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Idealism
Vs. Realism: April 27-May
3, 2001 By Ejaz Haider Ejaz Haider looks at the complexities involved in the issue of nuclear disarmament - brought to the fore, yet again, not only the problems of nuclear disarmament but also the dilemma faced by Pugwash itself. A quick run-through would perhaps help set the premise. The NNPT (Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) was never pegged to (complete) nuclear disarmament. This, despite the pious intentions of article VI, since amended further to purge it of any ambiguity. The treaty was, and remains, the corner stone of nonproliferation efforts, legitimising the possession of nuclear weapons by five powers while denying the capability altogether to every other state (at least until such hypothetical moment in history when the five nuclear weapon states decide to go non-nuclear). The Five-Vs-the-Rest formula is therefore at the core of nonproliferation. The other plank relates to the nuclear arms control measures. Arms control moved bilaterally between the United States and the Soviet Union from arms limitation to arms reduction during the cold war and has continued between the US and the Russian Federation. There have also been unilateral measures taken by the five nuclear weapons states to cut down on the numbers of weapons and reduce the operational salience of such weapons or, retain the capability at lower levels. However, at no point has any of the NWSs shown any inclination to move towards the abolition of nuclear weapons. The situation is complex. Indeed, far from achieving the ideal of complete disarmament, as the 2000 NPT Review Conference envisages, even the (discriminatory) nonproliferation regime is today under threat of unraveling. South Asia is overtly nuclear; missile proliferation is a reality and the US is very likely to push ahead with some form of missile defence. While it may achieve this by cutting down on offensive nuclear weapons and bolstering its defensive capability (passing that off as an arms reduction measure itself), it will definitely result in China - and Russia - putting more premium on nuclear weapons and modernising its offensive nuclear weapons. Not only would such a development put paid to arms reduction but it would also unravel the nonproliferation agenda. Together, these developments would take the world further away from conditions congenial for complete disarmament, if such conditions could ever exist, a questionable proposition in itself. A further problem is presented by the regional nuclear weapons states, their ambitions, their security dilemmas etc. In most cases, their threat perceptions relate to ongoing regional conflicts. India may harp on the ideal of disarmament before it would agree to abolition of its own capability, but the operational reality of its capability relates to Pakistan, a perceived threat from China and the perceived nexus between China and Pakistan. Pakistan, for its part, sees India as its biggest security threat. Israel looks at its nuclear capability in view of its fear of obliteration. None of these countries, and they are by no means the only ones in the game, are likely in the foreseeable future to roll back their respective nuclear capabilities. In fact, if anything, the regional scenario would probably require, as one moves further into the new century, a different paradigm, one with greater emphasis on managing nuclear weapons sans overt deployments, rather than abolishing them. In fact, the non-deployment scenario itself presupposes that the goalposts will remain the same and the US missile defence will not result in changing the nature and hue of the game. Not surprisingly, Pugwash faces the fallout of these developments. At the very top of the movement there is tension between the idealist and the realist approaches. It came through clearly in the two background papers by Sir Joseph Rotblat (idealist) and Prof George Rathjens (realist). Rathjens, the secretary general of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, put across four propositions: Why do states go nuclear and stay nuclear? Can states be de-motivated in regard to possessing nuclear weapons? If so, would that require extending security guarantees, and by whom? Rathjen's proposition here seems to imply the existence of some nuclear weapons possessed by a certain state which could conceivably extend security guarantees to other state(s) to dissuade them from going nuclear or rolling back their programmes. This implication comes through in his second proposition. If the US gives up its nuclear weapons, would that not reduce its credibility as a guarantor of the security of, say Japan or South Korea, forcing these countries to develop their own nuclear capabilities? Even if it were accepted that a nuclear weapons free world is possible, how would we, in the short term, deal with any holdout states? Would we need to use multi-national forces to attack and destroy the capabilities of such states? If so, by whose authorisation and under whose command? The proposition again presumes the existence - at least until such time that the holdout states are purged - of nuclear forces even if within a multi-national framework. But could the holdouts not argue that they are holding out precisely because some states, individually or as conglomerates, still possess operational nuclear forces? After all, the perceived or real strategic compulsions of one state cannot be considered holier than those of another. Also, what is the guarantee that after the holdout state(s) has been purged of its capability that the hypothetical multi-national force - or some elements within that conglomeration - will voluntarily give up its nuclear weapons?While Pugwash plays down the difference between the idealist and the realist viewpoints as one relating more to approach than substance, it should be clear from the propositions listed above and the possibilities and questions implicit in them, that the two approaches may in fact be mutually exclusive. Rotblat debunks the theory of deterrence. He looks at the ethical dimension of the issue, talks of a comprehensive no-first-use treaty, a verification mechanism for nuclear disarmament and strengthening and extending nuclear weapons free zones. He also rejects the bomb-in-the-basement and the breakout arguments even as he concedes that no verification mechanism can be fail-safe. His approach is essentially informed by ethics. Unfortunately, states' possession of nuclear weapons is pegged to factors other than ethics. agenda. The movement's strength lay in the past in doing the doable; or getting things done. That is why it, and Sir Joseph Rotblat himself, earned the Nobel Peace prize in 1995. But it is precisely at this point that Pugwash's dilemma begins. It could do what it brilliantly did until the agenda was pegged to nonproliferation and arms control; until the US and other nuclear powers wanted it to provide them a forum where they could not only reach out to each other but also take steps to get other states to agree to nonproliferation. Now it has to contend with the nuclear weapon states. How does it go about convincing them to completely disarm? Suddenly, there are no buyers for the idealist approach.But neither does the problem end here. The realist approach itself is likely to end up providing an underpinning to the nuclear weapon states' security agenda by emphasising management rather than abolition of nuclear weapons, precisely the outcome that Pugwash wants to avoid. It faces a catch-22. © 2001 - The Friday Times |