Introduction
My warm thanks to the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
for the great honour of being invited to deliver the Dorothy Hodgkin
Memorial Lecture. I am not a scientist and must admit to being among
those who have suffered from the schism of the 'two cultures' of the
sciences and the humanities which C.P.Snow famously spoke of in his
historic 1959 Rede Lecture. It is a schism which has still to be bridged
in modern education even though the complexity of contemporary life
demands a more holistic and integrated approach to all issues that
face us today and which the ubiquity of ICT alone cannot achieve.
I have, however, been a longtime admirer of the firm principles and
dedicated endeavours of the Pugwash Movement which has deservedly
earned you all the Nobel Peace Prize in 1995.The Russell-Einstein
Manifesto of 1955 - the 50th anniversary of which will be observed
in 2005 - remains an awesomely prescient and inspiring document for
the peace and disarmament movement. As a testament of nuclear disarmament
and the abolition of war it will remain historic. But it is also a
virtual Hippocratic Oath for scientists confronted with the eternal
dilemma of dual use ingenuity. It is a statement of conscience and
of accountability of all scientists as human beings. As Bertrand Russell
wrote in his letter of 5th April, 1955 to Albert Einstein, "Scientists
have, and feel they have, a special responsibility, since their work
has unintentionally caused our present dangers." It is not only
to scientists that the Russell-Einstein Manifesto appeals but to scientists
as human beings faced with the extinction of their species if nuclear
weapons are ever used again. This is where these two wise men were
echoing the words of Immanuel Kant who once wrote "Science is
organized knowledge. Wisdom is organized life". We have, 48 years
after the Russell-Einstein Manifesto was issued, still to make the
transition from knowledge to wisdom and to respond to its appeal that
"We have to learn to think in a new way" on questions of
weapons of mass destruction(WMD).
This lecture is in memory of Dr. Dorothy Crowfoot Hodgkin - chemist,
pioneer crystallographer, Nobel Laureate and of course - as President
of Pugwash - supporter of the humanist and humanitarian cause of nuclear
disarmament. I hope my modest contribution will be seen as an act
of homage to her memory.
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Dorothy
Crowfoot Hodgkin
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The Problems
I have chosen to speak on "The Resurrection of Multilateral
Disarmament" before a group of very distinguished scientists
not because I am a naïve optimist or because I seek some genetic
engineering breakthrough to invent a new clone to bring about transformational
change in the disarmament field. The multilateral system for disarmament
and arms limitation is widely regarded today as moribund. The responsible
approach for those of us who remain committed to disarmament through
the rule of international law is not merely to engage in hand wringing.
We must do something to breathe new life into the system. Disarmament,
especially the disarmament of WMD, is at a critical crossroad. It
is true that we tend to identify periods of time as being critical
when we disagree with contemporary trends. The Russell-Einstein Manifesto
refers to times of peril during the Cold War. It is over a decade
since the end of the Cold War led to an illusion of security as the
prospect of global nuclear war receded into the background. The disarmament
endeavour did lead to positive results in the past. Concrete reductions
of nuclear weapons through actual destruction of missiles followed
the INF and START I. Reductions (but not destruction) of deployed
strategic weapons followed more recently after the Moscow treaty of
May 2002 although most of us do not consider this a disarmament treaty.
As a result we do have fewer nuclear weapons deployed today than at
the height of the Cold War. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT) was signed in 1996 in a dramatic breakthrough for the advocates
of nuclear disarmament who had long seen this as a litmus test of
the political will to disarm. These apparent successes are now not
only under siege but they stand a real danger of being overturned
as nuclear weapons are, quite unabashedly, being given a new rationale
and the dangers of both indefinite possession and proliferation have
acquired a new urgency. Not only has the threshold for the actual
use of nuclear weapons been lowered dangerously but allegations of
WMD possession are being trivialized as casus belli without verifiable
proof. The ideological basis for this existed in some countries before
the events of 11 September 2001 but today counter-terrorism has been
widely cited as the reason for massive increases in military expenditure.
Before we can revive the disarmament process let us analyze what
afflicts it. The problems confronting the world in so far as WMD are
concerned are complex. I would like to place them in five categories.
The first is the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons beyond
the five nuclear weapon states recognized in the Nuclear Non-proliferation
Treaty (NPT). With the South Asian nuclear tests of 1998 we have,
de facto, 8 countries with a nuclear weapon capability (not counting
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea). A dilemma, both political
and moral, lies at the root of the non-recognition of Israel, India
and Pakistan as nuclear weapon states. And yet without their active
co-operation we are unable to make progress on nuclear disarmament
let alone nuclear abolition. In every one of the cases of proliferation
since the NPT was signed in 1968, a recognized nuclear weapon state
has either wittingly (for raisons d'etat) or unwittingly (through
careless custody of nuclear material and /or technology or naïve
transfer of technology arrangements) been the source of the transfer
of this technology. The burden of guilt, whatever the circumstances,
is clear. What are worse are the dual standards being adopted towards
proliferation with some proliferation being regarded as benign and
others as being downrightly evil depending on the nature of the ruling
regime in the proliferating country. This Manichean judgment is made
in terms of the relationship of the proliferating countries towards
particular powers unmindful of the fact that regimes change and with
them the relationships forged with the powers. The proliferation of
nuclear weapons to Israel, India and Pakistan though not formally
recognized is certainly being accepted as inevitable and irreversible.
Realpolitik has played its role in this notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 1172 in respect of India and Pakistan. Countries who have
had the capability of going nuclear and have not done so have witnessed
this 'managed proliferation' with concern. Some may even be encouraged
to harbour secret ambitions to go nuclear. The publicly declared stance
of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to withdraw from
the NPT and announce its nuclear ambitions has raised the fear of
proliferation in North-east Asia beyond DPRK in a sort of domino effect.
We cannot forge a principled multilateral response to violations of
non-proliferation norms if some members of the international community
choose to look the other way. All this is symptomatic of a weakening
of the non-proliferation norm and some cynicism regarding the subjective
manner with which it has been implemented.
The second category of problems is connected to the first because
of the failure of existing nuclear weapon states to fulfill their
promises to disarm and to achieve the total elimination of nuclear
weapons. As long as nuclear weapon states continue to enjoy the power,
deterrence effects and influence derived directly from nuclear weapon
possession we cannot realistically expect the non-proliferation norm
to hold indefinitely. This is not to cite the record of nuclear weapon
states as extenuating circumstances for nuclear proliferation. No
WMD proliferation is acceptable. Our moral and indeed our scientific
position would, however, not be complete if we did not at the same
time deplore the continued possession of nuclear weapons by those
who have them. The brazen withdrawal of DPRK from the NPT and its
open admission of a nuclear weapon programme have left the international
community perplexed as to what credible and effective action can be
taken. The IAEA has asked Iran to sign the Additional Protocol on
safeguards as a demonstration of good faith on Iran's part and as
a means of enabling the IAEA to expand its verification powers. We
may well have more countries following the proliferation route either
overtly or covertly especially since it is a moot point whether the
invasion of Iraq has encouraged or deterred more countries to acquire
WMD. The 'nth country' syndrome that was widely discussed in apocalyptical
terms in the 1950s and 1960s has returned to haunt us.
The NPT was expected to be the bulwark to halt the trend towards
proliferation and it has served that purpose admirably for three decades
with the exception of Iraq and DPRK. Do we need fresh mechanisms now
or do we need to end forever the casteism or apartheid between the
'haves' and the 'have-nots'? Those who have nuclear weapons regard
it as their ' manifest destiny' while those who do not, appear to
be under a 'cargo cult' - if I may borrow a term from the cultural
anthropologists who write of the mesmerizing effect of manufactured
goods being brought into developing countries by plane. Assuming that
some supernatural force had endowed these developed industrialized
countries with manufactured goods, the traditional societies of Melanesia
in the 19th century prayed to the spirits of the dead to bring them
cargoes of modern goods for distribution and restore their golden
age to them. Sadly today the possession of WMD is seen as an attribute
of power and development which can ensure independence and sovereignty.
It is a quest to be 'mimic men' which V.S. Naipaul writes of in one
of his early novels or the 'Brown Sahib' syndrome familiar to South
Asians like me. The attractions of nuclear weapons in particular acquire
greater urgency for medium to large size countries in conflict-ridden
regional situations that have a reasonably strong industrial base
to sustain a nuclear weapon development programme. That it conflicts
with solemn treaty undertakings and international conventions is seen
as less important than the overriding national security interest.
After all the same argument of the supremacy of national interest
is used by nuclear weapon states to abrogate treaties, to refuse to
sign other internationally agreed conventions to protect global welfare
and to actually attempt the legal invention of 'unsigning' treaties
with impunity.
The third set of problems arises from the serious emergence of the
danger that WMD may be used by terrorists or sub-national groups for
anarchist, secessionist or other purposes. This danger predated September
11, 2001. It was among the reasons why the breakup of the Soviet Union
was viewed with such alarm by those who cared about the safeguarding
of nuclear materials and technology in the former Soviet states and
the future of the trained nuclear scientists there. It was the first
time in history that a nuclear weapon state had imploded and we have
not learned any lessons that would make the next break-up of a nuclear
weapon state any easier to manage. The visionary Nunn-Lugar Co-operative
Threat Reduction programme has contributed greatly towards mitigating
the problem but despite this too many reports of leakages of material
continue to be recorded. It proves not only that the safeguards are
still inadequate but also that a demand continues for such materials
with many shadowy groups in the market. After September 11, 2001 when
the astonishing scale of the terrorist attacks in the USA were revealed,
the relief that WMD were not used was quickly replaced by a deeper
anxiety that such use was not beyond the reach of the organizational
capacity of Al Quaeda and similarly well-funded and fanatical groups
with their global reach. That anxiety is well founded not only in
respect of nuclear weapons and the more likely danger of a 'dirty
bomb'( or a radiological device to disperse radioactive material through
the use of conventional explosives) but also with biological and chemical
weapons where the detection of clandestine programmes is more difficult.
A different category of problems exists in the paralysis of the disarmament
machinery and the weakening of the multilateral system which provided
the context for constructive and result-oriented multilateral disarmament
diplomacy. Twenty-five years after the First Special Session of the
UN General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD I) achieved its remarkable
Final Document by consensus we find the machinery it set up for the
deliberation and negotiation of disarmament issues in disarray. The
66 member Geneva based Conference on Disarmament (CD) - a direct descendant
of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Commission (ENDC) - has not even
been able to agree on a programme of work because of disagreements
on the priorities of the disarmament agenda. Some states believe that
the CD should resume work on negotiating a Fissile Material Treaty
(FMT) for which a mandate - the Shannon Mandate - was agreed upon
sometime ago. Others argue that concurrently with negotiations for
a FMT work should also begin on the prevention of an arms race in
outer space, on nuclear disarmament and on negative security assurances
on the basis of mandates that could be non-negotiating if necessary.
An earlier compromise formula by the then Brazilian Ambassador Amorim
has now been elaborated as a proposal from five past Presidents of
the CD cutting across group loyalties. This has failed to find acceptance
and clearly the main actors in the stalemate are the USA and China.
A lack-lustre debate is held perfunctorily when the CD meets but increasingly
member states are losing faith in the process and some have withdrawn
the Ambassadors they had specially accredited to this important body.
Misguided calls for the abolition of the CD are dangerous. It is easier
to destroy multilateral institutions than to create them. The CD has
been idle for long periods before especially during the Cold War and
I have no doubt that when political will reappears the CD will resume
functioning.
In the cluster of deliberative bodies the First Committee of the
General Assembly is the forum for disarmament and security issues.
It meets annually during the autumn for approximately 5 weeks to go
through an agenda of items. Some of them are 'hardy perennials' which
are debated ritualistically and voted upon. Consensus is reached on
a few resolutions but the resolutions on nuclear issues are invariably
adopted with a division. Voting patterns have changed over the years
with most of the former Warsaw Pact countries now voting with NATO
while the countries of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) are no longer
as tightly-knit as during the Cold War. The Security Council's discussion
and action on disarmament issues has been confined to proliferation
of WMD as in the Summit held in January 1992. It has also addressed
country-specific situations as with Iraq. Another special meeting
of the Security Council to discuss WMD proliferation issues is projected
for later this year with a view to creating a mechanism analogous
to the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) set up in the immediate aftermath
of 9/11. This, I fear, will only reignite the concerns of the non-nuclear
weapon states that the casteism of the 'haves' and 'have-nots' is
being institutionalized at a time when a more inclusive approach is
needed. The more specialized disarmament forum - the Disarmament Commission
- failed to meet in its 50th year in 2002 and this year concluded
its session without consensus on the two issues it had on its agenda
for four years. In addition the Working Group set up by a resolution
of the General Assembly to agree on an agenda for a fourth special
session of the General Assembly on disarmament (SSOD IV) failed to
reach consensus.
All these diplomatic failures are of course indicative of a general
malaise in the political arena and cannot be blamed on the machinery
itself or its individual components. Political will is frequently
cited in diplomatic negotiations - the presence or absence of which
can make a vast difference. Clearly the political will of key countries
is more important than others. The generation of political will depends
largely on public opinion in democracies, on pressures brought to
bear on countries and on the policies pursued by incumbent governments.
Ultimately it is the world view of a small group of very powerful
countries that determines whether multilateral disarmament will work
or not. It could decide to let some aspects of multilateral disarmament
work in a sort of 'a la carte' multilateralist approach. This indeed
appears to be present situation where on Small Arms and Light Weapons
(SALW) we have a Programme of Action being implemented globally. On
antipersonnel landmines, the Mine Ban Convention and the Additional
Protocol of the CCW Convention are working on parallel tracks. A change
of policy of a superpower like the USA can accelerate progress dramatically
as happened when the Clinton Administration decided, against pressures
from some vested interests, to begin negotiations on a CTBT bringing
many of its allies to the table reluctantly. Today with the rejection
of the ratification of the CTBT by the US Senate and the current Administration's
policy the prospects for the entry into force of the CTBT are bleak.
Finally there is the category of problems arising from prevailing
strategic or defence doctrines. It is the pursuit of these doctrines
that influence decision-making in key countries and until these doctrines
are abandoned or revised the current crisis in multilateral disarmament
is unlikely to end. In the time of the Cold War the doctrine of Mutual
Assured Destruction (MAD) was well known. The conventional arms superiority
of the former USSR resulted in that country's adoption of the nuclear
policy of 'no first use'. This was abandoned after the Cold War when
NATO was perceived to have a conventional arms superiority. Russian
diplomats have told me that they were instructed to mine the statements
of US representatives during the Cold War to find arguments in favour
of this volte face!! Today only China and India have 'no first use'
policies. It had also been expected that with the end of the Cold
War there would be a lower salience of nuclear weapons in strategic
doctrines and military strategies. However NATO - the only surviving
military alliance and with additional members - remains wedded to
the use of nuclear weapons, admittedly as a weapon of last resort.
The efforts of Germany and Canada to have this reviewed have failed
so far and small wonder that Russia therefore shows more reliance
on nuclear weapons today.
The US, as the largest nuclear weapon state, has recently issued
its Nuclear Posture Review and National Security Strategy. Both documents
represent a fundamental change in post Cold war trends. Firstly the
threshold for the actual use of weapons is being lowered dangerously
as pre-emptive uses are planned even against non-nuclear weapon states.
The contradiction of this with the Advisory Opinion of the International
Court of Justice in 1996 and the Security Council Resolution 984 of
1995 providing security assurances for non-nuclear weapon states is
obvious. Secondly the new policy - subsequently ratified by Congressional
budgetary approval - is to begin research and development on 'mini-nukes'
or low-yield nuclear weapons for specific purposes such as 'bunker
busters' to penetrate hardened and deeply buried targets. The period
of notice required for a resumption of nuclear testing has also been
shortened although the Bush Administration has repeatedly stated that
there is no intention to resume testing 'for the moment'. The other
nuclear weapon states are also reportedly modernizing their nuclear
weapons and continue research and development with a view to developing
new generations of weapons. The new salience being given to nuclear
weapons takes place in a context of resurgent militarism as global
military expenditure reaches the heights of the Cold War years with
the USA clearly in the lead. The unilateral abrogation of the ABM
Treaty in order to clear the way for the development and eventual
deployment of ballistic missile defence systems will also involve
huge investments for a programme that is of doubtful value especially
with the asymmetric warfare strategy of terrorist groups and the acknowledged
vulnerability of the system. The distinction between offensive and
defensive military doctrines is becoming blurred. Doctrines which
involve the pre-emptive use of a weapon of mass destruction institutionalize
violence. The distinction between the civilized world basing its actions
on law and reason and the world of the terrorist using indiscriminate
violence on the basis that the end justifies the means must be maintained
at all times.
Possible Solutions
I have laid out a litany of troubles. Now what do we do about it?
The enormity of the challenges I have discussed in their five categories
cannot be overcome with any one magic solution. Nor can a half hour
lecture hope to suggest all the solutions to resurrect multilateral
disarmament the death of which has been triumphantly proclaimed by
the neo-conservatives of Washington D.C. think-tanks. I do believe
however that the time has come for us all to 'think in a new way'
as the Russell-Einstein Manifesto has urged us. Innovative ideas do
not all come spontaneously. They require a collective endeavour. We
have had the experience of high level commissions produce new ways
of thinking and new concepts in the post World War II era. Institutions
like the UN have also produced new ideas like 'human development'
and 'good governance' and the ongoing project on the intellectual
history of the UN will no doubt record this. But institutions have
their own bureaucratic processes and their budgetary problems. We
need a flexible and supple mechanism to seed a global change that
will encompass all the global and regional organizations including
the UN. Just as the Brandt Commission sensitized us all to the North/South
divide; the Brundtland Commission gave us the concept of 'sustainable
development' and the more recent International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty - sponsored by our host country Canada - yielded
the concept of 'the responsibility to protect' we could also establish
a commission to analyze the problems of multilateral disarmament and
prescribe solutions. I have therefore proposed since April 2002, an
International Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction to be launched
with senior political figures of influence and outstanding experts
to examine the current state of affairs and recommend measures to
break out of this situation. I am delighted that the Government of
Sweden has on 3 July this year announced the establishment of such
a Commission to be chaired by Dr. Hans Blix whose luminous integrity,
unquestioned expertise and rich experience equip him well for the
task ahead. We await further details about the Commission to be made
available in the autumn. Some argue that the disarmament norms created
after World War II are no longer valid in a changed global situation
although they propose nothing to replace these norms. A global order
is essential especially in the context of globalization. We cannot
regress to anarchy or a situation where the most powerful dictate
the rules. If we need to refashion or adapt norms or create fresh
norms we must do so as a global community seeking the co-operation
of all.
The Commission that I have advocated must have a broader mandate
than nuclear weapons which was the Canberra Commission's mandate.
Today chemical and biological weapons, despite being the subject of
Conventions totally banning their production and use, have different
levels of verification. The new threat of terrorism has enhanced the
danger of the actual use of these weapons while the lack of universality
in the two legal regimes governing these weapons is also worrisome.
Civil defence programmes are increasingly preoccupied with the likely
use of these weapons. The lethality of nuclear weapons in comparison
to chemical and biological weapons is well established. However, for
the purposes of a Commission we do not need to establish a hierarchy
of weapons as long as we treat all WMD in one category because of
their common threat to humankind, their indiscriminate nature and
our need to ensure the survival of the human race. The collapse of
the seven year process to develop a Protocol to strengthen the 1972
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) leaves the BWC without any effective
verification mechanisms. In addition the mandate of the proposed Commission
must include both the disarmament dimension and the proliferation
aspect. To focus on one to the exclusion of the other would cause
a major problem for the credibility of the Commission. The majority
of the international community belongs to the NPT, the BWC and the
CWC and would need to be convinced of the political objectivity of
the Commission. The dangers of terrorist uses of WMD must also feature
prominently in the mandate of the Commission. A carefully composed
Commission with due regard to political and geographical diversity
and gender balance supported if possible by a panel of experts, could
over a period of time develop a set of innovative and far-reaching
recommendations that could get us all out of the present rut. I am
personally aware that UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan supports the
proposal in principle and would be ready to have the Commission present
its report to him in the same way that the International Commission
on Intervention and State Sovereignty did. This could have influential
policy implications.
Apart from the establishment of an International Commission the international
community has a tool kit available to it for immediate action. For
example, the Board of Governors of the IAEA can begin, as it has done
with Iran, to demand that all states that plan to have nuclear power
projects for peaceful purposes must sign the Additional Protocol to
widen the agency's verification potential in their countries. The
Article IV provision in the NPT for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
cannot be read as an absolute entitlement. It is an incentive and
should have been more generously implemented by developed countries
to fund non-power projects in areas like medicine and agriculture.
For nuclear power projects, given the thin line separating peaceful
and non-peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the fact that existing
arrangements to safeguard declared facilities have proved inadequate,
it is reasonable for additional measures to be taken as a confidence
building measure internationally. Equally more money can be pledged
for non-power uses in the same way as the G8 pledged $ 20 billion
for Co-operative Threat Reduction measures last year. Thus the signature
of the Additional Protocol, hitherto a voluntary measure, will be
deemed to be a pre-requisite for the supply of nuclear projects, fuel
and other assistance.
There are other measures open to the international community in the
nuclear area. Strategic nuclear weapons remain an important area for
action by the nuclear weapon states. Equally important, if not more
so, is the question of sub-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons which
must be addressed urgently. While the entry into force of the CTBT
remains dependent on the political will of the USA we can legitimately
expect India and Pakistan, who promised to do so in 1998, to sign
the CTBT as a first step and as evidence of responsible behaviour.
On a FMT while the CD remains deadlocked it is important that informal
discussions commence among the 8 nuclear weapon capable countries
so that when negotiations in the CD do begin they will have a basis
to build on. Another measure that is now being recognized is the need
for more funding for the IAEA and the OPCW to conduct their verification
responsibilities as well as to take special measures against terrorist
uses of WMD. The strengthening of the Convention for the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material, greater circumspection in the transport
of nuclear material and the multilateralisation of the Co-operative
Threat Reduction programme are among other measures that can be taken
without delay.
In the chemical weapons area, the OPCW under its energetic new leadership
and with strong US support now must prove that its unique verification
powers under the CWC can in fact be implemented. This would instill
confidence in verification procedures and in disarmament treaties
amidst the propaganda about the virtues of 'paperless disarmament'
and the dangers of placing too much faith in treaties. Countries like
the Russian Federation with genuine financial difficulties in fulfilling
their treaty obligation to destroy chemical weapons will need to be
assisted. In the biological weapons area the agreement reached at
the resumed BWC Review Conference in 2002 augurs well for the prospects
of national legislation implementing the BWC and for the eventual
criminalization of the violation of the BWC under domestic laws. Several
other areas will be explored in the three annual meetings that will
take place before the next Review Conference and this is a healthy
sign of a multilateral process at work.
The salvaging of the BWC Review Conference is itself an illustration
of how multilateral disarmament diplomacy can be kept alive. It is
no secret that creative diplomacy by the European Union helped to
forge a compromise which the US tacitly accepted and the NAM acquiesced
in out of a realization that it was the best result that could be
obtained in the circumstances. We need more of these bridge-building
exercises across political groups if multilateralism in disarmament
is to remain robust and productive. Group solidarity is understandable
but in circumstances where total failure is so self-evidently destructive
of the multilateral process, individual diplomats with stature and
credibility as well as individual countries with broad acceptance
must activate themselves in the search for compromises. The approach
that suggests that nothing can be accomplished until political circumstances
are more propitious is essentially myopic and ultimately harmful to
the cause of disarmament.
A long-term strategy that was identified in the UN Secretary-General's
Advisory Board for Disarmament Matters was the need for disarmament
and non-proliferation education to ensure an informed public opinion
especially in the current context of indifference. This led to a General
Assembly mandated expert study of the subject and a report with a
number of many useful recommendations endorsed by the General Assembly
in 2002. These recommendations are in the process of being implemented
by the United Nations but they require the combined commitment and
resources of the entire global community for the results to be seen.
The Role of the Scientist
It is in this context that the role of the scientist in terms of
the Russell-Einstein Manifesto assumes great importance. The urgent
need for a code of ethics to govern scientists working in the defence
sectors in all countries cannot be overemphasized. The inherent ambiguities
in dual use technology are of course difficult and complex. Despite
this or precisely because of this, a code of ethics and a system of
mentoring younger scientists can help to ensure moral clarity where
legal precision may be difficult to achieve. Research and Development
programmes in the weapon industry have to depend on scientists. As
long as the right to self defence remains guaranteed by Article 51
of the UN Charter and the provisions for the collective defence of
international peace and security can be exercised by the Security
Council under Chapter VII of the Charter we will have armies and we
will have weapons which nations will seek to modernize. A weapon-free
world is therefore a Utopian ideal which the scientist cannot expect
any more than others. However all of us can legitimately expect a
lower reliance on weapon based security given its obvious limitations
in comparison to the more durable human security that sustainable
human development can achieve through non-military means. We can demand
that lower levels of arms be achieved to assure security. Thus the
pressure from military-industrial complexes throughout the world for
more resources for weapons development must be resisted by scientists.
The latest Yearbook released by the prestigious Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reveals that global military expenditure
is running at $ 128 per capita after the acceleration we witnessed
globally in 2002 ostensibly because of 9/11. While the USA accounts
for 43% of global military expenditure collectively USA, Japan, UK,
France and China total 62% of what the world spends on arms. The statistics
quoted for 2001 reveals interesting regional variations in military
spending with the Middle East (6.3%), North America (3%) and Central
and Eastern Europe (2.7%) above the global average of 2.3% while Latin
America (1.3%), Africa (2.1%), Asia (1.6%) and Western Europe ( 1.9%)
. While political tensions undoubtedly contribute towards these figures
scientists engaged in R&D can play a decisive role in rejecting
military solutions to political disputes. We shall never achieve the
Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations at current levels
of military expenditure.
Existing treaties like the NPT, CWC and BWC together with political
commitments solemnly made in the final documents of conferences make
it abundantly clear that all states are obliged to achieve the total
elimination of WMD. We are thus faced with the threat of burgeoning
conventional weapons and the possible development of new types of
weapons including those based on new physical principles. Here the
need for a code of ethics becomes vital for application across national
boundaries. It will prohibit scientists from engaging in any activities
that contravene existing treaties and conventions in the arms limitation
and disarmament field. Where new weapons or refinements of existing
weapon technologies are contemplated the principles of humanitarian
law and the protection of civilians must be the guideline. National
scientific bodies such as Academies of Sciences and international
scientific organizations must take responsibility for harmonizing
codes of ethics and for their implementation. If a plaint is filed
against a scientist for violating the code of ethics an inquiry must
be instituted and if the verdict is guilty the withdrawal of professional
membership and recognition must follow. It is only by maintaining
the highest standards that we can ensure that scientists do not allow
their skills to be subverted or exploited. Where scientists, especially
those in dictatorships, have been coerced, whistle-blowing should
be encouraged within the code of ethics as part of our common responsibility
to protect humanity. With the functioning of the International Criminal
Court it would follow automatically that any scientist found guilty
would automatically be struck off professional rolls and be disqualified
from pursuing his or her scientific career.
Verification technology is an area where a great deal of good work
has already been accomplished. The state of the art technology installed
in Vienna and other parts of the world by the Provisional Technical
Secretariat of the CTBT and IAEA's technical equipment and expertise
in implementing safeguards agreements are some outstanding examples.
More needs to be done in order to remain several steps ahead of violators
of treaties and to detect clandestine programmes. Satellite imagery
has been developed to a remarkable level of accuracy. Although national
intelligence agencies do not divulge their high resolution imagery
even to the UN, commercially available imagery has enabled NGOs like
the Federation of American Scientists and others to monitor disarmament
related developments and inform the general public of their findings.
Greater availability to the public of high resolution satellite imagery
and improvements in the quality and the reading of this imagery will
make the detection of clandestine programmes by both states and terrorist
group more likely. It will also make for a better informed public
at a time when civil liberties are being curtailed and transparency
sacrificed in the campaign against terrorism. The benefits also include
greater confidence in the verifiability of disarmament agreements
and greater confidence that cheats do not get away with their bad
faith actions. Other verification devices and aids could be invented
and popularized as a confidence-building infrastructure to the web
of treaties and conventions that restrain the unbridled pursuit of
weapon development. Radar and early warning systems are also technological
areas by which conflicts can be prevented. Their potential has to
be exploited through the collective work of scientists. A Canadian
proposal for a peacekeeping satellite - PAXSAT - remains unimplemented
for lack of funds while billions of dollars are spent on new weapons.
Scientists can be at the forefront of public campaigns demanding more
resources for peaceful research to ensure a safer and better world.
Finally there is the task of education in the disarmament and proliferation
area to which I have referred earlier. The dangers of the arms buildup
and of proliferation can best be explained to younger generations
by the scientific community in terms that are clear and irrefutable.
It is an investment in our future. It is a responsibility they have
to their fellow human beings. In the words of the Russell-Einstein
Manifesto "Remember your humanity".
(Jayantha Dhanapala is a former United Nations Under-Secretary-General
for Disarmament Affairs and a former Ambassador of Sri Lanka.)
