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The 56th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs

A Region in Transition: Peace and Reform in the Middle East
11-15 November 2006, Cairo, Egypt
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Paper from Working Group 1

1.7 (Calogero) BD
56th Pugwash Conference
Cairo, Egypt, 11-15- November 2006

 

[Contribution for the 10th PICC Beijing Seminar on International Security Xiamen, Fujiian Province, China, 25-28 September 2006 and for the 56th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, Cairo, Egypt, 10-15 November 2006]

 

The twin risks of nuclear weapon proliferation and nuclear terrorism

Francesco Calogero

Motto: quos Deus vult perdere, dementat

 

  1. The acquisition by terrorists of the capability to manufacture nuclear explosive devices will put at risk the very survival of our civilization. Likewise, a breakdown of the current nonproliferation regime of nuclear weapons -- causing their acquisition by many other states besides the 8 that possess them now -- is likely to have catastrophic consequences.

    Few disagree with these assessments, yet few have the intellectual courage to face these risks -- rather than escaping by some silly bon mot, like stating that “in the end we will all be dead” – or simply avoiding to face these difficult problems.

     
  2. Every knowledgeable person -- hopefully including by now some decision-makers -- knows that it is easy for a terrorist group to introduce in any city of the world enough Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) to manufacture there -- also quite easily -- a nuclear device whose explosion will have catastrophic consequences -- orders of magnitudes worst than any terrorist activity performed so far. Hence the sole barrier to impede terrorists from blowing up cities is to prevent them from acquiring a sufficient quantity of HEU. One hundred kilograms of this material is more than enough to manufacture easily a nuclear explosive device likely to have a yield possibly as large as that of the Hiroshima bomb. About one million kilograms of this material -- perhaps even more -- are still available in Russia; most of it considered excess in the context of any reasonable assessment of military needs, and part of it less securely guarded than one might reasonably wish. Research reactors using HEU exist in several countries, often in less than secure environments (such as Universities). The technological steps to take care of these risks are well understood indeed fairly obvious: and some efforts in this direction have been and are being made. But the priority, and the resources, devoted to these efforts -- by the USA, by Europe, by Russia, by the rest of the world -- have been and are inadequate, especially when compared to those squandered to take care of much less realistic risks.

     
  3. The acquisition of a nuclear-weapon capability by North Korea -- when it will happen -- is likely to cause a catastrophic breakdown of the nonproliferation regime in East Asia: demagogues in South Korea and Japan will prevail -- by democratic means -- over any politician trying to resist this trend. Many seem to believe that the front-line country interested in stopping this development are the United States of America; and that they are doing so rather clumsily. But the country most likely to suffer from this development is China; and, of course, also the rest of the world. Yet the temptation to face this risk by postponing any hard decision seems to prevail -- maybe rationalized by the hope that the onus to solve the problem be taken by somebody else. And as time goes by the likelihood fades to find a solution before an unstoppable chain of events starts, with catastrophic consequences.

     
  4. Likewise, the acquisition of a nuclear-weapon capability by Iran -- if it will be allowed to ever emerge – would be likely to cause a catastrophic breakdown of the nonproliferation regime in the Middle East: demagogues in Turkey, Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, perhaps Kazakhstan and other Islamic countries on the Southern border of Russia will prevail -- by more or less democratic means -- over decision-makers trying to resist this trend. Again, many seem to believe that the front-line country interested in stopping this development is the United States of America; and that they are doing so rather clumsily. But a country most likely than the USA to suffer from this development is Russia; and, of course, Europe, and, again, also the rest of the world (and most of all, the people in the Middle East).

    In this context, it must also be taken into account that Israel is unlikely to allow Iran -- a country whose President occasionally proclaims his wish to eliminate Israel from the Middle East -- to acquire a nuclear capability that would make such a wish realizable. Again, some strong intervention might be made inevitable by the democratic process within Israel bringing demagogues rather than moderates to power. The consequences will be catastrophic for all.

    Yet the temptation to face this risk by postponing any hard decision seems to prevail – again, maybe rationalized by the hope that the onus to solve the problem be taken by somebody else. And again, as time goes by, the likelihood fades to find a solution before an unstoppable chain of events starts, with catastrophic consequences.

     
  5. A catastrophic breakdown of the nonproliferation regime in East Asia, or in the Middle East, might also make it impossible for other countries around the world to stick to the nuclear nonproliferation norm -- including democratic countries, where demagogues will have a field day against moderates. Think, for instance, of Brazil; and the chain of consequences in Latin America that would be caused by a Brazilian nuclear-weapon program. Or think of Indonesia. And of technologically advanced countries in Europe.

     
  6. In any case it is a clear delusion to imagine that a nuclear-weapon nonproliferation regime may be sustained indefinitely, while 5, or 8, countries show no intention whatsoever to even envisage the prospect of eliminating their own nuclear weapons -- because demagogues at home would have a field day at ridiculing any moderate leader suggesting the eventual need to do so, indeed the urgent need to show some serious intention to eventually do so.

     
  7. The fact that no “greenish little person” seems to be sending messages from outer space is explained by some -- who consider it unlikely that an intelligent civilization only developed on planet Earth -- by observing that the laws of physics and biology seem to make it inevitable that an advanced civilization eventually acquire the scientific and technological capability to destroy itself -- presumably before acquiring the collective wisdom necessary to keep such a capability in check.

 

Francesco Calogero is Professor of Theoretical Physics at the University of Rome I “La Sapienza”. From 1982 to 1992 he was a member of the Governing Board of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), from 1989 to 1997 he served as Secretary General of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affair, and from 1997 to 2002 he served as Chairman of the Pugwash Council, of which he is now a member. He was involved in ISODARCO (the I  in PICC) from its very beginning until now.