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2.3 (Datan)
56^th Pugwash Conference
Cairo, Egypt, 11-15- November 2006

  

Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Conditions for Disarmament
Cairo, Egypt, 10-15 November 2006

 Merav Datan
Greenpeace International

 

 

Introduction

The goal of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) free zone in the Middle East has been repeatedly affirmed by all states involved as well as the international community at the highest political levels. Yet instead of movement towards this goal, security analysts as well as popular media headlines indicate a trend towards proliferation of WMD in the Middle East.

The current deadlock on progress towards a WMD free zone in the Middle East reflects vastly different, even incompatible and polar opposite, starting points. Therefore the key to change – the turning point from the current proliferation trend – will be different for each of these starting positions. For the sake of brevity, the three main positions will be characterized as those represented at the relevant international fora by the Arab states, Iran, and Israel. “Outside” players also have an influential role, but a lasting resolution of current conflicts and the achievement of a WMD free zone depend first and foremost on regional factors and intra-regional dynamics and history. The complex and inter-dependent history of the region continues to shape current positions and policies and is therefore the starting point for this discussion.

Historical Perspective

Looking for a moment beyond the three official governmental positions, each one can be seen to correspond to one of three major cultures (by no means all) that emerged from this region: Arabs, Jews, and Persians. The cultural and historical ties among Arabs, Jews, and Persians run deep. On the whole they have been constructive and mutually enriching. They predate the nuclear era by millennia, and they have the potential to outlast the nuclear era if seen from this perspective by all involved.

From a current pan-Arab and Iranian perspective the creation of the modern nation-state of Israel might be an aberration or a disruption, but the presence of the Jews in the Middle East is not. Under different political structures there has been a continuous presence of Jews in Palestine and throughout the Arab and Persian world historically, although the balance changed dramatically and controversially in the last century. The disruption, its causes, and the ripple effects are the source of continuing conflict. These continue to inform the positions of all involved regarding national security and therefore WMD in the Middle East, as well as the conditions for peace and security in the region. From a broader historical and cultural perspective, however, the current state of animosity and the refusal to dialogue with or recognize one another (where that is the case) – this is the aberration. This broader perspective should be kept in mind when considering the question of WMD in the Middle East.

The Goal of a WMD Free Zone in the Middle East: Rhetoric vs. Reality

The goal of a WMD free zone in the Middle East has been affirmed by the Security Council,[i] member states of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),[ii] and Israel.[iii] It has been a topic of discussion at countless conferences and seminars. The rhetoric, however, is far from the reality.

The Middle East remains the region with the greatest concentration of states that are not party to one or more of the international treaties dealing with WMD: the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the NPT, as well as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).[iv] Moreover and more ominously, WMD (chemical weapons) have been used in the Middle East.[v] The overwhelming majority of countries in the region have some form of WMD-related research, development or weaponization program.[vi]

This reality is an enormous challenge but is also the very reason that the Middle East is the region that receives the most international attention as a potential WMD free zone. Elsewhere in the world, Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs) have been successfully negotiated and adopted, and additional such zones are being systemically pursued. But in the Middle East the goal of a NWFZ has been linked to a WMD Free Zone (in the NPT Review Process and the relevant Security Council resolution, for example). This is because of the de facto link that states in the region have made among WMD,[vii] notwithstanding the significant difference in scale of mass destruction between nuclear weapons on the one hand and biological and chemical weapons on the other hand.

The current deadlock on negotiations towards a WMD free zone in the Middle East is a direct result of substantively different starting positions. As reflected in NPT meeting documents and the annual General Assembly resolution “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East” (sponsored by a group of Arab states), as well as annual requests for inclusion of an item on “Israeli Nuclear Capabilities and Threat” in the International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference agenda, the position of the Arab states is that Israel’s nuclear capabilities are destabilizing and must be addressed as a precondition to peace and security in the region.

Israel’s position is that “the establishment of peaceful relations, reconciliation, mutual recognition and good neighborliness, and complemented by conventional and non-conventional arms control measures”[viii] is a precondition for establishing a NWFZ and achieving the vision of a WMD free zone. These apparently polar opposite positions are what led to the breakdown of the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) talks within the Middle East Peace Process.

Conditions for Progress

The deadlocked positions regarding a WMD Free Zone in the Middle East are as well known as they are entrenched. But they do not preclude possible interim measures that might help lay the groundwork for eventual realization of UNGA resolutions, NPT commitments, and security aspects of the regional peace process. Thinking “outside the box” could shift the ground beneath the deadlock enough to make progress on the actual issues of concern: the presence of WMD and the lack of regional peace.

Consider, for example, Recommendation 12 of the report recently concluded by the WMD Commission:[ix]

All states should support continued efforts to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East as a part of the overall peace process. Steps can be taken even now. As a confidence- building measure, all states in the region, including Iran and Israel, should for a prolonged period of time commit themselves to a verified arrangement not to have any enrichment, reprocessing or other sensitive fuel-cycle activities on their territories.

Such a commitment should be coupled with reliable assurances about fuel-cycle services required for peaceful nuclear activities. Egypt, Iran and Israel should join the other states in the Middle East in ratifying the CTBT.

The February 4 IAEA Board of Governors resolution also points out that the resolution of the Iranian nuclear crisis could contribute to the realization of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) free zone in the Middle East.

Besides these important but incremental measures, however, it will also be necessary to consider the seemingly entrenched starting points of each of the representative positions characterized, as noted above, by the positions of the Arab states, Iran, and Israel. In each case, internal or domestic factors are inseparable from the national security and foreign policy positions that dictate stated positions in global fora such as the NPT and the IAEA. Threat perceptions originate outside of the states involved, but within the region they are a direct contributing factor, probably the key factor, in each of the representative positions considered here.

How these threat perceptions translate into foreign and security policy is inevitably highly subjective and the process is an internal, even private one. There is no “one size fits all” solution to national security concerns, particularly not in the Middle East, which does not offer a level playing field[x] from any political perspective whatsoever. Therefore one of the conditions for a WMD free zone in the Middle East is a domestic shift within all of the states involved, however it happens (and outsiders might never fully know), permitting some openness and flexibility as a result of reduced threat perceptions at both the decision making level and the public level, depending also on how democratic their national security decision-making processes are.

What this means for international and regional efforts to promote a WMD free zone is that the most persuasive arguments and relevant information might differ in the case of each representative position. The Arab states are grouped together for the purposes of this discussion because they generally take a joint position in the relevant fora, but among themselves they have varying WMD-related capabilities. These capabilities, however, are overshadowed by current concerns over the nuclear programs of Israel and Iran, and while a few Arab states have small nuclear research programs none has a large-scale nuclear program that gives rise to immediate nuclear proliferation concerns. Whether this remains the situation is a crucial question, because nuclear programs of any sort are inherently suspect to proliferation concerns. The case of Iran proves this point, and the reactions to Egypt’s recent announcement regarding the revival of its nuclear energy further support it.[xi] Outsiders might not be able to know whether and to what extent regional security developments factor into domestic decisions to develop a nuclear program, but that will not stop them from assuming that it is such a factor.

In the case of Iran, the positions and actions taken by international bodies to date have essentially had the reverse of the intended effect. Moreover, it is unlikely that sanctions, in the form presently envisioned, will succeed in achieving the desired change in Iranian policy. The crude tools of escalation, isolation, and the threat or use of force have an unmistakeably dismal and tragic track record in solving proliferation crises. However, signs of progress toward a WMD free zone in the Middle East could help persuade Iranian leaders that their security would be better served without an active, indigenous uranium enrichment program that invites suspicion. In the interim, Iran could drop its linkage between the efforts of the international community to end its uranium enrichment program and its suspended implementation of transparency measures (which are intended to allow the IAEA to conclude its investigation into its past nuclear activities) and thereby reduce international suspicion.[xii]

Within Israel there is a great deal of attention to regional nuclear issues but little or no attention to disarmament as a solution or even as a conceptual approach which could reduce regional tensions. In fact there is no word in Hebrew for “disarmament” as such. Rather the term used is closer to “dismantlement,” indicating a focus on the physical aspects of the weapons rather than a shift in policy. The argument that disarmament is a relevant and practical approach to regional security has yet to be seriously entertained in Israel. On a domestic level Israel appears to be immune to the enormous amount of international attention given to the issue of a WMD free zone in the Middle East, and many citizens would probably be surprised to learn that this goal is consistent with Israel’s official position.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to do justice to all the domestic factors that contribute to regional WMD proliferation. Nevertheless, a broad historical and cultural perspective that accommodates the traditional ties among the peoples involved, as well as a willingness to consider internal domestic concerns and to engage at that level, will go farther towards promoting a WMD free zone than an approach based exclusively on “naming and shaming” the states involved. Whatever the domestic drivers, it is always unfortunate from a non-proliferation perspective when nuclear technology becomes a source of national pride or a matter of principle in itself. But this appears to be the case in the Middle East as elsewhere. Therefore international statements and actions that seek to limit the nuclear capability of any state in the region on a seemingly selective basis are more likely to backfire than to promote non-proliferation.

Elements of a WMD Free Zone in the Middle East

Given the de facto link among WMD in the Middle East, progress is needed on all three fronts – nuclear, chemical, and biological – in order to further the goal of a WMD free zone in the region. Progress towards the universalization and implementation of the BWC and CWC, in parallel with national level measures to address nuclear proliferation concerns, is needed. The suspicion inherent in all nuclear programs, as noted above, must be addressed, and the key to addressing this suspicion lies in addressing the concerns over nuclear materials and technology.

Despite the deadlock on direct negotiations towards a WMD free zone, progress can be made by tackling nuclear materials and technology concerns head on. Discussions leading to a Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) are a step in the right direction but they do not go far enough because the current proposals would not address existing stocks or the capability to produce weapons usable material in the future. In contrast, a model Comprehensive Fissile Materials Treaty (CFMT) has recently been proposed and informally circulated among members of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.[xiii]

This approach would prohibit the separation or processing of weapons-usable plutonium as well as the production or processing of highly enriched uranium and would therefore go farther towards addressing proliferation concerns than any of the official proposals currently circulating. As an international proposal, it could cut across the current deadlock on WMD free zone negotiations in the Middle East, since each state in the region could independently entertain and engage with this proposal.

Moreover, since nuclear material and technology, and the suspicion they generate, are the source of proliferation concerns in the Middle East, then the solution lies in the alternatives. The option of exploring these alternatives is completely independent of the WMD free zone deadlock but, if pursued in parallel, could help pave the way for progress on negotiations by demonstrating the attractiveness of alternatives. The key alternative lies in the option of renewable energy sources and the vision of a Nuclear Free Middle East.

Renewable energy alternatives such as solar or wind have not received nearly the attention that nuclear and fossil fuel energy sources have received, globally or in the Middle East. Nor have they received nearly the same level of subsidies or investment in research and development. This is unfortunate given the potential for renewable energy in the Middle East. From an environmental and economic point of view, renewable energy sources are an option well worth exploring, and from a non-proliferation point of view they would make a decidedly positive contribution to security in the region.

Conclusions

For many observers around the world the Middle East has become synonymous with war and conflict, and for those concerned with WMD proliferation it is a “hot spot.” For those living in the region, the reality of war and the fear of mass destruction are all too real. But the Middle East is more than that. Its potential for growth and positive change and for making lasting contributions to the rest of the world is also part of the history and identity of the people who live here. For these reasons passions run deep in the Middle East and the world watches with more than a little trepidation to see how the nuclear era will play itself out in this famously volatile region.

There are those who believe that civilization began in the Middle East, and there are those who believe that it will end here. The former perspective does an injustice to the rest of the world, and the latter does an injustice to the Middle East. By looking beyond narrow national interests, which reflect only a snapshot of Middle Eastern history, the people of this region can make another lasting contribution to global civilization if they succeed in achieving the first negotiated WMD free zone. A Nuclear Free Middle East will be a necessary element of this goal, and as challenging as that step appears today, stranger things have happened in this part of the world.