War: Which Way to Turn?

As published in the Toronto Globe and Mail, February 8, 2003

Tad Homer-Dixon

Should we go to war with Iraq? The question has no easy answer.

If you're perplexed and confused by the issue, and if you're having trouble coming to a conclusion, you're not alone. In recent months, I've found my own opinion shifting from one side to the other - a picture of indecisiveness. Only recently have I made up my mind.

The pro-war arguments cluster around four concerns: the diffusion of weapons of mass destruction, Israel's security, oil, and Iraq's human-rights record.

It's indisputable that Saddam Hussein is doing whatever he can to get chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. International inspectors destroyed key manufacturing facilities in the mid-'90s, but Iraq has continued to press forward with its clandestine efforts. No one should doubt that Saddam has large quantities of biological and chemical agents squirreled away in secret caches around the country. And he is actively working on delivery systems, including unmanned drones for spreading biological agents in the air.

Saddam's weapons of mass destruction might also be smuggled out of Iraq into the hands of terrorists. Skeptics dismiss such arguments as scare mongering to pump up war hysteria. But the skeptics are wrong: although the specific case for a link between Iraq and Al Qaeda is weak, it remains true that many terrorist groups would love to get hold of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. And Saddam might eventually decide that these groups offer the best route to attack his enemies.

One of his first targets could be Israel. Israel's security gets surprisingly little attention in discussion about Iraq. Yet Saddam hates Israel, and it's entirely plausible that his long-term aim is to see the country destroyed.

Then there's oil. The West, and especially the United States, should have reduced its dependence on Middle Eastern oil long ago through a crash program of conservation and research for new energy technologies. But even if we'd done so, this oil would still be vitally important. Once Saddam has super-powerful weapons and even relatively modest delivery systems, he'll be able to hold the world's main oil-producing region hostage, and he'll be able to send the world economy into a tailspin at his whim.

And last, but certainly not least, is Saddam's human-rights record. His regime is murderous and despotic, and his record of brutality against his own people is almost beyond belief.

But for every reason why war is necessary, there seems to be an equally compelling reason why it's a bad idea. Again, I identify four: the dangers of unilateralism, the risks of battle, the aftermath within Iraq, and the war's potential repercussions in other countries.

American unilateralism, accompanied by rhetoric widely perceive as sanctimonious, is alienating many of its friends. Some of these countries - France and Turkey perhaps - may eventually go along, but relations will remain frayed. Over the long run, that's not good for the U.S., because the world is now too complex and dangerous for the U.S. to ensure its security by itself. American unilateralism also sets a precedent that weakens the legitimacy of the international rule of law: other countries will feel empowered to do what they want without listening to the international community.

The war itself will be fraught with dangers. The U.S. battle plan calls for fast and deep penetration, with special-operations forces inserted across the country to seize key infrastructure and to disable facilities suspected of making or storing chemical, biological, and nuclear components. Over 3000 precision-guided weapons will be used in the first few days. The aim, clearly, is to produce the rapid collapse of Iraqi command and control and an implosion of the defenders' morale. But this may be wishful thinking. Unlike in Kuwait, the Iraqis will be fighting for their country and often in urban areas. What will the U.S. and its allies do if the Republican Guard takes a stand in Baghdad? Will coalition forces lay siege to the city with its 5 million inhabitants? And if people start to flood out of the city, will coalition forces be able to take care of them?

Once the U.S. and its allies win (which they will, although the cost in blood and money might be much greater than the U.S. estimates), the country could tip into chaos. From north to south, Iraq is fractured by hatred - between ethnic and religious groups and between the current regime's enforcers and its victims. The U.S. has yet to produce a detailed and credible plan for the policing, governance, and economic restructuring of Iraq after the war.

But it's the possible reaction to the war outside Iraq that - to my mind - is the greatest concern. Those who despise America in the developing world will take an attack on Iraq as a cue to mobilize, and some governments may be unable to control the pressures that erupt. Pakistan is a key country to watch. President Musharraf's control over Pakistani society is tenuous at best, anger with the U.S. is pervasive and deep, and Islamic radicals benefited from a surge in public support in recent elections. Pakistan has enough enriched uranium for at least 50 atomic bombs, and if the Musharraf regime were overthrown, some of this material could fall into the wrong hands. This, I believe, is the most likely route by which terrorists could get hold of nuclear weapons.

So we have four strong reasons in favor and four strong reasons against. On balance, for me, the reasons against war prevail - for the moment. To build legitimacy for action against Iraq and support the rule of law, we must build as broad an international consensus behind war as possible. Such a consensus will weaken anti-American radicalism in counties like Pakistan, should war come. While we build this consensus, we can greatly strengthen the inspection teams and continue poking into every nook and cranny in Iraq to find what Saddam is hiding. As long as the inspections teams are there, Saddam will be kept continually off balance, and he won't be able to move his weapons programs forward aggressively. And the U.S. can use the time to better figure out what it's going to do in Iraq after a war, again should it be necessary.

The Bush administration deserves credit for forcing this issue, strengthening the spine of the U.N., and re-establishing the credible presence of inspectors within Iraq. But the U.S. is in danger of overplaying its hand. Now is the time for patience.