Table 1. Estimated number of US tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe anno 2009.[1]
The total number of 200 US nuclear weapons stationed in Europe accounts for several reductions achieved during this decade. The tactical nuclear weapons previously deployed in Greece were withdrawn by the US in 2001. Until 2007 US nuclear weapons were located in Germany at two different bases, but the 130 nuclear bombs at the Ramstein airbase were in all likelihood taken away in that year and shipped back to the US. Similarly the 110 US nuclear weapons at Lakenheath in the UK are all thought to have been removed in 2008. Most recently there was speculation that the 40 nuclear bombs deployed at the Ghedi Torre air base in Italy were withdrawn in the summer of 2008. Of the remaining five European countries currently possessing US tactical nuclear weapons, only three (Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands) are in charge of nuclear strike missions for their national air forces, through so-called dual-key arrangements. The other two, both on NATO’s southern flank (Italy and Turkey) – that together possess today 2 out of 3 US nuclear weapons based in Europe – are involved in the nuclear burden sharing of NATO by hosting US airplanes and the nuclear warheads assigned to them.
Russia possesses an estimated 3,000 to 6,000 tactical nuclear weapons that at present are all supposed to be stationed on Russian territory. Certainly in the US, but perhaps also in Russia, the original figures of available tactical nuclear weapons were significantly higher. In the middle of the 1980s probably about 6000 of these weapons were deployed in Europe by the US under NATO auspices. These included a large variety of different types, among which bombs, mines, artillery weapons and cruise missiles. Currently the overall size of the US arsenal of operational tactical nuclear weapons is thought to be approximately 500, with another 800 presumed to be in an inactive stockpile. These weapons include gravity bombs and warheads usable on both land-attack and sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles. None of the approximately 100 active Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles with nuclear warheads are currently likely to be deployed at sea. The 200 tactical nuclear weapons based in Europe are all of the gravity bomb type for delivery by US or NATO aircraft.
The presence of American and Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Europe originates, of course, from the Cold War between these two opposing powers during most of the second half of the 20th century. The severe political tensions and unprecedented arms race by which the bipolar world order was characterized in those days, however, ended two decades ago. This as well as the observation that significant reductions have recently been achieved in the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons by the US in Europe begs the question why still some 200 of them remain at present. This workshop was dedicated to inspecting the rationale behind these residual nuclear warheads and investigating whether they could also be removed from the European non-nuclear weapon states concerned, complemented by their dismantlement and eventual elimination.
Forward Deployment
NATO’s prime motivation for deploying US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe during the Cold War was to possess a deterrent against what was perceived as a conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact. As such these weapons allegedly served as a means to increase security. The reasoning, however dubious, was that the threat of escalation of any East-West conflict into a “mutually-assured-destructing” US-Soviet exchange of strategic nuclear weapons, triggered by the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, would withhold the USSR and its allies from initiating such a conflict e.g. by invading a NATO member state. Today, NATO has significantly enlarged to include all Central European members and the three Baltic States that before were part of the Warsaw Pact. With the disappearance of this adversary, NATO does not seem to have a reason anymore to keep its US nuclear weapons forward deployed in Europe.
It is thus understandable that “eliminating short-range nuclear weapons designed to be forward-deployed” is one of the concrete steps recommended recently by four American statesmen on the road toward a world free of nuclear weapons. In two widely publicized articles in the Wall Street Journal these respectable statesmen – George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn – make an appeal for the elimination of all nuclear weapons and describe the way via which this long-term goal could practically be achieved in a step-by-step manner.[2] The US is the only nuclear weapon state possessing short-range tactical nuclear weapons actually forward deployed in other countries.
In the late 1950s the US began deploying its nuclear weapons in several West-European countries to convince them that they did not need themselves to develop these weapons. The nuclear umbrella provided by their powerful ally would instead protect them. Except France and the UK, all these countries became member of the NPT as non-nuclear weapon country and have at present no wish to build nuclear weapons domestically. In the absence of such desire, one of the original reasons to forward deploy US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe has disappeared. Unsurprisingly, several other non-nuclear weapon states have expressed their discontent with the presence of US nuclear weapons on the territory of several European NATO countries and argue that this practice is in conflict with the spirit of the NPT. The NPT commits non-nuclear weapons states not to acquire or possess nuclear weapons. Nuclear sharing once was considered a privilege by several NATO members, given it implied automatic and exclusive access to its Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). Today, however, the NPG is open to all NATO members, which takes away a motivation for hosting nuclear weapons. Doing so at present no longer provides insight in information that other NATO members do not have.
Continuing the practice of forward deploying US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe may increase the risk that other nuclear weapon states are tempted to deploy similarly their nuclear weapons in ‘third’ countries. These could not only involve the other four official nuclear weapon states – China, France, Russia and the UK – but potentially also the three de facto ones – India, Israel and Pakistan. In order to avoid such an undesirable scenario, the US has another reason for withdrawing its tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. Entirely eliminating forward deployed tactical nuclear weapons, and doing so publicly by the US, may also constitute a motivation for Russia to undertake a similar, if not as drastic, step regarding its own arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons.
NATO policy
Regrettably, during the Bush administration NATO has largely distanced itself from arms control and disarmament policies. While in 2000 NATO had still endorsed the ‘13 steps’ for disarmament adopted during that year’s NPT Review Conference, NATO’s commitment to multilateral disarmament agreements steadily reduced in the years following. This reflected mostly the antipathy of the Bush administration to international agreements – and especially those thought to restrict the freedom of action of the US in the spheres of national security – but also the reluctance and lack of power of European NATO members to stand up for measures in support of multilateral reduction of nuclear weapons. Over the past years NATO essentially suspended attempts to reduce security threats through arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament strategies, in favour of a military reply to potential threats from adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction.[3] This downgrading of the role of non-proliferation probably reflects more the foreign and security policy of the Bush administration than the collective view of the Alliance as a whole. The EU still appears to place more emphasis on multilateral diplomacy to construct security from weapons of mass destruction than is now exercised in NATO. Within NATO, unfortunately, European policy seems to have been overruled by a determined Bush administration that dominates with what in essence can be characterised as an opposition to arms control measures.
Meanwhile, however, since 2001 approximately 300 US tactical nuclear weapons were removed from deployment in Europe: in two countries all these weapons were removed (Greece and the UK) and in two other states sizeable reductions took place (Germany and Italy). If as expected NATO recommits itself to the ‘13 steps’ under the Obama administration, the process of gradual withdrawal of forward deployed tactical nuclear weapons that took place during recent years may be pursued, although there is no tangible evidence that this will happen with certainty in the near term. In any case such a further reduction will not be realised overnight, and may be delayed for a variety of reasons, but it is not unthinkable that at some point during the Obama presidency this course of action is strengthened. In the not too distant future it may then lead to a complete removal of these weapons from the European continent, in line with the call towards zero nuclear weapons by the four American statesmen. Barack Obama has expressed support for their vision, but seems well aware that, however important such a vision may be, it is not enough by itself. Also needed at least is a logic on how to get to zero, as formulated in the form of a four-step transition in a recent article in Foreign Affairs.[4] Abandoning the controversial practice of forward deploying tactical nuclear weapons seems an evident early step in such a logic. At any rate, drastically cutting its nuclear weapons in combination with such efforts as removing its tactical bombs from Europe could give the US the credibility necessary to convince the world of the logic of zero.
Many argue that the deployment of US nuclear weapons in NATO Europe, as well as the nuclear sharing programme under which these may be used by the Alliance in time of war, constitutes an impediment to progress at large in global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. If the 2010 NPT Review Conference fails like its predecessor of 2005, it may well be possible that the negotiators will retrospectively have to conclude that it partly did so because of a lack of advancement regarding the issue of forward deployment. Indeed, many countries and diplomats consider the non-nuclear weapon status of the 5 European countries that host tactical nuclear weapons confusing, and may raise this ambiguity as topic to be addressed in the agenda of the forthcoming Review Conference. Each of the 5 European nuclear weapon host states individually could advance the cause for nuclear disarmament and thereby non-proliferation, if they expressed unilaterally (if not openly) their preference to end their participation in the nuclear sharing programme of NATO and consequently move the weapons deployed on their territory back to the US. Such action would strengthen the NPT and restore the belief in it, which several non-nuclear states have lost over the past decade.
The most problematic thinkable nuclear weapons threat to NATO is currently Iran, even while it is still probably years away from the development of a nuclear weapon (in the worst-case scenario that Iran is actually developing such a weapon). While it is unsure whether US nuclear weapons forward deployed in Turkey involve a certain level of deterrence and constitute strategic pressure on Iran (but will most likely not keep the latter from developing its own nuclear bomb if it so desired), their removal from Turkey could have a beneficial effect in the process of negotiating a security guarantee for the Iranian government and a conditional acceptance of its civil nuclear programme in exchange for an agreement on its presumed support for terrorist activity and its alleged attempt to develop a latent nuclear weapons capability.
If one considers the removing of forward deployed tactical nuclear weapons from Europe timely, the question is whether one ought to act quietly or not. Arguments seem to exist both in favour and against the full public disclosure of such removal. Virtually no attention was paid by the media to the examples of recent European nuclear weapons withdrawals mentioned above. A potential advantage of withdrawing these weapons silently is that as such no undue attention is drawn that otherwise may arouse concern with politicians interested in keeping them, for instance as a symbol of national prestige. Countries in Central Europe that are now member of the EU may express interest in keeping some NATO tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. These nations continue to hold reservations vis-à-vis their mighty neighbour, as demonstrated recently during the short war between Georgia and Russia in August 2008. A nuclear weapon in a nearby European ally could yield the sense of enhanced national security they desire. On the other hand, one may argue in favour of removing tactical nuclear weapons publicly from Europe. Much of the population is unaware of their presence in still 5 European countries and their existence deserves attention by the public. Publicizing their removal in one country may also prompt others to follow suit. Furthermore, public debate may help taking away a possibly big misunderstanding, in which Europeans believe the US still sees a role for these weapons deployed in Europe, while the US believes the Europeans still prefer to keep them forward deployed (for whatever reason it may) in their respective countries. Last but not least, one may wonder why 5 NATO members actually host US tactical nuclear weapons, while a large majority of 18 NATO countries do not see the need for their presence domestically.
Nuclear weapon states in Western Europe
Most agree that along the path towards realising a zero nuclear weapons world, Russia and the US bear the greatest responsibility, given the fact that they possess over 90% of all such weapons. Among these weapons are the thousands of tactical nuclear devices of these two nuclear weapon states, and in particular the small share of these weapons that are forward deployed. However important the arsenals of Russia and the US are in this respect, in as far as Western Europe is concerned two other countries that have NPT nuclear weapon status, France and the UK, should also be considered. The continued existence of nuclear weapons in these two smaller countries renders non-proliferation efforts more difficult, because other medium-sized or small states, and potentially non-state actors, may see in these weapons the same virtues of deterrence and symbol of status and power as did so far the nuclear weapon states.
The core argument of France and the UK for foreseeing a continued long-term role for nuclear weapons in their national security strategies is that if they were to abandon these weapons and became non-nuclear weapon states instead, then a country with nuclear weapons could pose a threat to their vital interests.[5] Only the possession of their own nuclear weapon gives these countries, they claim, the freedom to confront blackmail and acts of aggression against their vital interests by nuclear-armed opponents.
Of the 188 states party to the NPT, all but 5 have committed themselves to a non-nuclear weapon status. Many of them have the technical capacity to construct a nuclear weapon, if they so desired, but have explicitly chosen not to, since they do not consider themselves potential victims of nuclear blackmail from countries that possess nuclear weapons. The vast majority of states has voluntarily accepted non-nuclear weapon status and does not seem to suffer any disadvantage from this choice. If they do not, why would France and the UK be any different? In fact, the argument could also be turned around: it is not clear at all that any of the nuclear weapon states has so far in the past derived any benefit from its nuclear weapons by way of coercing a non-nuclear weapon state.[6]
Conclusion
Some may argue that withdrawing the remaining US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe should not figure high on the list of nuclear priorities, given the urgency with which other cases of nuclear problématique need to be addressed, such as on the Korean peninsula, regarding Iran, and between India and Pakistan. Also issues like the ratification of the CTBT and the negotiation of an effective FMCT, in addition to achieving a successful NPT Review conference in 2010 after its failure of 2005, appear significantly more relevant at present. Several clear reasons and benefits may nevertheless be distinguished for imminently removing the remaining tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe starting with the ones of the US. First, their withdrawal is long overdue, given that they were introduced on the European continent in the bipolar Cold War world opposing the US and the USSR, which is now over since 20 years. Second, taking the US nuclear weapons away unilaterally could motivate Russia to make similar, or perhaps even more drastic, reductions in its arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons. Third, removing them would provide a clear signal to all countries that nuclear weapon states ought to refrain from deploying their weapons in other (non-nuclear-weapon) states, thereby strengthening the NPT and increasing the chances for a successful Review Conference. Fourth, removing them would more broadly constitute another indication that the US, along with its NATO partners, takes its commitments under article VI of the NPT seriously to gradually reduce its nuclear arsenal. Fifth, the US would, by acting accordingly and thereby enhancing the chances in its own benefit to render the 2010 NPT Review Conference successful, stimulate a series of other countries to live up to their obligations under the NPT, be they official nuclear weapon states, countries with military nuclear aspirations, or non-nuclear weapon states.
Postscript
The organizers greatly acknowledge the generous financial support from the Flemish Peace Institute, of which in particular Tomas Baum, the Flemish Community and the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, without whom this workshop could not have been realized.
Participant list
Sergey Batsanov (Russia/Switzerland), Ambassador (ret), Pugwash Council
Tomas Baum (Belgium), Flemish Peace Institute
Werner Bauwens (Belgium), Foreign Office
Hugh Beach (UK), Admiral (ret)
Martin Butcher (UK), Acronym Institute
Paulo Cotta-Ramusino (Italy), University of Milan, Pugwash Council
Marco De Andreis (Italy), Fondazione Ugo La Malfa
Cihangir Dumanli (Turkey), General (ret)
Heinz Ferkinghoff (Germany), NATO International Staff
John Finney (UK), University College London, Pugwash Council
Ase Marie Fossum (Norway), NATO International Staff
Giorgio Franceschini (Italy), Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF)
Karel Koster (The Netherlands), Parliament
Rüdiger Lüdeking (Germany), Ambassador, Foreign Office
Oliver Meier (Germany), Hamburg Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy
Steve Miller (US), Harvard University
Alexander Nikitin (Russia), Center for Political and International Studies, Pugwash CouncilTom Sauer (Belgium), University of Antwerp
Edmond Seay (US), US NATO Mission
Yuri Shevko (Russia), Russian NATO Mission
Aleksey Shitikov (Russia), Russian NATO Mission
Bob van der Zwaan (The Netherlands), ECN, Pugwash Council
[1] Data in this section are taken from various sources, among which H.M. Kristensen, FAS Strategic Security Blog, www.fas.org/blog/ssp; R.S. Norris and H.M. Kristensen, “US Nuclear Forces 2008”, Bulleting of Atomic Scientists, 64, 1, 50-53/58; M. De Andreis, USPID, “Eliminating NATO Tactical Nuclear Weapons”, May 2008, www.uspid.org.
[2] “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons”, Wall Street Journal, 4 January 2007 and “Toward a Nuclear Free World”, Wall Street Journal, 15 January 2008.
[3] See for example M. Butcher, paper presented in Evidence to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee Inquiry into the Non-Proliferation Policies of the British Government, 2008.
[4] I. Daalder and J. Lodal, “The Logic of Zero: Toward a World without Nuclear Weapons”, Foreign Affairs, November / December 2008.
[5] In case of the UK, see White Paper, “The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent”, Cm 6994, December 2006. For the French case, see Le Livre Blanc, Défense et Sécurité Nationale, Odile Jacob, 2008.
[6] A long list of historic examples is given for the UK, USA and the Soviet Union in H. Beach, “What Price Nuclear Blackmail?”, 2008, paper proffered to this workshop.
