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Paper from Working Group 3 3.1 (Harries)
Prospects for the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process Abstract Prospects today are poor for processes for peace for Israelis and Palestinians. Prospects are unlikely to improve soon, as they must evolve in a regional climate that makes identification of substantive options for peace processes increasingly difficult. A peace process with even a remote chance of acceptance and effectiveness will have to both respect the realities of the ME and include guaranteed ‘incentives’ that attract parties to prepare for a future in which conflict is no longer the default response to every dispute. Three options that appear to offer some potential are in the fields of physical security, politics and diplomacy, and strategic foresight. David Harries Prospects for the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process “ Resistance to the West, and rejection of Israel, Introduction This essay first summarizes the reasons why the prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peace, which will determine the timing for and character of Middle East peace, are poor today and highly unlikely to improve soon. To balance this pessimistic diagnosis, a short list of options are suggested, the main characteristics of which are that that they are new – different from - processes that are not working now and have not worked in the past and potentially mutually reinforcing. Assumptions Two assumptions underpin this paper. The first is that while Israeli-Palestinian peace will be toned and timed primarily by Israelis and Palestinians, any sustainable reduction in conflict and reasons for conflict between them and in the region will be possible only with a changed international mind-set. This new mind-set must focus not on emotional reaction – usually revenge and retribution - to past and present wrongs, real and perceived, but first and foremost on ways and means to establish rational processes that promote stable peace in the Middle East. The second assumption is about geography. There are several definitions of the Middle East. One by Alfred Mahan in 1902[2] defines it as what are now 16 states/polities from North East Africa to South West Asia. For the purposes of this essay, a more contemporary definition was obviously needed. The Middle East ‘selected’ is that most often used by the media and is the one pictured in a recent Economist. It includes 20 states from Sudan, Egypt, Cyprus and Turkey in the West across to Afghanistan and Pakistan in the East[3] plus, of course, the Palestinian territories of Gaza and the West Bank. The reason for this selection may be obvious: Every state in this group has influenced and will continue to have substantial influence on some or all of the issues at the heart of Israeli-Palestinian stability or peace The Prospects for Peace are not Good Today “ Death and disintegration all round. History has not been kind for peace in the Middle East. “ The ME has been the centre of more than 20 major conflicts from the Persian-Greek Wars to the Crusades, to the Iran-Iraq War. After WW1, the decline and dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire marked the beginning of a new stage of conflict centering around the lands of Palestine.”[5] The Middle East is today the scene of five major conflict zones; Sudan, Gaza-West Bank-Israel, Lebanon, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Issues and elements of each influence those of one or more others. Israel is feeling much more vulnerable since its failure to achieve the stated aim of its summer 2006 operation in Lebanon. The ‘the complete demolition of Hezbollah’s power in Lebanon’[6] was not accomplished. Worse, for Israel and for peace, Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, believes he won the war – ‘a strategic, historic victory’[7] - and all his friends and supporters and all the West’s (i.e., America’s and Israel’s) enemies and detractors speak and act as if they believe him. No Middle East peace process has ever been durable or has worked as wanted. “The most effective peace process in the Middle East is a sharp, short war.”[8] On 14 May 1948 the state of Israel declared itself. The result of the four Armistice Agreements that Israel made in 1949 with Egypt (24 February), Lebanon (23 March), Jordan (3 April) and Syria (20 June) was their absorption of Palestine. In the sixty years since, the several state wars, civil wars, invasions, incursions and attacks, and the larger number of (peace) Proposals, Statements, Declarations of Principles, Accords, Rulings, Agreements, Initiatives, Roadmaps[9] and UN Security Council Resolutions have brought Palestinian-Israeli peace no closer, have allowed Hezbollah and Hamas to achieve state-level powers and status, and have reduced respect and support in the region for the West to modern lows. The Middle East contains the most intense fault lines among three of the world’s major religions. Jerusalem at the centre of the ‘clash of civilizations’, is the “the heart of the holy war”[10], and yet the “the key to peace.”[11] The Middle East is the oil bank of the world. But in the Middle East, oil’s location and its revenues are distributed extremely unevenly. Maybe of more concern is that the Middle East’s oil is no less a fuel for politics and power-broking throughout the world than it is for engines and energy. No surprise therefore is that its presence, need, price, benefits and pipelines are fought about and over, in the region and beyond. The Prospects for Peace are Unlikely to Improve Soon Israel, Palestine, and Lebanon, the three parties whose future is at issue, and for whom peace is most troubled, are all increasingly politically chaotic. The Middle East overall is short of water. For Palestinians and Israelis water has enough features of supply and demand to provoke conflict, and more than enough to be used as an excuse for conflict for other reasons. In Israel, political parties are viscerally divided about many things. First and foremost today is what is to be done, and how, about the lack of success and huge costs of the summer war against Hezbollah in Lebanon. As well, when will the three soldiers be returned, and, how serious are the political scandals? For arguably the first time since 1967 Israel is not sure of its ability to deal effectively with an enemy on its border. Powerful countries that feel seriously threatened do powerful things. Israel has many options, and few are likely to promote peace over time. For the Palestinians, their situation in Gaza and the West Bank is being complicated by a split within Hamas. This can only exaggerate the disagreements between Fatah and Hamas. “That tension (between Fatah and Hamas) over how to “form a unity government that would meet the world’s three conditions for lifting the boycott (that has virtually bankrupted the Palestinian Authority) recognizing Israel, renouncing violence and honouring PA- Israeli agreements”) has gradually divided Hamas in Gaza, where the party is strongest, from Hamas in the West Bank, where it is weaker and more moderate.”[12] “Such a split would truly render the PA ungovernable, and peace talks (with Israel) impossible.”[13] For Lebanon, the summer war on its territory between Israel and Hezbollah was all bad. If anything, Hezbollah is stronger and more politically influential than before the fighting. In addition, the physical destruction and post-war politics have left the Lebanese government even less able than before to govern effectively, with, without or against Hezbollah. The War on Terror, whatever ones judgement of its progress, is intensifying Muslims’ belief that it is a war of the West against Islam. This improves the recruitment of extremists with a reinforced commitment to carry the fight to the West. In the Middle East, fighting the West is most clearly manifested by the continuing public, and intensifying, campaign to rid the world of Israel. The US-led coalition in Iraq is in trouble. It is assessed, at best by President Bush and colleagues, as ‘not a failure’ but ‘not going well’ and at worst, by Hans Blix, as “a complete failure. The situation in Iraq is promoting radical extremism within and outside the country and between factions of both Shi’ites and Sunnis. It has reached a point at which many believe that Iraq is in the early stages of an almost certain civil war. Civil war in Iraq would push Israeli-Palestinian peace even farther into the future. America is in the run-up to mid-term national elections. Americans are increasingly against the war in Iraq. Notwithstanding the November election results for the Congress and the House of Representatives, the world’s only superpower is entering a two-year period of political and therefore foreign policy uncertainty as President Bush’s second and final term winds down. Though some may say ‘the less done by America the better’, a lame duck global leader at this stage in the Israel-Palestinian ‘peace process’ is, on balance, at least unfortunate. Iran and Syria bankroll, arm and celebrate Hezbollah’s strength and success. The three are committed to seeing the end of Israel. International, even UN, criticism and threats are having little effect, except possibly to more confuse perception and reality which is very much in the trio’s interests. Israel is a nuclear power. Iran seems truly committed to becoming one. Peace between Israel and Palestine will be set back decades if not forever were Israel to decide that, all things considered, it could not accept a nuclear Iran and attempt to destroy from the air Iran’s nuclear facilities. It is of little comfort that Middle East, not to mention global, peace and security, would be set back no less by such a – in Israel’s eyes – necessary action. Key Realities Peace may be possible between Israel and Palestine, but only if two key realities are acknowledged and appropriately accounted for. Each alone is a strong obstacle to progress. But together; co-existing, they are truly formidable. Indeed, if not ‘acknowledged and appropriately accounted for’ by the international community as a whole, there are very few reasons why will not provoke new fighting or even another war. The first factor is the truly unique character of the challenge to peace for and between Israel and Palestine. For both, the fundamental issue is not peace but survival. Tiny Israel is surrounded by bigger states and beset by extremists whose main goal; be it political, economic, religious or irrational, is the end of the state of Israel, by any means. Israel logically finds it hard to make the compromises necessary for peace with organizations and states who are committed to its end. Palestine was a state until, arguably, 18 May 1948. The Palestinian Authority aspires to that status and is supported in that aspiration by almost all Muslims, most Arabs, and hundreds of millions of other people throughout the world. As long as Israel will not or can not meet its demands on timing, format and geography of statehood, all its relationships with Israel will focus first on survival of its aspiration, and only then, maybe, peace. The second ‘reality’ factor is about democracy. In the most recent democratic elections in each of ‘Palestine’ and Lebanon, members of Hamas and Hezbollah won seats in government and some of them are now Ministers of government. Success in elections has not changed those individuals’ position on the state of Israel, nor that of their parties which now both have significant influence in the ‘Palestine’ and Lebanon governments. Indeed, depending on which day one reads the newspapers or watches TV, the argument can be made that each is ‘in control’ or at least holds sufficient control to block what the rest of their colleagues want, or country needs. Because Palestinians elected Hamas members to the Palestinian government, the West, led as always in matters of Israel by America, have cut off aid to the Palestinian Authority until, as noted earlier, Hamas formally recognizes the right of Israel to exist as a state. Because Lebanese elected Hezbollah members to their government, Israel feels the more threatened. When Hezbollah raided Northern Israel, killed several soldiers and kidnapped two, Israel felt it had little choice but to ‘wipe out’ the threat by force. Hezbollah is not a state, so the West has no ‘sanctions’ option, and must frame its criticism, demands and actions to reflect all of Hezbollah’s realities; i.e., particularly Syria and Iran and therefore those of the Middle East as a whole. Until the West, the champion of ‘democracy’, decides to learn how to deal with ‘democratically elected’ governments that include individuals from the likes of Hamas and Hezbollah that hold extreme views on aspects of the international system which the West does not accept, it is highly likely that, in and near those countries, peace will be less likely that either instability or war. Until the international community, and in particular the diverse group of primary actors in the Middle East peace saga – the Roadmap “Quartet” in particular - find ways to work with ‘democracy’ that is very different to what they want or like or practice, it is highly likely that opportunities for meaningful dialogue about peace among the likes of the Quartet, the PA and Israel will be few and far between, and then only when imposed. Options There are no obvious options. However, because no previous ‘peace process’ has worked for long or as expected, three options are offered that are unlike any that were used or suggested to date. As well, in theory if not in practise, none are impossible. The first option is containment. Robert Frost, the poet, wrote that good fences make good neighbours. ‘Fences’ worked in the Cold War, Israel has claimed considerable benefits from its “security fence”[14] and the US is planning a ‘fence’ on both its northern and southern land frontiers. The physical designs and resources for building fences have always been available. And now technology is available to greatly expand their effectiveness. A key issue for this option: A fence can be used in one or both of two very different ways. It can keep people or events out and it can keep people and events in. The second option is withdrawal. There is much to do in the world in support of stable peace and security. If the Israelis and the Palestinians can not or will not accept the help and advice others are willing to try to provide, then maybe it is best to leave them to their own devices until they can or will. In the meantime, the effort and resources can be directed to where they are welcome and will do most good. The third option is an intellectual one. Apply strategic foresight to create scenarios for Middle East futures that can be used to attract the different camps to a dialogue on what the future could hold for them and their children. Scenarios been proven to ‘lift’ people out of the emotion and pain of present crises to think and talk about what they would like to see. A subsequent analysis of the scenarios selected could indicate paths from the present circumstances to desired ones, as well as what to avoid. Common aspects of different paths might be used as focal points for multi-party discussions of ways ahead when survival is no longer in question. Conclusion Today’s prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peace are poor. They are unlikely improve soon unless new and different incentives are available to move both sets of actors away from a focus on survival to a focus on peace. The existing ‘incentives’ to do so are not working. New ones are needed. [1] The Economist. 21 Oct 2006. P 25.
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