Ironically, improving UN rapid deployment has proven to be a slow
process. We have been at it for more than a decade with national studies,
multinational initiatives, international commissions, panels of experts,
even conference workshops.
Yet rather than rapid
deployment, by 1997 routine delays of four to six months became the
norm. By their nature, emergency situations usually require prompt
responses. And, earlier this year, a representative from Sierra Leone
reminded us about the consequences of slow responses, warning that
delays often frustrated the combatants, encouraged re-armament, created
security vacuums, provoked ceasefire violations, and further prolonged
armed conflicts i.
Last year, the report
of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,
The Responsibility To Protect, revitalized wider interest in
the use of force to protect civilians threatened by genocide and mass
ethnic cleansing ii.
While helping to initiate a new international norm, it also raised
questions about 'how' to protect and 'with what', establishing the
need to identify and elaborate upon the alternatives.
Increasingly, we hear
of 'coalitions of the willing', of 'regional arrangements' and of
'mercenary armies' as the new preferences. There is little doubt that
the 'international community' will exhaust every dubious option before
returning to the one universal institution devoted to 'saving succeeding
generations from the scourge of war'. There is also the questionable
notion that the UN cannot handle robust operations or operations that
entail authorization for the limited use of force under Chapter VII.
Everyone knows that the UN has had difficulties and several serious
failures. The successes are seldom heralded. Yet it is noteworthy
that many of the recent UN operations have had a robust composition
and often a mandate authorizing the use of force (East Timor, Sierra
Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kosovo).
This is not to suggest
that the new EU rapid deployment force or the NATO rapid reaction
forces are to be dismissed; they may be quite useful in particular
circumstances. At best, however, these are temporary 'stop-gap' measures,
not viable long-term options for preventing, managing or resolving
armed conflicts worldwide. Given the universal membership and wider
legitimacy of the UN, this paper will argue the UN must be better
prepared for assigned tasks in diverse peace operations, including
protection of civilians.
It is relatively easy
to see a relationship between rapid deployment and the protection
of civilians. Almost anything can happen to civilians when a deployment
is delayed by 4 to 6 months. If the objective is to protect, you need
to get the mission in place quickly with a credible presence.
Once again, speakers at
this year's opening session of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping
Operations stressed that rapid response was the key to saving lives
and reducing costs iii.
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan concluded his report to this year's
committee urging member states to intensify their attention and response,
particularly in the area of rapid deployment iv.
What is new here? The
UN Secretariat has fulfilled its share of the bargain to modernize
and reform. The onus is now very much on the member states, particularly
those from the wealthier developed world who demanded the reforms
as a precondition to further participation.
Although further, more
ambitious changes are required, there are indications of recent progress
and complementary reforms v.
Five are noteworthy.
Recent Progress
First, it is encouraging
that the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations--DPKO--has been
substantively expanded to facilitate planning, management and support.
At least, there is a new HQ structure, new offices and 50% more staff.
That recruitment process is now largely complete. Since the UNTAEAS
mission, wherever both possible and justified, robust deployments
have been the norm.
Second, already, we hear
that there are sufficient Strategic Deployment Stocks at UN logistics
base, Brindisi to provide the basic infrastructure and kits for prompt
start-up of an operation.
Third, the on-call lists
for a rapidly deployable military mission headquarters attracted sufficient
response to fill each of the 154 positions with at least two nominations.
It remains to be seen whether this model will provide a coherent headquarters
on short notice. That redundancy of personnel listed will likely be
needed.
Fourth, the UN Stand-by
Arrangement System (UNSAS) has been refined and expanded. As of February,
seventy-five Governments indicated their support for this system,
with conditional commitments of personnel and equipment listed; conditional
as in what the member states might provide.
A fourth 'rapid deployment'
level for formed units was added to the system last summer to encourage
MOUs for self-sustainment and clarify contingent owned equipment,
largely to assist in movement planning and avoid administrative delays.
It is early going, but so far only two countries, Jordan and Uruguay
have committed to this level.
Within the standby arrangements,
however, there are still shortages of enabling units and there is
still a need for strategic lift capacity.
The Secretariat has also
called for more sophisticated military capabilities that can deter
and respond to threats by uncontrolled armed groups. This is easier
for some than others, but we already have one relatively good model.
Fifth, the SHIRBRIG was
designed to complement the UN stand-by arrangement, with a multinational
Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) for UN operations. It has
been operational since 1999 and although it has yet to demonstrate
rapid deployment, the intent is to provide the UN with approximately
5000 troops within 15-30 days. There are now 15 member states participating
in both the headquarters and the brigade pool. It has quite broad
representation, although it needs to attract more. It succeeded in
its first traditional mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia and it managed
a fairly quick exit, if not a quick entry. In December, the participating
member states agreed, in principal, that they would consider more
robust operations on a case-by-case basis, effectively suggesting
a jump from the former stipulation for Chapter VI peacekeeping to
remain relevant in the current operations, which often entail authorization
under Chapter VII for the limited use of force.
Would 5000 well-trained,
well-equipped troops be enough to make a difference? Of course, it
depends on the scope and scale of the particular conflict, but 5000
is the number Major-General Dallaire cited as being sufficient to
stem much of the genocide in Rwanda. The British didn't need to deploy
that many to have a calming influence on the savage violence in Sierra
Leone. Arguably, a coherent brigade group could be very useful in
protecting civilians.
The SHIRBRIG is the most
advanced mechanism to date for UN peace operations. However, it will
have to be modified if it is to remain relevant and ready for new
tasks. Given Canada's current Chairmanship of the SHIRBRIG, there
is a unique opportunity to take a lead role in preparing military
capabilities for the protection of civilians. If it is to be ready
for robust operations, including the protection of civilians, the
SHIRBRIG will need to expand its membership and the pool of available
resources.
Notably, the Brahimi report
(the Panel on UN Peace Operations) encouraged member states to cooperate
in developing coherent brigade groups that could be made available
to the UN at short notice vi.
To date, the SHIRBRIG
is alone. It has expressed a willingness to share experience and assistance
with others who might consider a similar partnership. Coalitions in
other regions are exploring partnerships to emulate this model of
cooperation (including the AU, SEEBRIG, ECOWAS and SADC).
Aside from the political
challenge of attracting additional commitments and capabilities, a
major effort will be required to address the current void in understanding
how to prepare military forces to protect civilians. At present, there
is lack of appropriate doctrine, tactics, training and exercises.
A Preliminary Foundation
Combined, these five related
efforts now provide a basic institutional foundation for peace operations.
This is also a foundation that should facilitate the establishment
of further, more ambitious developments and additional building blocks.
Arguably, if it is to succeed, it will have to.
Potential Limitations
To date, this is not a
foundation capable of ensuring rapid deployment or the protection
of civilians. Why? These arrangements still depend upon political
will, prompt national approval and funding, as well as appropriately-trained,
well-equipped, national units - conditions that frequently stymie
and slow responses.
This is evident in the
UNSAS and even in the SHIRBRIG, which also depends upon the political
will of the participating member states and their prompt national
approval, which in turn is frequently far from reliable.
Repeatedly, even in resolutions
of the UN Security Council, there are warnings of a commitment-capability
gap as numerous Member States continue to deny the UN sufficient personnel,
mechanisms and funding. That does not bode well for peace operations,
for protecting civilians or for overcoming an increasingly divided,
militarised and risky world.
Further, we all know that
for many affluent Western member states, the political will to contribute
declined markedly with donor fatigue, fear of casualties and apprehension
over extended commitments, costs and stretched resources.
For example, Canada, which
was formerly a leading troop contributor now ranks about 32nd with
just over 240 military personnel in UN missions vii.
But the problem is systemic. Western defence establishments have a
strong preference for the big league, big budget, advanced technology,
war-fighting roles and a bias toward coalition operations with American
forces. This preference is now also reflected in Foreign Affairs,
although the new emphasis appears to be on NATO peace operations.
Such preferences are not
without consequences. In the past four years, the heavy burden in
carrying UN operations has been quietly shifted onto developing countries,
which now provide over seventy percent of the personnel for UN peacekeeping.
As a result, there are widespread concerns about an increasingly unrepresentative,
two-tiered system that is far too selective and slow.
In short, we finally have
an institutional foundation for peacekeeping; it has improved in the
past two years with the Brahimi reforms and it might help speed deployments.
But due to the preferences of the member states, this foundation was
predicated on existing arrangements, not new effective structures.
Hence, there is no guarantee of reliability and no assurance of rapid
deployment -- irrespective of how desperate the emergency may be and
irrespective of what is actually happening to civilians.
Renewed interest in a
new 'standing' mechanism?
So the wider challenge
remains, as does the need for more ambitious building blocks and new
structures. One can cite a long list of political and financial impediments,
but it is also apparent that the political environment is changing
rapidly in a manner that might be conducive to the development of
options formerly dismissed as naïve 'long-shots'.
To cite one example, last
month, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld informed a group
of defense industry leaders in Washington that he was considering
the development of a standing international peacekeeping force viii.
This would be a major departure from the ad
hoc system of requesting national approval for national assistance
and personnel once a crisis arises. Unlike the conditional and quite
unreliable standby arrangements, a standing force is a coherent formation,
maintained in readiness with pre-trained, well equipped personnel,
available for immediate deployment once authorized.
However, as reported,
Rumsfeld's initial idea was to have the U.S. to organize, train and
lead this new force, effectively reallocating responsibility for peacekeeping
to the Pentagon, not the United Nations.
Last week, it was also
reported that President Bush met with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan
and the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean
Marie Guehenno, to discuss, among other things, options for global
peacekeeping and the possibility of training a 'ready cadre' of people
from around the Globe ix.
While many may see the
Bush administration's new interest in a standing peacekeeping force
as a desperate policy reversal, a 'trial balloon', if not another
diversion from current problems, Pentagon officials claim it is being
taken seriously, even in discussions with other governments x.
If that is the case, officials
from various member states may soon get a call requesting assistance,
if not advice. This might provide an opportunity for supportive governments
and organizations to revitalize wider interest in other options and
indicate support, albeit only if the focus is re-directed toward the
UN. Fortunately, reports indicate the American administration is still
thinking this through and not yet fixed to a particular preference.
One of the central findings
of the Canadian study on developing a UN rapid deployment capability,
including a UN standing force, remains valid: a force alone may be
insufficient xi.
As most peace operations are now complex multidimensional missions,
involving military, police and civilian personnel, there is a need
for both robust security forces and useful services that address human
needs and provide hope. These must be incorporated in both planning
and deployments at the earliest stages.
A UN Emergency Service
A multidimensional UN
Emergency Service - a UN '911' composed of military police and civilian
volunteers - would correspond to these diverse operational requirements
of contemporary, as well as future UN peace operations.
The model of a UN Emergency
Service is projected to require a total of approximately 13,200 personnel
xii. This number
includes all deployable elements, base support and administration,
as well as the operational headquarters. The latter would be expected
to ensure two tactical-field headquarters (mission headquarters) were
fully functional and capable of assuming operational control over
one of the two formations of deployable elements. The deployable elements
assigned to each mission headquarters would be identical, including
a military brigade group, three companies of civilian police, as well
as civilians skilled in diverse humanitarian, peace-building and conflict
resolution tasks. These various elements would be within a modular
structure allowing deployments to be tailored to the specific demands
of diverse assignments. Each package could carry a credible military
presence, provide unique support and services, and potentially fulfill
a wide array of tasks.
There would be no shortage
of individuals willing to volunteer for service on a paid, full-time
basis, similar to that of UN civil servants xiii.
Each would be recruited and selected on the basis of specific expertise
and skills, as well as dedication to the principles of the UN. To
ensure universal representation, applicants would be encouraged from
all member states xiv.
According to Kofi Annan
and his Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Jean Marie Guehenno,
improving UN rapid deployment remains a priority task; one the UN
and various NGOs are still pursuing, despite a lack of tangible support
from governments and foundations. That must change!
In his seminal 1957 study,
A United Nations Peace Force, William R. Frye provided an insight
that is worth recalling: that which is radical one year can become
conservative and accepted the next" xv.
We have yet to achieve Frye's objective. The
challenge remains, as does the urgent need. We should prepare accordingly!
xvi
i. [return]
Cited in UN, "Rapid Response By UN Key To Saving Lives And Reducing
Costs, Speakers Stress In Peacekeeping Committee, As General Debate
Concludes", Press Release, GA/PK/178, March 4, 2003.
ii. [return]
See: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, (Ottawa: International
Development Research Centre, December 2001).
iii.
[return] UN, "Rapid
Response By UN Key To Saving Lives And Reducing Costs…"
iv. [return]
UN, Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly, "Implementation
of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations",
A/57/711, January 16, 2003, para. 92, p. 26.
v. [return]
For more detailed analysis, see H. Peter Langille, Bridging the Commitment-Capacity
Gap: Existing Arrangements and Options for Enhancing UN Rapid Deployment,
(Wayne, NJ: Center for UN Reform Education, 2002).
vi. [return]
United Nations, Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809,
para 115.
vii.
[return] In Canada, it
is noteworthy that peace operations have been dropped almost to the
bottom of the human security agenda with officials placing their emphasis
on gender and expert civilian deployment.
viii.
[return] See
Esther Schrader, "U.S. Looks at Organizing Global Peacekeeping
Force", Los Angeles Times, June 27, 2003.
ix. [return]
Howard LaFranchi, "Bush may forge new model for global peacekeeping",
The Christian Science Monitor, July 14, 2003.
x. [return]
For further analysis of this option see, H. Peter Langille, "A
global emergency force?", The Toronto Star, July 4, 2003.
xi. [return]
See, Government of Canada, Towards a UN Rapid Reaction Capability,
Ottawa, September 1995.
xii.
[return] See Langille,
Bridging the Commitment-Capacity Gap, pp. 127-128
xiii.
[return] An excellent
review of the arguments for and against such a development is within,
Stephen P. Kinloch, "Utopian or Pragmatic? A UN Permanent Military
Volunteer Force", International Peacekeeping, vol. 3, no. 4,
Winter 1996.
xiv.
[return] This option
was outlined in Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United
Nations. Further elaboration was provided in H. Peter Langille, Maxime
Faille, Carlton Hughes and Major James Hammond, "A Preliminary
Blueprint of Long-Term Options for Enhancing a UN Rapid Reaction Capability",
in Davic Cox and Albert Legault, (eds), UN Rapid Reaction Capabilities:
Prospects and Requirements, (Cornwallis: Pearson Peacekeeping Press,
1995), pp. 179-200. Both inspiration and ideas were derived from Sir
Brian Urquhart, "For a UN Volunteer Military Force, The New York
Review of Books, vol. XL, no. 11, June 1993, pp. 3-4 For an early
response to the Urquhart proposal see: Lord Richard Carver, "A
UN Volunteer Military Force: Four Views", The New York Review
of Books, vol. XL, no. 12, June 24, 1993.
xv. [return]
William R. Frye, A United Nations Peace Force, (New York: Oceana Publications,
1957), p. 77.
xvi.
[return] This is an appropriate
time for an in-depth, independent, transnational study to identify
the general and specific requirements for starting, maintaining and
operating a UN Emergency Service. This study should provide a review
of diverse options and assess their potential for addressing probable
tasks and contingencies. It should also offer guidance into appropriate
composition, structure and organization.
