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UK Views on National Missile Defence Pugwash
Occasional Papers, II:ii,
Current US plans for national missile defence (NMD) envisage the use of two US bases in the United Kingdom. NMD plans would involve upgrading the early warning radar at RAF 1 Fylingdales, to improve missile detection and tracking, and using RAF Menwith Hill as a relay ground station for data from satellites detecting missile launches. However, use of these bases for NMD would need UK Government permission, which has not yet been requested by the US, or granted by the UK Government. This paper considers UK political reaction to US NMD plans and to the UK’s proposed role, focusing on Parliamentary debate. THE UK'S ROLE Fylingdales RAF Fylingdales has been part of the US Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) since 1963. The original "golf ball" structures were replaced in 1992 with a phased-array radar, which has three faces for 360° coverage. One of five existing early warning radars slated for NMD roles (the other four being in Massachusetts, California, Alaska and Thule, Greenland), Fylingdales currently provides the UK and US with early warning of incoming ballistic missiles and the tracking of space debris. For NMD, these radars would need to be upgraded, primarily with changes to software and related information technology hardware, to enable incoming warheads to be detected and tracked earlier. Such upgrading would also require the US to negotiate an amendment to the ABM Treaty, or to breach or formally withdraw from it. Yet, even these upgraded radars would have limited resolution to identify and track warheads and decoys and would thus be effective only against relatively uncomplicated missiles. To meet a more sophisticated threat, there are plans to add a higher frequency, and hence higher resolution, very narrow beam, X-band radar. The first phase of President Clinton’s NMD proposal called for an X-band radar built in Alaska, to deal with the potential threat from North Korea. However, the second phase proposed three additional X-band radars, possibly including one in the UK. This would require construction of a new facility, necessitating national government approval. Local planning and environmental issues could also be raised. Menwith Hill In its initial configuration, NMD would rely on US Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites to detect missile launches. These are due to be replaced by the Space-Based Infra-Red System-high (SBIRS-high) satellites, which will provide more accurate location and tracking of missiles in their boost phase. These satellites are seen as necessary for early warning of missile launches, whether or not NMD is deployed (e.g., DSP satellites detected the launch of SCUD missiles during the Gulf War). In 1997, the UK government gave permission for Menwith Hill to be used as the European ground station for SBIRS-high, and this is now under construction. However, if the US wished to use data relayed via Menwith Hill for NMD, specific UK consent would be required. Parliamentary Debate There has been considerable UK Parliamentary interest in US NMD plans,2 both in the House of Commons and the House of Lords. During the 1999/2000 parliamentary session there were more than a hundred ‘parliamentary questions’ involving missile defence. One parliamentary motion, introduced by Martin O’Neill, Chairman of the House of Commons Trade and Industry Select Committee, gathered the signatures of sixty MPs and read as follows: "That this House, in support of an effective defence of the United Kingdom, welcomes appropriate American leadership of NATO, but is concerned that the United States is considering abandoning the strategy of mutual deterrence in favour of combining offensive and defensive missiles, thereby creating a recipe for a new arms race (China-Russia); and urges the Government to state clearly that no British bases may be used by the United States for purposes of missile defences outside the context of the ABM Treaty."3THE GOVERNMENT POSITION The government of Prime Minister Tony Blair has not yet made a decision on whether UK facilities could be used for NMD, nor has such a request been made by the US. As stated in April 2000 by Keith Vaz (Minister for Europe in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office), the government has "made clear that the UK would consider any such request carefully. We have also welcomed the fact that the US will make their deployment decision on the basis of a number of important factors, which will include taking account of the views of Allies and the status of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty."4 The UK Government has also conducted discussions with both its NATO allies and other countries about NMD, including its EU partners, Russia, and China, as well as with Denmark and Canada, two other countries that can be expected to be called on to host NMD installations.5 It is interesting to note that, in terms of threat assessment, the Blair government does not consider the UK to be at risk from ‘states of concern’. When asked in parliament about the likelihood of an initial nuclear strike by North Korea, Libya or Iran, Vaz stated: "Our current assessment is that there is no significant threat that North Korea, Libya or Iran might use nuclear weapons against the UK in present circumstances. We continue to monitor developments in this area closely. It is not for us to make such assessments in respect of other countries."6 This sentiment was echoed in July 2000 when the Prime Minister defended the US threat assessment: "we have made it clear throughout that we understand exactly why the United States is concerned about the possibility of rogue nuclear states. We are trying to ensure that the fear that the United States has—perfectly legitimately and justifiably—is taken account of in a way that does not put at risk the substantial progress that has been made on nuclear disarmament over the past few years. It is vital, therefore, for us to continue a dialogue on what will be one of the most important issues that we shall have to face over the next few years."7 Despite feeling that no missile threat against the UK currently exists, the government has not ruled out the possibility of a missile defence system for Europe. In responding to the (admittedly vague) proposal of President Putin for Russian-NATO cooperation on such a defence, Foreign Minister Geoff Hoon in November 2000 replied that "the Russians have not yet set out any specific details of those proposals. When they do—we have encouraged them to do so—we and our NATO allies will consider them carefully."8 During the UK debate on NMD, differences of opinion appeared to emerge between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence. As criticized by Iain Duncan Smith (the Conservative Party’s Shadow Secretary of State for Defence): "The Defence Secretary said on 21 March 2000 that he would look sympathetically at requests to upgrade Fylingdales, but on the very same evening, in another meeting, the Minister of State said he did not like the ‘idea of a star wars programme, limited or unlimited.’ The Government are sending out conflicting messages. The Defence Secretary, driven no doubt by the MOD’s understanding of the nature of the threat, is beginning to move towards what I would consider a logical position, while the Foreign Office, in the person of the Foreign Secretary, and especially his Minister of State, is absolutely opposed to the process."9 The Blair government has denied any such split. As enunciated by Geoff Hoon in October 2000, "the Government speaks with a single voice on those matters. We have had discussions with our US allies. We were delighted that, in announcing his decision to defer any decision in the United States, President Clinton said that he had taken account of those views. We are most grateful."10 THE OPPOSITION PARTIES AND THE BACKBENCHES Perhaps unsurprisingly, the two main opposition parties come out on different sides of the NMD issue, with the Conservative party in favour of cooperating with the US and the Liberal Democrats opposed.Conservative Party As set out in its publication Believing in Britain, Conservative Party policy is that "We will ...take a lead in building support in Europe for cooperating with the US on the development of ballistic missile defences, to counter the new threat from rogue states and terrorists equipped with weapons of mass destruction."11 In criticizing what are seen as mixed messages from the Blair government on NMD, Conservative MP William Hague asked in July 2000, "Is it not time to make it clear to the United States that Britain would respond positively to any proposal for the upgrade by the United States of Menwith Hill and Fylingdales as part of a United States-NATO ballistic missile defence, should that be necessary?" 12 Conservative Party officials also rejected assertions that the UK faced no ballistic missile threats from countries like North Korea. Iain Duncan Smith (Shadow Secretary of State for Defence) noted in a May 2000 parliamentary debate, "I remind the Secretary of State that the radius of the threat that brings the United States into target range from North Korea also brings the United Kingdom into target range, because the ranges go over the poles. I am happy to show the right hon. Gentleman a map that demonstrates why it is more than just a threat to the United States now and a threat to Northern Europe later; there is a much greater degree of overlap."13 At the same time, the Conservatives are sensitive to the issue of the ABM Treaty, with Iain Duncan Smith noting in May 2000 "we will want—so, I am sure, will the Government—some accommodation to be made between the Americans and those who are now responsible for the treaty after the break-up of the old Soviet Union."14 Liberal Democrats The Liberal Democrats are opposed to US NMD plans and to any use of UK facilities for US national missile defence. As set forth in a parliamentary motion tabled in June 2000, the Liberal Democrats called on the House of Commons to declare "that this House…is concerned that the opportunities for a reduction in nuclear weapons have been preju diced by the...proposal that the United States should deploy a system of National Missile Defence, if necessary in breach of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty..."15 During debate on the motion, Menzies Campbell (Liberal Democrat Principal spokesman for Foreign Affairs and Defence) noted "an alarming drift towards unilateral action in international affairs. The failure of the United States Senate to ratify the comprehensive test ban treaty—the CTBT—and the determination of the United States to press ahead with a system of ballistic missile defence in apparent breach of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty are both disturbing and destabilising features of a determination on the part of the Americans to go it alone."16 Menzies Campbell went on to warn about the effects of NMD on strategic stability: "… deployment of national missile defence could result in the Chinese deciding to increase their nuclear arsenal, with the risk of a corresponding and chilling escalation by India and Pakistan: the domino theory in reverse." Menzies Campbell also criticized the basic US rationale for NMD: "Of course rogue states and deeply unpleasant regimes exist. However, we must ask ourselves whether they are so lacking in comprehension that they would threaten to use, or actually use, weapons of mass destruction against the overwhelming nuclear superiority of the United States. The classic definition of threat is capability plus intention. Rogue states may acquire the capability, but it is difficult to envisage circumstances in which they would have the intention."17 Finally, the Rt Hon Baroness Williams of Crosby (Liberal Democrat) expressed concern at the lack of public debate in the UK on the NMD issue: "Without the facilities in the United Kingdom, and possibly also those in Greenland, the present configuration of the national missile defence would be unable to continue… no one doubts that we want to be good allies…However, I am troubled by the fact that we in this country are not having the kind of debate which the United States is having; a debate which our own views might substantially influence."18 The backbenches Some of the most vigorous criticism of the Government on NMD has come from its own backbenches. In May 2000 Mike Gapes (Labour/Coop, member of the Defence Select Committee) criticized NMD on a number of issues, including its technical feasibility, methods of delivering weapons of mass destruction and cost. His main concern, however, was with NMD’s implications for arms control and the ABM treaty: "[The first stage of national missile defence] would require the elimination of the Article I ban on nationwide defences and the revision of Article III, which places limits on the allowed deployment areas. Article IX of the treaty prevents the deployment of ABM systems or components outside of national territory, which suggests that an upgrade of Fylingdales would require that article to be amended… Let us be clear. The ABM treaty is intended to prohibit national missile defence. It permits only 100 launchers to defend a single site. Therefore, what the United States proposes is fundamentally at odds with the entire purpose of the treaty. If we amend the treaty to permit, rather than prohibit, national missile defence and then seek a further expansion of those defences, at some point it will cease to be an arms control treaty; it will become an arms expansion treaty."19 Gapes also spoke of Russian objections to NMD: "If the Russians start to think that national missile defence can shoot down their warheads, they will want more of those warheads to overwhelm those defences. That is what the previous Conservative Government argued when they deployed more warheads on Trident than were deployed on Polaris, saying that that was necessary to overwhelm Soviet missile defences around Moscow. Will the Foreign Office ask the Ministry of Defence how it will respond if Russia starts to deploy its own national missile defence? Will the MOD be forced to consider reversing the Government’s welcome cuts in warhead numbers announced as part of the strategic defence review?"20 Criticism also was forthcoming from those backbenchers whose constituencies are located close to proposed NMD facilities. Lawrie Quinn (Labour, Scarborough and Whitby) noted in November 2000 that "RAF Fylingdales… is adjacent to my constituency.. If a President Bush is appointed, many people in my constituency will be concerned about the likely effect on my part of the world, which may become a defence target."21 FOREIGN AFFAIRS SELECT COMMITTEE: On 25 July 2000, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee published the report of its inquiry into Weapons of Mass Destruction. 22 In addition to analysing regional threats, nuclear treaties and chemical and biological weapons, the Committee considered NMD from a number of viewpoints, including the threat from ‘rogue states’, strategic stability, the ABM Treaty, technological feasibility and credibility, and the response of the UK Government. While acknowledging "the threat presented by a number of countries, which have acquired or developed long-range missiles and which are suspected of developing clandestine WMD programmes," the Committee expressed concern that "the USA over-emphasises the capability component of the threat equation, when it comes to assessing the extent of the threat it faces, and attaches too little importance to intention."23 Moreover "if a ‘rogue state’ did decide to inflict mass casualties on the USA, it is unlikely to use the one method of attack—ballistic missile— which would leave no doubt as to the identity of the attacker.. Other methods of attack—such as biological or chemical weapons—can be delivered much more easily, at a minute fraction of the cost and with a real possibility of concealing the aggressor. Finally, if a future US President came to believe the US was at imminent risk of a WMD ballistic missile attack from a ‘rogue state’, we believe it is reasonable to assume that that President would authorise the preemptive destruction of the rogue state’s missile site or sites regardless of whether NMD had by then been deployed in the USA or not." The report also noted, however, the testimony of Foreign Secretary Robin Cook by stating that "the UK Government acknowledges the threats generated by WMD proliferation [and] as the Foreign Secretary intimated, it is important to recognise that the perceptions of the threat from WMD in the hands of rogue states are not the same in the UK and the USA: the latter’s superpower status may make it a more obvious target." Regarding strategic stability, the Committee report acknowledged that Russia and China might feel "obliged to respond to NMD by enhancing their offensive nuclear capabilities… and that NMD might trigger an arms race, particularly in regions such as East Asia, the Middle East and the Indian Subcontinent which are already volatile." Finally, the report also expressed doubts about NMD’s technological feasibility. The Committee report voiced concerns about the Government’s position on NMD: "... the UK Government has to be realistic about the extent of its influence with the US Administration, but other EU partners and allies of the USA—notably, France, Germany and Canada—have been much more vociferous in their opposition to NMD, a system which they believe will be destabilising...We recognise, however, that the UK is in a difficult and uneasy position on this sensitive and highly important issue, with countervailing pressures from its European and US allies." Given the potentially profound effect of NMD on international relations and strategic stability, the Committee believed it "incumbent on the Government, as one of the five nuclear weapon states and as a close ally of the USA, to make an early public statement on its analysis of NMD’s likely impact on strategic stability and its assessment of whether this would be in the overall security interests of this country." On the specific issues of Fylingdales and Menwith Hill, the Committee recognised that "a UK refusal to allow the upgrading of facilities at Fylingdales would be unprecedented and prove very testing for the alliance." Further, the Committee noted, "a decision by a US administration to seek permission to upgrade Fylingdales, having given formal notice of its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, would present the UK Government with an acute dilemma... A decision by the UK to refuse a US President—possibly a newly elected President committed to implementing NMD as essential to the security of the USA—would have profound consequences for UK/US relations." Considering all these factors, the Committee report commended "the Prime Minister’s approach, whilst urging the Government to impress upon the US Administration that it cannot necessarily assume unqualified UK cooperation with US plans to deploy NMD in the event of unilateral US abrogation of the ABM Treaty… We wish to emphasise strongly that our concern about US plans for NMD does not stem from opposition to, or even indifference to, our closest ally’s desire to protect itself: the question is whether the additional security that NMD might offer outweighs the negative impact of its deployment on strategic arms control." In conclusion, "We recommend that the Government articulate the very strong concerns that have been expressed about NMD within the UK. We are not convinced that the US plans to deploy NMD represent an appropriate response to the proliferation problems faced by the international community. We recommend that the Government encourage the USA to seek other ways of reducing the threats it perceives." The Government’s response The Government’s response to the Select Committee’s report was published in October 2000 and stressed the following point: "The Government has repeatedly made clear that it values the stability which the ABM Treaty provides, and wishes to see it preserved. The US Administration is fully aware of UK views…At no point has the Government given the US Administration reason to assume unqualified UK cooperation with NMD deployment: nor has the US Administration at any stage sought any such assurance." 24 The Blair government also replied that it was "strongly in favour of deeper, carefully considered international dialogue on this complex and difficult issue. The Government has worked hard to promote such dialogue both among NATO allies, and with Russia, China, and others. We have of course articulated UK views in the course of such exchanges, and believe these views are well understood, not least in the US." The response noted the government’s belief that such discussions had already yielded positive results, referring in particular to the joint US-Russian statement of June 2000 on strategic stability. Debate outside Parliament Although the Government has repeatedly stressed that permission for the use of Menwith Hill and Fylingdales for NMD has not been requested by the US, or granted by the UK, there has been speculation outside Parliament on the consequences of such a step. Such speculation has focused both on the first phase of NMD, when internal upgrades to Fylingdales would be needed, as well as the later phases when a new X-band radar might be constructed in the UK. While it is not clear what types of local or national planning permission would be necessary for such construction, opposition is all but certain. As reported by The Guardian on August 2, 2000: "One [Government Minister] with direct knowledge of the project told the Guardian that a US request to construct a new radar station here would be a ‘nightmare’. He said Greenham Common—the US cruise missile base in Berkshire besieged by women peace protesters through the 1980s—would ‘look easy by comparison’."25 The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) has already targeted Fylingdales and Menwith Hill, organising demonstrations at both facilities in 2000 and into early 2001.Conclusion With President George W. Bush now having taken office and declaring his full support for moving ahead with some type of NMD deployment, the UK government may be forced to make its position clearer in 2001 than it did in 2000. Indeed, as noted in the essay by George Lewis, Bush has spoken of proposing a wider NMD programme that would also seek to defend US Allies. Following a strategic review of NMD that may extend through the first half of 2001, the Bush administration can be expected to announce its firm plans for NMD by June 2001, or perhaps earlier. As noted by others, the beginning of construction on an X-band radar in Alaska in summer 2002 would not need a deployment decision until autumn 2001. Prior to that, of course, there is likely to have been a general election in the UK. Whichever party occupies Downing Street, a US request to use UK-based facilities for NMD could put the UK Government in a difficult position, particularly if no agreement has been reached on amending the ABM treaty.
Sarah Pearce is Physical Sciences and Information Technology Advisor, Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (POST), London. The views expressed are her own, and do not represent those of the UK Parliament.
Endnotes
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