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Russian
Views on Missile Defenses
Pugwash
Occasional Papers, II:ii,
By Ivan Safranchuk The incoming administration of President George W. Bush has made clear its plans to proceed with some type of NMD deployment, as expeditiously as possible. At the same time, the new US administration intends to try to make a deal with Russia before abrogating the ABM Treaty. This means that NMD debates will continue to be an international rather than exclusively US matter. As such, Russia’s position will continue to be the key element of NMD discussion in both the US and in the international community. Russian views on the ABM Treaty In April 2000, the Russian State Duma ratified, unconditionally, a set of agreements reached with the Clinton administration intended, at least from the Russian perspective, to strengthen the 1972 ABM Treaty limiting the development and deployment of national missile defenses.1 In contrast to Duma ratification of the START II Treaty, which did contain preconditions, both the International Affairs and Defense committees of the Duma concurred with President Putin and accepted the one-sentence ABM bill concerning the demarcation of strategic and non-strategic missile defense, recommending passage "without reservations." Moreover, stressing that the ABM Treaty, in the words of the Duma Defense Committee, "is the most significant condition for strategic offensive arms reduction," both committees recommended passage of the ABM bill before proceeding to START II ratification. It is worth quoting at length from the records of the International Affairs and Defense committees to understand the significance of the ABM Treaty to Russian concepts of strategic stability and nuclear weapons arms control: "The 1972 ABM Treaty has played and continues to play an important part in maintaining strategic stability. The ratification of [these] agreements on the eve of the international NPT con-ference [April 2000] will assure the world community of Russia’s constructive policy aimed at maintaining strategic stability through creating the conditions that will rule out the circumvention of the 1972 ABM Treaty." Most important from the Russian perspective, "The 1972 ABM Treaty is strengthened, since the USA is no longer able to develop strategic missile defense systems disguised by the work on TMD systems not prohibited under the 1972 ABM Treaty. This will impede the attempts of the proponents of US withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty, who are active in the USA and strive for the implementation of plans to develop the NMD system banned by the treaty." Finally, "Russia is enabled to develop the non-strategic missile defense system without breaching the 1972 ABM Treaty, since due to the geographic position of the third world nuclear weapon states and threshold states, including those with unsta-ble political regimes, the Russian territory is more vulnerable to non-strategic missiles than the US territory." In short, by ratifying the ABM documents, Russia presumed that this would hamper any US decision to deploy an NMD system and to withdraw from or modify the ABM treaty for that purpose. More broadly, by adopting the law on ratification simultaneously with START II and without reservations, Russia sought to strengthen its diplomatic position vis-à-vis both the US and with the international community, portraying strategic stability not just as an issue of the US-Russian nuclear balance but as the cornerstone of global stability. Official Russian policy on ABM and NMD President Vladimir Putin, and President Yeltsin before him, as well as Minister of Defense Sergeev and Minister of Foreign Affairs Ivanov, have repeatedly stated "No" to US unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and "No" to any deployment of NMD. At the February 2001 Wehrkunde Conference in Munich, for example, Ivanov responded to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s advocacy of NMD by declaring that "the destruction of the ABM Treaty will result in the annihilation of the whole structure of strategic stability and create prerequisites for a new arms race, including one in outer space."2 While basing their position on the understanding that the ABM Treaty underpins all other disarmament treaties, Russian officials have never stated that a US NMD system would undermine Russia’s deterrent capability. Russian authorities also believe that missile threats against which the United States is going to deploy NMD are exaggerated: they do not exist now and are unlikely to emerge in the next 15 years. Even if new missile threats do emerge, Russia believes there are other ways to meet the challenge. In his address to the State Duma prior to the vote on START II ratification, President Putin affirmed that Russia’s response to US unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would be to withdraw from all disarmament treaties, including START I, START II, INF, and CFE, as well as to renounce Russian adherence to the Bush-Gorbachev reciprocal unilateral initiatives on the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons. Most experts inside and outside Russia in fact do not believe that Russia will withdraw from all disarmament arrangements if and when the US proceeds with NMD deployment. With Russia in economic turmoil, the country would be unable to preserve the nuclear balance (parity) with the United States without the deeper cuts envisioned by START III, not to mention the constraints of START II. While experts differ on how the Russian nuclear arsenal will evolve over the next decade, most agree that by the year 2010 it will hardly exceed 1500 deployed warheads, and that 800 deployed warheads is a more realistic estimate.3 In such a scenario, Russia could only maintain a nuclear balance with the US if previously concluded arms control treaties are fully implemented and new ones (START III) are concluded. While Russia might in the end withdraw from some disarmament treaties if the US abrogates the ABM Treaty, this seems unlikely because of the huge disparity in the size of their strategic arsenals that would result. Putin’s deep cuts initiative On November 13, 2000, President Putin made a statement concerning further reductions in strategic offensive arms, which attracted much attention at the time and was subject to a number of different interpretations. In essence, Putin declared that Russia was ready to continue the nuclear disarmament process ("there should be no pause in nuclear disarmament, it is necessary to intensify the disarmament process"), and that by 2008, Russia and the US should reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals to the level of 1,500 deployed warheads. Beyond that, the parties should start negotiations on further reductions after 2008, and that negotiations should be swift and should benefit from the legal mechanisms of START I and START II. Putin declared his hope that the US Senate would complete ratification of the START II and the 1997 ABM agreements so that Russia and the US could move together toward radical reductions of nuclear munitions. Above all, Putin declared his sup-port for strengthening and preserving the ABM Treaty, while noting, as an alternative to US NMD plans, the Russian proposals for a Global Control System for Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technology 4 and joint US-European-Russian development of TMD systems. Finally, Putin said that Russia was willing to continue dialogue on the ABM Treaty within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission. On the same day, the Russian media disseminated an interview with Gen. Vladimir Yakovlev, Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces, who proposed the introduction of a constant aggregate index of strategic weapons, which would include both strategic offensive and defensive arms (i.e., if one party enhanced the capabilities of one type of weaponry, it should ensure a reduction in the other). Yakovlev also proposed the concept of equalizing ICBMs and SLBMs (Yakovlev did not dwell on this topic, but one may presume that this was a proposal to return to MIRVed ICBMs). Re-MIRVing of ICBMs is regarded in Russia as a possible response to the US abrogation of the ABM Treaty and deployment of NMD. In addition, re-MIRVing could become an element, perhaps the key one, of a US-Russian compromise on ABM Treaty modification. If the United States were to deploy a limited NMD system within new ABM treaty provisions, then MIRVed ICBMs become a guarantee for Russia that the US system is not designed to threaten the Russian deterrent, since a limited NMD system could be overwhelmed with Russian ICBMs equipped with multiple warheads. The new Russian Topol-M (SS-27) ICBM can carry up to three war-heads. 5 While deployment of this missile in a MIRVed version will require a new series of tests and additional design work, the price for doing so is not substantial and would certainly be seen as affordable by the Russian leadership.6 This is especially true as Russia is unlikely to expand the service life of its heavy ICBM (SS-18) and other currently MIRVed ballistic missiles beyond the time period 2007-2010. In all likelihood, the Topol-M will be the only ICBM in the Russian strategic nuclear force beyond 2010. Thus, the re-MIRVing of Russian ICBMs may either proceed in agreement with the US (as compensation for ABM Treaty modifications), or as a unilateral Russian response to US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Should the former occur, Russia may well agree to limit re-MIRVing just to the mobile version of the Topol-M (which is not yet deployed). In the latter case, however, Moscow could expand the scale of re-MIRVing to include keeping multiple warheads on all available ICBMs and then, after 2010, deploying multiple warhead versions of both the mobile and silo-based SS-27. Despite the speculative nature of such discussions, it is important to remember that at present there are no prohibitions on multiple warhead ICBMS (except for downloading rules); START II is not in force and is unlikely to be in the near future. The tone of both the Putin and Yakovlev proposals was quite moderate. During 2000, Russian statements pertaining to US NMD plans had always contained implicit or explicit threats, including the possibility of Russia’s withdrawal from some disarmament treaties. Neither the Putin or Yakovlev statements contained any such threats. At first, Putin’s initiative sparked a good deal of interest in the international community. Some experts assumed that the Russian President was trying to intensify dialogue with the United States in hopes of reaching an agreement with the Clinton administration. Another view was that Putin was mitigating the Russian position and offering significant concessions to the US. An analysis of Putin’s statement demonstrates that there was, actually, little new in it. The limit of 1,500 deployed nuclear warheads on strategic delivery vehicles had been under discussion for more than a year, while the target date of 2008 had been mentioned many times. The same was true of the Global Control System for missiles, inherited by Putin from Yeltsin, and of Putin’s proposal to the United States and Europe to jointly develop TMD systems.7 Also, Russia continues to urge US Senate ratification of the protocol to START II and the 1997 ABM demarcation agreements. What was new in the Putin initiative were three thought-provoking elements: 1) using the legal mechanisms of START I and START II for the START III talks; 2) the possibility of joint or parallel US-Russian reductions; and 3) dialogue on the ABM Treaty within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission. While not entirely new, the reference to using the START legal mech-anisms did demonstrate Putin’s strong opposition to the US draft of a START III treaty, which contained significant changes to the modalities of the START I and START II agreements. In particular, Putin signaled that Russia was not ready for limits on nuclear warheads themselves (as opposed to delivery systems). In his view, with the US promoting a qualitatively new treaty for START III and with Russia focusing on lower quantitative limits, there seemed to be little basis for negotiations or compromise. Moreover, the US concept for START III (particularly relating to verification provisions) implied lengthy negotiations, yet Putin had been emphasizing an intensification of the negotiation process and the signing of a new treaty at the earliest possible date. Regarding Putin’s statement that "it is important now that Russia and the USA immediately start to move together or in parallel towards radical reduction of nuclear munitions," many experts took note of the word "parallel" (in the sense of unilateral and parallel reductions). Putin seemed to be signaling that Russia was ready for unilateral reciprocal (parallel) steps in the area of nuclear disarmament. Moreover, Putin may have been directing this message at the Bush camp, since George W. Bush was thought to be supportive of unilateral disarmament measures. One should not, however, read too much into Putin’s statement. The text of the initiative was actually quite sloppy, with numerous stylistic mistakes (including an incorrect reference to the NPT Review Conference). Also, the use of the word "parallel" may have indicated a desire for unilateral measures or simply been another example of imprecise language; in subsequent statements, Russian officials did not elaborate on what Putin may have meant by "parallel" reductions. What Putin certainly did desire was the commencement of START III negotiations soon after START II ratification in Russia. US diplomats unofficially promised the same. In the Joint Statement on Common Security Challenges at the Threshold of the 21st Century, adopted during the 1998 Moscow summit, it was agreed that negotiations on START III would commence as soon as START II was ratified by Russia. Washington had affirmed this position following Russian ratification of START II in April 2000; thus Putin’s statement can be seen as an invitation to the US to commence official talks. As far as discussions over ABM were concerned, Russian diplomats (admittedly those who had not participated in preparing Putin’s statement) regarded the President’s NMD initiative as a concession. They believed it would be quite unprofitable for Russia to have two separate tracks of negotiations (on START III and the ABM Treaty), which would inevitably emerge if the ABM dialogue remained within the Standing Consultative Commission. For many Russian experts, a favorable com-promise could only be achieved by discussing START and ABM issues as one package. Meanwhile, one can treat this proposal as a way to toughen the Russian position. The problem, however, is that the SCC will not be considering the issue of modifying the ABM Treaty. The US has not submitted any such motions to the Commission and is not expected to do so. Even had Washington submitted such proposals, debate within the SCC would likely have been lengthy, with only Russia benefiting from the delay. It is also noteworthy that the Putin and Yakovlev statements actually contradicted each other. Where the President suggested transferring the ABM dialogue to the Standing Consultative Commission (in effect creating two separate tracks of negotiations), Gen. Yakovlev spoke about an aggregate index for strategic offensive arms and missile defense (i.e., discussing START and ABM issues in one package). At the same time that President Putin was urging the US Senate to complete START II ratification and conduct START III talks on the basis of START II, Gen. Yakovlev was calling for the rearming of ICBMs with multiple warheads, contradicting one of the fundamental provisions of START II. Were these contradictions deliberate? There is no unequivocal answer to this question. Perhaps Yakovlev’s statement was a personal initiative, reflecting opinion that is popular among some Russian experts. Or perhaps Russia was floating various trial balloons. Whatever the thinking underlying these initiatives, it is the case that Putin’s speech was developed by a narrow circle of presidential aides, mainly from the staff of the President’s Foreign Policy Advisor, Sergei Prikhodko. Experts from the Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Defense, and the Security Council were not involved, and the document was not submitted to these agencies for approval. In the end, what seems to have happened is that the Putin statement took on a bureaucratic life of its own. At the Moscow Summit in June 2000, Putin and Clinton had agreed to discuss nuclear disarmament issues in the course of their future meetings. Putin’s staff went to work preparing appropriate materials and statements for the next Putin-Clinton meeting in Brunei. There were also several versions of the document for the eventual outcome of the US presidential election. However, the uncertain outcome of the US election in November 2000 forced Russian bureaucrats to speed up work on the document, merging several drafts (which accounts for the text’s stylistic mistakes). The most one can reasonably say is that the Putin speech was not in fact intended as a formal diplomatic initiative, and that the entire process demonstrated a significant lack of inter-agency coordination in the Russian decision-making system. Future Russian policy Had Russia been interested in exchanging ABM issues for US concessions on START III, Moscow would certainly have sought to construct a deal on the most favorable terms. And the time to do this would have been at the end of Clinton’s presidential term. By contrast, Russia preferred to raise the stakes, demanding the complete elimination of American NMD plans, to which of course the new Bush administration is more committed. Thus, as of early 2001, the Russian leadership has been reiterating its firm intention to maintain the 1972 ABM Treaty. To that end, Russia continues efforts to form a broad international coalition in opposition to US NMD plans, as symbolized by its actions in June 2000 in getting Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to join the debate by signing a joint statement confirming their commitment to the September 1997 agreements. Yet Russia’s official position of no amendments to the ABM Treaty (which a majority of Western experts believe is merely a declaratory policy) has led Moscow into a cul-de-sac, in which it is impossible to abandon its initial position without suffering significant losses for the image of the country and of President Putin himself. Thus, these steps seemed to run counter to Moscow’s strategy and tactics with respect to ABM/START issues. At the same time, Russia’s persistence calls into question the original strategic and tactical goals of the Russian leadership in the area of nuclear disarmament. The Putin government may even harden its position to such an extent that it is impossible to retreat, i.e. Russia has been deliberately narrowing its field of maneuver so as to make compromise impossible even under considerable US pressure. By demonstrating that such pressure would be useless, Russia may hope to avoid pressure entirely. On the other hand, Russia has been maintaining dialogue on ABM issues, which makes some Western and Russian experts believe that the Russian leadership is striving to strike a favorable deal with the United States. If Russia’s major goal in 2000 was to make the United States post-pone an NMD decision, that goal was reached with Clinton’s acting to defer a deployment decision to the next administration. With the Bush administration now in office, Russia has two options: to delay the ABM/START III solution or accelerate the negotiations (not necessarily in the form of a compromise) by putting forward its own initiatives. Russia has the capabilities to realize the second scenario, since it may still develop Putin’s initiative on a European non-strategic missile defense and the idea of global system of control over missile launches. In the future, Russia will obviously combine holding a hard line in some spheres while raising new initiatives in other areas. Such ambivalence may become either a problem or an advantage for Russian diplomats. On the one hand, any move by Russia will be interpreted equivocally (sometimes contradictorily or even antagonistically), making it difficult to convey Russia’s true position to the other party. On the other hand, such ambiguity will force the other party to maintain dialogue in order clarify Russia’s positions, although any significant compromise is hardly possible in such a vague situation. It will take the Bush administration some time (probably no less than four months) to formulate a new defense policy, so that a renewed inter-national debate on NMD is not likely until summer 2001. Russia may use this period to promote its initiatives and seize a dominant position in the international NMD debate. After that, it will be impossible not to take Russian initiatives into account, especially if Putin seeks trade-offs between ABM and START III issues (as improbable as that seems now). At first sight, it may seem that traditional patterns dominate US-Russian relations; the US generates the majority of initiatives, while Russian policy is reactive. Nonetheless, it does seem that Russia is reconsidering its traditional approach towards nuclear policy and nuclear disarmament. Changes in Russian policy are influenced by factors both domestic (military reform) and external (lack of prospects for prompt START III conclusion). It has become more popular in Russia to consider unilateral disarmament measures. For many experts, the bilateral disarmament formula is exhausted, with every new treaty leading to more and more concessions on the Russian side. For example, the Russian idea of compensating for some shortcomings of START II by the prompt conclusion of START III seems to be a non-starter. Accordingly, the future of Russian nuclear policy in the year 2001 will remain a point of heated debates within the Russian military. This was certainly true in discussions last year between the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff. For Defense Minister Sergeev, the primary goal was maintaining nuclear parity with the US. Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces ensure Russia’s Great Power status, and if the balance is broken, Russian influence in world politics will decline. For this reason, Russia should only reduce its nuclear arsenal together with the US on reciprocal basis. By contrast, the General Staff believes that, under current circumstances, Russia’s economic situation makes it impossible for it to keep pace with the US. Nuclear parity can only be maintained by concluding new arms reduction treaties that con-strain American forces. Yet Washington clearly understands this and demands qualitative concessions in exchange for quantitative reductions. While Russia may formally maintain a nuclear balance, the US actually gains unilateral advantages that are codified in treaties. The way out of this dilemma is to shift to an entirely independent nuclear policy, following the French and Chinese examples. Russia should seek an economically affordable nuclear arsenal in the pursuit of an efficient nuclear policy. Thus, within the framework of this concept, Russia’s tough position on modification of the ABM Treaty and its willingness to withdraw from all disarmament treaties does not seem a mere bluff. On the contrary, worst-case scenarios can be regarded as a good pretext for realizing such concept. It thus becomes understandable why Russia is not ready to declare its new disarmament approaches, preferring to leave the initiative to the United States and to react to Washington’s actions. This does not at all mean that Russia is ready to accept amendments to the ABM Treaty or is interested in US unilateral withdrawal from the agreement, which would enable Russia to act freely with respect to its nuclear policy. What would be more correct to say is that Russia is still working through its ultimate positions regarding the ABM Treaty, national missile defense, and future nuclear reductions. While not yet ready for any compromise concerning the ABM Treaty in the short-term, time is running out, and the Putin government will indeed need to respond to possible American decisions on NMD and the ABM Treaty by spring or summer of 2001. Ivan Safranchuk is project director for Nuclear Arms Control at the PIR Center for Policy Studies, Moscow, and a member of the Executive Council of the Euro-Atlantic Association in Russia. Endnotes
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