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Forward
Pugwash
Occasional Papers, II:ii, By John B. Rhinelander The Pugwash Workshop on Nuclear Stability and Missile Defense was convened in Sigtuna, Sweden, just before the extraordinary American Presidential and Congressional elections that were held in November 2000. The eventual Presidential winner, George W. Bush, made two objectives clear during the campaign: sharp reductions in US strategic offensive nuclear systems, unilaterally if necessary, and the deployment of effective ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems capable of defending all fifty states, US allies and US forces abroad. The Russians would have to accept necessary amendments to the ABM Treaty or Bush as President would exercise the right to withdraw from the Treaty. While Bush’s rhetoric was loud and clear, and has been repeated since in office, details were and are lacking. The highly experienced national security team that President Bush has selected—led by Vice President Cheney, Secretary of State Powell, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and National Security Adviser Rice, veterans of four prior Republican administrations under Nixon, Ford, Reagan and Bush—will have to spend much of their first year in office staffing up and sorting out a host of issues that are more complicated than any of them faced in their prior government service, including interrelated nuclear-weapon and BMD issues (technical, political and legal). Russia is weaker and its early-warning network is crippled. China is now a major player. India and Pakistan are both nuclear-weapon capable. The Middle East is highly unstable with a nuclear-capable Israel, and North Korea remains a nuclear enigma. Overarching in the US will be budget and economic issues, including international trade, in an era of globalization. Further, the Bush Administration must work with a Senate that is equally divided between Republicans and Democrats and could turn Democratic at any time. A historic form of power sharing has been agreed between the Republican and Democratic Senate leaders, but broad consensus will be necessary on most important issues since amassing the necessary 60 votes to stop a Senate filibuster is improbable. A common theme in the Occasional Paper is the importance of the ABM Treaty. Three bits of history are both relevant and useful background to an assessment of the impact of the US elections on the Treaty, BMD and related issues explored by the Workshop.1 National defense Bush’s BMD quest will be the fifth attempt to defend the United States against nuclear attack. The first consisted of the NIKE missiles, armed with high-explosive or nuclear warheads, that were deployed across the continent against the threat of Soviet bombers in the mid-1950s under President Eisenhower. They were dismantled as ineffective in the missile age by the 1970s. The second was the proposed Sentinel nuclear-armed ABM system of President Johnson in the late 1960s 2 that morphed into a single ABM-Treaty-compliant Safeguard site deployed in Grand Forks, North Dakota, under Presidents Nixon and Ford. The program survived Nixon’s first year in office thanks to Vice President Agnew’s tie-breaking vote in the Senate. When eventually deployed, the Grand Forks site operated for only four months before being shut down as cost ineffective while Ford was President. Cheney was then White House Chief of Staff, and Rumsfeld was then serving for the first time at the Pentagon. The third effort was President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or Star Wars, announced in 1983. It petered out during his second term while still in the R&D stage because of lack of Congressional support. Offshoots of that program, though, are the building blocks of any near-term BMD program. The fourth was GPALS (Global Protection Against Limited Strikes, whatever the source), announced by former President Bush in January 1991. It was basically a non-nuclear, scaled-back and re-labeled Phase I of SDI. The hardware would have included 1000 or so space-based "brilliant pebbles" interceptors, another 1000 ground-based interceptors, and transportable anti-tactical ballistic missiles (ATBMs). This scheme was abandoned by President Clinton after a "bottom up review" in favor of multiple theater missile defense (TMD) systems such as PAC-3, THAAD and a modified AEGIS (sea-based) system. The fifth attempt, the renewed focus on National Missile Defense (NMD) started by President Clinton and to be continued by the new Bush Administration, will undoubtedly include the X-band radar and EKV missile programs favored by Clinton, even if initial deployment is switched from Alaska to North Dakota. The Bush approach, though, will probably include sea-based, air-based and space-based kill vehicles. Whatever the architectures ultimately chosen by the Bush Administration and funded by Congress, no NMD system can be deployed and made operational during a first Bush term which will end January 2005. Offense reductions The ABM Treaty of 1972 was President Nixon’s keystone arch in addressing the central strategic nuclear relationship with the Soviet Union. SALT I, SALT II, START I and START II, with their limitations and then reductions on ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, are all explicitly linked to the ABM Treaty, most recently by the Duma’s approval of START II. The 1991 parallel unilateral reductions of tactical nuclear weapons that were engineered by former President Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev were only possible with the ABM Treaty continuing in force. President George W. Bush’s campaign positions would, if successful, break the link between offensive reductions and the limits on strategic defenses in the ABM Treaty that have been in place for nearly 30 years. This appears implausible if Russia remains adamantly opposed to US BMD programs. Russia will in any event be sharply reducing its ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers because of financial necessities, but Russia could re-MIRV even while reducing the number of ICBMs. Yet President Bush has reaffirmed his intent to reduce US strategic weapons, unilaterally if necessary and presumably in parallel to Russian reductions, while deploying NMD and TMD systems. The ABM Treaty The ABM Treaty of 1972 was a US initiative in response to the Soviet deployment in the late 1960s of the first ABM site, which has 100 nuclear-armed missiles and remains in operation around Moscow today, and the more than 1,000 surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites that the Department of Defense feared would be integrated with the ABM system. The Treaty as originally negotiated permits two ABM deployment sites in each country, and combines quantitative, qualitative and geographic constraints as well as prohibitions in interlocking buffers of space and time. It limits any deployment to fixed, land-based ABM components (radars, launchers and missiles). Surface-to-air (SAM) and antitactical missiles are indirectly constrained. Yet the position of the United States as to the Treaty has changed radically over the years. President Clinton’s BMD program, if ever fully tested and deployed, would have required amending every substantive article in the Treaty including:
The ABM Treaty was explicitly designed to be amended, by agreement of the parties, and was in 1974 when the two authorized ABM sites were reduced to one. In 1997, emarcation amendments were signed delineating permitted TMDs. The Duma has approved, but the amendments have not yet been forwarded to the US Senate. Any expanded BMD program proposed by President George W. Bush that features the unconstrained testing of sea-based, air-based or space-based kill vehicles, as well as linking TMD and NMD, would be even more inconsistent with the basic design of the ABM Treaty than Clinton’s program. Necessary amendments would, in effect, negate the present Treaty regime.3 The ABM Treaty was bilateral when negotiated and ratified in 1972. With the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, former President Bush and Boris Yeltsin recognized Russia as the continuing Treaty party with the United States. This was confirmed by President Clinton. Formal consent by the Senate was neither considered nor required, under the US Constitution, to continue in force this or any other treaty with respect to Russia. Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan have been invited by the US and Russia to join the ABM Treaty as parties and have been attending meetings, but whether they are currently parties or will become so only after formal ratification by the five remains unclear in the US but not Russia (which accepts the three as parties).4 Many other major countries around the world, including European allies and China, have expressed intense interest in the ABM Treaty, either as currently in force or if and as amended, but there is no likelihood any of them will become parties to it. However, it is conceivable and would be wise for the US and China to reach some sort of understanding dealing with offensive and defensive systems, whether formal or informal. The Workshop Occasional Paper — Basic views from Europe The paper by the sole American author, George Lewis, is the necessary starting point for the subsequent papers by the Europeans. Lewis lays out the technical characteristics of the leading BMD approaches that the US is pursuing. Four comments are appropriate. First, the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) he describes is central to any early NMD deployment. It relies on mid-course collision with its target. While understated at the time and since, Ronald Reagan eliminated nuclear-armed weapons from future US BMD programs. The EKV with its infrared and possibly visible light sensors represents state-of-the-art technology, but Lewis makes clear the possible Achilles heal of it being unable to differentiate real warheads from simple decoys. Testing to date has not been successful, and the next test has been postponed. Second, the planned upgrading of early warning radars with new software, including those at Fylingdales in the UK and at Thule, Greenland, raises fundamental ABM Treaty questions, as well as issues of local consent. The same is even truer with respect to the proposed X-band radars to be located in the US and abroad at Fylingdales, Thule and other sites. Together, these radars would provide a "base" for a worldwide, let alone nationwide, BMD system. Third, the radar Treaty issues would be compounded by SBIRS-Low, the space-based missile tracking satellites in low earth orbit, that in effect would substitute for land-based ABM radars. The fourth and final comment is pertinent if the Bush Administration pursues sea-based systems (whether mid-course or boost-phase), as well as air-based and space-based kill vehicles, as seems probable. Notwithstanding enthusiastic support and optimistic estimates in conservative Republican quarters of Congress, the necessary technology for these approaches is not developed. Initial deployment would be stretched out, probably even beyond a Bush second term, as Lewis indicates. Two caveats are worth noting with respect to some concerns of Lewis and all subsequent papers. Foremost, the Congress and the Senate in particular may not go along with whatever programs and architectures the Bush Administration ultimately chooses. Tension between Congress and the President has been a constant theme in the strategic defense debate in the United States for the past forty years, as has been the discontinuity in Executive branch positions as administrations change. Secondarily, any attempts to negotiate Treaty amendments with Russia will be complicated by the fact that the Bush Administration will probably want to conduct field tests on many more approaches to BMD than it, or a successor administration, would choose to deploy. However, the advanced development and field testing of sea-based, air-based and space-based NMD approaches are banned by the current ABM Treaty. This issue might create the earliest and the severest tension with the Treaty, particularly if the proposed Alaska site, with its X-band radar on Shemya Island in the Aleutians, is shifted to North Dakota where a deployed site is legally permissible. If this were done, the initial North Dakota question would be modifying Article I’s ban on a nationwide defense. With the foregoing background, the views from Europe should be in clearer focus.5 The essay by Ivan Safranchuk lays out clearly and fully the Russian position on BMD, the ABM Treaty and offensive reductions after START II. Not surprisingly, it concludes that Russia’s present rhetorical position opposes all that the US proposes with respect to BMD. However, if the US were not responsive to Russia’s final position, when made, then Safranchuk suggests the General Staff favors shifting to "an entirely independent nuclear policy, following the French and Chinese examples." Safranchuk states Russia’s willingness to withdraw from "disarmament treaties does not seem a mere bluff." Whether Russia will show flexibility to specific Bush proposals when made—both sharp reductions below START II levels in strategic offensive systems and the testing and deployment of BMD systems requiring radical amendments to or withdrawal from the ABM Treaty—is unknown, as Russia is still working through its formal position. Safranchuk leaves his conclusions unspecific, but the Russian response to a US notice of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty could involve three elements: (1) notice of its withdrawal from CFE, INF and START I; (2) given that the ICBM MIRV ban in START II would not come into effect, announce its intent to maintain its MIRV’d SS-18s with ten warheads each and to MIRV its Topol M with three warheads each; and (3) maintain its ICBMs on hair trigger alert. Estimates suggest Russia could maintain 3,000 to 4,000 deployed strategic warheads during the next decade with MIRV’d ICBMs.6 Over the near term, Russia will surely continue to align itself with the opposition of the Chinese and US allies to whatever unilateral measures Bush proposes. Thérèse Delpeche and Sverre Lodgaard have written sophisticated and subtle papers covering US allies in Europe, the Middle East and Asia, the threats and other issues. A summary cannot do justice and both should be read carefully. Delpeche is concerned lest "the Europeans find themselves stymied once more between a United States going more unilateral and a Russia going more sour." It is clear that regional differences are sharp and that the greatest supporters of BMD are Turkey and Israel with everyone else opposed. Secretary of State Powell has a daunting, if not next to impossible, task of minimally satisfying the divergent views of US allies and avoiding increased instability with Russia and China, and in particular areas such as the Taiwan Straits and South Asia, as the Bush Administration develops its approach to TMD, NMD and anti-satellite systems (ASATs). Sverre Lodgaard notes, quite correctly, that the US "seems to have an unclarified strategic relationship with China." His analysis of differing views of deterrence, threat assessment and arms control across the Atlantic are fundamentally important in order to understand the chasm between the United States and its European allies. How the Bush Administration will deal with this bundle of issues is not clear at all. Left unstated by all authors is that China was not a factor when the ABM Treaty came into force in 1972, but is now. The Clinton Administration’s attempt to persuade China that the Alaska-based NMD scheme was not directed at it was a total failure. Capabilities, not intent, were the primary concerns of Chinese military planners in judging Clinton’s BMD program. Further, none of the authors note that any amendments to the ABM Treaty acceptable to Russia will probably be denounced by China. Country commentaries on missile defense Sarah Pearce's essay on the UK dilemma could be subtitled the schizoid special relationship. It lays bare the sharp differences within Tony Blair's government between the Foreign Office and Defence Ministry as well as between the two prime opposition parties. The impression one is left with is that if push comes to shove, the Blair government will do the US bidding with respect to the large radars on UK soil. Sweden has long been in the forefront of non-proliferation and multilateral arms control matters. Ingermar Dörfer’s paper suggests that Russia will not carry through its threats to withdraw from the INF Treaty, a judgment I believe premature and perhaps incorrect. He views China as capable of harming various arms control regimes in reaction to the United States, including those central to non-proliferation. Other authors pick up this theme. Finally, Dörfer and others suggest that sea-based TMD may prove of greatest interest to Western Europe. Henriette Rasmussen’s essay implies a Danish decision could be the same as the UK’s. Notwithstanding limited home rule in Greenland, foreign affairs remain in Danish hands. A US request for approval of the upgrade of the present early warning radar in Thule, and construction of an X-band radar there, would raise major political issues in Denmark. Promises of US aid and assistance, which surely will be made to Greenland, may not suffice to gain approval there. Nevertheless, Denmark may prove to be a good ally to the US if the issue is forced. Germany is a special case in Europe and within NATO. Traditionally Bonn governments supported US initiatives, but the recent and prospective US postures on BMD will test whether the Berlin Republic follows suit or makes public its private opposition. Götz Neuneck lays out current views in Germany. After digesting them it seems highly probable that Germany, for itself and Europe more generally, will not publicly oppose the US, but make its views forcefully known privately to those in Congress who oppose the Bush Administration’s BMD program and particularly the possibility of US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Conclusion The US cannot deploy an operational NMD system during the next four, and perhaps eight, years. A Russian response to a vigorous unilateral US NMD program would probably include keeping its ICBMs MIRV’d and on hair trigger alert. This action-reaction cycle would decrease the security of both. Negotiations are urgently needed. It is worth remembering that Richard Nixon campaigned in 1968 in opposition to the immediate ratification of the NPT and in favor of deployment of ABM sites across the United States. Once in office he reversed course, ratifying the NPT his first year and signing the ABM Treaty in Moscow in his fourth year. During this same period Nixon opened the door to China after secret negotiations In brief, a Republican realist governing in a complex world may be far different from what his campaign rhetoric for the Presidency suggests. It is also worth stressing that the President, alone, cannot make US policy. A President has broad powers to conduct foreign policy, including negotiations to reduce nuclear weapons and even decisions to withdraw from treaties, but the spending of money requires concurrent action by the House and Senate acceptable to the President. In this respect, the Senate Minority Leader, Tom Daschle, may be next in importance to President George W. Bush in shaping programmatic BMD matters, and Democratic centrist Senators including Joe Biden (Delaware) on Foreign Relations and Carl Levin (Michigan) on Armed Services will be active participants.7 Finally, Republican presidents have been much more successful than their Democratic counterparts in obtaining Senate advice and consent to arms control agreements. The issues explored at the Workshop and summarized in this Occasional Paper are weighty and views of allies are important in Washington. As a starter, the Bush Administration (with allies urging their positions on it) should start with detailed studies — what should be permitted and prohibited to the United States, with respect to (1) Russia, (2) China and (3) others with respect to TMD, NMD and anti-satellite (ASAT) technologies and basing modes. If there are to be no prohibitions on the US at all — the ultimate position of US unilateralists — the exercise is easy. This outcome, however, would be highly contentious inside the government and profoundly upsetting to US allies. It could be severely adverse to US net security interests.8 If there are to be legal limits on the US — and reciprocally on anyone else in treaty relationship with it — then they need to be analyzed in detail. This, in fact, is what happened before the US presented a draft treaty text on ABMs to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1971. The first studies were done within the US government, followed by the give and take of the first year of the SALT negotiations and continuous consultations with allies and Congress. This type of process needs to be replicated within the US government — probably including in each instance the impact of TMD, NMD and ASAT programs on the current and an amended ABM Treaty with respect to Russia — and separately with respect to China. Unfortunately, President Bush may give a six-months’ notice of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty no later than September to December 2001. If he does, Russia will announce START II will not enter into force and will probably give six months’ notices of withdrawal from the INF and other treaties. Which parties, if any, are likely to give three-months’ notices of withdrawal from the NPT will then become the most pressing treaty issue. Of greatest concern, though, would be the reactions of China, India and Pakistan in Asia, and Russia, including exports and assistance of proliferation concern that would continue and might increase. The post-World War II arms control framework and non-proliferation regimes could begin to disintegrate before the end of 2002. Finally, the critical issue in Washington may be whether one or more leaders of a bipartisan centrist arms control coalition will emerge in the House and particularly the Senate. In the mid 1980s such a coalition was personified by Senator Sam Nunn who favored limited BMD deployment and arms control. Under his leader-ship Congress mandated that SDI funds spent by the Reagan Administration be consistent with the "traditional" interpretation of the ABM Treaty, rejecting the "reinterpretation" foisted under the Sofaer doctrine.9 An active centrist Congressional role will be critically important if US-Russian and US-Chinese relations deteriorate and the NPT threatens to collapse. Much better, of course, would be a working consensus between a bipartisan, centrist Congressional coalition and the Bush Administration that could prevent a breakdown in relations from ever occurring and that could develop responsible policies for both offensive and defensive nuclear weapons negotiable with Russia, and acceptable to China. At the same time, European allies of the US, most governed by left of center parties, should consider a centrist approach to respond to and work with the US, rather than solely criticize it from the sidelines. John B. Rhinelander is now a Senior Counsel at Shaw Pittman, a Washington law firm, and is a Vice Chairman of the Lawyers Alliance for World Security (LAWS). He has held various government positions, including Legal Adviser to the US SALT I delegation that negotiated the ABM Treaty. Endnotes
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