iran have created much
concerns and anxieties in the international community. On the other
hand, US quest for new small nuclear weapons called the 'Mini Nukes'
could serve as a sever blow to the existing nuclear non-proliferation
regime. Amid these developments, the volatile relations between Iran and United States with neo-conservatives in US calling for a regime change in Iran have complicated the issue even more. The problem not only relates to the viability of the present most important nuclear disarmament treaty, namely the NPT, but it also concerns the wider regional security issues including Iran's legitimate right for access to advanced technologies. Although, there might have been lack of adequate transparency, diplomatic finesse or rhetorical pronouncements about nuclear weapons and Israel on the Iranian side, but the undeniable fact remains that Iran has not violated any commitments related to the NPT and there are no legal basis for prejudgement and depriving that country from access to peaceful nuclear technologies. Thus, it seems that to uphold the present nuclear non-proliferation regime by simply putting pressures on Iran's nuclear program is not fair and justified; although this is not to disclaim the responsibility of the Iranian side for adequately addressing the international concerns through needed transparency. However, it would be short-sightedness if some important aspects related to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons were neglected. This refers to the dual approach regarding the NPT, which allows the friendly countries to skip the provisions of the NPT while putting pressure on other states. This trend could lead to more dissents in the present regime and more withdrawals as North Korea did recently. The second point relates to the obligations of nuclear powers in fulfilling their duties under the NPT for a complete nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately nuclear powers have not done enough in convincing the international public opinion that they are abandoning the nuclear weapons in their military doctrines. Finally, it is the new nuclear posture and possible deployment of Mini Nukes by the US that could severely damage the present non-nuclear regime. Without adequate attention to the above-mentioned issues it seems that there could be little hope for viability of the present nuclear non-proliferation regime in the future. Footnotes:
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