By Sverre Lodgaard

"If you have a shield, it is easier to use the sword"
—Richard M. Nixon

THE OFFICIAL RATIONALE

The official rationale for the US National Missile Defense (NMD) programme focuses on emerging threats from "states of special concern" such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq. Focusing as it does on so-called ‘rogue states’ and pariah regimes, the program garners substantial public support,1 and it is this rationale that the NATO allies and other governments are invited to share and support. Many Americans believe that the missile defence programme, like others before it, will fizzle, and that other countries will be bemused to see how much money the US government throws at it—in vain. Others in the US, however, especially leaders and advisors of both political parties, have technological visions of missile defence that extend far beyond the limited, first phase concept. Accordingly, governments in other parts of the world cannot know how the US will proceed. In cases like this, when the uncertainties are large and much is at stake, reactions tend to be based on "best case" capabilities and "worst case" outcomes. In other words, the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of NMD is largely irrelevant to its strategic impact.

THE FUNCTIONS OF NMD

States of special concern

In addition to North Korea, Iran and Iraq, the United States may also be concerned with India and Pakistan. Fifteen years ago, North Korea was not a concern, but India, Brazil, Argentina, Egypt, South Africa and perhaps Libya were, as all were involved in long-range missile programmes. Since then, all but India have terminated such efforts. Thus, the list of countries posing possible missile threats has not only changed, it has become shorter. By the time any NMD system reaches full operational status, North Korea may have disappeared from the list, and democratization trends in Iran may have altered the direction of that nation?s military preparations. Iraq?s nuclear and long-range missile capabilities have been stymied if not eliminated, while uncertainty remains about its biological and chemical weapons capabilities.

Current predictions about the proliferation of long-range ballistic missiles resemble similar predictions made about the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the 1960s. At that time, senior US officials thought it likely that, in due course, scores of countries would go nuclear. Yet today, only three states have been added to the five nuclear weapon states recognized by the NPT. Ballistic missiles with ranges long enough to reach US territory are limited to the other four major nuclear weapons states, whose actual deployment of nuclear warheads has been much reduced since the end of the Cold War.

Americans still tend to base their policies on longterm scenarios and speculative assessments of threats. This way, justifications can be produced for a range of policies, including those pursued for unstated reasons that are less suitable for public consumption. The official rationale for NMD is based on a combination of (1) gloomy projections of missile proliferation and (2) the claim that in some countries, the leaders/ regimes are irrational and undeterrable and therefore a matter of "special concern". Yet even regimes that are much different from Western democracies and therefore difficult to understand are not ipso facto suicidal and immune to the logic of deterrence. The main caveat regarding deterrence is that future threats may not be presently identifiable. Deterrence can hardly work against anonymous actors delivering their weapons in unconventional ways, but then, neither would NMD.

Deterrence is admittedly less effective with non-status quo powers. But the facts of the matter do not support the assertion that there is a growing list of such states eroding deterrence. Those states known to be pursuing a ballistic missile/WMD capability ? primarily India and Pakistan ? are, moreover, doing it mainly for regional reasons. Thus, those skeptical of NMD are hard put to believe that the official rationale of ?states of special concern? is anything more than a minor part of the impetus for the massive and sustained investments in NMD. It is certainly not the whole story.

Accidental launches

Another reason cited for national missile defence is the risk of accidental launches, not least from Russia. Russia is known to have a deteriorating early warning capability, and probably also a weakened command, control and communications system However, as long as it has thousands of nuclear weapons deployed, an accidental launch could well involve large numbers of warheads that would easily overwhelm NMD. Implementation of the US-Russian agreement of 1998 to exchange missile surveillance information is a much more convincing response to that risk than NMD.2

China

The United States seems to have an unclarified strategic relationship with China. Today, mutual deterrence applies, however asymmetrical. It is not far-fetched to think, however, that an NMD consisting of 100 interceptors with an estimated one in four effectiveness would be able to totally negate the warheads launched by China?s approximately 20 long-range ballistic missiles (especially if NMD was called upon to destroy the remaining warheads launched by Chinese missiles that survived a US first strike). Even if the ?states of special concern? disappear entirely, China is still there, with NMD undermining its ability to deter and retaliate. In addition, given current conflicts of interest in East Asia, an operational NMD could be a welcome contribution, widening US military options in the region. Accordingly, many observers believe that China is in fact the main rationale for NMD, so it is no surprise that the stiffest opposition to the programme comes from Beijing.

Russia

Given the size of Russia?s strategic forces, NMD poses no immediate threat to its retaliatory capability. Even under a START III agreement, Russian forces could overwhelm any US NMD deployments of a few hundred interceptors. In conjunction with other factors described by Ivan Safranchuk in his essay, however, the NMD programme could bring about a change in US-Russian relations that puts Moscow at a distinct strategic disadvantage.

From a realpolitik or neorealist assessment of the significance of states in world politics, the European Union and China would be next to the United States, with countries like Russia and India a step further down the list.3 Such images of relative significance do influence the way countries are treated, implicitly if not explicitly. In elaborating its strategies in world affairs, the United States can hardly avoid adopting such a worldview, however rough the classification. Because of the power it wields, the political significance of such an overall perspective underlying the formulation of specific policies has very real consequences.

Seen from Russia, the real purpose of the proposed NMD system is to begin a process of overturning the legal prohibition on national missile defence established by the ABM Treaty. As noted by John Steinbruner, "once that has been accomplished and the basic infrastructure of sensors and data handling is in place, a more serious defensive system could be created by adding more launchers of more robust design and linking it to widely disbursed and highly capable TMD systems unconstrained by the ABM Treaty."4 With Russia under severe economic pressures to reduce its arsenal, the United States could build a base for a much more robust missile defence system from which it could leap ahead at some stage and turn the tables of offence and defence in favour of the latter. This, indeed, is the highest ambition any American government could have for NMD. While such a goal is thought futile by many, continued progress in missile defence technologies and the relegation of Russia to regional power status will continue to nurture such hopes in the minds of many.

Freedom of military action

In sum, the functions of the NMD programme indicated above ? whether actual or perceived ? all point to enhancing the scope of US military action without the US having to fear intimidation and retaliation against its territory. Ideally, the missile defence shield should be extended to also cover allies, US forces abroad, and the countries hosting those forces.

THE SHIELD AND THE SWORD

As of the year 2000, the United States accounted for one-third of total world military expenditure. The US military procurement budget for FY 2001 is up nine per cent in real terms compared with FY 2000, and 29 per cent compared with FY 1998. Further increases are planned for the five-year period 2001-2005. 5 Total US investment in military R&D is 900 per cent greater than that of second-place France.6 Across a broad range of criteria, US capabilities for global military action are growing.

The US Space Command says it is developing the capacity to track all major military activities, to attack them rapidly and precisely at any time, and to deny corresponding military capabilities to anybody else. The NMD must be seen in conjunction with that ambition. What emerges is a US military profile that seeks to erect a shield while strengthening the sword. As President Nixon noted at the time of the ABM Treaty, it is easier to use the sword if you have a shield. Today, this is precisely the concern of many actors around the globe.

Multilateral and unilateral approaches to security

In an increasingly interdependent world, large as well as small states have a growing stake in the development of international rules, norms and standards. For their security, such states all rely on a web of international agreements, especially in the nuclear sector where the NPT is at the centre of a cluster of multilateral treaties, bilateral accords and national laws and regulations. The ABM Treaty is another key element of that cluster. By contrast, in the United States there is a trend toward unilateralism ? a growing tendency to try to affect global politics on the basis of decisions made in Washington. Many in the US feel that international treaties lull the country into a false sense of security. Worse yet are multilateral arrangements. We should not moralize about it, however, because the roots of unilateralism are structural, stemming from the superior position of the United States in world affairs. Clearly, we are faced with two different philosophies?two fundamentally different approaches to the conduct of international affairs. While important in itself, NMD gains additional significance because it crystallizes this growing dichotomy between unilateral and multilateral approaches to security. From a European perspective, this is the political context in which the controversial character of NMD must be understood.

NMD SEEN FROM EUROPE

Threat assessments

European threat assessments are broadly similar to those in the US: missile proliferation is increasing and, combined with WMD proliferation, presents a major strategic challenge. Yet neither observation is convincingly supported by the facts. Rather, they are belief systems that become self-fulfilling prophecies because of the policies that are developed in response to them.

In some respects, European assessments do differ from American ones. National histories are different: Europeans are accustomed to living and coping with threatening environments while the United States has not suffered a foreign invasion of its territory since 1812. Neither are the methodologies of threat assessment the same. Where US policies are elaborated in reference to long-term forecasts, European analysts are more inclined to wait and see whether projected technical capabilities are tested and proven. Europeans rely less on anticipated capabilities and more on combined assessments of capabilities and intent than Americans usually do.7

Management of threats

These Euro-American differences become more sharply delineated when it comes to ways of dealing with threats. Two major differences stand out. First, as noted above, the United States strives to enhance its scope and capabilities for military action. The European Union is also moving in that direction, but its emerging capability to handle so-called Petersberg tasks in and around Europe is small-scale in comparison. This may be a matter of convenience as much as anything else; states often adapt their threat assessments to the capabilities at hand. But it also reflects a stronger European belief in political, economic and diplomatic means of responding to threats. Second, the Europeans obviously believe more in the utility of multilateral instruments than most American do. Arms control, the orchestration of economic incentives, and cooperative programmes and policies such as security assurances are held in higher repute in Europe than in the United States.8

NMD and transatlantic relations

Beyond these different approaches to threat assessment and threat management, the NMD programme raises a number of more specific issues that are seen differently on the two sides of the Atlantic.

All European countries would like to preserve the integrity of the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of strategic stability. Still, if the Russians agree to amend it, it is hard to imagine any European opposition of significance. Amendment is a tricky business both for the Russians and the Americans, however, as NMD is a programme in process, not something that will soon be finished and remain the same thereafter. Agreed amendments to accommodate the first phase of the programme ? an interceptor site in central Alaska and an X-band radar on Shemya Island ? may not be the end of the story. Thus the Russians fear they will be taken for a ride, while US Senators are concerned that treaty amendments will be used to brake or bloc further continuation of the programme.

European countries would also like to preserve and strengthen the NPT and continue the process of nuclear disarmament. At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the five major nuclear weapon states made an unequivocal commitment to disarm to zero. In terms of declaratory policy, this was over and above what was expected. In terms of operational policies, however, the commitment seems a sham. The evidence suggests that the world is being remilitarized, and the pursuit of NMD may well undermine existing arms control agreements and lead to nuclear rearmament. In a statement to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in February 2000, China made it clear that it will be uncooperative in all multi- and bilateral arms control fora if the United States proceeds with NMD.9

Beijing?s strategy seems to be to vigorously contest the initial stages of the programme and, if this does not succeed, to rearm to maintain a deterrent capability. Russia made ratification of START II conditional upon maintenance of the ABM Treaty. The Duma has ruled that Russia will withdraw from other commitments as well if the Treaty is abrogated.

In East Asia, the European Union is not among the major security actors. However, if China acquires a larger nuclear force, India will quite possibly react by doing the same, and then Pakistan will follow suit. This could lead some countries in the Middle East to become more interested in nuclear weapons. If this chain reaction extends to the Middle East, the European Union (which has Turkey on its list of candidate members) would be directly affected. Russia may not be in a position to rearm in any major way, but it may further upgrade the role of nuclear weapons (and perhaps maintain multiple warheads on its ICBMs) and reintroduce tactical nuclear arms in defence of its 17, 000 kilometre-long border. In general then, European stakes in the non-proliferation regime are as strong as those of anyone.

How will the NMD programme affect the NATO Alliance? If the United States builds a national missile defence of some effectiveness without European participation, there will obviously be two different security standards in the Alliance. But that should not affect the traditional ‘coupling’ concern in a negative way. On the contrary, the less vulnerable the United States becomes, the freer it would be to take action in defence of its European allies. There was always a strong element of logic in de Gaulle’s assertion that the United States would not sacrifice Chicago for Paris.

However, in relation to conflicts in other parts of the world, which might or might not escalate to involve the Europeans, the United States would be left with a greater freedom of choice. It could intervene unilaterally and preemptively, or it could stand back and refuse to become involved. In itself, an operative NMD would not greatly influence one or the other of these possibilities, but simply leave the US government with a wider range of options. Close cooperation might still be the rule when European interests are involved, but the Europeans would be less certain about that being the case. In sum, the combination of a wider range of US options and growing American unilateralism puts the Europeans at greater risk.

Will the European allies respond positively to US invitations for NMD cooperation after all? Possibly, if an agreed amendment of the ABM Treaty opens the door for some kind of joint venture. The odds are against it, however. The EU has its own security and defence agenda, and will be hard put to mobilize sufficient resources for it. A major investment in national missile defence seems out of the question. The EU furthermore will seek to enhance its autonomy. If initiatives like the DCI (Defence Capabilities Initiative) and NMD become real and substantial joint ventures, US technological leadership may once again reinforce US political leadership in the Alliance ? to the detriment of EU autonomy efforts.

NMD and Russia

When the Cold War came to an end, there was general agreement throughout Europe that Russia must be integrated into European affairs, security affairs not least.10 Little has been delivered on that promise.

On the contrary, the Russians have had to swallow some major Western initiatives that they regard as offensive. First, the then Soviet government of Mikhail Gorbachev that agreed to German unification believed it had been assured that NATO would not extend its jurisdiction eastward. Yet this is precisely what NATO proceeded to do. Second, in the course of its enlargement, NATO assured the Russian government that it would never attack unless one its members was attacked first. Yet two years after Russia formally accommodated to the enlargement, NATO launched an air attack on Yugoslavia without seeking the approval of the UN Security Council where Russia could defend its interests. While NATO holds that its Kosovo action was fully justified, Russians view it as an implicit threat to Russia itself. Third, the green light for another round of NATO enlargement negotiations is expected to be given at the NATO Summit in 2002, possibly involving some former Soviet republics (i.e. the Baltic states). On top of all this comes the NMD issue.

Important decisions regarding further NATO enlargement and a continuation of the NMD programme may occur simultaneously. If badly handled, relations with Russia may be severely strained for a long time. One should not be lulled into a false sense of security just because Russia is currently too weak to mount much of a protest, or because Moscow has resumed cooperation in such venues as the joint Council in Brussels. Western claims to this effect smack both of propaganda and complacency. Due consideration should be given to likely long-term effects.

Here again, European attitudes are different from those in the US. The European Union tends to treat Russia as an equal partner, while the US (and especially many in the new Bush administration) view Russia as a couple of rungs down in the international hierarchy of states.

As to NATO enlargement, the United States may exert a modifying influence on its European allies. Each of the nine applicant countries that met in 2000 to draw attention to their requests for membership have their respective supporters among the European allies; among the Nordic countries, for example, there is support for the Baltic states. The US will be in the driver’s seat on the issue of NATO enlargement, and will have to consider its impact on Russia in conjunction with its NMD decisions. It is precisely in this context that an agreed amendment to the ABM Treaty may be forthcoming as a quid pro quo for cautious handling of the enlargement question.

THE PRIMACY OF DISARMAMENT

NMD has the potential to be popular in a way that deterrence never could be. Nuclear deterrence is, after all, counterintuitive: it says that you are best off when you are naked and unprotected. The abbreviation of Mutually Assured Destruction ? MAD ? makes the point eloquently. Yet, in comparison to attempts to turn the offence-defence relationship in favour of defence, MAD remains the lesser evil. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to simply oppose NMD on behalf of MAD. The main reason to oppose NMD is the obstacles it throws in the path of further arms control and disarmament. In the final analysis, nuclear dangers will not disappear until the weapons themselves have been eliminated.

Today, the entire framework of arms control is being challenged. We are reminded that what is knit together may also fall together. At the same time, however, we need to recall the strength of this web. The final document of the NPT Review Conference 2000 speaks to the viability of the regime and the broad support that still exists for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. For the 15 members of the European Union and the 13 applicant countries, preservation of the integrity of the ABM Treaty is a common denominator. They are joined in these sentiments by a vast majority of the global community. Thus, the web may be stronger than many seem to realize.

To end where I began: the state of NMD technologies may not warrant deployment at this juncture. Even so, there is nothing to suggest that a robust research programme will not continue. A faith in absolute security has been entertained in other periods of human history, yet these have turned out to be illusions. NMD may turn out to be a myth as well. Myths are not just errors, however, they are also sources of inspiration. It makes little sense to leave the matter to technological chance and hope it will disappear of itself. As no issue is casting such long shadows over great power relations as NMD, it must be addressed accordingly.

Sverre Lodgaard is director of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), a former director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research in Geneva and of the Peace Research Institute of Oslo, and a member of the Pugwash Council.

Endnotes

1. Threats from such regimes come and go. Therefore, had the rationale been phrased in terms of features of a new era rather than observations about the current situation, it would have been intellectually more convincing. However, this would have made it less effective in the public eye.
2. "Joint statement on the exchange of information on missile launches and early warning", issued at the summit meeting held in Moscow on 1-2 September 1998. Kosovo came in the way of implementation of this agreement, but it remains on the diplomatic record.
3. The Russian GNP is no more than 2 per cent of that of the United States.
4. John Steinbruner, "The Strategic Impact of NMD", White Paper from the Lawyers Alliance for World Security.
5. SIPRI Yearbook 2000.
6. SIPRI Yearbook 1999, p. 352.
7. This is very well described in Camille Grand, "Missile Defence: The View From the Other Side of the Atlantic", Arms Control Today, Vol. 30, No. 7, September 2000.
8. In the first half of the 1990s, the United States took the lead in a number of cooperative non-proliferation measures, such as rendering security assurances to Ukraine and negotiating the Framework Agreement with North Korea. The shift of emphasis towards unilateral action emerged in the second half of the decade.
9. Statement by Ambassador Hu Xiaodi on 24 February, 2000.
10. Except in Eastern Europe, where governments naturally had other concerns.

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