By Ingemar Dörfer

The Swedish government position on NMD was formulated by Foreign Minister Anna Lindh at the United Nations in September 2000. 1 "The United States’ plans for a national missile defense system causes serious concern. In today's globalized world, we must always take account of the global effects of our decisions. It is hard to see how a possible threat from a few states would best be countered by a missile shield that may or may not work, and which risks setting off a renewed arms race with immense costs in terms of wasted resources and loss of human security. The recent announcement by the US administration to postpone the decision on the NMD system was welcome. A more secure world ought to be built on cooperation rather than on isolation and confrontation. The ABM treaty is crucial to global security and must not be jeopardized."

As articulated by the Foreign Minister, Sweden’s main concerns with NMD focus on: the consequences of breaking out of the ABM Treaty, the unraveling of various arms control regimes, and a potential costly new nuclear arms race. Both Russia and China have threatened to block arms control agreements if American deployment of NMD goes ahead. Finally, NMD program costs of $60 billion and upwards would be both expensive and wasteful.2

SWEDISH OPTIONS

What are the Swedish options for influencing a US NMD decision? Sweden is a member of two groups, the European Union and the seven-member New Agenda Coalition, that collectively could seek to influence the outcome of the NMD debate. Regarding the latter, the New Agenda Coalition has little clout with the United States (Slovenia even left the group because she did not want to prejudice her chances of joining NATO). Sweden does have the chairmanship of the EU for the first half of 2001, but a counter initiative by the EU is unlikely. Transatlantic security is handled by NATO, not by the EU, nor are the EU nations united on the issue. In all likelihood, the United Kingdom will support a US decision to proceed with NMD, as will some other European nations.

MAD AS STRATEGTIC STABILITY

A central Swedish assumption is that the ABM Treaty is crucial to strategic stability. In prohibiting the defense of national territory by limiting American and Russian missile defenses to only one site, nuclear deterrence would continue to rely on mutual assured destruction (MAD). Similar to the NATO alliance, Sweden during the Cold War was vulnerable to Russian nuclear weapons, and remains so today. Yet MAD is a cold war concept. It implies a core belief in the US nuclear umbrella, since without the extended deterrence provided by the US, Sweden could find itself open to UAD, unilateral assured destruction by Russia. If Swedes believe that only Russia and America deter each other, then they have not understood the concept of extended deterrence, the very basis of NATO strategy for fifty years.

Russia and China

In opposing US plans for NMD, Russia is playing on fears of European vulnerability. Moscow’s threat to break out of the INF treaty and redeploy tactical nuclear weapons is a threat aimed at Western Europe, not the United States. Yet it is unlikely that Russia would make good on such threats even if the US abrogates the ABM treaty. Russia’s dependence on good relations with the West would make such actions counterproductive. Moscow’s financial ability to rearm will be limited for some time to come, and her current relationship with the United States gives her the best opportunity to monitor and shape US nuclear forces. China can, in Sweden’s view, do much harm to various arms control regimes that Sweden supports.3 Beijing could increase the number of strategic nuclear weapons as one response to US NMD deployments. One assumption that needs to be better understood in Sweden is the apparent American reluctance to live in a MAD relationship with China as she did with Russia.4 An initial NMD deployment by the US could be a first step in the endeavour to escape this condition.

Decoupling

Decoupling, disarmament and deterrence are three European concerns about NMD. Is Sweden as a non-NATO member interested in coupling US security to that of Europe? Of course. Even during the Cold War, Sweden´s military ties to NATO were more extensive than generally assumed. Now it is repeatedly stated by Stockholm that an American presence in Europe is in the Swedish national security interest. Paradoxically, then, Sweden is worried that an American NMD program could lead to decoupling. Yet decoupling is a tricky concept. If you do not trust America, why would you want her coupled to European security? But if you do, why do you trust Washington on European security issues but not on the question of the US defending itself with NMD? As Camille Grand has written, "the majority of European governments feel it is not their responsibility to lecture the United States on its security choices."5

A SWEDISH MISSILE DEFENSE?

Since there is no acute sense of vulnerability in Sweden, little thought is given to its own national missile defense, which in any event is currently beyond its economic and technological reach. Nonetheless, long-range defense planning does view ballistic missiles equipped with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons as a major threat.6 Similarly, Swedish peace-keeping troops deployed on overseas missions could be vulnerable to such weapons long before Sweden itself is targeted. Thus, countries like Sweden are in the contradictory position of opposing the American NMD program while assuming that their peacekeepers are (or will be) protected by an American TMD umbrella. For this and other reasons, one can expect, over time, an increased European interest in US Navy-based TMD systems.

CONCLUSION

Most Swedes would probably like to see the NMD issue go away. With little chance of this happening, Sweden hopes that US deployment of NMD can be accommodated within the ABM treaty, thereby maintaining strategic stability. Sweden has long supported the arms control process and itself benefited from that process during the Cold War. Yet developments in Asia could make the arms control paradigm obsolete,7 while possible drastic events on the fringes of Europe could induce revisions in Swedish thinking. Over time, this could lead to greater interest in theater missile defenses with like-minded neighbors and allies.

Ingemar Dörfer is Director of Research, Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI), Stockholm. The views expressed here are his own.

Endnotes

1. Statement by H.E. Ms. Anna Lindh, Minister for Foreign Affairs in the General Debate of the 55 th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 14 September 2000.
2. While admittedly a small fraction of the entire US defense budget, NMD program costs still represent real opportunity costs for the US military. Much was made in the Swedish media of the cost of the failed NMD missile test in July 2000 - $900 million.
3. John Pomfret "China Threatens Arms Control Collapse", The Washington Post, July 14, 2000.
4. Stephen A. Cambone "Threats and Risks Prompting a Commitment to Ballistic Missile Defense" in Burkard Schmitt & Julian Lindley-French, eds. National Missile Defence and the Future of Nuclear Policy. Paris: Institute for Security Studies-Western European Union, September 2000, p.15.
5. Camille Grand "Missile Defense: The View from the Other Side of the Atlantic" Arms Control Today. September 2000, p. 15.
6. Försvar för fred. Årsrapport från perspektivplaneringen 1999-2000, Stockholm: Defense Headquarters, March 2000, p 70.
7. Thérèse Delpech "Nuclear Weapons and the New World Order: Early Warning from Asia", Survival, Winter 1998-1999. Paul Bracken, Fire in the East (Harper & Collins, 1999).

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