|
||
|
|
|
The 57th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs Speeches Report of the Secretary General 2007 Pugwash: A Movement with Many Facets Pugwash is the oldest thriving non-governmental organization dealing with the problems of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament, and more generally, of weapons of mass destruction. Based on the Russell Einstein manifesto, it deals naturally with the conflicts (actual or potential) that involve States or entities possessing such weapons or that may possess such weapons in the near future. Pugwash was founded by scientists who believed that putting the nuclear genie back into the bottle and controlling and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons was the main social responsibility of scientists, especially of those who helped build the nuclear bomb. So despite the fact that it may appear as a one-issue movement, Pugwash in reality had and has many facets and components. In Pugwash we have always been involved in calling the attention of public opinion as well as of policy makers to the fact that nuclear weapons are ultimately incompatible with the progress and even the existence of mankind. Pugwash involved scientists, policy makers and expertsall taking part in their personal capacity and coming from different countries, political-ideological and religious backgroundswho could be influential in the choices made by their governments and their respective political headquarters. This is something that in modern terminology we call promoting track II initiatives. Pugwash dealt naturally with people belonging to opposite and conflicting fronts; the ensuing interaction between these fronts has been on many occasion an important element of conflict prevention and/or conflict resolution. Finally, having been founded by scientists who had been directly involved ino the fabrication of weapons with terrible devastating consequences, Pugwash has always stressed the need for the scientific/technological community to keep in mind the social responsibility of its actions. From an organizational point of view, Pugwash has been always very flexible, resisting temptations to stumble onto the bureaucratic path that plagues other organizations. Pugwash is geographically widespread, and being now present in about 50 countries, it is truly an international organization and not an international NGO set up and controlled by, say, a mother-house of a specific country. Finally, Pugwash is not a mini-UN, where unanimous universal consensus is required among the representatives of different countries to do anything; in fact, most actions are carried out and implemented by Pugwash's (very slim) central structure. A changing international environment for the problem of nuclear weapons All these many facets of Pugwash's work have been instrumental in allowing Pugwash to face a rapidly changing international environment and to adapt to new situations. The most important changes with which we are concerned are of course those connected with nuclear weapons, their numbers, the countries possessing them and the relevant nuclear policies. End of the Cold War but very limited disarmament Over the last 15-20 years the confrontation between the two main blocs (US-Russia) changed nature in many ways. In particular, the number and characteristics of nuclear weapons ceased to be considered as one of the main (if not the main) measuring sticks for the power confrontation. But the reduction of deployed nuclear weapons made possible by the arms control agreements of the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s was not pursued to the point of getting below the existing level of several thousand warheads in the hands of the two main nuclear powers. So, despite the end of the Cold War, nuclear disarmament was and still is beyond the horizon, while the relevance of nuclear weapons as a symbol of power has been preserved, albeit in a different framework and without the extreme emphasis on the bilateral competition that was typical of the Cold War period. Moreover, with the exception of South Africain its transition period to the post-apartheid erano country dismantled its nuclear arsenal. As the aura of nuclear weapons as a currency of power has been preserved, so are the worries of non-nuclear states that are antagonized in various ways by nuclear countries. The demise of arms control During the Cold War, given the centrality of nuclear weapons in the East-West confrontation, arms-control treaties and talks about nuclear weapons became the key element of the more general detente and peace process. Discussing nuclear arms control was probably the most relevant conflict prevention initiative. This was significant even for track II initiatives or for non-official talks. After the end of the Cold War, attention to bilateral arms control or bilateral arms reduction inititives dropped dramatically, even though the risks associated with nuclear weapons are far from having been eliminated. Moreover specific arms control agreements have been dismantled (such as the ABM treaty), prompting a possible chain reaction that in due time may bring the whole system of arms control inherited by the Cold War crashing down. As a matter of fact, there are now very worrisome symptoms of a possible renewal of the US-Russian arms race. Nuclear proliferation after the end of the Cold War The problem of nuclear proliferation, which was kept under relative control in the Cold War period by the bipolar system, acquired a new dimension in the post-Cold War period. Generally speaking, a country may be motivated to acquire nuclear weapons for a combination of prestige-related motivations and concerns about its own security. Despite the end of the Cold War, prestige associated with nuclear weapons has been kept unfortunately high by the lack of disarmament, both in absolute terms and considering the trend over the last 15 years or so, and even by the persisting identification of the five offcial nuclear powers with the permanent members of the UN Security Council. As for security concerns, those obviously did not disappear with the end of the Cold War. In some cases the lack of a bipolar equilibrium exposed some countries to hightened levels of pressures from the only superpower left; in other cases, tensions between more powerful nuclear countries and smaller non-nuclear countries encouraged the smaller countries to consider becoming nuclear at least as a form of insurance policy. In the post Cold War period we have seen three countries added to the list of five official and one unofficial nuclear power states. The number of nuclear countries is still low, but we should not forget that almost half of mankind now belongs to countries that possess nuclear weapons. More countries may be on line to acquire nuclear weapons, and some countries have been suspected of having an interest in nuclear technologies, and not for civilian-only purposes. Bad and good proliferators The non proliferation policy of the major powers and particularly of western states has recently put more emphasis on coercing potential proliferators rather than on building a general consensus for the non proliferation goals. Sanctions and even war have been used as an instrument to prevent real or only suspected proliferation. And paradoxically, the closer some critical countries have come to the nuclear threshold, the more they have been treated with caution and respect. Even more, new nuclear or potentially nuclear countries have been divided into good and bad proliferators [or potential proliferators]. The good ones have been "forgiven" and rewarded in various ways, with the result that the "bad" ones have been induced to progress more rapidly in the nuclearization process. Renewed interest in nuclear energy Other elements which are important in understanding the high proliferation risks that we are now facing is the renewed interest in nuclear (civilian) technology for energy purposes, considering the relatively thin barrier that separates military from nuclear civilan activities, and the fact that military nuclear technology is, in its less sophisticated aspects, a technology which is about 60 years old and hence pretty accessible. The main technical obstacle to nuclear proliferation remains of course the availability of fissile material, the control of which is of course very important. It is also important that Pugwash support all forms of international control of the production, storage and transfer of fissile materials. Pugwash’s task to reach out to regions and countries where proliferation is a problem In a world with more nuclear independent actors than in the Cold War period, an organization like Pugwash should not only support in general terms the goals of nuclear disarmament and non proliferation, but also extend its presence to new subjects and areas and try to address the dividing issus or the sources of conflicts that may affect areas where nuclear weapons are present or nuclear proliferation may be a serious risk. This has been part of a great effort made by Pugwash in the past quinquennium. The cold war does not provide the only model for handling confrontation betwen nuclear states or potential proliferators: sources of conflict unrelated to armaments The Cold War model of how the confrontation between nuclear states developed, was handled and eventually reduced does not necessarily apply to the various actual or potential nuclear subjects that exist today. There are a variety of divisive factors that might today trigger a military nuclear action, or induce one country to seriously damage the non proliferation regime and the NPT treaty. Addressing these factors is important for any organization whose priority is preventing the acquisition, spread and particularly use of nuclear weapons. For example, the issue of Kashmir can be more relevant in triggering an Indo-Pakistani confrontation than, say, the number of weapons that are targeted across the border or the Line of Control. The "new" terrorism Another important change from the Cold War period is the role of terrrorism . On the one hand, it is apparent that, given the availability of fissile material and particularly of HEU, terrorist groups could produce a nuclear bomb or a nuclear explosive device. On the other hand, the relevance of terrorist organizations has increased over the last years, especially since 911. In particular, a viewpoint has gained ground by which societies are attacked from within, often by random destruction, so that from the ashes of destruction a new order might possibly be built on the basis of "new" ideas. This sort of millenarist approach has found a fertile breeding ground in the aftermath of a series of crucial mishandlings of some specific critical situations (Afghanistan, Iraq and the Middle East in general). And from the point of view of nuclear risks, it is undoubtedly relevant, since the only thing standing between a consistent number of motivated individuals and a nuclear terrorist attack is the availability of fissile material which, especially after the demise of the Soviet Union, should not be underestimated. One point of extreme importance in dealing with terrorism is not to identify all radical groups with actual or potential terrorists. Recent policies in the Middle East in particular do make this kind of confusion, complicating immensely the problem. If radical groups are indiscriminately identified with and treated as terrorists, then the number and the influence of terrorists is bound to increase dramatically. Engaging radical groups, allowing them to operate within a framework where some basic rules are respected, and understanding their social basis, can be a complicated but necessary task. Back to square 1: promoting nuclear disarmament and stenghtening the NPT One of the widespread myths used to justify the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament is that nuclear proliferators are not influenced by either the lack of or progress in disarmament. The lack of nuclear disarmament creates an international climate where nuclear weapons are considered both a currency of power and an instrument of dominance. Reactions to this climate have different and often unpredictable time scales, but this climate is defining the environment, and countries sooner or later are induced to follow the example of the more powerful states. Art. VI of the NPT is not a token compensation for the non-nuclear states. It was, and is, meant to be a clear committment. The distinction between good and bad proliferators is not so much injust as it is conterproductive. It increases the fatal attraction towards nuclearization. Equity and fairness in the NPT is, in the long run, the most effective way to handle proliferation risks. A special word is also needed to support the preservation of the present architecture of arms control agreements and, in fact, to improve it, while avoiding that certain dubious choices, such as the deployement of BMD systems, jeopardize the existing agreements. Improving control of critical material and nuclear technology A big effort is needed in many directions to improve the control of fissile material and to secure the development and spread of nuclear technology against the risks of nuclear proliferation. Many ideas are on the ground, from improving safeguards to establishing international centers for the production of nuclear fuel. Many of these ideas will not be implemented if there is the perception that these measures are unfairly imposed on certain states. Countries interested in extending the production of nuclear energy are not even interested in signing the IAEA additional protocol, not to mention the idea of cooperating with more advanced safeguard constraints. The idea of imposing safeguards or even denying access to parts of the nuclear energy production process on the basis of the right of the strongest risks being totally ineffective, and can be a stimulus for further proliferation. A special mention should be made on the need for monitoring efforts aimed at securing separated (excess) fissile material and stored or dismantled warheads. This was a crucial problem which Pugwash dealt with in many past meetings and for which there is intense international activity. The widening of these activities so as to involve countries other than Russia is also important if the issue of nuclear terrorism is to be taken seriously on a world-wide level. Dealing with the root causes of hostility and conflicts in regions where nuclear weapons are a relevant factor. Stabilizing situations where nuclear weapons are an important factor (whether existing or potential) requires dealing with complex issues, of which military (or nuclear) confrontation is only one. Hostility between countries or populations can come from territorial, religious, cultural and economic motivations. It can be the result of recent misgivings, or antagonisms rooted in the past. Addressing those issues and promoting dialogue across borders or across dividing lines can contribute substantially to lowering tensions and to promoting a better relations that can have an effect on military stability. The point to underline here is that lowering the risks of conflict (possibly with nuclear weapons) and promoting reciprocal engagement centered on the sources of hostility is a two way-street. The Pugwash method of bringing together critical people from different fronts What Pugwash has done in the past and intends to do even more in the future is to facilitate dialogue between key people coming from antagonistic countries or populations. The dialogue that Pugwash is promoting is often very private and unpublicized and, I would add, unassuming, since immediate results are hardly ever expected. These kinds of meetings usually involve a very limited number of participants. But it should be added that in the critical situations we especially have in mind, such as the Middle East, South Asia, North East Asia and other places, the very fact of opening a dialogue among selected people across the dividing lines is a major undertaking, and any result in this direction carries in itself an important weight that is not to be underestimated. Transferring people across borders or having people sitting together from different fronts is at times both very difficult and very important. Dealing with other types of WMD and with conventional weapons There is a long tradition in Pugwash of dealing with the control and/or limitation of some specific type of weapons. These include non-nuclear weapons that are also called (properly or improperly) weapons of mass destruction. Chemical and Biological weapons pertain to this category. Other types of conventional weapons, from cluster bombs to the widespread use of small arms in critical areas, have also drawn Pugwash’s attention. Back to the future: the global responsibility of scientists and decision makers Pugwash was initiated by a group of scientists (mainly physicists) interested in dealing with the consequences of their scientific activity and its horrible results on the world. Our founder Jo Rotblat belonged to this category of scientists. We should recall that he was the only one who left the Manhattan Project when it became clear that Nazi Germany would not produce an atomic bomb. In abandoning working on the construction of the bomb before the final result, he gave us a message that we still cherish as the key element of our activity. Scientists, policy makers, decision makers and military leaders do not have only an obligation or loyalty only to their country or own political-religious frame of reference. They have more and more a global responsibility. Our behavior on this planet should take into consideration the living conditions of all of us. Policy makers or scientistsif they do not interact with analogous decision makers or scientists from different countries or political-cultural-religious environmentsquite often do not grasp the real essence of this global responsibility. Global responsibility is fully understood when comparison, engagement and cross cultural exchange is allowed. Pugwash is an instrument for this type of reciprocal engagement. It is, and has always been, a small organization, but we have the presumption to believe that even after 50 years, we still play a role in strengthening global responsibility. * * * Annual (Quinquennial) Pugwash Conference Bari, Italy, 22 October 2007, Plenary Session on “Fifty years of Pugwash: 1957-2007” I have been asked to talk for 20 minutes on 50 years of Pugwash, from the first meeting in Pugwash, Nova Scotia, in July 1957, to this meeting in Bari, over 50 years later. I am honoured by this assignment, but I am also reminded that the main reason this task was assigned to me is because I have become -- by the simple feat of surviving long enough one of the most senior Pugwashites around, having attended my first Pugwash Conference in 1965 (in fact also in Italy, in Venice). To excel in seniority is not particularly pleasant…it seems yesterday when I used to be the junior member in my crowd… I do not plan to dwell at all on the history of Pugwash; I leave happily the difficult task to summarize half a century of Pugwash history to Sandy Ionno, who being herself a Pugwashite -- has been investigating over the last years these developments with the diligence and competence of a historian. I will rather try and outline what have been in my opinion the distinguishing features of Pugwash, that underlie its unique nature and have in my opinion underpinned its remarkable effectiveness. I repeated twice the caveat “in my opinion”: this is of course obvious in Pugwash, corresponding indeed to the golden rule underpinning the very essence of Pugwash, the fact that here everybody talks for oneself. It also implies that what I will say need not evoke universal consensus. It is perhaps appropriate to elaborate a bit on this notion that everybody in Pugwash talks for oneself: not as representative of a nation or any other type of group or constituency. This fact has played a fundamental role in Pugwash, fostering useful dialogues. It is inconsistent with the notion that you might have to support an argument because you have been mandated to do so. It is an essential underpinning of the scientific approach based on give-and-take open-minded dialogue that has been at the very root of the Pugwash methodology. Give-and-take open-minded dialogue among individuals, especially among individuals with quite different backgrounds. Different nations, different ideologies, and also different competences: scientists, but also diplomats, military experts, international relations specialists, political scientists and politicians, etc. At the beginning most participants in Pugwash discussions and activities were natural scientists, indeed mainly physicists. This was congruent with the initial focus of Pugwash on the danger of nuclear weaponry. This prevalence of physicists provided undoubtedly an element of commonality among the participants to Pugwash meetings and activities at the beginning and through the Cold War period an element of commonality that did play a significant role in fostering useful exchanges across the Cold War divide. Physicists -- however passionately they might be communists or anticommunists -- shared their entire professional backgrounds, indeed their very way of thinking. But already before the end of the Cold War, and even more so recently, the need became evident to involve as well -- indeed, more and more -- individuals whose backgrounds are not in the natural sciences. This was clearly essential in order to promote the Pugwash agenda: arms control and disarmament, conflict resolution, a better future for humankind. Another characteristic of many -- indeed, at least in the early period, perhaps of most -- Pugwash participants, is to be, in some sense, “eminent” individuals -- internationally eminent, and/or within their societies. Of course not all of us; yet, quite a few of us. This is a delicate point, yet I would be remiss to gloss over it, because the effectiveness of Pugwash in pursuing its goals has been greatly influenced by this fact. Yes, Pugwash is an elitist group; it is not, and it never tried to be, a mass movement. Although it also always tried to influence public opinion at large, for instance by issuing statements and by publishing books -- indeed, it always felt a responsibility to do so, never forgetting that its very origin -- the Russell-Einstein Manifesto -- was indeed addressed to the general public no less that to fellow scientists and decision-makers. [Am I eminent? Keynes was once asked whether someone could be trusted. He replied: “Is he trustworthy? Certainly. Is he absolutely trustworthy? I wonder.” So, am I eminent? Certainly: I am not the typical “man in the street” or “house-husband”. But how eminent? I wonder. And for sure in Pugwash there have been and there are many individuals much more eminent than me…]. Eminent individuals -- almost by definition -- have more chances to influence events: to cause or prevent certain significant developments, to advise decision-makers, to affect the thinking of other eminent individuals. By the strength of critical analysis, the introduction of new ideas, intelligent persuasion. Much of it person-to-person, or via small group dynamics. Indeed the most important achievement of Pugwash -- albeit the most difficult to document precisely -- has been its contribution to that change of mindsets which eventually caused the end of the Cold War. I also believe that without the contribution of certain key statesmen -- primarily of Mikhail Gorbachev -- this extraordinary change might not have occurred. And it is indeed not by chance that Pugwash enjoyed a positive interaction with Gorbachev, who sometimes championed ideas that had been invented or at least elaborated in Pugwash: such as “defensive defence”, namely a defensive posture minimizing threatening aspects; or “sufficiency” in nuclear forces rather than “parity”, the latter concept -- parity -- having been -- in a world inevitably characterized by asymmetries -- a main engine driving the arms race, yielding those absurdly excessive nuclear arsenals that are still plaguing us. Not to mention that prospect of total elimination of nuclear weapons that seemed for a moment in sight at the Reykjavik meeting among Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev, and that seems now -- at least in the USA -- becoming again fashionable -- at least among quite a few individuals who held key decision-making roles in the past. To the extent this is opening up a real possibility of paradigmatic change, Pugwash has undoubtedly an important role to play in this hopeful development: the next two years might be crucial in this respect. This will continue our activity -- going back to the very origin of Pugwash 50 years ago and being pursued since as the main focus of our endeavour that was recognized by the award of the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize to Joseph Rotblat and to Pugwash “for their efforts to diminish the part played by nuclear arms in international politics and in the longer run to eliminate such arms”. Many other Pugwash accomplishments could be listed, let me tersely outline a few. Important contributions towards the achievement of the main arms control treaties sometimes via the introduction and elaboration of new ideas, often by engaging key negotiators and policy-makers via what is now called a “track two” methodology (or even “one plus one half track”, a term our Secretary General jokingly used in our Pugwash Council two days ago, reporting on recent Pugwash consultations involving directly top decisions makers). I already mentioned the Pugwash activities relating to nuclear weaponry, a detailed review of which would require more time than I have now. Yet let me spend a moment to underline an instance -- the ABM Treaty -- in which the very idea of such an arms control development emerged in Pugwash and Pugwash was instrumental in promoting its acceptance, which was then instrumental in avoiding a nuclear arms race even more diverging than the one we witnessed: indeed we see now the negative consequences of the demise of that treaty. Pugwash also contributed towards the achievement of the Chemical Weapons Convention, towards the ban of biological weapons, towards the prohibition of certain kinds of conventional weapons, limitations to the arms trade, reductions of conventional forces; and of course, whenever and wherever we saw an opportunity, to the resolution of specific conflicts. Perhaps a hint at the methodology of our work may be given by recalling when, at a certain stage of the long gestation of the Chemical Weapon Convention, a group of negotiators from the key countries met regularly, once or twice a year, for two weeks in Geneva. Then we convened a Pugwash Workshop in the weekend in between, at which we invited outside experts and all the main negotiators -- who, lo and behold, rather than taking the opportunity of that weekend to rest and enjoy the Alps, did come to our Workshop and engaged in a round of exchanges with outside experts and among themselves, conducted in the Pugwash way: whatever they said was off the record and did not represent an official position committing their countries, and the goal was to seek consensus. There is no doubt that this contributed substantially to the final agreement on the text of the Chemical Weapons Convention, that bans altogether an entire category of weapons of indiscriminate killing and sets up a verification system to back this ban. It was then signed and ratified by most (if unfortunately not yet by all) countries. Let me dwell a bit more on the methodology of our work. To be effective, it required -- as I already emphasized -- the involvement of eminent and influential individuals, from all relevant camps. Most often than not, this required that such perspective participants be guaranteed that their participation not be taken advantage of for propaganda purposes. A commitment in this sense by all participants has therefore been a fundamental rule of Pugwash, no less valid today than through the entire half-century Pugwash history. It entailed and entails a considerable amount of restraint also for Pugwash itself -- I mean its leadership -- hence the tendency of Pugwash to stay away from the limelight. No secrecy, but caution, and the avoidance of hype, in the relations with the press and the media. This for instance explains why it has been possible for Pugwash -- in spite of its clear overall stand against nuclear weaponry -- to involve in its discussions also individuals directly involved in developing nuclear weapons and/or in promoting the theoretical framework underpinning nuclear-weapon strategy, including the rationale -- as well as the politics and diplomacy -- associated with their production and deployment -- from all relevant countries. Like it or not, it was the engagement of such individuals -- in their personal capacities -- in the give-and-take Pugwash exchanges that often yielded progress and breakthroughs in arms control. Let me now emphasize the extent to which the effectiveness of Pugwash -- indeed its very survival -- for half a century is somewhat of a miracle. Remember that, strictly speaking, International Pugwash does not exist; we are an NGO even formally recognised as such by the United Nations but our status there depends rather on our prestige than on any formal recognition. There is no formal membership of Pugwash; all of you who are present at this Conference are Pugwash members -- even if this is the first time you attend a Pugwash meeting, and even if you were not aware of this fact until this very moment. This entails no obligations, and no commitment other than following the Pugwash rule of not attributing to specific individuals statements they make in closed sessions here without asking for their permission to do so. Although you are now a member of Pugwash, you are not bound to support Pugwash policy, and of course you cannot pretend to speak on behalf of Pugwash. Only the Pugwash Council or, rather exceptionally, the Pugwash Executive Committee can make pronouncements in the name of Pugwash, but certainly without the pretence to speak for all the members of Pugwash, among whom there certainly are a plurality of different opinions on just about every subject (this being indeed an essential feature of Pugwash). In Pugwash -- as indeed in scientific debates -- matters are not decided by a counting of votes; indeed even in the Pugwash governing bodies there is a strong tradition of resolving all matters -- even procedural ones -- without voting, but rather by always trying to reach a consensus. This was and is useful indeed necessary because of the very different backgrounds of the individuals engaged in the Pugwash enterprise a diversity that, as I have already emphasized, is the very essence of Pugwash. Moreover Pugwash encompasses an archipelago of different entities: the National Pugwash Groups, themselves very different in their nature and structure from one another, as explicitly admitted by Pugwash; Student/Young Pugwash; the International School On Disarmament And Research on Conflicts (ISODARCO), that has operated for over 40 years as a kind of teaching arms of Pugwash, essentially coinciding with the Italian Pugwash group; the Pugwash Foundation based in Geneva, and several other Foundations and Charities associated with Pugwash in different countries; the Pugwash Park Commission and the Pugwash Peace Exchange in the Pugwash village; the Pugwash History Project; the 4 Pugwash Offices (London, Geneva, Rome, Washington), with their different histories, their different roles, and the individuals working there (full-time or part-time, paid or unpaid); the Pugwash Council, its Executive Committee, and the 4 Pugwash Officials (President, Secretary-General, Executive Director, Chairperson of the Pugwash Council). The functioning of this complex in its multiform activities -- Conferences, Workshops, Study Groups, Projects, Consultations (namely occasional meetings that require no public mention at all or only a minimal one in order to be possible and useful), fund-raising activities, publications -- is mainly regulated by tradition and by a set of rules explicitly meant to only serve as guidelines. That this interlinked complex has been able to function for 50 years on the basis of informal guidelines is remarkable; and I submit that its survival, and most importantly, its usefulness, has depended on the recognition of the impossibility to transform it into a neat structure, with fixed rules (indeed: which rules? Everybody of course tends to think that those prevailing in one’s environment are those to be followed…). Such a complicated machinery is perhaps resilient because of its very messiness indeed, someone bent on destroying Pugwash would have some difficulty to decide where to begin, maybe overfeeding our Secretary General might be the most devastating strategy… One thing is clear: the strength -- but also the fragility of Pugwash depend crucially on the human element: on that trust, shared among most of those involved in the Pugwash enterprise, recognizing that each of us is working for a good cause -- indeed, for a multiplicity of good causes -- together with other individuals motivated by the same overall commitment. So, in the end, it is a matter of individuals. And let me end on this note: individuals, personalities. The Pugwash enterprise over the last 50 years -- and I submit in the future -- has been and is likely to be useful for humankind inasmuch as it involves committed, and often quite special, individuals. The list of such characters, who played and play an important role in Pugwash -- from all over the world -- is long enough that I could have spent my 20 minutes just reciting their names. Let me finish this presentation by just singling out two such names, not at random, but because of their significance, to Pugwash, to me and to this circumstance when we meet in Italy. Both these individuals were born in 1908, so next year it is the centennial of their birth, that shall surely be adequately celebrated, because both of them have been eminent, indeed quite eminent, both in connection with Pugwash and more generally. The first of them is of course Joseph Rotblat, who has devoted most of his long life to the Pugwash goals -- as identified by him -- to eliminate nuclear weapons, indeed to eliminate wars as means of settling conflicts. During his long life certainly some progress has been made in both directions, but much more remains to be done, a task for us and especially for the younger ones among us. As I am sure he is well known to all of us here -- he has been the main figure in Pugwash throughout and a mentor to most of us -- I will say no more about him now. The second individual I would like to single out as exemplary is Edoardo Amaldi. He collaborated with Enrico Fermi in the scientific breakthrough that opened the way to unleashing the energy stored in atomic nuclei -- to produce energy for useful purposes, but also nuclear bombs. He remained in Italy when other members of that research team -- Fermi himself, Emilio Segré and Bruno Pontecorvo -- had to escape when fascist Italy began to import the racial policies of nazi Germany. Amaldi also considered the possibility to emigrate to America, but opted against doing so because he did not wish to occupy any academic position there that might rather be taken by Jewish colleagues who had to escape from Europe. After the war Amaldi was the key figure in the reconstruction of physics and not only physics, other scientific disciplines as well in Italy and indeed in Europe. He always had a keen interest in nuclear disarmament for instance we fought, together (myself being indeed the junior partner) and with most other Italian scientists, the campaign to obtain that Italy sign and ratify the Non Proliferation Treaty. He was as well interested in the worldwide promotion of human rights, focussing especially on the plight of scientists persecuted for political reasons, because he felt he could be more effective in intervening on their behalf than in helping entire populations. He was a good friend of Rotblat, and as a leading statesman of Italian and European science he was invited to the very first meeting in Pugwash in 1957: although he could not attend due to other commitments he was soon drafted to be a member of the Continuing Committee -- as the governing body of Pugwash was then called -- on which he served until 1972 when he resigned to cut down on his international engagements in order to spend more time with his handicapped wife. He was instrumental -- while serving as President of the Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei -- to arrange for the Academy to host the Pugwash Rome Office in its premises, a most convenient venue out of which the international activities of Pugwash are organized to this day by Claudia Vaughn -- as all of you participants to this Pugwash Conference well know. These two men are examples of the individuals who shaped Pugwash. Their stature -- their place in history -- is clearly much higher than most of us can aspire to attain in our own lives. Yet these are the standards by which our own goals in life -- and our roles in the future of Pugwash must be measured. 50 Years of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs Sandra Ionno Butcher It is my great honour to join Francesco Calogero in commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Pugwash Conferences. If it weren’t for Francesco’s support of the Student/Young Pugwash network while he was secretary general, there is every chance I might not have become so involved in this organization. Francesco literally has held our history is the palm of his hands, as he is the man who accepted the Nobel medal on behalf of Pugwash in 1995. He is a true Pugwashite in every sense of the word and, like a true Pugwashite, he asked me to cut out all the other nice things I wanted to say about him, because he would rather discuss the substance. When thinking about this 50th anniversary, my favourite quote is one from Newton, “If I have seen a little further it is by standing on the shoulders of Giants." The point in exploring the history of Pugwash is not to stay rooted in the past, but to appreciate how the past can give rise to an expanded perspective on current problems, to realize that the important work we are all doing is based on very, very solid foundations, and to never lose sight of the goals. However distant on the horizon those goals seem to be, we have a unique platform that helps us to chart the way forward. Of course we must commemorate the first Pugwash Conference, and how that came about. It is the story of how people of courage rose to the challenges of their times. After the US dropped nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, many nuclear physicists knew that more powerful bombs were on their way. Joseph Rotblat was one of those people. He knew about the ‘Super’ from his time in Los Alamos. It was a heavy secret he carried with him after he left the Manhattan project on moral grounds, when he learned Hitler was not developing nuclear weapons. By the time of the atmospheric tests of hydrogen bombs in 1954, there was a great deal of confusion about the nature of those bombs. Rotblat helped people understand that these new weapons were approximately 1,000 times more radioactive than the bombs dropped on Japan. In the course of educating the public to this danger, he met Bertrand Russell, and helped fine tune Russell’s understanding of these topics. Russell gave an important radio address, called Man’s Peril, in December 1954. This led people like Max Born and Frederic Joliot Curie to contact Russell, and out of these interactions grew the powerful statement that became known as the Russell-Einstein Manifesto. Signing the Manifesto was reportedly the last official signature of Einstein’s life. Think of that, we are all gathered here now as the representatives of the last public hope of one of the greatest thinkers in history. The manifesto urged people to think in new ways, to recognize that humankind itself is endangered by the existence of nuclear weapons, and that in this nuclear age we need to abolish war. ‘Remember your humanity and forget the rest’ the 11 signatories urged us. The manifesto included (ironically despite reservations from Russell) the call for a conference of scientists. It took 2 years to organize this conference, as the initial plans to hold it in India fell through. Ultimately, the meeting was hosted by Cyrus Eaton in Pugwash, Nova Scotia. I cannot go into the details today of how this came about, but urge you to look out for the next issue of the Pugwash History series. In the interest of time, I will gloss over the tremendous logistical challenges of organizing this meeting, and instead I would like us for a few moments to think about the courage and the foresight of the 22 scientists who participated in that first meeting. They created this movement, and in doing so helped to create a new type of organization whose traditions we still observe today. Paul Doty says that they came to the meeting with “more hope than expectation.” The decision to attend was a difficult one for the participants, and it took courage. At a time of grave suspicion of anyone who sought to contact others across the Iron Curtain, it was uncertain what impact attendance at the meeting might have on their careers. Mark Oliphant wrote about this personal dilemma to a friend, he said: If I accept [Russell’s] invitation, I am associated with Joliot-Curie and Powell, who are known communists, and with Pauling who was ‘investigated’ but cleared. Yet, can I say no and feel decent? Would I not be a coward? We are in a bad spot, morally, ethically, nationally… Joseph Rotblat said, “I came here with hope, but also prepared that it was going to be a complete fiasco.” Chou Pei Yuan was asked directly by Premier Chou if he was worried about traveling to a capitalist country alone and his family worried about his safety during the whole time of his trip. I am certain that some of you gathered in this room, and some who have come together for recent Pugwash meetings can identify with these concerns. And I am equally sure that you believe that dialogue is so important you nevertheless take that bold step to go where others are not always willing or able to go. As it turned out, the first meeting was a great success, they discovered that as scientists they could find a common language on those important topics. A continuing committee was established, to discuss future activities. There was agreement that future conferences should be organized, and a great deal of discussion went into determining the size and nature of such meetings. The largest meeting ever held was in Vienna in 1958 and that meeting involved 10,000 people. They eventually fell into a mode of operation that still exists today: they typically held annual conferences engaging a larger number of scientists, and throughout the year smaller workshops focused on specific topics which went much more in depth into matters. The work stayed focused on nuclear issues, but also broadened out to include other topics, such as chemical and biological weapons, the environment, the arms trade, regional conflict, etc. The most effective and essential ingredient of their success was the way in which the meetings were organized. Because each participant came as an individualand NOT as a national or organizational representativeand because the rules stated that no one could quote what a person said in the private meetings, it gave these eminent men and women space to explore creatively their understanding of different topics. Also, please don’t feel guilty if you find yourselves here in Bari enjoying the coffee breaks, dinners, the excursion. It is why you are here. Pugwash’s success has been in creating the environment where people can relax and get to know and trust each other in quiet and serene settings. (As a footnote, also, the reason why you typically get a bag when you attend a Pugwash Conference is because they gave all participants at the first meeting a leather briefcase. The tradition continues.) I will give you two quick historical examples of how and why Pugwash works. Example 1--The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty In the mid-1980s, Pugwash provided a forum for discussion of non-offensive defence, an idea that explored ways of restructuring national conventional forces so as to appear non-provocative to one’s enemies. This was not as far afield from the traditional Pugwash anti-nuclear theme as one might suppose. A central tenet of non-offensive defence was that the question of removing US nuclear weapons from Western Europe could never really be addressed until the intimidating Soviet conventional forces in Eastern Europe were restructured. The concept was first introduced at a Pugwash meeting by Anders Boserup in 1981, and was further discussed at subsequent meetings. In 1984, a special Pugwash Study Group on Conventional Forces began to meet regularly and involved leading thinkers such as Anders Boserup, Robert Neild, Frank von Hippel, Yevgeny Velikov, Alexsei Arbatov, and others (including Goetz Neuneck and Sverre Lodgaard). Frank von Hippel raised the issues of non-offensive defences with Gorbachev at a February 1987 international forum of scientists in Moscow. According to von Hippel, he and Andrei Kokoshinwho was trying to promote the concept in the Soviet Unioninvited a panel from the Pugwash working group to present their views to the Russian scientists at this forum. Kokoshin encouraged the group to write a letter to Gorbachev, and Gorbachev himself corresponded with the Pugwash group in October and November 1987. Gorbachev ultimately unilaterally withdrew 10,000 Soviet tanks from Eastern Europe, which helped to create the environment for the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. It is not possible to link Pugwash discussions directly with the CFE Treaty, and other organisations such as the US-based Federation of American Scientists also were highly involved. However, it is certain that the personal relationships formed at Pugwash meetings between some of the key thinkers in the field, combined with their ability to channel creative ideas into the diplomatic stream, led to key breakthroughs in negotiations. This kind of input had effect on many other treaties, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, etc. Example 2--Vietnam War Pugwash also played a role in regional conflicts (as it is doing today in many parts of the world). During the Vietnam War, Pugwash played a direct and important role that most people don’t know about. At a June 1967 meeting in Paris, attended by three scientists from France, three from the US, two from the Soviet Union, and Rotblat as secretary-general, a “formula to stop the escalation of the war” emerged. Henry Kissinger, one of the US participants, was also then a consultant to the US president. It was ultimately decided that two French men, Marcovich and Aubrac, would take the Pugwash proposal directly to Ho Chi Minh. This was possible because Ho Chi Minh was friends with Aubrac. There is a great deal of documentary proof that this secret mission, code-named “PENNSYLVANIA,” received attention at the highest levels of the US government, involving the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara (later a Pugwashite), and President Johnson. This back channel, which became independent of Pugwash, stayed open for months. Although the proposal initially failed, it is widely seen as having laid the groundwork for the San Antonio proposal, which was ultimately, according to McNamara, “the foundation for the start of the negotiations between North Vietnam and the US in Paris.” A final thought about the legacy. We all hope for a change of mindset among world leaders, but we never really know how to accomplish this big change. I suggest to you that the ideals of Pugwash have helped shaped a massive change in the world’s thinking. The term ‘new thinking’ is forever associated with Gorbachev’s important reforms (and we know he was influenced by Pugwashites). Outgoing British Foreign Minister Margaret Beckett used the phrase ‘new thinking’ in her important speech on a world free of nuclear weapons. This phrase from the Russell-Einstein Manifesto is now a part of the vocabulary used by world leaders. Likewise, many people refer to the fact that Henry Kissinger was one of the signatories of that recent influential piece calling for the goal of disarmament. Well, it may be a dubious claim to fame, but Kissinger’s diplomatic skills were first tested in the Pugwash Vietnam initiative. I wonder if his desire for a world free of nuclear weapons may have had a long gestation from that early involvement with Pugwash. One can never know for sure. There is another version of the ‘standing on the shoulders of giants’ quote, attributed to an earlier theologian, John of Salisbury, who reportedly wrote in 1159: "We are like dwarfs sitting on the shoulders of giants. We see more, and things that are more distant, than they did, not because our sight is superior or because we are taller than they, but because they raise us up, and by their great stature add to ours." The best way to honor the 50th anniversary of Pugwash is to look further and deeper into the future. As this quinquennial meeting reaffirms the founders’ vision of a world where nuclear weapons are never again used, and a world without war, it is up to us to “make that vision a reality,” to borrow the words of a man who I wish you all could have met, Joseph Rotblat. It is not an exaggeration to say if it hadn’t been for his sustained determination, commitment, stubbornness, and vision over most of the past 50 years, I doubt any of us would be here today. So, happy 50th anniversary. I wonder what they will say at the 100th anniversary about the work we are involved in today.
|