Pugwash Occasional Papers, II:ii,
© March 2001. All rights reserved.

By Thérèse Delpech

Most analyses dealing with the international consequences of national missile defense have been primarily concerned with the American-Russian relationship, or secondarily with its implications for China. Many do not even refer to US allies, (or if so, very briefly). There is some logic in this approach, since the United States and Russia are the main protagonists in the current debate and China is an indispensable third actor to take into account. But the allies are increasingly present and active as well, and their role is a significant part of the overall debate.

The allies believe (perhaps presumptuously) that they played a role (even if a limited one) in President Clinton’s announcement on September 1, 2000 to postpone the decision concerning NMD. Although the major factors were technological shortcomings and the impossibility of reaching agreement with Russia, the guarded or negative reactions from allies (in particular European allies) had been weighing in on the side of postponement when the decision was made. The three major European countries were either largely hostile (France), strongly reserved (Germany), or at best guarded and embarrassed (United Kingdom). At a more collective level, the allies had expressed openly their reservations at the NATO Ministerial meeting in Florence in spring 2000.

Given the very different situations of each of the allies, whether in regard to NATO, concepts of European defence, geography, or military programmes, there is understandably no unified allied view regarding NMD. In Europe, the only common denominator is a will to preserve the ABM treaty and to prevent the US from unilaterally withdrawing from it. Any compromise the US and Russia might agree to regarding the treaty would likely be acceptable in Europe. More broadly, reactions in different regions to the prospect of missile defences are symptomatic of new strategic global and regional realities in the 21st century, and deserve careful attention precisely for that reason.

The importance of the Allies

The US needs political support for NMD both at home and abroad. Winning the support of the allies has been a stated American objective (witness former Secretary of Defense William Cohen’s speech in Brussels, July 2000) and will remain so for the Bush administration. Beginning in the fall of 1999, the Clinton administration undertook a concerted effort to convince the allies of the benefits of NMD, with numerous briefings in Brussels and various European capitals. Russia understood well this American objective, with Vladimir Putin promoting the alternative of a jointly operated missile defence system meant to protect Europe as well as Russia (possibly with boost-phase capabilities). While few are clear about the details of Moscow’s proposal (including the Russians it seems), the main thrust of this mostly political proposal was to play on Europe’s uneasiness in delaying Washingtons’s decision. Once again, America and Russia were fighting each other on European soil.

A second factor underlying allied importance is that European technical participation in the NMD project might well be needed. Should President Bush proceed with the Clinton-type NMD deployment, Denmark (and Greenland) and the United Kingdom would have to approve the modernisation of early warning radars located on their territory. This would make them active participants in the defence of US soil, while the benefits for their own defence would be unclear. Should additional early warning radars be needed to defend against possible missile threats to Europe, these would have to be sited in southern Europe, not in the north. Recent conflicts have shown that radars are often the first targets of attack, something London and Copenhagen are well aware of. Finally, such radars are viewed as political targets by Russia. Taking into account the lack of enthusiasm for NMD in Denmark, Greenland and the UK, other solutions for early warning might be considered; for example with ship-based radars or on the US northeast coast. The British government in particular could find itself in a difficult position if asked formally by the US to upgrade the Fylingdales radar ; a "yes" would mean problems with the rest of Europe and Russia, while a "no" would imply tensions in the "special relationship" with Washington. Hence the "complex and difficult issues" referred to in London.

A third allied consideration is that of overseas military interventions by western coalitions. One of the lessons from the Gulf War is that short range anti-missile systems may prove essential to the conduct of such interventions in the future. American and European forces, acting together repeatedly since 1990, are coming to view theater missile defences (TMD) as an essential component of their force structures, which is why most Europeans are more open-minded about TMD than about NMD. Some of the allies have small scale TMD programmes (extended air defence or navy based systems), but these remain fairly minor, with little inter-European coordination. Only a crisis involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or a dramatic increase in the pace of WMD proliferation is likely to change this state of affairs.

US arguments in favor of NMD

American arguments in support of NMD are numerous and diverse. Summarized briefly, the US government has argued that a lack of support and cooperation on the part of Europe would increase the already large disparity in defence matters between the US and Europe. Secondly, extended deterrence in the 21st century might come to involve extended defence, because of new threats not present during the Cold War. Washington has also argued that US and European interests could diverge if the US is protected against small-scale missile attacks and Europe is not. If the Europeans stick to their position that there is no real threat, that missile defence will not work and that it is too expensive, they could well find themselves in a world in which the US has deployed a defence against a limited nuclear missile threat but Europe remains vulnerable.

Regarding coalition military operations, if the western allies are drawn into a conflict involving the threat of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, delivered with medium to long-range ballistic missiles, the Europeans might be less likely to join the coalition and more inclined to appease. In any event, the US believes that, once a defence system is deployed, the Europeans will have to decide whether they differentiate their security from that of the US or are willing to acquire a similar degree of protection.

Do the Allies need BMD?

In the Middle East, the answer is yes for two of America’s allies (Israel and Turkey). While theater missile defense has been attracting growing interest in many regions, the experience of the Gulf War for the Middle East was pivotal. During the war, Israel discovered that its nuclear deterrent did not prevent Saddam Hussein from attacking it with ballistic missiles. While it is now known that the Patriot TMD performance was very poor, Israel remains committed to deploying its Arrow missile defense system (developed jointly with the US) as a far less dangerous alternative to relying only on nuclear weapons.

Regarding Turkey, it is the only NATO ally that wishes to deploy a territorial defence because of ballistic missile developments in the Middle East. Recent reports of progress in the Iranian ballistic missile programme might also increasingly make TMD deployments a condition of a continued US military presence in the Middle East.

In East Asia, the answer is a cautious and ambiguous "perhaps". Theater missile defenses are looked at by some as insurance for an uncertain future. In Japan, cooperating with the US in missile defence research (the Navy Theater Wide Defence System) could be a way to buy time, in the hope that regional problems (Korea, Taiwan) will be solved so that no deployment is ultimately necessary. Japan’s involvement in TMD is also a way to tie the US to East Asia by stepping up cooperation on security issues. In any event, political goals are as important to Japan as military objectives. Ultimately, however, the future will be determined by Korean and Chinese developments, and missile defences themselves will not provide lasting solutions to potential threats posed by North Korean development of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, or to Chinese military modernization.

In Europe, the overall current response can be summed up as follows: "we do not know for sure, but most probably not, except for limited TMD developments". Thus Europe remains the most difficult region for the US to convince. With Europe no longer threatened by Soviet/Russian forces, solidarity with America is more difficult to achieve than during the Euro-missile crisis of the 1980s. Europeans have always had a different sense of vulnerability than Americans, and they currently have different, more pressing conventional military priorities (large transport aircraft, intelligence, surveillance). Finally, Europe has much less money to invest in defence than does the US, and it certainly can not spend $120 billion to deploy a system of uncertain capability. Thus, ongoing TMD programmes in Europe remain limited: to MEADS (a joint US/European programme with Italy and Germany); to the acquisition of Patriot PAC-3 by Germany and Holland ; to Aster in France and Italy (where only the naval component is ready for deployment on the aircraft carriers Charles de Gaulle and Garibaldi, with no money available for possible ground-based systems); and to some Aegis ships in Spain.

All the same, the allies in Europe will hardly be able to ignore a US decision on NMD. Of course, the details of such a decision will be of crucial importance. Where the Clinton- type NMD would not be supported in Europe, boost phase defences might be more acceptable, as these would provide some protection to European territory (an argument the US would surely emphasize). Yet boost-phase technology is not yet here, and the cost may be substantially higher than currently outlined. As George Lewis notes in his essay, boost phase (and sea-based) systems will probably be a supplement to, rather than a substitute for, mid-course and terminal-phase land-based systems.

Allied political reactions

Expressions of concern over the consequences of NMD for alliance relations have been expressed in Europe and East Asia, though not in Israel, where the Arrow programme is seen as coupling US and Israeli security. Given heightened military tensions in East Asia, Japan fears more than ever that the US might focus exclusively on its own security; thus Tokyo would like to be, similar to the Europeans during the Cold War, in a position to convince potential foes that they have no chance of limiting a conflict to the region, with no US involvement. Joint TMD research programmes are a symbol of this uneasy situation.

For the Europeans, ambiguity prevails. While often objecting to an excessive intrusion by the US in European affairs, the allies also complain about decoupling. Yet decoupling arguments lack credibility. Not only has Europe always been more vulnerable than the US, but decoupling concerns were voiced in the past precisely at a time when the US was first becoming vulnerable to attack (i.e. the exact opposite situation than the one existing today). Missile defenses could in fact become a coupling factor if they created better conditions for overseas military interventions. Finally, and a bit paradoxically, one of the major European concerns is precisely about unwanted coupling because of the need for upgrading early warning radars on European soil.

Regarding the effects of missile defences on nuclear deterrence, here again there are arguments on both sides. Such defences could either strengthen or weaken deterrence, according to various scenarios. There being no unified view on deterrence among the European allies, the subject remains touchy. Anxiety over the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence also prevails in other regions, such as the Middle East and South Asia, where the question is far less abstract. In these regions, missile defences could be deemed essential to dealing with nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, while postponing as long as possible more costly responses.

The effects of missile defences on arms control are understandably more strongly felt in Europe and Japan than in US because of their proximity to Russia and China respectively. Yet potential Russian and Chinese responses remain difficult to assess, given economic disarray in Russia, Moscow’s current military needs and priorities (e.g., Chechnya), and military force decisions already made in China. Indeed, most of the opposition in Europe would disappear if agreement on modifying the ABM Treaty is reached between Washington and Moscow in the coming months. Conversely, if the lack of such agreement leads to a US unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty (the main fear in Europe), then a clearer allied position on the future of arms control needs to be articulated and then conveyed to both Washington and Moscow.

Some additional questions

The Europeans treat proliferation as a more distant threat than does the US. This is true even in Italy, which has been the victim of a ballistic missile attack from Libya. Nonetheless, the allies need to deal more proactively with ballistic missile proliferation if they want to avoid a deterioration of the current situation. The adoption of a code of conduct at the Missile Technology Control Regime meeting in Helsinki in October 2000 was undoubtedly a step forward, but an insufficient one. What is needed is a European-wide assessment of the threat that ballistic missile proliferation could pose to Europe in the coming decades. Such study is lacking so far.

Also important are potential Russian reactions to the US moving ahead with NMD, especially if Moscow decides to withdraw from the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (which Russia has already repeatedly violated) and from the 1987 INF Treaty on intermediate nuclear forces. Should one or both occur, the Europeans would find themselves stymied once more between a United States going more unilateral and a Russia going more sour.

If the Europeans want to become more active in the Middle East, as they claim, they need to take an active part in reducing ballistic missile proliferation in the region, where ten countries now have such capabilities and where the use of such missiles is a reality (two hundred ballistic missile attacks in the ‘war of the cities’ during the Iran-Iraq war; fifty Iraqi ballistic missile attacks against Israel, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait during the Gulf War). The acquisition by Iran of the Shebab 3 (a North Korean design with a range of 1300 km) is only the latest destabilising factor in the Middle East.

Finally, the best way to use the current pause in the NMD debate is for the Europeans to forge a common position vis-à-vis Washington in order to prevent further deterioration in relations among the major powers. Simultaneously, the allies need to devote serious resources and efforts to curbing the threat posed by ballistic missile proliferation, especially in the areas of intelligence, surveillance and analysis. One area where the Europeans should be more active, particularly those having decided to open embassies in Pyongyang, is the issue of ballistic missile exports from East Asia (North Korea in particular) since they can threaten European interests in the future. Iran is also a country where the Europeans should use comparative advantage if they truly have any.

Whatever the policies developed, less rhetoric and more substance would be the best European motto on the subject of missile defences and the proliferation threats they are designed to counter. In the diplomatic sphere, the best policy for the Europeans in the coming months is to encourage both the United States and Russia to enter into a negotiating process on the issue of missile defences.

Thérèse Delpeche is currently Director for Strategic Affairs at the Atomic Energy Commission, Paris, and Commissioner to UNIMOVIC (UN Commission on Iraq). She is also an International Advisor to the International Committee of the Red Cross and Senior Research Fellow at CERI (Centre de Recherches en Relations Internationales). She is the author of numerous articles on nuclear deterrence, ballistic missile defense, European security and other military issues.

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