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Missile Defense: Germany and Europe Pugwash Occasional Papers, II:ii,© March 2001. All rights reserved. By Götz Neuneck Initial efforts by the Clinton administration to garner European support for missile defense began in earnest in February 1999 during the 36th Munich Conference on Security Policy (the Wehrkunde Conference) in Germany, when Defense Secretary William Cohen warned that, "for America and Europe, the threat of missiles from rogue nations is substantial and increasing." Almost immediately, European concerns were forthcoming. Questions were raised about the technical feasibility of NMD, about the ability of relatively simple countermeasures to defeat the proposed system, and about the effects of NMD deployment in prompting Russia and China to pull out of arms control treaties which could affect Europe far more than the United States. In France, for example, French President Jacques Chirac clearly rejected any erosion of the ABM Treaty: "We must avoid any questioning of the ABM Treaty that could lead to the disruption of strategic equilibria and a new nuclear arms race." Some Europeans worried aloud that, if the US developed a system only for the protection of American soil, then "rogue states might try to blackmail Europe rather than the United States."1 In Britain, Martin O’Neill, a senior Labour MP, criticized the US for "considering abandoning the strategy of mutual deterrence in favor of combining offensive and defensive missiles, thereby creating a recipe for a new arms race (China-Russia)."2 In Germany, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer said the 15 European Union countries should try to come up with a common position on NMD: "Obviously, this national decision of the United States will have a strong impact on the security interests of all Europeans...We are looking forward to unifying a position. But interests are not homogenous within Europe, so we will need some time for discussion."3 During the spring 2000 meeting of the NATO foreign ministers in Florence, several European ministers warned of the negative consequences of a renewed arms race and the possible breakdown of the NPT regime. They reiterated their support for joint US-Russian agreement on any modifications to the ABM Treaty and their fear that Moscow might withdraw from the CFE and INF treaties, with direct consequences for European security. From a European perspective, US plans for unilaterally proceeding with national missile defense would have four distinct implications for European security. First is the global dimension. START II implementation is currently blocked by the Russian Duma’s insistence that its implementation must be coupled to a preservation of the ABM Treaty. Future progress in the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) is dependent on Chinese cooperation, which in turn is held up by the refusal of the United States, alone, to agree to start negotiations on outer space. Abrogation of the ABM Treaty and NMD deployment could lead to a new arms race between the US, Russia and China, which could also affect India and Pakistan. In stressing the dangers of a new offense-defense nuclear competition, French President Chirac observed that, "If you look at world history, ever since men began waging war, you will see that there’s a permanent race between sword and shield. The sword always wins.. . more improvements are made to the sword. We think that with these systems, we are just going to spur sword-makers to intensify their efforts."4 Second is the transatlantic dimension, where a breakdown of the ABM Treaty could have serious repercussions for the NATO alliance. As noted by the annual Strategic Survey of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, allied disagreements over the ABM Treaty are part of a wider phenomenon where "the bridge of communication [between the EU and the US] seems to have broken down and, unless some way is found to reconstruct it, the loss of trust could have a profound impact on the alliance’s cohesion." Third is the intra-European dimension and the ramifications of US unilateralism in withdrawing from the ABM Treaty and deploying NMD for both the nuclear arsenals of France and Britain and independent European defense efforts. An unraveling of nuclear weapons arms control could pressure Paris and London to increase their nuclear arsenals, while additional expenditures on missile defense could undermine efforts to develop a robust and autonomous European security policy. Finally, there is the regional dimension, of missile threats emanating from such countries as Iran, Iraq, Libya or Syria. While most Europeans do not yet see specific ballistic missile threats from these countries, it is also true that serious analysis about future threats and adequate responses is only just beginning in Europe. The Europeans need to develop joint positions on future missile threats, taking into account specific European factors (different notions of vulnerability from the US, constrained defense budgets, fewer global military commitments) that can produce positive policies for dealing with proliferating missiles and weapons of mass destruction. The Europeans also need to think through what they will do if the US does inexorably move toward deploying NMD. Will they consider developing missile defenses themselves, or cooperate with the US in building up theater missile defenses? To what extent will the US share American missile defense technology with its European partners? Perhaps most importantly, how can Europe limit the political and strategic damage to great power relations and arms control that NMD deployments and an abrogation of the ABM Treaty might bring? The debate in Germany While skeptical of US plans for national missile defense, the German government has made few overt criticisms in order to avoid provoking a dispute within NATO or with the Americans. For example, during President’s Clinton’s visit to Germany in June 2000, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder remarked that "neither economically nor politically can we afford a new round of the arms race. No one can dispute the Americans' right to develop what they believe is right for national defense. On the other hand, we are partners in a common alliance."5 The tempo picked up, however, at the February 2001 Wehrkunde conference when Chancellor Schröder warned of an "overly hasty" US decision to deploy missile defenses. Picking up on the Russian theme about a possible new arms race in space, Foreign Minister Fischer noted that "a new arms race in Asia or space… would create less, rather than more, security." And even Karl Lamers of the conservative opposition party, the Christian Democratic Union, criticized NMD as the type of project envisioned by people who want to be "invulnerable" and "masters of the world."6 A year earlier at the same Wehrkunde conference, an annual gathering of NATO officials and security analysts, Fischer had pointed to other ways of dealing with the so-called "rogue nation" threat, saying that "Iran should be included in the international community. There should be no irrational reactions with WMD and related delivery systems. The US policy toward North Korea is a good example for a preventive policy."7 To that end, Germany has begun to engage North Korea diplomatically, as witnessed by the visit to Pyongyang of the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Ludger Volmer, in October 2000. Not surprisingly, the German government warmly welcomed President Clinton´s decision to postpone an NMD deployment decision. Speaking at the same Georgetown University venue where Clinton announced his decision, Foreign Minister Fischer noted that no one wants "to deny Americans the right to protect themselves—that would be absurd." Rather, a unilateral US decision to deploy NMD would have "far-reaching international implications, affecting the security of Germany, Europe and many other states."8 In late September, Minister of State Volmer elaborated on a central German concern, that the US might have lost interest in arms control: "Rightly or wrongly, Europeans are… concerned that the USA—the country that in the 1960s invented arms control and non-proliferation—is today showing signs of distrust in the effectiveness of multilateral disarmament regimes. Coming after the Senate rejection of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty last year, National Missile Defense is regarded as another sign of the US preference for unilateral responses to global issues."9 In the German Bundestag, meanwhile, a coalition of liberal and conservative MdBs from the opposition were arguing for a common European position concerning missile defense, noting that: (1) the threat of WMD is increasing on a global scale; (2) Europe can not avoid analyzing the need for its own missile defense; (3) Europe should develop a comprehensive threat analysis and common strategy concerning missile defense; (4) NATO should not allow zones of differing security; (5) the Government should continue its support for disarmament efforts, including the 1972 ABM Treaty; and (6) a global initiative, including the US and Russia, is needed to combat proliferation, where the NPT, the CWC, the CTBT and further disarmament agreements would play a pivotal role. Where is the threat? In reports on WMD proliferation published in 1997 and 1999, the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) warned that "NBC weapons and related powerful delivery systems are posing a direct threat to the Federal Republic of Germany and NATO in the mid and long term. Several states in the Near and Middle East are developing missiles with a range of more than 1,000 km [thus] NATO territory is also in the range of these missiles, possibly equipped with WMD."10 The assessments noted Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria and North Korea in particular (1997) and expanded to include India and Pakistan in the 1999 report. Detailed information was provided on the international network of missile technology acquisition, and a more recent BND analysis in 2000 expected that Iran as well as North Korea would acquire missiles with ranges in excess of 2,000 km within several years. In the views of most European countries, however, the threat posed by ballistic missiles is not increasing significantly. North Korea is far away, it is hoped that Iraq will be controlled by UN inspections, and domestic changes in Iran point in the direction more of economic cooperation than of threatening others with weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the threat posed by ‘rogue states’ cannot be completely eliminated by the implementation of a missile defense. It is also assumed that sufficient preventive diplomatic measures could be taken to decrease the assumed threat. For all these reasons, there remains only limited interest in European theater missile defense systems. A lack of funds in defense budgets, the mixed experience with the MEADS system, the poor test results thus far of US NMD tests, the availability of countermeasures to defeat missile defenses, and a low threat perception, all combine to keep Europeans wary of the promises held out by missile defense advocates. What the Europeans can do It is readily acknowledged by most Europeans that they have limited leverage when it comes to influencing a US NMD decision. Apart from giving consent to the upgrading of US early warning radars in the UK and Greenland, the main point of leverage will be in pushing for the preservation of the ABM Treaty and the continued involvement of Russia in the global disarmament process. Europe can also do more to analyze the threat posed by nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and to use its political, economic, and diplomatic influence to counter the proliferation of ballistic missiles. For example, a recent memorandum from the Federation of German Scientists (VDW) calls for a joint European initiative which would emphasize intense diplomatic dialogue with ‘states of concern’ in and around the Mediterranean. The memorandum also warned that a unilateral deployment of NMD could undermine security and stimulate new military buildups.11 In sum, among various concrete steps that could be taken are the following: (1) the sharing of information on missile-related activities and capabilities; (2) the creation of a "global early warning system" to monitor and share information on civilian and military missile launches; (3) making available satellite-launch capabilities; (4) contributing more financially to the control and destruction of Russian fissile material; (5) investing more in preventive diplomacy in troubled regions where the ballistic missile threat is the greatest, such as the Middle East; and (6) working to establish a new ballistic missile arms control regime. Götz Neuneck is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, Germany. He is also chairman of the working group "Physics and Disarmament" of the German Physical Society (DPG). His current work focuses on missile defense, arms control and new military technologies. Endnotes
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