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53rd Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs
Advancing Human Security: The Role of Technology and Politics

Halifax and Pugwash, Nova Scotia, Canada
17-21 July 2003

The issue of climate change has surfaced relatively recently on the scale of environmental concerns, yet international responses to it have been notably swift and tightly targeted. In just over a decade and a half, climate change has garnered international attention and the international response to this global problem has shifted from contentious debate on its presumed-dubious scientific groundings, to virtually global acceptance of the reality of the problem and the severity of its predicted effects. This progress has been quite remarkable given the breadth and complexity of the problem, in social, economic, political, and scientific terms. However, while the expediency of the international climate change negotiation process deserves guarded praise, the exclusive nature of the process, from a gender perspective, raises considerable cause for concern.

Despite the overt United Nations commitment requiring all UN processes to abide by the principles for mainstreaming a gender perspective, the international climate change negotiation process has remained in contravention of these principles by assuming gender-neutrality and by failing to engage in required gender-analysis. I will argue that this failure has not only resulted in the process coming up short on gender equity principles, but also that this has had, and will continue to have, injurious effects on the process in terms of efficiency and effectiveness¹. The international climate change process will be unable to achieve truly global legitimacy or relevance until it adopts the principles of gender equity at all stages of the process, from scientific research, through analysis, agenda formation, negotiation and decision-making, regime implementation, and finally in further development and evaluation.

Setting the boundaries through definition

In order to effectively engage in this debate, it will be useful to clarify a few concepts at the outset. First of all, 'gender' is a concept, distinct from 'sex', that "refers to the way in which, in any particular society, individuals are socially constructed to behave and experience themselves as 'female' or 'male'" (Jacobson 2002). This is changeable over time and there are wide variations of gender experiences within and between cultures, which depend on factors such as age, class, and ethnicity (Mertus 2000, 18). Furthermore, "gender always carries with it some form of relational content", which contributes to a person's gendered identity (Jacobson 2002). Thus, the use of a gender perspective in the analysis of any issue "recognizes, understands, and utilizes the knowledge of gender differences in planning, implementing and evaluating programs and working relationships" (Hanley, quoted in Mertus 2000, 15).

According to the UN's Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action, there is a stated need to mainstream a gender perspective throughout all UN activity areas (UN 1996). Furthermore, the UN has acknowledged that women's right to participate in decision-making constitutes their basic human right as well as their right and responsibility as citizens (Gierycz in Skjelsbaek & Smith 2001, 18-19). In July 1997, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) defined the mainstreaming of a gender perspective as:

These principles collectively challenge the assumption of gender-neutrality, rendering this assumption illegitimate and ignorant not only of accepted UN policy but also blatantly ignorant of concern for gender equity.

Let us now also open up some of the conceptual definitions surrounding climate change and allow the clarification of what I refer to as the "international climate change negotiation process". While it is not practical in this context to engage in a lengthy scientific explanation of the processes that cause and result in climate change, it is feasible to begin by acknowledging that:

If it may be agreed that this is more or less the scientific process causing climate change, then the human process of international meetings and negotiation to obtain agreement on how to slow or alter this process, or at least to mitigate its effects, can be referred to as the international climate change negotiation process.

The general objectives of this process were summed up in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN FCCC). Article 2 (Objective) states:

The UN FCCC remained the focal point of the international climate change negotiation process throughout the 1990s and has now survived into the 2000s, with the most current major development in the process being the agreement in 1997, and ongoing ratification, of the Kyoto Protocol (Grubb et al 2001, 36-37).

Very briefly, the Kyoto Protocol, which is the culminating product of the Kyoto conference, i.e. "the biggest and most high-profile event on the international environment since the Rio Earth Summit", sets out legally binding (pending ratification) commitments by industrialised countries to limit their greenhouse gas emissions (Grubb et al 2001, 61). The commitments were made according to agreed implementation time scales in conjunction with "a complex package" of "global 'soft' commitments, related processes on technology transfer and financial mechanisms, policies and measures, minimization of adverse impacts, sinks, and compliance mechanisms…designed to gain and sustain global participation" (Grubb 2001, xli). In short, Kyoto is the world's comprehensive-albeit imperfect-agreement guiding international policy and practice on the control and mitigation of climate change.

Given this definitional introduction to two seemingly distinct "issue areas", it will now be useful to draw some links between gender issues and climate change, and to establish the foundation for a gender-based critique of the international climate change negotiation process.

Foundations for fair criticism

As I have begun to show, the formal principles guiding international action on both climate change and gender equity are grounded in development initiatives of the United Nations. The UN FCCC is actually one of several agreements emerging from the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), which itself was the product of a long preparatory history of meetings and discussions². Similarly, much of the formal international work on gender equity has taken shape in the UN, beginning with the creation of the UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) in 1947, further taking shape through UNIFEM and the UN Conferences on Women in Copenhagen 1980, Nairobi 1985, Beijing 1995, Windhoek 2000, and also with Security Council Resolution 1325 (Gierycz in Skjelsbaek & Smith 2001, 15). Underpinning both of these development initiatives are concerns for achieving greater global equity and efficiency in development, in the interests of women and men, and the common future they share on Earth. As such, progress in the areas of both gender and environmental issues was intended to crosscut all issue areas of the UN, and to avoid becoming mainstreamed as an afterthought to other processes (Gierycz in Skjelsbaek & Smith 2001, 19; Greene 2001, 390).

Given these parallel beginnings, it is increasingly evident that gender, environmental, and development concerns should be considered in concert with one another, as complementarities, and certainly not as competing interests. Moreover, based on the common goals of achieving efficiency and equity, it would appear that the two issue areas stand to gain from being mutually supportive, and contrastingly, that it would be of lesser value to consider one to the exclusion of the other. Ironically, while the formal UN-based women's movement has developed and maintained an interest in the inclusion of environmental issues throughout its development³, the UN-based environmental movement, and specifically the international climate change negotiation process, has essentially ignored gender issues by assuming gender-neutrality⁴.

Before moving on to a discussion of how this exclusion came to be, and how the process may be redeemed, allow me first to explain briefly why gender issues should indeed be made central to the development of the international climate change negotiation process.

Making the case for gender inclusiveness

Climate change is often viewed as a scientific process, making it difficult to understand and often even more difficult to explain to the wider public (Villagrasa 2002, 41). This is further confounded by the belief that most of the effects of climate change will occur only in the future, complicating the generation of immediate public concern (Villagrasa 2002, 41). Fortunately, however, the very real, very human aspects of climate change, including its anthropogenic causes and the severe effects it will likely have on human life are increasingly being acknowledged⁵. Consequently, there is also growing awareness of the differential ways in which women and men are slated to experience climate change. These differences occur principally in the areas of responsibility, vulnerability, adaptability, and mitigation (Skutsch 2002)⁶.

Responsibility

Evidently, both sexes are implicated in the human responsibility for climate change based on their participation in the global economy (Skutsch 2002, 32). However, women's and men's participation in the global economy, defined in this case as their use of products and services owing to the emission of greenhouse gases, is neither the same, nor equivalent, on a global scale (Skutsch 2002, 33). For example, if we consider car use and ownership, although the sexual division has become less extreme in the past few decades in the Western world, "it is evident that cars are still more used by men than by women, with the side-effect that women are often disproportionately dependent on public transport" (Skutsch 2002, 33). This is only one of thousands of examples of women's and men's differential involvement in the global economy contributing to climate change. The point here is not to accrue blame on one sex or the other, but rather to emphasize the fact that since women and men have differential responsibilities for contributing to climate change, it is thus only logical to incorporate a gender perspective when conducting research on human responsibility for climate change⁷.

Vulnerability

It is with regard to vulnerability that the majority of women's research on gender differences and climate change has been conducted. This is because it is relatively frequently acknowledged that "the effects of climate change are very likely to be gendered…because of the strong relationship between poverty and vulnerability to environmental change, and the stark fact that women as a group are poorer and less powerful than men" (Nelson et al 2002, 51). While a statement as broad as this should not be accepted without qualification and acknowledgement of the significant gains women have made to challenge their assumed vulnerability⁸, it is clear that climate change will have the most dramatic and likely detrimental effects on the most vulnerable segments of society (IPCC 2001), and this does, for a variety of reasons⁹, often include women (Nelson et al 2002, 52).

Adaptability and Mitigation

Regarding adaptability and mitigation, women have been shown to be both capable of, and especially adept at, adapting to climate change (Masika 2002, 6), as well as being willing to play a key role in developing and implementing mitigation strategies (Skutsch 2002, 35). However, in both cases, women are much more likely to achieve this if granted the opportunity and agency necessary to become involved in the process (Skutsch 2002, 35). This would, however, involve the granting of space for the voices of women to speak on behalf of women. This issue brings us neatly back to the lack of gender analysis and gender perspective in the international climate change negotiation process.

Based on the evidence presented in the preceding paragraphs, it is irresponsible to deny that climate change is a gendered concept. After all, under the assumption of the gender neutrality of both the problem and the process, it is not that the above issues disappear, but rather that they remain suppressed and ignored. It would seem logical, therefore, if our goal is to achieve maximal efficiency, for our response to climate change to aptly emerge from a gender analysis and incorporate a gender perspective at all stages of the process, from scientific research, through regime formation and mitigation-strategy implementation. Yet the international climate change negotiation process fails to incorporate a gender perspective in an integrated and meaningful way. I maintain that the consequence of this neglect is a lack of efficiency and equity in the process, given that a gender-neutral process and gender-neutral mitigation strategies will fail to address the differentiated concerns and needs of half of the human population.

I will now turn my attention to an examination of the development of the process, in order to illustrate how it evolved to the exclusion of women, before proceeding to recommendations on how the process might be reorganised in such a way as to include a gender perspective.

How the process proceeded to exclusion

As I have noted, the international climate change negotiation process has its roots in UN initiatives, not the least of which was the formation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988, under the auspices of the UN Environment Program (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) (Grubb et al 2001, 4). The IPCC provides "authoritative assessments to governments of the state of knowledge concerning climate change" and it is these reports that provide the "scientific underpinning for the diplomatic processes of the UN FCCC" (Grubb et al 2001, 4). The IPCC has evolved into "what is probably the most extensive and carefully constructed intergovernmental advisory process ever known in international relations" (Grubb et al 2001, 4). Its first assessment report jump-started the UN FCCC and its second assessment report "marked a crucial stage in the progress of global action to combat climate change…set[ting] the context for the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol" (Grubb et al 2001, 4). And yet, this most influential UN-based body has taken an almost exclusively gender-neutral stance in its research and reports. Hence, the international climate change negotiation process, in its assumption of gender-neutrality, started on the course of regime formation as a process exclusive of gender concerns, and continued in that vein despite strong statements from the UN requiring mainstreaming of a gender-perspective.

Still, the process cannot be let off the hook quite so easily. There were intervening moments and factors throughout the process that should have reeled it back into the realm of gender equality. The first of these was Agenda 21, the 'comprehensive' international programme of action for achieving sustainable development in the 21st Century (Grubb et al 1993, 97). Section III, Chapter 24 of Agenda 21 emphasises the need for the active involvement of women in decision-making and plainly acknowledges the need to forcibly eliminate gender discrimination (UNCED 1992). Secondly there was the Beijing Platform for Action emerging from the UN Conference on Women in 1995, which propounded in no uncertain terms the continuing efforts to eliminate gender discrimination and further entrenched efforts to adopt a gender perspective cognisant of women's identity and agency across all UN activity (United Nations 1996).

However, notwithstanding these intervening and purportedly vital documents, and despite a strong move by women away from viewing women as the vulnerable victims of this global phenomenon, neither the UN FCCC nor the Kyoto Protocol make any mention of gender or women's issues relative to global environmental change (Skutsch 2001, 30). Equipped with all the necessary bases for designing a gender-inclusive process of international negotiation on climate change, the agents of this process still failed to do so¹⁰.

Getting back on track: mechanisms to promote gender inclusiveness

One foremost consideration to retain is that a numerical representation of women does not necessarily result in the theoretical representation of feminist goals, i.e. gender equity. Therefore, while the number of women participating in climate change negotiations should increase at all levels-in government, business, and NGO communities-and throughout the process of regime formation, this will not necessarily guarantee an acceptable representation of women's interests (Villagrasa 2002, 41). In order to achieve adequate representation, women must be acting as women, on behalf of other women, and in women's interests.

At the current point in the climate change regime formation process, one strategy that would serve to quickly integrate a gender perspective would be the design of gender-sensitive climate change mitigation strategies. Without requiring a total revision of the process, gender-sensitive strategies could be taken into account within the existing mechanisms devised to mitigate climate change, such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (Denton 2002, 16). Projects falling under the discretion of these mechanisms should presume the inclusion of the main stakeholders at all stages of project development anyway, thus providing a perfect opportunity to achieve a high measure of gender-sensitivity (Denton 2002, 16)¹¹. Since there is "enough evidence to show that women are at the centre of sustainable development, and that ensuring gender equalities in all sectors would mean that society as a whole would benefit" (Denton 2002, 17), it seems logical to incorporate a gender perspective at the stage of mitigation design, given that it is too late to achieve the ideal incorporation of such a perspective at all stages of the process.

A second method which may prove effective has been put forth by Delia Villagrasa, who suggests that developing a mentoring process may help to effectively integrate newcomers, theoretically both women and men as required, into the process. As negotiations on climate change and the implementation of agreements become increasingly complex, Villagrasa suggests that it has become more and more difficult to invite in stakeholders who have been previously disengaged from the process (Villagrasa 2002, 43). A mentorship system could help identify the missing links and build competence in this area, thus ensuring the continuity of the process as well as incorporating a greater range of valuable interests. If designed according to gender-equity principles, this plan could stand to improve not only equity, but also the overall efficiency of the process as it reaches crucial stages of implementation, enforcement, and further development.

Thirdly, data collected to study the impacts of climate change on human populations should be disaggregated by sex in order to show the different experiences of women and men relative to climate change, as well as to climate change mitigation strategies. If we do not know how women and men are differently affected by climate change, then how can we effectively plan gender-equitable mitigation and adaptation strategies? Sex disaggregated data has proven vital to the analysis of conflict on men and women; it stands, similarly, to illuminate the international climate change negotiation process (UNIFEM 2003).

Recommendations for improving the equity and efficiency of the international climate change negotiation process will only increase in number as more and more stakeholders are empowered to become involved in the process. One key point to be recalled during the consideration of gender perspectives is that assumptions of essentialism and universalism in feminism have become outdated as the field takes on a more post-modern approach. Avoiding universalism is especially worthy of concern with regard to the climate change process, in view of the differentiated experiences, goals, and mitigation mechanisms of women in the global North and South, especially when it comes to questions relating to development, industrialisation, and the environment (Dankelman 2002; Masika 2002, 4; Littig 2002, 121)¹².

The costs of gender-blindness, and the benefits of gender-equity

One further issue may need to be problematised before proceeding to a conclusion that recommends gender inclusion in the ongoing international process of climate change negotiation. Building on the notion of improving equity and efficiency in international systems, it may actually be premature to be contemplating gender equity in environmental crisis, given the unresolved issues of poverty, inequality, and development in the context of a globalising, liberalising world. After all, we have never entirely made up for the lost 'development decade' of the 1980s, nor have we achieved the goals we established for developing sustainably in the 1990s. Neither can we say with any confidence that the 20th Century featured the attainment of gender equality, despite whatever advances were made.

However, I do not consider this necessarily to be cause for pause in the current climate change negotiation process. It may be that the mitigation of environmental degradation and the expansion of gender equality could be catalytic elements in a greater equation involving social and economic development as well¹³. This has been proven to be the case in certain, though rare, 'post-conflict moments' (Cockburn 2001), where the reorganisation of social order following the social upheaval experienced during conflict has actually had positive, equality-oriented benefits for women¹⁴.

What may be enlightening in this context is the reconsideration, or a slight reinterpretation, of the 'no regrets' principle. Rather than simply having a situation in which greenhouse gas emissions are reduced to the point of negative net costs and the generation of direct or indirect benefits are considerable enough to outweigh and offset the costs of implementing the options, perhaps we could also envision a situation where the direct and indirect benefits of achieving gender equity (ie. efficiency and equity) outweigh the costs of implementing gender equitable policies. It is by thinking in these terms that we will begin to fully comprehend the potential gains associated with incorporating a gender perspective.

Conclusion

I have begun to establish the regrettable consequences associated with making the faulty assumption of gender-neutrality in a process as anthropocentric as the international climate change negotiation process. By examining the links between environmental, development and gender concerns, I have been able to demonstrate how the process has remained lacking in this area, and have suggested that until the process mainstreams a gender perspective at all levels of regime formation and implementation-as should all UN-based activities-it will lack the gender-sensitivity required to achieve truly global relevance and legitimacy. Finally, out of interest and respect for the continued development of the process, I have highlighted a couple of suggestions that may serve as a starting point for the integration of gender equity. These recommendations may be necessary, but they are certainly not sufficient to achieve gender equity. They are, however, a starting point, and a start is most certainly hurriedly welcomed, lest we reach a point where regret becomes the dominant feeling associated with the international climate change negotiation process.

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Footnotes

1. [RETURN] My definition of effectiveness is drawn partially from the conglomerate definition explained in Oran R. Young and Marc A. Levy (1999) "The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes" pp. 1-32 in O. Young (ed) The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: causal connections and behavioural mechanisms London: MIT Press. I incorporate their economic, normative, and political approaches, but add an additional approach based on gender equity and applicability.

2. [RETURN] The UN General Assembly initiated this series of meetings and discussions in 1989 when, following on from the Stockholm Conference of 1972, it mandated the 'Earth Summit' to be held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992. For a concise introductory synopsis on the historical process of climate change regime formation see Owen Greene (2001) "Environmental Issues" in J. Baylis and S. Smith (eds) The Globalisation of World Politics: an introduction to international relations Second Edition, Oxford: Oxford UP, pp. 387-412.

3. [RETURN] For example, among others, see Rosi Braidotti et al (1994) Women, the Environment and Sustainable Development: Towards a Theoretical Synthesis London: Zed Books in association with INSTRAW, and Annabel Rodda (1991) Women and the Environment Women and World Development Series, London: Zed Books.

4. [RETURN] See Margaret Skutsch (2002) "Protocols, treaties, and action: the 'climate change process' viewed through gender spectacles" in Gender and Development Vol 10, no 2, pp. 30-39. The most relevant exception to this is the inclusion of women as one of nine 'major groups' deemed to have special interests and connections to the implementation of sustainable development initiatives, acknowledged in Agenda 21. See Chapter 24 of Agenda 21 for details of how UNCED perceived the inclusion of a gender perspective with regard to sustainable development.

5. [RETURN] In my view, this recognition of the potential and actual effect of climate change on human beings should be enough of an indicator that gender issues need to be addressed within the process, given that the occasions are rare indeed that women and men experience major events in the exact same ways (take conflict and/or violence as a case in point).

6. [RETURN] Although there is an ongoing debate on what causes climate change, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the majority of scientists are of the conviction that human activities producing carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases are responsible for a major share of the measured and forthcoming change in the Earth's climate. See Margaret Skutsch (2002) "Protocols, treaties, and action: the 'climate change process' viewed through gender spectacles" in Gender and Development Vol 10, no 2, pp. 30-39.

7. [RETURN] I fully acknowledge differences in responsibility for climate change occurring along divisions in humanity other than gender divisions, such as differences in human responsibility in developed and developing countries, for example, or between urban and rural dwellers. I confine myself to the discussion of gender differences here only due to a lack of space in the limitations of this paper.

8. [RETURN] On women's efforts to defy victimhood, see, for example, Irene Dankelman (2002) "Climate change: learning from gender analysis and women's experiences of organising for sustainable development" and Delia Villagrasa (2002) "Kyoto Protocol negotiations: reflections on the role of women" both in Gender and Development Vol 10 no 2, pp. 21-29 and pp. 40-44, respectively.

9. [RETURN] For example, Fatma Denton refers to women's differential responsibilities in the division of labour, and specifically to women's involvement in agriculture and their dependence on biomass energy, making them "key stakeholders in effective environmental management" and consequently also "particularly vulnerable to the risks posed by environmental depletion". See Fatma Denton (2002) "Climate change vulnerability, impacts and adaptation: why does gender matter?" Gender and Development Vol 10 no 2, pp. 10-20.

10. [RETURN] Unfortunately, the confines of this paper do not give me license to explore the reasons for this failure, though there are many and they are compelling. I must now move expeditiously on to a consideration of how this process might recover from its weaknesses by working to promote women's agency and clearing the space required to allow gender inclusiveness, on the road to realising greater overall equity and efficiency.

11. [RETURN] As a comparative example, one might consider the design of gender-sensitive free trade adaptation mechanisms, some of which were recommended by feminist groups during the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) integration process. Similarly to the climate change process, the NAFTA integration process was deemed to be a gender-neutral process. However, when it was found that gender-neutrality was a faulty assumption, and that job losses and employment retraining programs continued to fall disproportionately to the disadvantage of women, some elements of the process were re-worked in order to incorporate a gender perspective into the process.

12. [RETURN] For case studies illustrating some of these concerns, please see Terry Cannon "Gender and climate hazards in Bangladesh", Emily Boyd "The Noel Kempff project in Bolivia: gender, power, and decision-making in climate mitigation", and Marlene Roy and Henry David Venema "Reducing the risk and vulnerability to climate change in India: the capabilities approach", all of which are presented in Gender and Development Vol 10 no 2, 2002, pp. 45-50, pp. 70-77, and pp. 78-83, respectively.

13. [RETURN] For a slightly lengthier consideration of this possibility see Nelson et al (2002) "Uncertain predictions, invisible impacts, and the need to mainstream gender in climate change adaptations" Gender and Development Vol 10, no 2, pp. 51-59.

14. [RETURN] For example, women who have moved into traditionally male roles (such as working outside the home to support the family while the usual male breadwinner serves as a combatant), have sometimes been able to retain some of this additional responsibility and equity even after the conflict ends.

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Works Cited and References

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Braidotti, Rosi, Ewa Charkiewicz, Sabine Hunter and Saskia Wieringa (1994). Women, the Environment and Sustainable Development: Towards a Theoretical Synthesis. London: Zed Books in association with INSTRAW.

Cannon, Terry (2002). "Gender and climate hazards in Bangladesh". Gender and Development Vol 10, no 2, pp. 45-50.

Cockburn, Cynthia (2001). "The Gendered Dynamics of Armed Conflict and Political Violence". Caroline O.N. Moser & Fiona C. Clark (eds). Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence. London: Zed Books, pp. 13-29.

Dankelman, Irene (2002). "Climate change: learning from gender analysis and women's experiences of organising for sustainable development". Gender and Development Vol 10, no 2, pp. 21-29.

Denton, Fatma (2002). "Climate change vulnerability, impacts and adaptation: why does gender matter?". Gender and Development Vol 10 no 2, pp. 10-20.

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Littig, Beate (2002). "The case for gender-sensitive socio-ecological research". Work, employment and society Vol 16 no 1, pp. 111-132.

Masika, Rachel (2002). "Editorial". Gender and Development Vol 10 no 2, pp. 9.

Mertus, Julie A. (2000). War's Offensive on Women: The Humanitarian Challenge. Bloomfield, Connecticut: Kumarian Press.

Nelson, Valerie, Kate Meadows, Terry Cannon, John Morton, and Adrienne Martin (2002). "Uncertain predictions, invisible impacts, and the need to mainstream gender in climate change adaptations". Gender and Development Vol 10, no 2, pp. 51-59.

Rodda, Annabel (1991). Women and the Environment. Women and World Development Series. London: Zed Books.

Roy, Marlene and Henry David Venema (2002). "Reducing risk and vulnerability to climate change in India: the capabilities approach". Gender and Development Vol 10, no 2, pp. 78-83.

Skutsch, Margaret M. (2002). "Protocols, treaties, and action: the 'climate change process' viewed through gender spectacles". Gender and Development Vol 10, no 2, pp. 30-39.

United Nations (1996). The Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action. Fourth World Conference on Women, A/CONF.177/20. New York: United Nations.

United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) (1992). Agenda 21. Geneva: UNCED.

United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) (2002). Agenda 21: An easy reference to the specific recommendations on women. Women, Environment, Development Series. New York: UNIFEM.

United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) (2003). "Women, Peace and Security: Progress on UN Security Council Resolution 1325". New York: UNIFEM.

Villagrasa, Delia (2002). "Kyoto Protocol negotiations: reflections on the role of women". Gender and Development Vol 10 no 2, pp. 40-44.

Young, Oran R. & Marc A. Levy (1999). "The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes". Oran Young (Ed) The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: causal connections and behavioural mechanisms. London: MIT Press, pp. 1-32.