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NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENCE (NMD) A Proffered
Paper for the By Major-General (Ret) Leonard V. Johnson The American program to devise and deploy a missile defence system known as National Missile Defence (NMD) is strongly and widely opposed for various good reasons, including fears that it would lead to revival of the nuclear arms race. That dire outcome is by no means inevitable, however. Indeed, it is possible that a defence against the limited attack capability of so-called "rogue" states or accidental launches by nuclear weapons states could eliminate the triggering event that might otherwise ignite the nuclear holocaust of mutual assured destruction. If it was linked to drastic reductions of strategic weapons, it could further the implementation of Article 6 of the NPT. President Reagan's Star Wars dream was to make nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete," thus replacing mutual assured destruction with assured defence. Technical and strategic objections aside, the strategic defence initiative made sense to people dissatisfied with the suicide pact of mutual assured destruction. Its successor, NMD, has the same appeal. If its technological problems can be overcome, its deployment may well be inevitable. In that case, it would be better to turn the situation to advantage than to protest impotently. In a February statement on television, President Bush linked NMD to nuclear disarmament, implying willingness to scrap or drastically reduce the U.S. nuclear arsenal in favour of a limited defence against "rogue" states, now "states of concern" in the jargon. . On July 22, George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin issued a statement linking an agreement on U.S. missile defense plans to cuts in both countries' nuclear arsenals. Doing so would honour commitments under Article 6 of the NPT and remove the threat of mutual destruction in the only possible way. Indeed, implementation of Article 6 should be a condition of acceptability to NATO allies and other concerned parties. Instead of opposing NMD without a fair hearing, people should be looking at how missile defences might further the nuclear abolition objectives of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Without an American strategic arsenal to justify Russian and Chinese retaliatory preparations, and with defensive weapons available, those states might be persuaded to follow suit, scrapping weapons no longer needed for retaliation against nuclear attack. With an alternative to nuclear deterrence available, states who might otherwise develop nuclear weapons might desist. One incentive might be to make theatre missile defence technology available to any state that wanted it, or even to develop it jointly. Without the means to defend its forward bases against missile attack, moreover, the U.S. could not maintain its security guarantees to allies who depend on them. This could provide an incentive for them to go nuclear. If NMD deployment becomes inevitable, then efforts should made to turn it to advantage in the cause of nuclear weapons abolition. It should not, and need not, provoke a revitalization of the threat of nuclear retaliation as the only deterrent to missile attack with weapons of mass destruction. The challenge is to move technology from the realm of strategic competition to that of strategic cooperation to the benefit to all. Major-General (Ret.)
Leonard V. Johnson |