Working Group 3 discussed
the strengthening of chemical and biological arms control treaties,
as well as chemical, biological, and nuclear terrorism.
The group decided that the best way to discuss these topics in the
sessions allotted was to hold five largely separate discussions on
the following issues:
Strengthening the Chemical Weapons Convention
The discussion began with a presentation on the implementation problems
under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which just had its fifth
anniversary. Currently, 174 states have signed the treaty, and 145
have ratified it, testifying to the popularity of complete chemical
disarmament. The treaty is a watershed in disarmament verification,
especially in terms of its on-site inspection provisions administered
by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).
However, States Parties must solve a range of implementation challenges
if the treaty is to function effectively at prohibiting chemical weapons.
One working group presentation identified three far-reaching implementation
problems that have arisen since the treaty’s entry into force:
noncompliance of certain states with the treaty’s verification
provisions, the predicted failure of certain states to meet an ambitious
April 2007 deadline to destroy their CW stockpiles, and atrophy of
various treaty provisions because individual States Parties have not
used them.
Several states have not complied fully with the CWC’s provisions.
The United States, for example, was cited as ratifying the CWC with
significant conditions. This sets a poor example and precedent that
other states may follow or exploit politically. Many states have yet
to create a National Authority for domestic implementation of the
treaty. Such noncompliance undermines the treaty.
It was noted that neglect of certain provisions has weakened the treaty
regime. Challenge inspections have not occurred, yet were to have
provided teeth to the CWC’s verification regime. They serve as
a contractual obligation that requires states to operate inside the
treaty’s institutions to pursue evidence of accused programs.
Similarly, the General Purpose Criterion (GPC), a catchall for control
of agents not scheduled under the convention, has not been applied
vigorously in treaty interpretation.
The GPC was central to one point of concern raised about research
on so-called non-lethal weapons (NLWs), including sedatives, retching
agents, and psychoactive substances. While the treaty does allow for
use of riot-control agents in non-combat and law-enforcement situations,
the US appears to give itself the benefit of the doubt when interpreting
the treaty, potentially allowing for the use of such agents in operations
other than war. Some group members were aghast at such developments,
saying they undermine treaties and that the “non-lethal”
label is scientifically unsound in any case. Others were more open
to NLWs, noting their potential practicality in peacekeeping and other
military operations where armed individuals could be hiding in crowded
areas or using hostages as human shields.
A range of proposed remedies arose from this discussion. While no
particular proposal received a stamp of approval from the group, participants
repeated three major points. First, the treaty’s near-term responsibility
is to ensure destruction of declared stockpiles, and to make every
effort to do as much as possible before 2007, especially in Russia.
Second, participants said that emphasis should be shifted from routine
inspections, many of which could be carried out with automatic monitoring
equipment such as that employed by UNSCOM. It was observed that this
would free resources for challenge inspections and more direct challenges
to treaty violators. Third, on a range of issues participants encouraged
States Parties to adopt a more scrupulous interpretation of treaty
provisions ranging from the General Purpose Criterion to the loophole
provided for “riot control agents.”
It was observed that at least one positive development has emerged
from the CWC: the chemical industry’s support for the treaty
regime. This support persists, and appears critical to the success
of any treaty where dual-use dilemmas may emerge.
Strengthening
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
Discussion on strengthening the BTWC focused not only on the need
for such a regime, but also on new biotechnology developments that,
if left unfettered, could imperil the BTWC altogether. As with the
CWC, less-than-scrupulous interpretation of treaty loopholes by States
Parties was cited as a problem that could be a “treaty breaker.”
This discussion seemed based on the assumption that little progress
will occur when the Fifth BTWC Review Conference resumes in November.
The United States’ rejection of the Draft Protocol and its attempt
to terminate the Ad Hoc Group’s mandate have left a leadership
vacuum in Geneva. Given this, few new measures are expected besides
limited biosafety and biocriminality measures of the type backed by
the US and the UK. It was argued that these proposals, which are limited
in scope, will be a useful basis for moving forward, but do not constitute
an adequate protocol in themselves.
The group focused a great deal on emerging concerns. Among these was
the threat from new biochemical techniques that could create a host
of new weaponizable toxins. Using combinatorial techniques, industry
is now screening 3 million chemicals per year; 50,000 of which are
found to have highly toxic properties. Such techniques also yield
“non-lethal” agents that could be weaponized. Unfortunately,
the technology’s potential use for toxin synthesis presents another
major challenge to both CWC and BTWC verification. Another group member
raised concerns about recombinant DNA experiments, citing a research
study in which a recombinant mouse poxvirus designed to serve as a
delivery vehicle for contraceptive gene therapy for rodent control
was inadvertently converted into a fatal pathogen. Abuse of genomics
research is also a concern.
In light of the potential misuse of this new technology, it was proposed
that these activities be regulated under existing treaties. Under
the CWC, the OPCW could focus inspections on the discrete organic
chemical (DOC) plants that employ biotechnology to produce toxic chemicals.
A BTWC monitoring protocol could also take the risks of new developments
into account.
Confronted with these thorny issues, participants noted that certain
false dichotomies muddle efforts to bring substances under treaty
control. One is the “lethal weapon” versus “non-lethal
weapon” dichotomy. A group member noted that no chemical agent
could be called non-lethal, since lethality is ultimately a function
of the dose administered. Others questioned this dichotomy on the
grounds that non-lethal substances not only would be indistinguishable
from lethal agents in real time, but also would almost certainly be
employed in tandem with lethal weapons, a clear violation of humanitarian
principles. Another problematic dichotomy is the provision in the
treaty distinguishing between offensive and defensive purposes for
possessing biological agents. Under the treaty, States Parties are
able to conduct activities that are indistinguishable from offensive
research and development but for the stated intent. US biodefense
activities are particularly troubling in this regard.
Group members suggested a few steps to get BTWC verification back
on track. One proposed measure was to use the British Green Paper
on BTWC verification, which summarizes a number of politically viable
options, as a basis for moving forward. The Ad Hoc Group remains a
suitable forum for discussing a protocol. Even more critically, supporters
of a strong BTWC protocol must elicit support of industries that would
be affected, especially by winning support of such groups as the Pharmaceutical
Researchers and Manufacturers of America. Such support may require
compromises, but it was offered that useful provisions, including
green-light challenge inspections and disease outbreak investigations,
might be accepted by industry. Inconsistencies in inspection requirements
would still have to be worked out—sectors from brewing to pharmaceuticals
to education would likely be affected by BTWC inspections.
A widespread feeling prevailed that little progress will take place
without increased US involvement. Many group members dismissed the
idea of attempting an Ottawa-type process in lieu of US leadership.
Chemical
and Biological Terrorism
The group was uncomfortable with the word “terrorism,” believing
that it requires careful definition. Group members did acknowledge
that “terrorism” does usually encompass a manifestation
of politically or ideologically driven violence. It was generally
also used as a term of reference for the use of weapons against a
population outside of a recognized combat situation. Rather than debating
definitions, the group deliberated on the motivations for chemical
and biological weapons use and the effects of such weapons.
Shying from the term “terrorism,” an analytical framework
of armed violence was introduced as the basis for discussion. This
framework was meant to serve as a model to identify the chain of events
that would contribute to a chemical or biological attack, or, for
that matter, any violent act and measure its effects. Four key determinants
are at play in this framework:
- The potential
of the weapon to cause the desired effect
- The number
of potential users armed
- The vulnerability
of the victim(s)
- The psychological
potential for violence.
Each of these determinants
is to some degree a function of the others. Two simple concepts make
this framework useful. First, if any of these factors is measured
at zero, there will be no violent effect. Secondly, the psychological
potential for violence is shaped by an individual’s perception
of the other three determinants. This framework was presented as a
useful way, for example, to assess the sending of anthrax letters
in the US last fall. Participants took this model as a point of departure
to address the likelihood of use and the likely effects of biological
or chemical weapons.
The question of the effects of CBW use, and their resulting attractiveness
to non-state actors, was discussed. Participants agreed that chemical
and biological weapons have a spectrum of effects, most of which could
not be termed “mass destruction.” Even the term “mass
destruction,” it was said, creates problems. How does one compare
the effects of deliberately released smallpox, which could kill millions,
and the more intense local effect of a nuclear explosion? These are
but two manifestations of unconventional weapons use. The group questioned
the value of labeling weapons types according to the damage caused.
Nor can effects simply be measured in terms of physical damage. Terror
thrives on ignorance and sensationalism, both of which were served
in heaping portions following September 11. Thus, an effect of anthrax
letters was not only the people killed and the buildings quarantined,
but also the widespread fear that any letter among billions could
contain anthrax spores. Another noted consequence of the media feeding
frenzy over the anthrax scare was an erosion of the norm against BW
use.
Working group members agreed that several “bioterror” scenarios
are cause for grave concern. For example, it was accepted that the
deliberate release of smallpox or any other highly contagious and
fatal disease would be a crime against humanity potentially leading
to hundreds of thousands, if not millions of deaths. The deliberate
release of a vaccine-resistant contagion is also worrying. At the
same time, participants noted that no use of BW would be able to destroy
human civilization, although it is feasible that some pathogens could
cause 90 percent fatality rates, leading to a crisis unprecedented
in human history.
Non-state use of chemical weapons prompted less discussion. While
they would cause significant localized damage, they were not treated
as a “megaterrorism” threat, to quote one participant. Participants
said that CW remained a threat, particularly because they can be targeted
more easily than biological agents, and their effects will not differ
as significantly from one victim to another. Also, some chemical agents,
such as chlorine and cyanide, are more manageable and more accessible
than BW.
Some proposals to address the terror threat did come out of the working
group. One was for states to prepare for attacks by strengthening
public health and educating public in order to mitigate psychological
effects of terror attacks. This would entail expanded epidemiological
research and monitoring as well. Another measure is for states to
sign on to treaties establishing stiff penalties for biological weapons
possession and use and maintaining tight control over pathogens. Participants
also agreed on a treaty requiring states to establish stiff criminal
penalties for possession and use of illicit biological agents.
Nuclear
Terrorism
Nuclear terrorism presents a range of unique problems that the group
determined would be worth longer discussion. Nuclear terrorism encompasses
the range of threats involving nuclear materials. Roughly in order
of increase threat level, these are:
- Radioactive
dispersion devices
- Attacks
on nuclear power installations
- Acquisition
or use of nuclear materials suitable for use in functioning nuclear
explosive devices
- Acquisition
or use of intact nuclear weapons.
The problem with the
current response, especially from the United States, to this four-fold
threat is that it is not the product of an effort to consider or compare
the full range of nuclear terrorist threats. Participants argued that
we must decide which threats will be a priority.
For example, the first threat, radioactive dispersal devices (RDDs),
is more psychological than physical. The second, sabotage of nuclear
power installations, is not a hypothetical threat, given cases of
sabotage in the former Soviet Union. In one instance, a nuclear facility
was subject to blackmail, in another, a plant security system was
faced a planned computer virus attack. This threat is most acute where
reactors are in urban areas. Russian blueprints for a maritime mobile
power reactor based on highly enriched uranium (HEU) naval reactors
are also problematic. The safety of facilities in Pakistan and India
also prompted concern.
The third category, theft of fissile material, was also raised as
a real concern, given its usefulness in fashioning a working nuclear
device. In fact, it is a key choke point in nuclear weapons production.
HEU can be easily incorporated into a crude gun-type nuclear device.
However, programs to downblend HEU to a sub-weapons-grade level are
moving slowly.
Fourth and finally, acquisition of functional nuclear weapons is a
grave concern. Thousands of tactical nuclear weapons are in storage
and not well protected, especially in Russia. Yet these weapons, which
pose the greatest proliferation threat, are not subject to any legally
binding transparency or verification mechanism that could ensure their
security.
Recommendations for
comprehensive action against nuclear terrorism
The first two threats listed—radiological attacks and nuclear
sabotage—merit attention, but could be addressed primarily by
immediate safety measures and a public information campaign. In the
short-term, screening of personnel could begin immediately at the
world’s nuclear facilities. In the intermediate term, fissile
material controls should be enacted, as should controls on other radiological
materials. One such proposal suggested that an international agency
could be assigned to control of radioactive materials, especially
in the nuclear fuel cycle.
Tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) are vulnerable to theft. One participant
said that more cooperative threat reduction funds, both from the US
Nunn-Lugar program and foreign governments, should go to TNW dismantling.
In fact, the US and Russia should adhere to their 1991 and 1992 agreements
to take such weapons out of deployment.
The Nunn-Lugar programs received universal acclaim for their role
in addressing the nuclear terrorism threat in the former Soviet Union
and as a model for international initiatives against the global nuclear
terrorism threat. The group lauded the US political commitment at
the G8 to move forward with funding for CTR for at least another decade.
However, this commitment to funding is marred by tricky accounting
where funds already committed to CTR are being counted as “new
commitments” to nonproliferation over the next ten years. The
moneys under the G8 commitment could also occur through debt reduction
linked to Russian nonproliferation support. Participants noted that
the EU also deserved strong criticism for its failure to fund CTR
efforts in the former Soviet Union. It was strongly urged that more
money should go to accelerating HEU downblending.
On the international legal level, a draft convention against nuclear
terrorism has been tabled by Russia. Other conventions apply to nuclear
safety, each of which could be a part of the comprehensive plan of
action.
Openness in Science
To conclude discussion, participants questioned whether the technical
feasibility of chemical, nuclear, or biological attacks should be
explained in public fora. Participants agreed that responsible and
realistic communication with the public is crucial before and after
predictable unconventional weapons events. When properly informed,
people will be less likely to panic over small threats. And if such
an event happens to be severe, then the public still benefits from
access to scientific knowledge by knowing how to respond.
The group generally concluded that the full spectrum of threats from
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons demands a domestic commitment
from governments and a shared international response.
