The Third Pugwash Workshop on East
Asian Security was held in Beijing at the Daioyutai Hotel, 13-16 April,
2004, as a follow-up to the First Pugwash Workshop held in Seoul,
South Korea, in April 2001 and the Second in March 2002 in Beijing.
More than 30 participants from the US, Japan, Russia, Italy, Germany,
China, and North and South Korea actively took part in the workshop.
As last time this third workshop was exceptionally well organized
and hosted by the Chinese Pugwash Group and the Chinese Peoples' Association
for Peace and Disarmament (CPAPD).
The meeting was not only
timely but urgent due to the long impassé over the North Korean
nuclear issue. Active participation of all parties concerned including
North and South Korea made the workshop a useful forum in building
confidence and fostering mutual understanding. Shortly after the workshop,
the North Korean leader, Chairman Kim Jong Il, only two weeks after
a visit by U.S. Vice-President Dick Cheney, paid a surprise visit
to China raising high hopes for an early negotiated solution to the
nuclear problem. He conferred with the Chinese leaders and expressed
his willingness to seek a diplomatic solution to the crisis and committed
North Korea to the third round of the six-party talks. Now it is certain
that the third round of the six-party talk will be held by June this
year to find a negotiated solution to the problem. Washington and
Pyongyang have both assured the Chinese leadership that they hope
to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis peacefully with the ultimate
goal of a nuclear-weapons free Korean peninsula. If the two sides
work together and press on with six-party talks, there is much hope
for a peaceful end to the 19-month-old standoff.
The overall theme of this
workshop was how to end the Cold War between the US and North Korea,
and to create a new security framework of dialogue in order to resolve
the nuclear issue peacefully.
Situation
on the Korean Peninsula
The first session dealt
with the situation on the Korean peninsula assessing some positive
and negative developments.
On the positive side,
it was reported that private as well as official contacts and visits
between North and South Korea increased since the June 2000 summit
between Chairman Kim Jong Il and President Kim Dae Jung. The current
government is actively following this policy of rapprochement and
reconciliation. In spite of the current nuclear crisis, these contacts
are expanding cooperation between the two Koreas. More people in South
Korea feel confident that the nuclear issue can be resolved peacefully
through dialogue and engagement with North Korea. Many new communications
spurred up in spite of the crisis and direct dialogues even on sensitive
issues established, even as the US continues to reject broad engagement
with North Korea. But an increasing number of young South Koreans
regard the US as greater threat than North Korea and view the US military
presence in South Korea as the root cause of tension and instability
in Korea.
On the negative side,
the frequent US-South Korean military exercises were mentioned as
a security threat by North Korean participants. They argued that these
exercises not only increase tension but also greatly damage the North
Korean economy. The recent relocation plan of the US bases in South
Korea to outside of North Korean artillery range was interpreted as
a US plan to attack North Korea. It was pointed out that as anti-US
sentiment is growing in South Korea and inter-Korean relations are
improving, major adjustment in the US-South Korean military alliance
is needed.
Another problem mentioned
was the construction of a dam by North Korea near the border to generate
electricity that has caused much environmental damages as well as
economic losses in South Korea. In response to the dam, South Korea
constructed a dam to prevent any damages which might be caused by
an accident. Participants from North and South Korea agreed that there
must be better communication and mutual exchanges of information to
prevent such problems in the future. A South Korean participant mentioned
that the money could be used better to help the North Korean people
instead of wasting it on precautionary measures.
On the
nuclear crisis
The second session was
devoted to the on-going nuclear crisis in Korea. Although the first
nuclear crisis could be averted by diplomatic efforts between the
US and North Korea, hostility and mutual distrust between the Korean
War enemies still persist. After the Geneva Framework Agreement in
1994, North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear facilities and to remain
in the NPT regime. The US started to supply heavy oil to North Korea
as compensation for the loss of energy. The two light water reactors
(LWR) under financial commitments of South Korea, Japan and the EU
which were to replace the North Korean reactors started later than
expected. The Clinton administration, however, failed in fulfilling
the Geneva Agreed Framework with North Korea, especially the lifting
of sanctions and normalisation of relations. U.S. President Clinton
envisioned visiting North Korea near the end of his term of office
in order to strike a deal on the nuclear and missile issues with North
Korea. Due to the circumstances, however, he left office without settling
these security issues with North Korea.
Some Chinese, North and South Korean participants
For his successor President
Bush the agreement reached under Clinton was not acceptable. The Bush
administration branded North Korea as a member of the "axis of
evil" in early 2002 and even rejected bilateral talks. The US
regarded North Korea as a candidate for a pre-emptive military strike
which intensified North Korea's distrust of the US. The new North
Korean policy under President Bush was isolation, sanction and regime
change.
The second nuclear crisis
erupted in October 2002 when the US charged that North Korea was working
on a clandestine uranium enrichment program (HEU) for nuclear weapons
which it allegedly admitted during the special envoy James Kelly´s
visit to North Korea. North Korea rebuffed this allegation and insisted
that it had never admitted to the US allegation that it had such HEU
program nor that it pursued such program. North Korea states that
it had only assured that it is entitled to acquire even more powerful
weapons to defend itself against the US hostility. The US stopped
delivery of heavy oil to North Korea, as North Korea had allegedly
violated the 1994 Geneva Framework Agreement by having the HEU program,
and demanded immediate stop of the clandestine nuclear activities.
North Korea responded by restarting its reactor which had been frozen
since 1994 and asked the IAEA inspectors to leave the country. In
addition, it declared on January 10, 2003 that it is leaving the NPT
effective from the next day.
North and South Korean participants engaged in serious discussions
North Korea demanded direct
bilateral talks to resolve the issue but the US insisted on complete
dismantlement of clandestine nuclear activities before any talk could
begin. The Korean peninsula was again focal point of an international
crisis and military tension increased. North Korea seriously believed
that the US would strike even before the invasion of Iraq. With the
escalation of military tension between the US and North Korea, China
called on the US and North Korea for direct negotiations to resolve
the issue.
The Six-party
talks and their prospects
In April 2003 China succeeded
in bringing the two conflict parties together and the first round
of the three-party talk was held in Beijing. The US and North Korea,
however, came to Beijing expecting the other side would make a compromise
first and refused to negotiate directly, but they agreed to engage
in multilateral talks. The US stressed its position that North Korea
must first destroy all its clandestine nuclear activities before any
negotiation could start. North Korea insisted that the US must stop
its hostile policy toward North Korea and sign a peace treaty to end
the long hostility.
From May 2003 North Korea
somewhat softened its hard-line attitude towards the US and agreed
to join a multilateral forum including all parties in the region.
China hosted the first six-party talk in Beijing in August 2003 where
the US, China, North Korea, South Korea, Japan and Russia attended.
Although this first round of multilateral forum failed to reach any
settlement, it was a success as they agreed to meet again. The US
and North Korea failed to negotiate directly during the meeting.
After intense diplomatic
efforts by China supported by South Korea and Russia, the second round
of the six-party talk finally took place in Beijing in February 2004
and brought some concrete results. North Korea proposed to freeze
and eventually dismantle its nuclear facilities in return for the
security guarantee that the US must promise not to attack and to deliver
some economic compensation for its energy losses. South Korea proposed
to offer economic assistances in response to the nuclear freeze which
was supported by China and Russia. All parties agreed to continue
the dialogue process and to have the third round of the talk before
June 2004. In addition, they agreed to have some working group meetings
prior to the talk in order to narrow some differences on how to end
the stand-off. These working group meetings are expected to clarify
complex technical issues such as HEU and CVID.
Although there is still
a long way to go until a negotiated solution to the nuclear issue
can be found, all parties agreed that there is no other alternative
to the multilateral forum in resolving the nuclear problem peacefully.
The key to success of
the multi-lateral approach very much depends on the US stance that
North Korea should completely, verifiably, and irreversibly dismantle
all its nuclear activities before any negotiation can start. North
Korea should show more flexibility in its demands for immediate stop
of hostile policy and signing of a peace treaty by the US. It should
also consider and accept security guarantees offered by other countries
in the region. Even one US participant admitted that CVID has been
the US policy under President Bush towards North Korea from the beginning
and this leaves little room for diplomatic negotiations. North Korean
participants demanded the US to make a bold switchover in its stance
and take a trustworthy practical action, as North Korea has already
proposed to freeze and dismantle all its nuclear activities even including
the peaceful use of nuclear technology, in order to ultimately sustain
the Korean peninsula as nuclear-weapons free.
In search
of sustainable peace and stability
The third session was
devoted to the prospect of sustainable peace and stability in North
East Asia. All agreed that a peaceful resolution of the nuclear crisis
and the ending of hostile relations between the US and North Korea
are the keys to sustainable peace and stability in the region. In
addition to great expectations of the six-party talk process, there
was a serious discussion on the applicability of the Libyan model
to North Korea. It was mentioned that 9 months long secret and direct
negotiations between Libya and GB as well as the US were the key to
success in the Libyan case. A South Korean participant urged that
the US should negotiate directly with North Korea, and South Korea
should play a mediator role in order to strike a deal similar to the
Libyan case. But the North Korean participants rejected this approach
because the situation in Korea is different and the model is not applicable,
as the US must end its hostile policy towards North Korea and sign
a peace treaty replacing the armistice agreement. North Koreans stressed
that the Korean War was still not over and needs to be terminated
first peacefully.
A Chinese treat after the workshop
The two US participants
who are experienced in dealing with North Korea for many years told
the North Koreans that there were many missed opportunities in the
past. According to them, North Korea missed these windows of opportunities,
mainly due to its inflexibility and misunderstanding. They urged North
Korea not to wait until the change of administration in the US but
to be prepared for the next window of opportunity.
In the final session there
was an open discussion on the feasibility of the six-party talks as
a new security framework for the region. Although the benefits of
such an institution in the region were mentioned, however, due to
the uncertainty of the multilateral dialogue process and the military
tension on the Korean peninsula, it was clear that it is still premature
to talk about such a security mechanism in the region. In the meantime,
neutral institutions such as Pugwash Conferences on Science and World
Affairs could and should continue to provide a forum for informal
dialogues among experts and policy makers to build confidence and
to improve the security environment.
All in all, the workshop
was a success as many renowned experts from all countries concerned
got together and shared background information as well as different
perspective on various issues. It was clear that there are different
perceptions on threat and security interest, especially on the nuclear
issue; therefore, such dialogue is much needed in order to better
understand each other's position. The workshop certainly contributed
much in building confidence and in understanding the complex issues
affecting regional security and stability. Immediately after the workshop,
Secretary General of Pugwash, Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, and Pugwash
Council member, Dr. Mark B. M. Suh, visited North Korea in order to
seek further dialogue with North Korean authorities and to discuss
about future Pugwash activities in the region. The Fourth Pugwash
Workshop on East Asian Security was agreed to be held in Pyongyang
in the near future.
