Introduction
The end of the Cold War
led to vastly reduced tensions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Yet
the new millennium has been marked by the continuance of NATO-indeed
its great expansion-as well as increased American tendencies to resort
to unilateral and isolationist measures. While many people think of
the UN as a fifty-year old institution in need of reform, NATO is
also a middle-aged organization in need of reform. Wholesale reform
will not work. Reforms must be cumulative, built gradually on existing
foundations. For instance, the decision to invite Latvia, Lithuania
and Estonia into the alliance was one kind of reform. The establishment
of the Euro-Atlantic Council and the NATO-Russia Founding Act were
others. But NATO needs a much greater transformation of its structures
and procedures if it is to serve the common security interests of
the allies and others. Today's ongoing tumult of change necessitates
that traditional policies be seriously reconsidered and, perhaps,
drastically reevaluated. As September 11th, 2001 made evident, old
ways of thinking no longer apply to the world we live in. This article
suggests strategies to reform NATO in order to enhance national and
international security.
NATO's Approach Toward
Nuclear Weapons
Dangerous American
attitudes toward pre-emptive nuclear war
Many Europeans and Canadians
fear that the Bush administration will resort to using nuclear weapons
in a future conflict. Although Russia, China, France, and Britain
officially retain the use of strategic nuclear weapons, American development
of new theatre and battlefield nuclear weapons (including the 'robust
nuclear earth penetrator') is frightening many because of the US administration's
apparent willingness to resort to their use. As the Bush administration
declares:
"Given the
goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer
solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability
to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's threats, and
the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries'
choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies
strike first….To forestall or prevent such hostile acts the US will,
if necessary, act pre-emptively."
The development of nuclear
weapons-related technology and possible acquisition by terrorist groups
or "rogue states" means the use of nuclear weapons seems
more 'credible' now than it has been since the Cuban missile crisis.
Whereas it is certainly true that the Americans cannot sit idly by
while their security is undermined, the route they are taking-asserting
nuclear credibility-will result in a more insecure world with a greater,
not less, likelihood of nuclear war. The Western alliance's concepts
of nuclear deterrence and nuclear pre-emption must move away from
the traditional notion of 'defending' against threats-such as strategic/tactical
nuclear weapons, rogue states or terrorists-towards an emphasis on
minimal deterrence-and eventually nuclear abolition. But if the US
continues on its present trajectory-threatening to respond or pre-empt
a nuclear, biological or chemical attack with nuclear weaponry-they
will incite an arms race where states will also seek to deter or pre-empt
using new types of weapons like "enhanced radiation weapons",
"space control satellites" and "nuclear-survivable
communications systems." The costs for the world will be enormous
as countries compete to design weapons for possible use against undeterrable
terrorists, on rogue-state battlefields or in outer space. As a new
statement on nuclear weapons policy issued by the board of the Nuclear
Age Peace Foundation states:
"It is the
US insistence on retaining a nuclear weapons option that sets the
tone for the world as a whole, reinforcing the unwillingness of other
nuclear weapons states to push for nuclear disarmament and inducing
threatened or ambitious states to take whatever steps are necessary,
even at the risk of confrontation and war with the United States,
to develop their own stockpile of nuclear weaponry. In this post-September
11th climate, the United States has suddenly become for other governments
a country to be deterred rather than, as in the Cold War, a country
practicing deterrence to discourage aggression by others."
Reassessing NATO's
reliance on nuclear deterrence strategy
Curiously, the NATO allies
continue to profess their reliance on the strategy of nuclear deterrence
while the US moves toward a pre-emptive 'first-strike' strategy that
promises to retaliate with nuclear weapons even in the event of a
'limited' chemical or biological attack. The situation is similar
to the 1960s when the allies continued to rely upon mutual assured
destruction (MAD) even as the US developed 'flexible response'. While
NATO recently conducted a review process, its reexamination of the
Strategic Concept simply reaffirmed its central tenet-that nuclear
weapons are "essential". Although NATO decision-makers assert
that the "Paragraph 32" process is finished, the door needs
to be re-opened to further engagement on the question.
We need to remember that
efforts to change NATO's deterrent policy can begin at the nation-state
level. The thrust for NATO's recent review essentially began because
Canada's parliament released a report calling for a re-examination
of NATO's reliance on nuclear deterrence and the Strategic Concept.
The Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy committed his department
to attempt to change NATO's nuclear doctrine-for which he was often
labelled a 'nuclear nag.' Yet in the final analysis, even American
diplomats at NATO headquarters were impressed with the Canadian initiative
and the determination of the Foreign Minister and his diplomatic aides,
particularly the Deputy Ambassador Robert McCrae. In a similar fashion,
working together with other like-minded countries, such as Germany
and Norway, it might be possible to reforge NATO's nuclear doctrine.
Problems with traditional assumptions about nuclear deterrence
One of the main assumptions
the allies need to ask themselves in their reforging of doctrine is
whether nuclear weapons protect the alliance by deterring potential
aggressors from attacking. During the Cold War, strategists assumed
that by threatening massive retaliation, nuclear weapons could credibly
prevent an enemy from attacking. September 11th demonstrated there
are no guarantees that the threat of retaliation will succeed in preventing
an attack-indeed, it may be difficult to retaliate against a sub-state
opponent, like a terrorist group. Also traditional arguments against
deterrence still hold true. There are many ways that deterrence could
fail, including misunderstanding, miscalculation, poor communication,
irrational leadership, and accident.
But, of course, even if
some allies seriously question the efficacy of relying upon deterrence,
there may appear to be little likelihood that hard-line strategists
will come to the same conclusion, in part because it is difficult
to give up on long-held assumptions. Will this generation of NATO
decision-makers have to retire or die before the allies can relinquish
their convictions about deterrence? In each of Christopher Columbus's
four voyages between 1492 and 1504, Columbus believed that "he
had reached Asia, he was in Asia, and it was from Asia he returned.
No one, nothing, to the day of his death, ever made him relinquish
that cherished conviction."
On the other hand, recent
evidence indicates that, in the wake of the September 11th crisis,
decision-makers in the highest echelons of American decision-making-including
President Bush and his closest advisors-are coming to doubt the efficacy
of deterrence and try to think more about this strategy. At a National
Security Council on October 9, Vice President Cheney and Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld discussed the possibility that bin Laden (whom
they referred to as UBL) might have weapons of mass destruction. "UBL
might not be deterrable," said Cheney. "Well," the
president said, "sponsoring nations of UBL, those that support
him, might have some influence with him. Should we send some messages,
private or public?" We need to think some more about this, said
Rumsfeld. Clearly strong advocates of deterrence from the 'New Right',
like Bush, Cheney, and Rumsfeld, now recognize that deterrence may
fail to work with sub-state actors and many more alternatives are
needed.
Since all the NATO allies
depend on a relationship of 'extended deterrence' with the US (even
if they profess to be nuclear-weapon free on their own soil), it is
incumbent upon each of them to re-examine deterrence strategy with
a view to generating a cornucopia of alternative strategies ranging
from reassurance to coercion. Verifiable treaties, well-funded inspection
regimes, cutting-edge technology, strong sanctions, and enhanced control
over fissile materials are needed in every region of the world. But
history shows that the first steps towards a regional-then global-approach
can be taken by the leaders of individual nation-states through regional
organizations like NATO and the EU. Each NATO ally needs to reconsider
its reliance on extended deterrence in light of the new types of threats
and challenges the international community now faces.
NATO in the Aftermath
of the Wars against Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq
The lack of consensus
about NATO's collective security guarantees
The NATO allies responded
swiftly to the September 11 terror attacks, invoking Article V-the
collective defence provision-of the 1949 Washington Treaty the next
day. According the US Department of Defense's report on allied contributions,
the European allies in NATO deployed AWACS aircraft to the US by October
9. The UK and France contributed support aircraft to the air campaign
over Afghanistan, deployed ground troops inside the country before
the Taliban was overthrown, and dispatched naval forces to the Indian
Ocean for maritime surveillance/interdiction operations. Other NATO
nations, most notably Canada, Italy, and the Netherlands, also sent
naval forces to the Indian Ocean; Canada, Denmark, Germany, and Norway
deployed special forces inside Afghanistan; and the Czech Republic
deployed a chemical defence unit to the region. The NATO allies also
provided the bulk of the 16-nation International Security Assistance
Force in Kabul. Apparently all the NATO allies were in agreement about
the necessity of a collective response to the attack on America. But
the atmosphere of consensus dissipated by March 2003 shortly before
the US attack on Iraq.
In March 2003, Belgium,
France, and Germany imposed a veto on the commencement of military
planning to defend another member state, Turkey, in the event of hostilities
with Iraq. To date, the effects of the Franco-German 'dovishness'
have been considerable. For example, the former members of the Warsaw
Pact that either have joined or hope to join the alliance are asking
whether France and Germany might be prepared to veto NATO countermeasures
to help them in the event of a crisis? These countries are particularly
dependent on NATO's collective security guarantee because they are
being asked to give up much of their 'all-round' and 'outdated' defensive
capabilities in order to contribute 'specialist' skills. All the allies
need to engage in a discussion about when and how Article V provisions
will protect them during a crisis.
Coping with American
heavy-handedness
Another fall-out of the
war against Iraq relates to perceptions of American heavy-handedness.
US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld threatened to pull NATO headquarters
out of Brussels unless Belgium agreed to repeal a law which gives
its courts universal jurisdiction to try cases of genocide, war crimes
and human rights violations. While Belgian parliamentarians did agree
to change the law to cases in which either the victim or the accused
were residents of Belgium, war crimes lawsuits had already been filed
against US President George Bush, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, US
Secretary of State Colin Powell, General Tommy Franks, and Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.
The new US propensity
to threaten others with extreme measures is, perhaps, most telling
in the United States' recent decision to suspend military assistance
to six nations seeking NATO membership because they failed to exempt
US citizens from prosecution in the new International Criminal Court
(ICC). As the deadline passed for governments to sign exemption agreements
or face the suspension of military aid, Bush issued waivers for 22
countries but he did not include Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Slovakia, and Slovenia. It is not yet clear whether these countries
will sign bilateral waivers in order to obtain military aid; but what
is clear is that the Bush administration is taking a more aggressive
approach than has ever been seen in NATO corridors. The allies should
respond to aggressive bullying just as schools and mature adults respond-with
a heavy emphasis on non-violence and respectful confrontation.
New Types of Threats
to Allied Security
Reconsidering the
Nature of the Threat
NATO needs to reconsider
and reevaluate perceived threats to the international community. Who
is threatened, by whom, and how? For a while, the fact that there
was no longer a significant Soviet threat implied that security could
be preserved at much lower levels of defence spending. Now the threats
from Slobodan Milosevic, Osama bin Laden, and Saddam Hussein have
led to calls for greater defence spending. US President Bill Clinton
planned to increase the defence budget in his last year in office
by hundreds of billions of dollars, the largest hike in peacetime
history. Then in the wake of September 11, US President George Bush
announced his plan to increase the defence budget in 2003 to $380
billion, more than double that of the rest of NATO combined. By one
estimate, the US is now spending 45 percent more on nuclear weapons
activities than at the end of the Cold War. And many American diplomats
are eager to lecture Europeans and Canadians about the need to increase
their defence spending. The NATO allies need to discuss whether American
plans to increase defence spending to such high levels are a greater
threat to the world's security than small-scale tyrants like Saddam.
In any discussion of whether
the US itself now poses the most serious threat to allied security,
some facts need to be highlighted. After all, it is better to judge
a nation by what it does, not what it says. The US has yet to take
its nuclear arsenal off the high alert status of the Cold War. It
has not renounced first use of or threat to use nuclear weapons under
all circumstances. It opposes the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
and it has withdrawn from the ABM treaty. Plus it is making plans
to shorten the time needed to resume testing of new and more usable
nuclear weapons. The situation is similar to a boy's gang where the
leader is hell-bent on a dangerous course. Do the other boys follow
him blindly or do they call a meeting to argue about the club's rules
and principles? Being a member of the NATO club does not entail unquestioning
allegiance to the club's leader.
Rather than respond in
a knee-jerk fashion to the United States' remonstrations, NATO should
implement new kinds of defence preparations that are considered vital
to NATO-and concomitantly the international community's-concerns.
Governments needs to think carefully about how they will spend their
defence dollars and where: Is there any need to prepare for high-intensity
conflict, as NATO did during the Cold War, and still does? When and
how should the NATO allies contribute to UN-sanctioned mid-intensity
conflicts, such as the Gulf War, or NATO-sanctioned mid-intensity
conflicts, such as the war over Kosovo? What kinds of American defence
preparations in Europe (e.g. in Turkey) might be perceived as offensive
and provocative, rather than defensive and necessary?
Sharing alternative
threat assessments and intelligence
For decades, NATO's assessment
of the threat has been shaped and influenced by American military
threat analyses. While Prime Minister Tony Blair has been exonerated
for taking American intelligence at face value so much so that he
was able to argue, fairly convincingly, in favour of attacking Iraq,
citizens will not accept this sort of back-handed logic in future
wars. In future, domestic publics will demand to see hard evidence
of a country's professed trangressions, even if the Americans argue
they have the evidence but it cannot be released for security reasons.
Some of the lessons of the war against Iraq are that the NATO allies
need to undertake more of their own independent military threat analysis.
They need to institute the infrastructure and procedures necessary
to carry out their own independent threat analyses and share their
findings. In conjunction with UN monitoring agencies and international
watchdog institutes, NATO could unite with like-minded nations to
provide the UN Security Council with timely and accurate threat assessments
based on new information (and possibly conflicting analyses of the
threat). Such alternative threat assessments might play a valuable
role in ameliorating tensions and defusing arms spirals in the weeks
and months preceding possible multilateral or unilateral actions,
such as air strikes.
Promoting an atmosphere
of conciliation through NATO
Naturally, critics will
retort that sharing intelligence-especially contrary evidence as to
the nature of the threat-will not necessarily harness the Bush administration
from undertaking pre-emptive or unilateralist measures. For many American
diplomats at NATO, the lessons of the Kosovo campaign in 1999 and
the Franco-German rebuff in 2003 reinforced their belief that NATO
is far too cumbersome and bureaucratic. Now that targets have to be
approved by a consensus of all 25 members of the NATO club, "coalitions
of coalitions" may seem more practical , as exemplified by the
United States' 'coalition of the willing' in Iraq. Even if one or
more of the NATO allies puts forward contradictory evidence about
the nature of the threat, the US and members of its 'fast alliance'
may choose not to accept evidence stemming from alternative sources.
A great deal will depend on the quality of the intelligence and in
this respect, the more independent European partners in NATO (France,
Germany and the UK) could have a lot to offer. NATO headquarters should
inculcate a culture where competing interpretations of threats are
encouraged among the 25 allies. On the other hand, such an atmosphere
of conciliation and acceptance may take a long time and patient nurturing.
As the Ditchley Foundation concluded in a recent discussion of NATO's
future role:
"Whatever the underlying causes, most of us agreed that this
level of transatlantic insult had not been seen before and that it
had contributed to an unnecessary crisis, the effects of which would
be with us for some time. There was a good deal of broken crockery
about."
Threats to North
American Security
The decline of the Soviet
threat previously meant that the North American Aerospace Defence
Command (NORAD) was no longer as important to North American security.
But now some argue that preparing for possible warfare in space is
necessary, and the US (probably in conjunction with Canada) will work
through NORAD to develop space-based interception capabilities. In
his annual report released on 10 June, the Chief of Canada's Defence
staff, General Ray Henault, stated that Canada had a common interest
with the US in developing a missile defence system. In Europe, concerns
have long been raised about the European allies' possible contributions
to the US military's global surveillance, warning, and communications
systems. As many Europeans have pointed out, the American government
needs to be especially careful that it is not perceived to be intent
upon erecting some kind of 'Fortress America.' NATO governments should
maintain official positions of nonparticipation in active missile
and space-based defence programs. The allies should re-emphasize their
commitment to the basic tenets of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
(although the US and Russia chose to abandon the ABM Treaty) and work
to ensure that aspects of the missile defense program associated with
NORAD do not violate the ABM Treaty's basic principles.
New Threats and Challenges
to NATO and the World's Security
The Threat of Russian
Nuclear Proliferation
The possibility of Russian
nuclear weapons and fissile material falling into the wrong hands
is great. Desperate conditions exist in nuclear cities and biological
institutes across Russia. Many weapons scientists and engineers are
not being paid. The sale of nuclear weapons, materials, technology,
and the flight of nuclear scientists to other countries is inadequately
monitoried. A sharp drop in weapons research spending has left thousands
of scientists, engineers, and technicians in near poverty. NATO should
work with other like-minded states through the International Scientific
and Technical Center (ISTC) in the former Soviet Union to provide
Russian scientists with more long-term research grants and programs
that promote alternative civilian employment. NATO should also propose
that an international registrar of scientists be set-up through the
UN to track the research activities of all scientists in the world.
Similar to the UN Arms Registrar, cooperation would have to be voluntary
(in order to preserve academic freedom). However, over time such a
registrar could contribute to increased transparency, openness, and
scientific security.
Reinforcing the
Nunn-Lugar Program
What can be done through
NATO to further enhance Russia's nuclear stability? Much of the problem
stems from Russia's weakness, not its strength. NATO should press
Russia to continue to centralize control of its nuclear arsenal and
consolidate nuclear weapons on Russian soil. More technological and
monetary assistance for Russia is necessary. Estimates are that only
37 percent of the potentially vulnerable nuclear material in the former
Soviet Union is being adequately protected. The NATO allies can help
with more funds in order to avoid a nuclear tragedy from occurring.
They might also issue a challenge to other rich nations, such as Saudia
Arabia and Japan, to contribute substantial amounts. With like-minded
nations, NATO could also sponsor anti-leakage programs at Russian
nuclear facilities. As non-nuclear players, allies such as Belgium,
Canada, and the Czech Republic could be perceived as neutral third
parties genuinely interested in reducing leakage of information and
nuclear materials from Russian nuclear storage and launching sites.
North Korea's Nuclear
Program
The announcement by the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) of withdrawal from the
Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was disturbing but still more frightening
is recent news that North Korea is developing technology that could
make nuclear warheads small enough to be placed atop the country's
missiles, which could put Japan at risk. The DPRK claims it decided
to withdraw from the NPT "to preserve its sovereignty and defend
the country against the continuous moves from the USA to isolate it."
It would appear that this is a conflict between the US and the DPRK
which should not concern the other NATO allies (except Canada, which
would be within range of a threatened nuclear attack by North Korea
on Seattle). But the Great Powers (US, Russia, China, UK, and France)
and smaller European allies cannot absolve themselves of responsibility
for the present hair-trigger situation. The failure of the nuclear
weapon states to implement their NPT obligations under Article VI
of the NPT means many countries like North Korea have the excuse they
seek to obtain nuclear arsenals of their own.
The Threat of Conventional Weapons Proliferation
The United States is the
largest contributor in the world to the arms trade and arms trafficking.
Compared to the other Great Powers, it has an over-sized military
industry that promotes American wares with zeal. The Asia-Pacific
and Middle East regions are engaged in regional arms races and eager
to obtain American weapons systems. Countries like Saudia Arabia are
flush with petrodollars and demand American defence products. American
companies such as General Motors, are contributing to the worldwide
arms race in acquiring conventional weapons. All the NATO allies,
particularly the United States, need to actively discourage their
own domestic manufacturing industries from seeking military contracts
in the Asia-Pacific and Middle Eastern regions. Negative inducements
could include the elimination of government subsidies and grants and
the closure of loopholes that permit tax breaks for research and development
for military purposes. Government trade missions and foreign service
officers should also be actively discouraged from promoting significant
military industry contracts overseas. Each ally must take action so
as not to become an important supplier of assemblies, components,
and sub-components to arms manufacturers in the United States.
Future Rounds of NATO
Enlargement
Delay Further Rounds
of Expansion
The first round of NATO
expansion took place in the spring of 1999 without widespread Russian
approval. Although Russian President Boris Yeltsin conceded at the
last moment to the idea of inviting the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Poland into NATO, all the Russian parties and most Russians were opposed
to NATO's enlargement from 16 to 19 nations. The second round of expansion,
agreed upon in 2002, also runs the risk of inciting old hatreds and
new insecurities. The seven former Soviet bloc nations due to join
the alliance next year are: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia. At 25 members, NATO will have difficulty
forging a consensus and the US has already expressed interest in working
closely, if necessary, with a few close allies, not the entire unwieldy
apparatus.
The alliance should postpone
any decisions about soliciting newer members (such as Japan ) to avoid
further tensions with Russia, a strong opponent of NATO expansion
and the air wars against Yugoslavia and Iraq. The United States and
the other NATO allies should delay opening the door to further NATO
enlargement until the Russian leadership considers that it is an integral
part of Europe's emerging security architecture.
Include Russia in
NATO
NATO's first priority
should be not to create new dividing lines. A reformed NATO, which
did not aim to include the most powerful country in Europe, Russia,
would be fatally flawed. The NATO allies should strive to engage NATO
and Russia in an active, cooperative relationship that would form
the cornerstone of a new, inclusive security structure in Europe.
The allies must act strongly through NATO, the UN and other multilateral
institutions, such as the G-8 and the International Monetary Fund,
to invite Russia into Western security and economic structures.
NATO's air attacks on
Serbia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, make it even more imperative that
the alliance make a supreme effort to welcome Russia into European
decision-making circles. During the Kosovo war, Russia suspended all
contacts with NATO and took its soldiers in Bosnia from under NATO
command. Russia's decision to step back from involvement in NATO,
within hours of the attack on the former Yugoslavia, indicated that
the provisions of the NATO-Russia Founding Act were insufficiently
attractive for Russia to remain engaged in discussions at Brussels.
Russia needed more incentives and more reassurances. Then during the
war on Afghanistan, Russia supported the US war against terrorism.
But the recent controversy about attacking Iraq revealed that, even
despite its desperate need for US funding, Russia was against attacking
Iraq without the UN Security Council's approval. The US went ahead,
despite opposition from Russia, China, Canada, and a host of other
countries. It is still too early to say what the damage has been but
evidently Russia needs to be consulted, not ignored. More incentives
could include formally embedded consultation mechanisms, a mutual
non-aggression pledge, and a promise to develop non-offensive defence
systems.
The NATO Allies' Approaches
toward Worldwide Defence Spending
Maintain Low Levels
of Defence Spending
Since 1997, high-level
Americans, such as the US Ambassador to Canada, have repeatedly emphasized
the need for other NATO members to increase overall military spending.
Overall, the non-US NATO members spent an average of 1.9 percent of
GDP on defence in 2001 as compared to 2.0 percent in 2000. The Czech
Republic, France, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Turkey, and the
United Kingdom ranked at or above this average. All other 11 NATO
members fell below this average, highlighting that American remonstrations
to spend more are failing to convince.
For example, Germany is making drastic cuts in equipment and slimming
down its organizational structures; its focus has switched to peacekeeping,
crisis management, and the war against terrorism, rather than defending
itself from Cold War attacks. On the other hand, Canada has recently
increased its defence spending on capital and equipment sharply. Although
Canada's continuing fiscal problems, and its prominent role as a proponent
of disarmament, should constrain its spending on defence, the country
is setting a poor example which other states could follow. Increasing
defence spending is not an option for responsible policy-makers.
Many European defence
lobbyists bemoan the continent's low level of spending on defence
but domestic publics will not tolerate higher levels of spending.
The newer allies will have a tough time coming up with the money to
bring their militaries up to NATO's basic standards of interoperability.
One defence official noted that Hungary promised to meet 14 of its
initial 48 goals by its acceptance in March 1999 but as of June 2000
had completed only six. "The reason is not our commitment; the
reason is money," that official said. Taking a strategic view,
however, Hungary's geographic location allows NATO to project into
Eastern Europe, and Hungary has played an active role in the Bosnia
and Kosovo operations as a host nation supporting NATO's deployments
and logistics. Similarly, Poland is playing a useful role in charge
of NATO's peacekeeping mission in Iraq. At a meeting in Brussels in
June 2003, Spain and Ukraine each committed to head a brigade of an
8,000-strong multinational division to help stabilize Iraq, which
will be led by Poland with NATO's support.
Calculate each ally's
defence spending fairly
In forthcoming analyses
of the allies' abilities to meet an agreed-upon set of capabilities
pledges-the "Prague Capabilities Commitments"-the newer
NATO allies need to factor into the equation alternative sorts of
commitments (e.g. to UN and NATO-sponsored peacekeeping) because they
also improve the alliance's military preparedness and close the spending
gap between the US and its European allies. Even the EU's efforts
to field a rapid-reaction force of 60,000 personnel by 2003 should
count as a monetary contribution to NATO's security. After all, US
calculations of their percentage of GDP spent on NATO include all
US defence spending worldwide-including US spending in the Middle
East on defence and American foreign military assistance to Columbia-so
it makes sense to silence critics questioning whether NATO's European
members have the will to deliver on their spending promises by asking
NATO officials to calculate spending estimates on all types of defence
expenditures. Individual countries should also consider threatening
to halt payment for the costs of NATO enlargement until the United
States agrees to its fair share of assessed UN dues. If high-level
American officials admonish the allies for reduced spending on defence,
Europeans and Canadians should remind them of the United States' failure
to pay its UN dues fully.
NATO's Approach toward
Peacekeeping
NATO overhaul emphasizes
rapidly deployable capabilities
Most of the NATO allies,
including the United States, are participating more heavily in peacekeeping
under NATO auspices than in the past. NATO foreign ministers announced
two new missions this year: commanding the International Security
Assistance Force in Afghanistan and assisting in Poland's command
of a NATO-supported peacekeeping force in Iraq. NATO is also improving
its ability to act far beyond Europe and North America through a major
restructuring that includes cutbacks at NATO headquarters in Belgium
and a stronger presence in the United States. A new command centre
in Norfolk, Va will oversee this modernization. More robust, rapidly
deployable capabilities will change NATO into "a much more nimble,
deployable, action-oriented organization." According to Canadian
Defence Minister John McCallum, such a "major streamlining"
is "a cultural change that will be significant."
The most significant change
affects NATO operations, which were formerly divided between a European
and an Atlantic command. The two will be merged under Allied Command
Operations, based in Belgium and under the authority of US General
James Jones. A new entity called "Allied Command Transformation"
is also being created to supervise changes to NATO's military capabilities,
including efforts at joint training between alliance members. The
most significant development will be a 20,000-strong 'NATO Response
Force,' ready to deploy within days after its creation in 2003.
At the same time as these peacekeeping initiatives are being planned,
the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) is contributing between 25,000 and
32,000 alliance and non-alliance troops. The Stabilization Force (SFOR,
formerly IFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina includes about 13,000 NATO and
non-NATO troops. Finally, NATO members have been patrolling the Eastern
Mediterranean since the terrorist attacks of 2001, a mission called
Operation Active
Endeavour.
But the risk is that as
NATO involves its allies in more "out-of-area" operations,
similar to Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the rest of the world will
come to perceive NATO peacekeepers as defenders of the American empire.
There needs to be a return to the UN as the chief guarantor of safety
because of the widespread perception that the 'NATO club' consists
mainly of Northern, 'rich', 'white' nations based in North America
and Europe.
Return to the UN
with increased funding and contribute to the SHIRBRIG
The UN continues to experience
a funding crisis due to member states' failure to honour their financial
obligations. Member states of the UN invest an average of $1.40 in
UN peacekeeping activities for every $1000 spent on their own armed
forces. For example, for every dollar that it has invested in UN peacekeeping,
the United States has tended to spend over $2000 on its own military.
The NATO allies need to contribute more money and personnel to UN
peacekeeping or run the risk of being accused of trying to maintain
the status quo through NATO peacekeeping. One effective way to do
this would be to contribute stand-by forces and equipment to the UN's
Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG). Fifteen countries are contributing
to the brigade, which successfully monitored the ceasefire between
Eritrea and Ethiopia, but more contributors and resources are needed.
SHIRBRIG aims to provide the UN with a jump-start, rapid deployment
force of as many as 5,000 troops within 30 days notice. While NATO's
new 'Rapid Reaction Force' will be perceived as US-led and status-quo
oriented, each participating state in SHIRBRIG reserves the right
to decide whether to deploy national personnel on a case-by-case basis.
Canada currently holds the chair and presidency of the brigade. And
there is some hope that it could be deployed to avert genocide in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Improve NATO's Peacekeeping
Training
NATO could do more to
help member states adjust to their peacekeeping responsibilities.
Peacekeeping duties now include the monitoring and administration
of elections, preventive deployment, humanitarian and human rights
functions, the enforcement of UN Security Council resolutions, and
nation-building mandates. The burden of peacekeeping for NATO has
dramatically increased and many NATO allies have valuable experience
and knowledge that could be used to reshape NATO and other multilateral
institutions in the new era. However, NATO's institutions and peacekeeping
infrastructure remain much the same as they were during the Cold War,
despite the explosion of new operations. The promising concept of
the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training
Centre in Cornwallis, Nova Scotia must be fully developed and implemented
as its original architects intended. The Pearson Peacekeeping Training
Centre is currently only a shell of what it could be. The Chretien
government arguably implemented it purely for electoral purposes,
not to make real changes to the military's approach to peacekeeping.
The Canadian government must ensure that the Pearson Peacekeeping
Training becomes widely regarded as one of the best peacekeeping training
centres in the world, an invaluable resource for the Canadian Forces,
NATO, and peacekeepers worldwide. It must become a centre of learning
for all ranks-not just a place for officers and civilians to share
peacekeeping ideas and experiences.
Conclusion
NATO has limited time
and a small window of opportunity to take advantage of its fairly
benign reputation. It is highly unlikely that this regional military
alliance will be seen in such a positive light ten years from now.
Indeed, NATO is well-situated to make the important changes proposed
thus far in this article because the NATO allies did not acquiesce
to American pressure to join the war on Iraq. It was evident from
France, Germany, and Canada's reluctance to join the war that not
everyone could agree on the best methods and most efficient means
of achieving commonly-valued objectives, including the ouster of Saddam
Hussein. One important lesson is that every NATO ally-not just the
current hegemon-have a duty and responsibility to put forward new
ideas and proposals to enhance international and national security.
As Professor James Eayrs suggested over thirty years ago in Fate
and Will in Foreign Policy:
"Force is the monopoly of the Great Powers, for all the good
it does them. But Great Powers enjoy no monopoly over ideas. The foreign
minister of a small state may not be able to summon a gunboat in aid
of his diplomacy, to carry a big stick let alone to brandish it. But
he can carry a briefcase well enough, and stock it with proposals."
Erika Simpson is Associate
Professor of Political Science at University of Western Ontario.
