Participants argued
that the US manipulates the non-state status of detainees, including
Al Qaeda members and the Taliban. Although the Taliban were not
recognized as a legitimate regime by most nations of the world,
Taliban-related prisoners are nonetheless entitled to either POW
status or civilian prosecution. Six individuals (from UK, Australia,
etc.) are subject to military commission prosecution for war crimes.
Regarding the negative
influence of post-9/11 changes on civil liberties, it was stressed
that changes seriously touched upon the Fourth Amendment of the
US Constitution which protects citizens from "unnecessary searches."
Since 1978 there has been a separate Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA), which established more severe rules for the surveillance
of foreigners. The USA Patriot Act developed this precedent further:
authorities need only to have a "significant purpose"
to justify intrusion into individual homes or curtailment of rights.
The Act, therefore, removed a filter between domestic and foreign
intelligence norms. In order to reestablish rights, the US legal
system would need to restore "primary purpose" requirements
for searches. However, while it is possible to work with interpretations
of the Patriotic Act, there is no chance for disregarding Patriotic
Act entirely.
Some participants raised
concerns that this is a mirror situation. Rights of prisoners kept
at Guantanamo require social work, but rights of victims of terrorists
require social attention, too. There should be priorities: rights
of crime victims are more important than rights of crime suspects.
Has there been any evidence
that the curtailment of civil liberties enhanced the effectiveness
of anti-terrorist activities? The relationship between the two has
yet to be measured. Many participants agreed that the correlation
between enlarging/limiting liberties and increasing/decreasing of
terrorist threat to society needs to be analyzed.
Does a change in legal
regulations intrude into the lives of average Americans? The influence
of post 9/11 measures on immigration policy remains high, and almost
all regulations in this area have yet to change. Though the right
to privacy is limited by FISA and the Patriotic Act, more than 200
American cities have passed statements or clarifications which contradict
certain regulations of the Patriotic Act.
One must differentiate
between measures aimed against international terrorism and measures
targeting domestic terrorism. International law does not deal much
with terrorism. In particular, because the Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions are not directed towards non-state actors, they are
somewhat legally irrelevant for governing state actions against
terrorism. In current international law, the closest analogy to
terrorists stems from 1940s (when the Protocols were created) language
regarding would-be "guerrillas." Obviously, new definitions
in humanitarian law are needed.
Reconstructing and
debating US motivations and policy on anti-terrorism and regime
change
Participants stressed
that there are visible electoral implications in the current Bush
policy on anti-terrorism and regime change. Most obviously, Bush
welcomes UN assistance in Iraq, but only to a very limited degree.
Three overlapping debates cover United States policy on Iraq: 1)
retrospective debates - i.e. how did the Administration enter into
war;
2) analysis of the current status; and 3) speculation of future
policy paths.
For the retrospective
debate, it is important that Saddam and Bin Laden have not been
caught and that WMD have not been found. At the same time, the accuracy
of CIA information is not a debatable issue in the USA, in contrast
to UK. The US claims to have destroyed primary state sponsors of
terrorism and the Al Qaeda infrastructure in Afghanistan, detained
Al Qaeda bases, captured more than 3000 operatives, and prevented
numerous attacks. Further, there have been no further catastrophic
attacks on US soil, terrorist financial routs are damaged or blocked,
and statistics show that the number of terrorist attempts is decreasing.
But there is another
school of thought which believes the war on terrorism is being lost.
Rather than continuing to foster the growth of anti-American sentiment,
the USA needs to win the hearts and minds of people in Islamic world.
Polls show instead that the US image abroad has deteriorated; moreover,
fewer and fewer Arabs respect the US. The number of Pakistanis with
a positive opinion of America fell from 45% to 16%, while the number
of US policy supporters dropped to 18% in Jordan. The war against
Iraq more than likely is responsible for spreading perceptions that
"the US is against Islam."
Terrorists remain active
globally, including in Bali, Moscow, and Morocco. Indeed, the Bali
attack was one of the worst in terrorism history, second after 9/11
in casualties. The US continues to be vulnerable to terrorist attack,
and, because the Iraq campaign proved to be a huge distraction from
the war against terrorism, critics argue that the Administration
lacks priorities. Though some claim that, in and of itself, the
campaign against Iraq was successful, the war has ultimately proved
harmful for the US anti-terrorist campaign.
On the other hand, optimists
maintain that good progress has been made and that current difficulties
can be attributed to normal transitional tensions. In effect, this
group argues that, though the administration is on the right track,
the media misrepresents events and focuses exclusively on bad news.
Yet, if things were going well, argue members of the media, the
civil administration in Iraq would not be housed behind barbed wire,
nor would NGOs and the UN be afraid to send more personnel.
Some propose bringing
more troops to Iraq; the RAND Corporation published an analysis
which concludes that Iraq needs three times as many troops. Others
advocate a reduction to 40,000 troops on Iraqi soil; any more, they
claim, would increase tensions on the ground. In addition, there
is a concept that something like "Vietnamization" is needed;
command and control of the country should go to Iraqis stage by
stage.
Washington itself doesn't
know whether it is close to victory or close to defeat. Neoconservatives,
who were mostly enthusiastic for the war, stress the moral dimension
of having ousted a dictator and bringing democracy to Iraq. Others
support the war for more pragmatic ambitions. Some, for instance,
realize the value in democracy but argue that we cannot know gauge
its effects on Iraqi society. To hedge against the unintended consequences
of democratization, the US needs to maintain a stabilizing force
in Iraq. Alternately, others argue that the primary goal of the
war was to maximize American influence in Islamic world.
There are several ways
in which the US can extract itself from Iraq. Minimalists argue
that, having removed Saddam, the US job is done. The US, therefore,
should declare victory, remove US troops, and pass all responsibility
for reconstruction to the UN. Other possible options include "staying
on course" and "wrapping it up." According to the
first option, success may be defined differently - from democratizing
Iraq to freezing the situation. On the other hand, with "wrapping
it up," the US should declare victory and get out before the
situation gets any worse. The correct strategy seems to lay somewhere
between these two options, and whichever strategy is chosen, it
must prevent the return of Saddam, ensure reasonable security for
Iraqis, foster some sort of functioning Iraqi police and judicial
system, eliminate the capacity to produce WMD, and prevent terrorists
from seeking haven on Iraqi territory.
Has the American presence
proved helpful or harmful? Is a stable coalition government in Iraq
is feasible? How will a transitional coalition government be created?
Does the US have the capacity to play a balancing role within Iraqi
politics? In addition, the potential partition of Iraq and possible
Turkish intervention if a Kurdish state is proposed will define
the success of the situation. One suggestion to pass all Iraqi post-conflict
regulation to the UN would allow the US to save face and exit with
dignity, and the UN could be a neutral regulator for Iraq.
Participants from the
Middle East stressed that, historically, attitudes toward America
in the Middle East were generally positive (in contrast to attitudes
toward the British and French colonial powers), yet feelings towards
the US have deteriorated in recent decades and especially in recent
years.
Participants drew attention
to the fact that the US is still trying to resolve the current situation
through the use of force. However, regime change is a complicated
social situation, and force is not enough. After all, the situation
is not about terrorism, or even Saddam's regime; instead, it concerns
the social/political/economic organization of life in a group of
Third World societies in the whole of the Middle East.
Continued chaos, the
"Lebanization" of Iraq, could affect all of Europe. Therefore,
the question of liberation cannot be isolated and resolved as an
isolated issue. If you define the main problem as an issue of how
to organize political and social processes in Iraqi society after
Saddam, then Americans have no right to proclaim victory and leave.
What Americans have
already done in the region contradicts their own strategic task
of creating roots and space for the stable projection of American
interests into the Islamic world and finding a "modus vivendi"
with the Islamic and Arab world.
Comparisons to the Vietnam War and its damage to the US image were
raised more than once. Participants asked whether Americans would
be able to draw any lessons from the Iraqi campaign. Is Washington
ready to do it again in Iran? Did the regime change formula prove
or undermine itself?
Some participants called the US support of Israel "a blind
support." They stressed that, rather than democratizing Iraq
by force, efforts would have been better spent creating a truly
democratic state in Palestine.
It would be harmful
to bring in the UN if nation-building is to be done under command
of the USA. Such a configuration of power will end up devaluing
the image of the UN. Instead, the UN should be given full control
over the civilian sphere, leaving military control in US hands.
However, it would be difficult to clearly differentiate between
the two spheres.
The formula "proclaim
victory and leave" originates from the idea that no American
administration would think of proclaiming defeat or recognize its
own inability to deal with consequences of a war campaign. The US
position on inviting the UN to assist in the reconstruction of Iraq
is somewhat like "the UN should give us troops and money and
obey our orders." Iraq is too important, Bush thinks, to give
it to somebody else's responsibility, especially since the UN is
perceived as anti-American, unreliable, and unpredictable. However,
the current logic belies an internal contradiction: why is the US
trying to pass around unfinished business? Bush even thinks that
there are numerous forces, including France, who want America to
fail.
There are other scenarios
of internationalizing the campaign in Iraq than just giving responsibility
to the UN. Specifically, one alternative is to simply bring more
NATO troops and expand the "coalition of the willing."
The coalition counts more than 40 states, at least according to
the White House.
The President has asked
for $87 billion for Iraq in the 2004 budget; yet the EU announced
it would only contribute 200 million Euros for the reconstruction
of Iraq. Such a response by the Europeans is perceived by America
almost as a "calculated insult."
Among critics of the war there was a common argument that to run
post-war Iraq would be expensive, difficult, and imbalanced. Even
before the first war in Iraq in 1991, the same questions were asked,
and this uncertainty prevented Saddam's overthrow at the time.
Bush thinks that strong messages should be sent to other members
of the "axis of evil." Americans didn't know in what bad
shape Iraqi oil centers were. Rather, they expected that oil money
would be switched on soon after the end of military phase. Now there
is a necessity to pump money into Iraq's reconstruction much longer
than was planned.
Some participants mentioned
that the belief that Iran can take a greater role in creating stability
and balance in the region is widespread in Europe. Instead of putting
a new "Musharraf" in power in Baghdad, there is a possibility
of nation-building through local coalition. Countries affected by
the post-Iraq instability (like Iran) should have a bigger say in
local conflict resolution. Despite such arguments, American experts
replied that Bush would not involve Iran in the Iraqi reconstruction
because it considers Iran among its targets. Rather than cooperating
with Iran in the interest of strengthening the country, Bush works
with Iran mainly in the hope of playing on differences between political
forces there or facilitating covert operations, oil policy, sanctions,
etc. Such an approach for regime change is even more complicated
and multi-layered than that for Iraq or even North Korea.
The decision to overthrow
Saddam should not be perceived in a simplistic way. Instead, it
incorporated multiple components, including WMD, the Middle East,
and terrorism. All components were of genuine concern at certain
stages. To understand properly the logic of American actions, it
should be recognized that Bush considers himself at war against
extremely dangerous, persistent, and pluralist external (and internal)
radical hostile elements of Islam. According to this vision, the
war has two components: the sub-state component (Bin Laden and Al
Qaeda), and the state component (Saddam in Iraq, but also Syria,
Libya, Sudan, etc.).
International law and
terrorism
Problems of interaction
between domestic and international law were discussed to better
understand how to give legal treatment to terrorism. Some time ago
the UN passed Resolution 1373 to create the Terrorism Affairs Working
Committee whose task is to elaborate the legal definition of terrorism.
This task has not been resolved due to political reasons. The UN
approach is to allow some autonomy when applying the label of "terrorism"
without necessarily requiring the heavy mechanism of UN Security
Council voting each time.
The RAND Corporation
produced a study on the cost of anti-terrorist measures. Three terrorist
scenarios (moderate, severe, and nuclear) were considered. The study
showed that around 95 billion USD need to be spent directly and
urgently for counter-terrorist measures. Including indirect costs,
a total of 190 billion USD are needed. In comparison, the costs
for nuclear deterrence over a period of 45 years cost the USA on
average 120 billion per year. The study comes up with figures of
20 billion per year for moderate, 120 billion per year for severe,
and 500 billion for preventing the nuclear terrorism scenario.
Neoconservatives allied
with Bush stress that the US spends 4 % of GDP for defense, while
under Reagan this figure was 8% and 15% under Eisenhower. This group
thinks that spending on security is not a real burden, and that
more should be spent.
There was a proposal
to elaborate mechanisms in international law which would enable
the world community, rather than national authorities, to try and
punish individuals for terrorist activities directly. At minimum,
the equalization of national norms on terrorism among countries
is required.
An opinion was expressed
that instead of elaborating a unified definition of terrorism, it
is possible to better implement the 13 existing conventions and
acts of international law which deal with various aspects of terrorism.
However, even if a universal definition or convention on terrorism
could be negotiated, the matter of punishing terrorists would likely
still be left to national courts and laws. After all, some authority
needs to be responsible for catching, keeping, and trying terrorists.
Definitions help but cannot solve the problem in its entirety, for
even the Iraq war was waged under an anti-terror umbrella. There
are efforts to create a forum for cooperative security aimed at
preventive measures. Participants discussed whether both terror
and anti-terror can be considered "communication strategies"
and came to conclusion that in part they are.
International law and
legitimacy of use of force
International law did
not perform well during the anti-terrorist campaign. Conventions
were not adopted, and agreed-upon definitions are still absent.
It is unclear how to try and punish Al Qaeda operatives if they
are not holding a "smoking gun." Further, the legitimacy
of pre-emptive strikes and preventive operations is questionable.
War against Iraq was explained by the American administration as
a "preventive measure" or "pre-emptive measure".
However, pre-emption is only ambiguously recognized in international
law, because any use of force until World War I was considered purely
legal and was not limited. Given that the UN Charter defines only
two cases where the use of force is permitted in international relations
(self-defense and collective action of international community under
UNSC decision), the US has only two options: to assure a UN resolution
(and it is remarkable that they attempted to secure a resolution
for such a long period), or to proclaim war in Afghanistan and Iraq
as pre-emptive actions under the broadly-defined and overstretched
justification of self-defense.
International law also
does not contain clear definitions of "humanitarian intervention,",
which can be found in UN Charter only "between the lines."
As a result, the USA can't use it for pretending "to save Iraqi
people from dictatorial oppression." At the same time, some
criticism of such an interpretation was expressed by other participating
experts. Use of military ships for sea blockade of Cuba in the 1960s,
another example of the pre-emptive use of force, was also interpreted
as extended self-defense.
Legalization of actions
through UNSC resolutions is tricky. The UN Security Council is not
a democratic institution by itself. While a combination of old SC
resolutions (adopted between 1991 and 2003) regarding Iraq could
be interpreted as indirect legal permission, every SC resolution
is subject to interpretation. Yet, participants argued that it is
better to have some international legal regulations than have none,
which could lead to anarchy. However, international law often works
only if no strong country is seriously interested in protecting
its national interests from the law. Now, for example, the US is
blocking the creation of International Criminal Court, thereby undermining
this international initiative. In addition, the IAEA was trying
to keep the decision regarding use of force in Iraq on a legal track
by insisting that the UNSC decision be based upon results of objective
inspections. However, the IAEA proved too slow, and America was
not ready to wait.
International law must
elaborate and provide a spectrum of instruments; as of yet, however,
this arsenal of measures is narrow. Though there were casus belli
arguments in cases of Kosovo and Afghanistan, none existed in the
case of Iraq.
Many participants agreed
that UNSC is not a democratic institution, but the General Assembly
would never produce a decisive resolution on the use force. The
UNSC resolutions at least are legally clear: they either contain
the word "authorization" or not. While there was such
a definition regarding Iraq in 1990, Bosnia, and Somalia, there
was no such authorization in case of Iraq in 2003.
Iraq after the war:
political and social situation and role of international community
Interesting and active
discussion of the post-war situation in Iraq took place with the
participation of witnesses who had just come from Iraq, as well
as Iraqi experts who know well the situation inside the Iraqi émigré
community.
Among the 15 political
parties that exist in Iraq and in exile, many would be interested
in early elections. The more elections are delayed, it was thought,
the less will be the influence of the ayatollahs and the greater
the influence of democratically inclined parties returning from
exile. The passing to time will also allow vested economic interests
to manifest themselves by establishing connections with parties;
the oil factor, therefore, could pose a greater and greater influence
on politics.
An alternative opinion
was expressed that attempts to avoid an Islamic state in Iraq by
prolonging the American presence would be damaging in the long run.
It would be better to release Iraq's own potential, instead of going
through path of externally imposed Westernization.
It was noted that there
is a group of political and religious figures working to draft a
constitution, and the majority of them are from abroad. Among this
group, the ayatollahs participate actively, and many are intellectually
influenced by precepts set out in the Turkish Constitution. Many
people describe this political situation as the "Iraqi Rainbow
coalition" or rather "Iraqi mosaics." Because this
Iraqi mosaic lacks a strong national unifying theme, Islam is the
most likely element to unite the diverse groups within Iraq. In
a country which doesn't have civil society, no real NGOs, and the
only existing strong vertical structure with a nation-wide mobilizing
network is the Shiite clergy, Islam is likely to emerge as a strong
political theme. A similar outcome can be seen in Iran, where the
clergy had unique networking capabilities and won.
Unlike the first Gulf
War, the Arab League did not contribute forces to the US-led effort,
and is not involved in the reconstruction process. The League has
refused to recognize the provisional Council as the real government
of Iraq, and is waiting to recognize a democratically established
government.
The issue of delegating
authority to local political forces (like tribal chiefs in Afghanistan)
is less of an issue in Iraq. The country is more homogeneous (after
several decades of a highly centralized regime). Rather, the biggest
problem is the absence of a state infrastructure. It may be a mistake
to dismiss all former police and employees of local administrative
offices because not only do they add to the army of unemployed,
but they also prevent infrastructure from early repair. Well trained
professionals should be used by the new regime, if they don't have
a record of criminal activity under previous regime.
It seems that a gap
between the occupying military and the population is deepening and
widening with each month. Initial sharing of food and joint football
matches are now substituted by rising alienation and hostility.
There is also a problem with reconstruction funds: only about 10
billion USD will go to reconstruction as such; the rest is used
for expenses incurred by the coalition and for supporting the infrastructure
of occupying forces.
Westerners may underestimate
the quite developed character of the justice system in Iraq under
the previous regime. Though the regime was repressive, individuals
were protected from crimes committed against them. City life was
also safe before the war. Now police are again patrolling the cities,
and the highway from Baghdad to Amman has to be protected by the
Iraqi police force and Coalition troops.
While the governing
Council incorporates a mixture of all 15 major political parties.
US officials were not able to include those individuals of real
influence in most parties, so that the structure of the Council
does not accurately reflect existing interests in society. To help
rectify this situation, participants stressed that a greater UN
role, an increased role for NGOs and the international community,
and the activization of internal political and social life of Iraqi
society is ultimately necessary.
Reconstruction of Afghanistan:
prospects, impasses, and problems
The world is approaching
the two-year eve of the collapse of the Taliban. The economy of
Afghanistan has increased by 15-20% during this period, yet general
situation is disturbingly marked by steady increases in violence
and security problems. The UN confirms that one third of the country
is beyond its ability to operate, and there are continuous attempts
to obstruct the reconstruction process.
Major obstacles in the
reconstruction process include:
US strategy in the region has included providing weapons to some
local war-lords and even training "anti-Al Qaeda" brigades
of former militia members. This effort has not been supported by
either Karzai or Afghan central authorities, who are against any
further strengthening of regional or local forces.
Some 31 different nations
compose the peace-keeping coalition in Afghanistan under NATO leadership.
A concept advocated by the provisional government is a civil-military
hybrid: teams of 60-100 military (too little for any concrete territory)
are to be projected to provinces, with NGOs operating the under
umbrella of the military operation.
With so much insecurity,
ordinary people do not see many benefits of the new regime. There
is a big project of the Kabul-Kandahar road, which proved unsuccessful
- only 2% of the road has been completed, and the project failed
to provide more than 100 new jobs. In 2 years, only 2000 military
have graduated from the Afghan military school. What is needed are
teams of 2000-3000 well trained personnel military in every important
provincial center.
Opinion was expressed
that it would be wrong to accuse in equal proportion Pakistan, Iran,
and Russia in external interference. The main problem is created
by Pakistan. And the USA tolerates insurgence and interference from
Pakistan.
Opinions were expressed
that the US has no clear strategy of how to deal with the region:
it collects information, controls cases on an ad-hoc basis, and
yet little progress is made towards providing stability or democracy.
Taking into consideration differences in population size, aid to
Afghanistan is actually extremely low. It is about 63 USD per capita,
while in Kosovo it was 198 USD per capita. Even in Rwanda it was
128 USD. Moreover, aid funds are siphoned into the pockets of local
bureaucracy; what is needed is more infrastructural aid and reform
and continuing assistance.
There are 73,000 policemen
according to ministerial lists, but the majority of them were in
fact mujahaddin fighters. Retraining is dramatically needed. Germany
established a police academy with a 2-3 year program and the capacity
to graduate 2,000 policemen per year. That is not enough for immediate
change. What is needed is 2-3 month long police courses for lower
level policeman. It should be taken into consideration that 40%
of retrained officers disappear in the process of retraining.
The situation with women
has proven contradictory: women's NGOs say that they most need security
for women, even more than liberation and rights. Now, however, security
has decreased dramatically.
The draft of the Constitution
seems to be very liberal; it has no strong religious component,
except the formal statement that Afghanistan is an Islamic Republic.
On the other hand, since elections scheduled for 2004 (as predefined
by UN) may not happen on time anyway. It was thought that the attempt
to impose a Western model of organized democracy almost inevitably
will fail in the tribal society of Afghanistan. There is also a
question of Karzai's legitimacy, as he lacks public support.
Doubts were expressed
that Al Qaeda can redevelop in Afghanistan with all the pressure
from the USA. In comparison to Iraq, some participants even called
situation in the Afghanistan "more promising".
Some thought that the
Bush administration doesn't care much about Afghanistan, considering
it "done." Passing control to NATO designates exactly
this attitude. Some studies show that you need about 20 military
personnel per 1,000 inhabitants for effective control and stabilization.
In Afghanistan this figure is about 0.4 per 1,000 of population.
Moreover, reconstruction of Afghanistan is a multi-pillar process;
the fall of one pillar undermines the whole process. For example,
the very slow pace of judicial reform (for which Italy is responsible)
undermines the efforts of Germany to retrain the Afghan police.
Afghanistan is often
portrayed as a site of ethnic conflict. But in fact there is a multi-layer
conflict over territories (including fertile territories to cultivate
drugs), weapons, representation of tribes in power, and relations
between highlands and valley tribes, etc. The time available for
reorganizing society is limited, and participants expressed great
concern regarding the ability of the international community to
act effectively in this limited time frame.
Study of suicidal terrorism
Results of a study on
suicide terrorism were presented at one of sessions, derived from
work on Palestinian terrorist acts in the Middle East. The psychology
of suicide attacks was a particular specific focus. Suicide terrorism,
more than other types of terrorist actions, results in strategic
consequences. For example, an attack on the American marines in
Lebanon in the 1980s led to the withdrawal of the multinational
peacekeeping force. Attacks in Israel in 1996 shifted public opinion
to the right, allowing the right-wing to take office.
Sometime attacks are high-risk but not suicidal for terrorists.
Psychologically, the act of self-demolition aimed at killing others
is a very deeply motivated action, different from simple politically
motivated actions. An interview with a jailed "Hamas"
military wing terrorist showed that shahids believe they will reach
paradise after suicidal death. But such individuals are allowed
to proceed to paradise only after mission is accomplished. Lebanon,
Israel, Egypt, Iraq, Chechnya/Russia have become sites of suicidal
attacks. In 1981 the first registered suicide attack occurred at
the Embassy in Lebanon.
The notion of "religious
fanaticism" is often used to describe the rationale underlying
suicidal political behavior. The idea of sacrificing oneself for
certain "holy" purposes has been employed for the sake
of Islam (as well as Christianity and Judaism), but experience gained
by Israeli intelligence suggests that political rather than religious
fanaticism is the dominant motive. Out of numerous cases studied,
the vast majority were highly politicized acts, with no serious
religious connotations. Elsewhere, the Tamil Tigers (Sri Lanka)
and PKK (Kurds) have committed dozens of suicidal attacks, with
no element of religious fanaticism of promise of "going to
paradise."
In the Islamic faith,
suicide is in fact forbidden. Regular suicide rates in Islamic countries
are about 10 times lower than in Western countries. There is a concept
that suicidal terrorists are just a suicidal-oriented people irrespective
of political component. But there are arguments and examples against
such an explanation. For instance, ten IRA activists in prison died
during a hunger strike in 1981 while aiming to obtain status as
political prisoners. Rather than being suicidal, they demonstrated
a remarkable ability to survive, rather than die, in an attempt
to reach a political goal. The power of group commitment and group
solidarity worked in this case instead of religious fanaticism.
Interviews with families
of Palestinian suicide bombers revealed some interesting results.
The few things in common between suicide bombers included an average
age close to 21 (for Tamils it was 16), and unmarried/no children
family status. Gender composition of trained terrorists seems to
be a matter of organizational policy (for the PKK, 11 of 15 suicide
terrorists were females; among the Tamil Tigers, around 30%). There
were few psycho-pathological cases; most suicide bombers were normal
men and women, with only a small having psychological tendencies
towards suicide (depression, drug abuse, etc.). The individuals
were not excessively religious, and their level of education was
higher than average for their ethnicity. Further, when survivors
were asked for motivation, they didn't mention religion as the primary
factor. Main motivations did not include personal revenge, either
(only small percent had lost close relatives in the conflict). Instead,
revenge for national humiliation was among the major motivations
for these terrorist acts.
Two main factors seem
to have influenced the emergence of the suicide terrorism phenomenon.
First is the role played by the media and public opinion. About
70% of Palestinian population supported suicidal terrorism on Israeli
territory against the Israeli population. Suicidal acts over the
years developed an aura of "heroic behavior, " with such
acts associated with patriotism. The second factor was group loyalty
and group behavior. Previously, the practice of training shahids
was long, and they often spent months or years in group preparations.
Now, however, preparations sometimes are limited to days, but group
psychology still works. Videotaping the last address of the shahid
also works by surrounding the suicidal act with public attention.
The role of political
organizations is also obvious and central: there are no cases when
an individual performed an act of suicidal terrorism without going
first through training and brain-washing in one of political organizations.
Responding to results
of the study, some participants pointed to the importance of national
humiliation as a primary motivator. Suicide bombers themselves feel
it is a legitimate use of force in prolonged social conflicts because,
while it may cause death to civilians, it has its roots in the violence
carried out against their civilian population. Participants stressed
that to end the phenomenon of suicidal terrorism is possible only
in combination with the political resolution of conflicts in which
such terrorism is used.
The most serious global
consequence of suicide terrorism would be a suicidal act carried
out by a state, particularly a suicidal nuclear strike that unleashes
a retaliatory nuclear strike.
Bioterrorism
Important events in
the area of bioterrorism during the past decade have included the
emergence and research of infectious diseases (AIDS and SARS among
them).
As a response to these
and other events, the World Health Organization has undertaken to
improve "biological intelligence." Attempts to make more
deadly viruses need to be countered with bio-defense measures. One
problem, of course, is that even bio-defensive measures should probably
be classified, thus inhibiting the timely flow of information about
possible outbreaks. To this end, improved national and international
procedures and cooperative efforts are needed. There is also the
prospect that knowledge gained about the human genome raises new
dangers about its misuse for bioterror purposes.
In the area of biological
weapons, negotiations on adding a protocol and verification measures
to the Convention on Biological Weapons (of 1972) have been blocked
by US opposition. The US has justified its position by arguing that
enormous progress in biotechnology has made verification too intrusive
for the commercial sector.
Components of necessary
strategy include improving the ability of national health systems
to recognize new and unusual diseases, improving the connectivity
and ability to pass and spread samples, rapidly undertaking laboratory
work to elaborate defensive measures, and creating ways of quick
distribution of defensive agents to the population. Significant
state financing is needed to implement all this, and only the USA
has the necessary resources.
Despite the difficulties
of classified and proprietary information, however, effective measures
against bioterrorism will require broad international cooperation.
IAEA strategy for protection
against nuclear terrorism
The possibility of nuclear
terrorism and measures against it were discussed as the next case
in the terrorism/anti-terrorism continuum. It was stressed that
the international community underestimates the probability (and
relative ease) of the creation of a crude terrorist nuclear device.
The main mechanisms of combating nuclear terrorism need to be:
