52nd
Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs
Science <—> Sustainability <—> Security
10-14 August 2002
UC, San Diego, La Jolla, CA
Report of Working Group 2
Missile Defenses and the Uses of Space
Catherine Kelleher and Jasjit Singh, Co-Convenors:
Götz Neuneck, Rapporteur
The Working Group on Missile
Defenses and the Uses of Space was composed of 22 members from 11
countries. The discussion focused on the status of U.S. plans to develop
and deploy both theater and national missile defense systems, the
linkage of those systems to the increasing danger of the weaponization
of outer space, the possible consequences for future civilian space
activities, and the prospects of future space arms control measures.
There was in general a high level of consensus within the group.
The group started with an analysis of the technologies and wider implications
of the current U.S. administration’s declared plans, which include
the placement of strike weapons in space. Space weapons are on the
one hand devices deployed in space whose mission is to destroy or
permanently disable satellites or targets on land, air, sea or space.
On the other hand, they comprise weapons on the ground, at sea, or
in the air that target satellites, inevitably including exoatmospheric
ballistic missile defenses into the subject.
The demise of the ABM Treaty removed important restrictions on the
deployment of weapons in space. Current U.S. plans for a multi-tiered
missile defense system include not only previously prohibited space-based
components but also an inherent capability to destroy from the ground
satellites in low-earth orbits. If U.S. plans were to be realized,
it would pose an enormous challenge not only for potential US adversaries,
but also for the commercial space industry. The treaty prohibited
the testing and deployment of not only sensors in space, but also
space-based interceptors which have also an anti-satellite capability.
The distinction between ABM and ASAT systems has now been lost and
a new treaty-based definition is urgently needed.
In the absence of such an agreement, the United States and subsequently
other nations with access to space are free to test and deploy space
weapons. It is feared that this process could result in a costly and
dangerous arms race in space.
It was noted that advocacy for space weapons in the United States
has picked up increasing momentum despite the huge technical, financial
and political obstacles that have prevented the development of these
weapons to date. A small group of space enthusiasts, especially in
the U.S. Space Command, have envisioned missions and technologies
for controlling outright the use of space and using the domain of
space as a medium for the direct application of military force. A
fanciful set of exotic weapons underlies the aspirations of these
“space fundamentalists,” and there is a wide range of weapons
conceivable (if still technically infeasible): maneuverable kill vehicles,
space mines, parasite satellites, lasers, trans-atmospheric vehicles,
“brilliant pebbles,” and others. It was observed that the
Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management
and Organization, which was chaired by Donald Rumsfeld prior to his
becoming Secretary of Defense, echoed more extreme formulations with
its call for the “development of doctrine, concepts of operations
and capabilities for space, including weapons systems that operate
in space and that can defend assets in orbit.”
Despite all efforts to push forward the weaponization of space by
a small group of space advocates, it is not yet the policy of the
U.S. to weaponize space. Nevertheless funding for the kinetic energy
ASAT and the space-based laser continues, albeit on a limited level.
A more aggressive program is conceivable.
A discussion about the relation of offensive and defensive technologies
in space was conducted. It was suggested not only that is it difficult
to distinguish between offensive and defensive weapons in space but
also that weapons for destroying satellites are likely to be less
costly and more effective than weapons for defending assets in space.
In such a context, many countries could interpret the placement of
defensive weapons in space as an offensive move and would consider
in advance the use of countermeasures. The result would be a competitive
weaponization of space. Today there are no strike weapons in space.
However, it should be recognized that perceptions of the intentions
of others, rather than technical capabilities, will drive the future
planning of various states with ambitions in space and trigger new
R&D in this field.
Many participants expressed the fear that the vision of a small group
of “space warriors” could lead to a condition of U.S. supremacy
in space. The U.S. might develop the capability to intervene anywhere
on the planet from space if these plans were to materialize. US domination
of space could result in a feeling of helplessness and degradation
for many countries. In some states this would trigger a call for counteractions.
Other countries and their space industries could become totally dependent
on the United States. There was considerable skepticism in the group
that such dominance would be feasible, but even the perception of
such steps could cause harm in the international relations.
Often it is argued that the medium of space is comparable to that
of the sea, where navies with a variety of weapons for offense and
defense have long been present. This picture seems to be seductive
but does not hold up to deeper analysis. Behavior at sea is also regulated
by the international law of the sea. It should be clear that space
is different: No country “owns” space; unlike the sea, space
is not a medium for transporting goods, but rather one for transmitting
information; and the loss of assets at sea is not likely to have consequences
of a magnitude comparable to the loss of assets in space. A closer
analogy to space might be Antarctica, where the major powers have
agreed to share responsibility for its safekeeping, and have pledged
not to place weapons there.
An examination of existing space regulations revealed that the provisions
apply to specific military activities, but do not prohibit the deployment,
operation, and the use of conventional weapons in and from space.
The preamble of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) recognizes the common
interest in the use of outer space for peaceful purposes and prohibits
the orbiting around the earth, and the stationing in outer space of
weapons of mass destruction. The 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty prohibits
nuclear weapon tests “or any other nuclear explosions” in
outer space. The OST did not define the term “space weapon,”
though this might now be an advantage because it provides room for
introducing new definitions. By asserting that space belongs to everyone,
the OST builds a strong norm against the domination of space by one
power. The OST was signed by approximately 100 countries and constitutes
an important barrier against the deployment of nuclear weapons in
space. The regime should be strengthened.
It was generally agreed that the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty
created urgent need for a new system to regulate the peaceful use
of space. Although individual proposals exist, the arms control community
should devote more time, creativity and awareness to work out new
regulations for space arms control. A revival of the ABM-treaty or
any similar initiative is quite unlikely as long as the present US
administration remains in office. A new government with interest in
arms control might come to other conclusions. Active, anti-satellite
platforms with “shooting” capabilities must be the next
major focus of the arms control community. One key issue is finding
an appropriate forum for developing new space regulations. Another
is finding arms-control allies in the military as well in the space
industry and in space-faring nations including Russia, China, Canada,
France, Germany, Sweden Japan, Brazil or others—perhaps even
within the United States. The current body of space law needs to adapt
to the current political situation and to the new technological realities.
Another subject of the group was the threat and the vulnerability
of space assets. Satellites are certainly fragile against other high-velocity
objects in space. Geosynchronous orbit can be “poisoned,”
but doing so would take time, resources, and determination.
Most of the scenarios that are mentioned in US planning documents
as justification for weapons development are highly unlikely and can
be matched with different measures. A “space Pearl Harbor”
is an unjustified exaggeration. A space system consists of several
ground stations with uplink and downlink connections to a space segment.
It is more than an single object. The threat of physical attack on
ground stations by states or terrorists might be conceivable, but
the best protection would efficient safeguards on the ground of key
facilities. Communications satellites are mostly in geostationary
orbits and are safe given present technologies. With regard to space
launchers which are necessary to hit satellites in space, only a threat
from major space-faring nations seems to be possible. Conventional
ASATs against GEO satellites are not easy to field and need much time
for maneuvering and testing. Many in the group felt that a threat
to satellites is remote and reminiscent of claims about the long-range
ballistic missile threat.
While the threat of ASAT weapons is remote, payload verification and
the notification of launches and satellites were believed by many
to be problems that were not insoluable. One advantage of space is
its transparency. Satellites emit a lot of data. Not only would “killer
satellites” look quite different given their function and data
flows, they would have to be tested, which could be observed.
On the issue of testing ASAT weapons, the issue of debris was discussed.
Testing or launch failures or accidents would aggravate the threat
for civilian satellites in low earth orbits.
The group also considered the implications of the US plans to deploy
ballistic missile defense systems for space arms control. The planned
land or sea based interceptors are also capable of intercepting satellites
in LEO. There are strong arguments, that the planned U.S. midcourse
missile defense system will not work, or if it works, it will not
be efficient. It seems to be also clear that the BM threat is not
ballistic, but stems from nuclear weapons or other WMD delivered by
simple carriers such as ships or cars. The group felt that an invincible
Maginot-line in the sky and in space is illusionary and creates a
false sense of security.
Future intercept-technologies, such as the Airborne or Space Based
Laser could not only deny the access to space by shooting down space
launchers but could also intercept satellites. The “Brilliant
Pebbles” concept which consists of some 1500 satellites could
either be used for missile defense or as an attack system to destroy
satellites in orbit.
The implications of BMD for nuclear deterrence and for regions such
as South or South East Asia were also discussed. Missile defense can
turn defense into offense and might trigger new arms races in different
regions. For the regional context, the situation for countries such
as Japan, India or China is more complicated, if the U.S. deploys
Theater Missile Defenses. The combination of missile defense, space
support and the ideas of the “Nuclear Posture Review” will
increase the risk of the use of nuclear weapons in local conflicts.
The working group session ended with several proposals and recommendations
for future work and action:
- With respect to actions
for Pugwash, it was recommended that Pugwash should become more
deeply engaged with the problem of the weaponization of outer space.
There was unanimous support for the idea that Pugwash establishs
a continuing working group to study the subject in depth. The group
should examine issues such as the nature of the ballistic missile
threat, missile defense and its linkage to outer space activities,
the dual-use problem, future space threat scenarios and their likelihood,
the possibility for a space arms control treaty or “rules of
the road,” as well as the regional and global consequences
for nuclear disarmament and arms control. The group could start
with a workshop that would include not only scientists and policy
experts from like-minded nations but also officials from the space
industry and the military. One participant proposed that the chairman
of such a group should not be from Russia, China or the United States.
The group welcomed a paper by the Student Pugwash-Group that outlined
their vision of the problem and proposed a full set of concrete
steps. Pugwash should emphasize the space issue in their Goals for
the tenth Quinquennium. Pugwash should be also be present at the
“Space Policy Summit” in Houston, USA in October 2002.
The next Pugwash conference in Halifax, Canada should establish
the working group on the subject.
- Regarding options,
the “easy-to-handle” proposal would an amendment to the
Outer Space Treaty which should prohibit the placing in orbit of
any kind of weapon, not only objects carrying nuclear weapons or
other WMD, as it is the case today. Many countries have signed the
Treaty and this amendment would increase the pressure on the U.S.
to abide by the principle of the treaty, which recognizes the common
interest in the use of outer space for peaceful purposes. An exclusion
of the United States should optimally be avoided. The so-called
Registration Convention of 1976 which provides for the recording
of all space objects launched from earth, which is adhered to by
over 40 states, should be expanded.
- Another concrete step
favored by the working group would be an effort to internationalize
the agreement on non-interference with “peaceful” assets
orbiting in space, enlarging upon the thirty-year old examples contained
in the SALT and START dealing with the protection of “National
Technical Means.” This effort could perhaps take the form of
an United Nations Resolution.
- Concerning the international
level and the appropriate fora, a set of ideas for strengthening
existing treaties were discussed. First, there is some hope but
not much confidence that the CD would overcome its stalemate. The
new joint Chinese-Russian working paper was welcomed as a useful
starting point for a fruitful discussion on the subject. Second,
there was a proposal to initiate an Ottawa-II Process, modeled after
the Landmine treaty to establish an international movement for the
prevention of an arms race in Outer Space. Such a conference could
start with a common statement to create common set of principles
and standards. Like-minded governments, NGOs, and representatives
from the space industry could elaborate details. A goal for the
future is certainly a comprehensive and freestanding treaty that
would forbid attack vehicles in space and weapons against space
objects and include verification measures. Additionally, an international
space agency could be founded
- to bring international
capabilities such as PAXSAT into Outer Space,
- to regulate and maintain
space traffic and
- to help less developed
countries to achieve access to space for peaceful purposes.
In addition, the United
Nations General Assembly should also accelerate its efforts to maintain
space as a domain free of weapons. A caucus of state parties to the
OST this fall in NY during the General Assembly should enable a first
discussion of the above proposed elements.
Having discussed space policies and the possible future danger of
an arms race in space the group came to the conclusion that in this
very critical moment urgent action is needed. Pugwash can and should
contribute to this by informing the public and the parliaments about
the danger of space weaponization. Again, the group thinks that no
state has the right to put arms into space. Space belongs to all mankind
and should only be used for peaceful and scientific purposes, international
cooperation and the prevention of conflicts. A costly arms race in
space can be avoided if decisive steps by the international community
are starting now.
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