Nuclear Weapons Issues and the Pugwash Agenda
April 2000


The remains of the Prefectual Industry
Promotion Building, Hiroshima, Japan.
September 1945
© 1945 U.N. photo #149439

by George Rathjens
Secretary General

EDITOR'S NOTE: As Pugwash sets its agenda on nuclear weapons issues, members of the Pugwash community are invited and encouraged to respond with their comments and reactions on how Pugwash can best respond to the challenges facing the control and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.

THE following observations are based very much on the discussions in the Pugwash Nuclear Issues Consultation held in La Jolla, California on January 15-16, and in London on March 3-4, but also reflect points made in papers circulated to the two groups and in other documents that have gotten some attention in the late 1990s by those concerned about nuclear weapons issues. These have included, notably:

• the report of The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons;
• two Pugwash monographs, A Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: Desirable? Feasible?, and Nuclear Weapons: The Road to Zero;
• a widely distributed Statement on Nuclear Weapons by Generals Andrew Goodpaster and Lee Butler -- and 57 other flag officers; and
• a report on The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy by the Committee on International Security of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences.

It may be well to begin by highlighting four points on which there seemed to be consensus among those who met in La Jolla and London and then by noting points of difference that seem likely to be significant for further discussion.

Points of Consensus

WITH the demise of the Soviet Union, the likelihood of a nuclear exchange involving many thousands of nuclear weapons has diminished, but with the degradation in the Russo-Western relations of the last several years and the spread of nuclear weapons to south Asia, the probability of the military use of nuclear weapons at some scale has increased.

During the early 1990s there appeared to be a growing acceptance on the part of general publics and security specialists of belief in the desirability and feasibility of a nuclear-weapons-free-world (NWFW), or at least of several fold reductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the United States and Russia.

Beginning, however, in about 1993, there has been a serious degradation in Russo-American relations, and in the international security environment, more generally. A number of developments have to be seen in varying degrees as causes and/or symptoms of this trend: a trend that is serious enough that it must be taken account of in consideration of the realism and feasibility of approaches to nuclear weapons problems. Among the most troublesome and worrisome developments have been:

• Russia's reneging in 1993 on its 1982 no-first-use of nuclear weapons (NFU) commitment,
• the U.S.-orchestrated NATO enlargement -- and its interest in further expansion,
• the failure (until April 2000) of the Russian Duma to ratify the START II Treaty,
• the vote in the U.S. Senate not to recommend ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
• the U.S.-led NATO handling of the Kosovo crisis, including what many in Russia regard as insensitivity to Russia's legitimate interests,
• the testing of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan, followed by conflict between them over Kashmir,
• a growing perception in Russia, China and many other countries of tendencies in the United States to a unilateralist approach to international security problems,
• Russo-Western differences about Chechnya,
• the intensification of conflict between the United States on the one hand and Russia, China and, indeed, some U.S. allies on the other, over possible deployment of ballistic missile defenses -- and possible modification or termination of the ABM Treaty.

Finally, there was general agreement in both meetings that Pugwash needs to better focus its efforts on nuclear weapons issues in the future and that, by and large, its comparative advantage lies in its international character and in its ability to bring together specialists from a wide range of countries in looking at the multi-dimensional aspects of nuclear weapons developments as these affect the major nuclear powers, aspiring nuclear weapons states, and non-nuclear countries as well.

Points of Significant Disagreement

IN the light of the aforementioned developments -- and Frank Blackaby cites others in his introduction to the second of the aforementioned Pugwash volumes -- there is now much support for the view that abolition of nuclear weapons is a remote -- and perhaps, receding and misleading or unrealistic -- goal; and that, accordingly, the primary focus as regards nuclear weapons should be on measures that might, in the short and medium term, be effective in reducing the likelihood of their use and/or the damage that might be expected should they be used. As one participant in the London meeting said, "Let's not discuss a fire-free world while sitting in a burning building. Without giving up on long-term objectives, we need to focus on near-term dangers that are making the nuclear weapons threat more serious."

There were/are clear differences of opinion about the extent to which reductions in numbers of nuclear weapons and measures that might reduce the likelihood of their use will depend on the structure of the international system and about the views in individual states of their positions in that system. Narrowly, the controversy might be seen as between

• relative emphasis on trying to deal with nuclear weapons "problems" through "technical fixes" (reductions in numbers of weapons and/or delivery systems, constraints on transfers of technology and critical materials and on weapons development, performance and deployment), and
• through reductions in nations' motivations to acquire, maintain and possibly use nuclear weapons, perhaps mainly through security guarantees and resolution of disputes, but, ultimately, through movement towards world governance based on the rule of law.

There are striking differences in how statements of policy, and agreements, including treaty obligations, are viewed by participants in discussions about international relations. The differences are, at least to some degree, understandable. We are all aware -- even those only in their thirties and forties -- of many international agreements not being implemented, including, notably, Security Council resolutions that have been passed, but with those voting for them not being willing to support their implementation, and we have seen many statements of policy and commitment made by individual states, large and small, which turned out to be vacuous bluffs, when called. A result has been cynicism about exhortation and commitments relating to international relations, not backed by serious actions. In the relatively strong states -- the United States, China, Israel, India and, during the Cold War, Russia -- this has led to skepticism about cooperative approaches to security problems. Instead, for such states self-help -- or to use what has become an ugly word, unilateralism, has often been seen as a preferred approach in international affairs. In contrast, and, oft-times, in what has seemed a triumph of hope over history, belief seems to persist in many other states that, in matters of international relations, security assurances, negative and/or positive, and other verbal and paper commitments will be honored. In weakness, what other hope can one have?

These points were illustrated in the discussions in La Jolla and London, and notably in the differences between the two groups. In London, as in many Pugwash meetings, one heard statements to the effect that nations' committing themselves to certain courses of action -- or inaction -- would be desirable; e.g. to movement towards a nuclear-weapon-free world or to no-first-use of nuclear weapons. But, there was little talk in La Jolla (an all-American group) of the U.S., or any other state, basing its actions on what any country might verbally commit itself to do. Exemplifying this view was a rhetorical question from that meeting, "Why shouldn't Moscow hedge its bets with depending on nuclear deterrence, no matter what we say, or even what we do?" It is noteworthy that, few people, if any, in the American political/military establishment ever took Soviet -- or Chinese -- NFU statements seriously, nor, apparently did many Russians, considering that there was essentially no reaction in Russia at all when it reversed its position on NFU.

It would seem to be important to recognize that participants in discussion of policies relating to nuclear weapons -- and others in international affairs -- are like to start from quite different premises about the utility of statements of policy or commitment, verbal or written, and that their views may well reflect to a significant degree the societies from whence they come.

An Area of Ambiguity

IT is clear that there are differences in belief among those who participated in the aforementioned review efforts about the utility of nuclear weapons, but the extent of differences is not entirely clear. It appears to be at least partly a semantic one. All of those who were in La Jolla, and probably all or most of those in the London meeting, seemed to believe that there are, or might be, states motivated to acquire, retain and/or perhaps use nuclear weapons against other states not having such weapons, or against other states that, having them, might eschew using them. On the other hand, those on the Canberra Commission, and others, have signed on to, or made, statements to the effect that nuclear weapons can have no use except to deter nuclear attack by others. Some -- perhaps all of this latter group -- apparently mean by this only that they view the acquisition, retention or use of nuclear weapons to cope with non-nuclear threats as politically and morally indefensible, not that they discount totally the possibility of nuclear weapons being acquired, retained and possibly being used for deterrence or coercion of non-nuclear adversaries or, if deterrence or coercion fails, in conflict against them. This said, it is clear that some of those concerned with nuclear weapons issues see such weapons as having much greater utility than do others.

Russian and American Interests in Nuclear Weapons

THERE are reasons for believing that the bases for American and Russian retention of nuclear weapons and dependence on them are significantly different, and in some ways more complex, than those for the other present and aspirant nuclear powers. In what follows they are, therefore, singled out as special cases.

Russia

ONE hears radically conflicting statements about Russian interests and potential capabilities as regards nuclear weapons, particularly as regards force levels.

At the one extreme, Russo-American intergovernmental discussions have focused largely on the ratification by the Duma of the Start II Treaty and about what might be reasonable objectives for START III. Also, there has been a revision of Russian nuclear doctrine, the details of which are not publicly available, and statements about the need for the maintenance and improvement in tactical nuclear capabilities to offset superiority by NATO in conventional capabilities. Additionally, there have been expressions of alarm and annoyance about the possibility of a U.S. deployment of a National Missile Defense (NMD) that might imply, in the view of some in Russia, a need for it to upgrade its strategic offensive capabilities, and/or to also deploy defenses so as to maintain some semblance of parity in the over-all Russo-American strategic balance: all of which can only be seen as an almost certainly futile effort to recapture a lost capability to maintain an acceptable balance vis-a-vis a West that is viewed by many Russians -- and, indeed, apparently, by increasing numbers -- as implacably adversarial.

But, it may well be that Russia, far from being able to maintain START II or likely START III force levels -- or nuclear parity of any kind with the United States -- will have to face the reality that maintenance of parity with China, or of some kind of "minimum deterrent" nuclear force posture, is a more realistic goal. Obviously, if there is much in this perspective, continuing to focus on START-type negotiations is likely to be nonsensical, if not counter-productive for Russia -- and the United States.

A third view of Russia's nuclear future got some attention in the London work-shop but more in La Jolla. It is that in the light of the Soviet Union's political and economic collapse and the disintegration of its conventional military capabilities, the only basis for any continuing claim by Russia to great power status, besides its history, lies in its nuclear arsenal. There was no apparent dissent about this in La Jolla, nor about the implication that necessary conditions for Russia's reducing its nuclear forces to low, or even relatively modest levels, will be substantial reconstruction of its economy and its conventional military establishment.

Whether this third, status-based "requirement" might be met by nuclear capabilities consistent with either, or both, of the two previous scenarios is unclear, but this would seem to be an interesting and important question for debate and research. Whatever the answer, it does seem that it will be some years before Russia is likely to be without nuclear weapons. And, during those years, there will be problems with the weapons it retains, with the critical materials from those it has disassembled -- and/or for those it might be assembling, with its whole nuclear infrastructure, and with its command and control systems: all, about the adequacy of safe-guards against accidents or misuse. If these observations are accepted as realistic, and there was no dispute about them in the La Jolla and London meetings, there is a very strong case for help for it, not just from the United States, but also from Europe and Japan in dealing with its nuclear infrastructure problems.

The United States

THE United States is unique in providing security guarantees to other countries: its NATO partners, Japan and South Korea. Moreover, its very substantial conventional force projection capabilities have been, and in the future might again be, used by it to intervene militarily to thwart the use of force by non-status-quo powers against neighbors (Iraq against Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) or against populations in their own countries (Serbia in Kosovo). A U.S ability to continue to play such interventionary roles may depend in some way on American nuclear capabilities. This is not primarily because of any inadequacies of American conventional forces, but rather because the price, in casualties, of prevailing over, say, Iraqi or North Korean forces in a conventional war, or one involving BW/CW weapons, might be unacceptably high, given that the stakes would likely be less than vital to U.S. interests. The argument is made that, states such as Iraq and North Korea, realizing this, will more likely be deterred by the possibility of a U.S. response if it retains a nuclear option.

American guarantees and interventionary proclivities also have a bearing on whether other nations may be motivated to acquire nuclear forces. If the U.S were to continue, without any nuclear capabilities, to play a guarantor/interventionist role in, say, east Asia, the Gulf or the former Yugoslavia, this could result in an increase in impetus for some non-status quo powers, e.g. North Korea, Iraq or even Serbia, to acquire nuclear capabilities as deterrents to the United States' using its conventional forces to thwart any expansionist ambitions they might have in those areas. On the other hand, withdrawal of the American guarantees to South Korea and Japan, just to pick two worrisome examples, could possibly result in their "going nuclear".

Thus, one is driven to conclude that what the United States does in regard to nuclear weapons is of a degree of importance unmatched in the case of other countries, not primarily because it has so many, but because its continuing commitment to their possible use may have important effects on the willingness of the United States to guarantee the security of other states and to use its conventional force projection capabilities in intervention in defense of human rights -- as well as, perhaps, for less worthy purposes; but also because, additionally, the credibility of its acting in guarantor/interventionary roles will have an impact on the incentives for other states to acquire, and possibly use, their own nuclear weapons.

But the U.S. could go a long way in reducing its nuclear stockpile before these considerations would likely come into play. How far? Some would argue that the U.S. needs no nuclear weapons at all for self-defense: that, but for the aforementioned considerations, it, like the United Kingdom and France, could, and should, unilaterally renounce nuclear weapons totally. This, though, is unlikely. The issue of "deep cuts" for the United States was discussed in the La Jolla meeting, and there was a majority view in that group that, while the U.S. need not maintain superiority or parity with Russia in nuclear capabilities as long as the numbers on both "sides" are in the thousands, at levels below a few hundred weapons, decisions for the United States probably should -- and, certainly would -- take account of the levels likely to be retained by Russia -- and China. The Cold War, or at least the fear of a resurgence, lives on!

Comparative Advantage and Priorities for Pugwash

IN thinking through the future work of Pugwash on nuclear weapons, it is useful to consider at least three different trajectories for Russian and American nuclear policies, which, though not mutually exclusive, merit, for expository purposes, separate consideration.

There is the prospect of continuing START-type negotiations, extending, perhaps, to include Russian and American tactical nuclear weapons as well. To the extent that such negotiations take place, they will be strictly Russo-American affairs. Discussions and analytical work by non-governmental organizations (Track II efforts) might be helpful, but it is hard to see a useful role for Pugwash in them. Bilateral Russo-American discussions, such as those that have been taking place between the CISAC group of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and its Russian counterpart, are likely to be more productive than meetings involving participants from other countries, who will generally be less informed and less well-connected with government decision-makers than those from Russia and the United States, a number of whom have been professionally involved with the Russian and American nuclear programs and policies for years.

There may be narrow subject areas, where, because there are, or may be, counterpart problems in other nuclear weapons states, the involvement of nationals from those countries may be especially useful. In general, though, the problems relating to managing nuclear-related programs, particularly in Russia, so as to reduce the risks of accidents, miscalculation, diversion of nuclear materials etc. will also be better dealt with through bilateral discussions, in some instances at the laboratory-to-laboratory level, than through multinational meetings.

If one assumes that, for financial or other reasons, Russia may have little option as regards its nuclear forces other than to reduce them by factors of ten or more, then, details of force posture of Russia vis-à-vis China, as well as vis-á-vis the United States may be relevant, and in that context, Russo-Chinese-American trilateral Track II type discussions could be useful. But a question must be raised as to whether Pugwash might have any advantage over other plausible arrangements for such efforts.

If it is accepted that the resurrection of Russia as a great power, as measured by its economic and conventional military strength, is a necessary condition for its reducing its nuclear weapons capabilities to low levels, the arguments for Pugwash getting significantly involved in Track II efforts are altered. On three counts there would seem to be strong reasons for its doing so: reasons why it could have comparative advantage over more narrowly based national institutions, of which CISAC is an example:

• firstly, while the economic rehabilitation of Russia must be largely a matter for the Russians, the involvement of other states, particularly those of the EU and Japan, are likely to be about as important as that of the United States;
• secondly, discussion of such reconstruction is likely to benefit from a broader range of disciplinary backgrounds than are normally brought to bear in, e.g., CISAC efforts; and
• thirdly, the possibility of such resurrection of a great Russia implies consideration of some very tough trade-off questions that can not be reasonably approached without the active and informed participation of people from around Russia's periphery, many of whom will question whether a Russia, with, say, great conventional military strength -- and perhaps, expansionist proclivities -- is to be preferred, no matter how weak might be its nuclear arsenal, to the present situation, where Russia is a basket case economically and in terms of conventional military strength but a giant in terms of nuclear strength, however poor may be the controls over that strength.

Although there was strong support in the La Jolla group for Pugwash making a major commitment to involving itself in this problem -- really, nothing less than that of the reconstruction of Russia on a basis acceptable to the rest of the world, and particularly to its neighbors -- one has to wonder if it might not be just too tough: so difficult that it could well involve an unrewarding dissipation of Pugwash's energies. If it is to be attempted, it will require bringing a number of new people into Pugwash.

Because the interests of a number of both status-quo and non-status quo states in acquiring nuclear weapons seem likely to depend on the U.S. role as a guarantor/ interventionist power, and because decisions about how far the U.S. might go in these respects are likely to be coupled to decisions about its retaining its nuclear weapons, many countries are likely to be concerned about the prospects of the U.S. becoming a non-nuclear state -- and, indeed, about the possibility of its just changing its policy on NFU. Given the international aspects of these issues there would seem to be a case for Pugwash being involved.

Two more focused topics emerged from the La Jolla and London meetings as candidates for Pugwash workshops.

One is that of no-first-use of nuclear weapons. While the whole idea of declaratory policies got short shrift in La Jolla, the case was made in the London meeting that NFU commitments that involved actual implementation of nuclear weapons retention, acquisition and deployment decisions so as to make first use impossible, or likely to be difficult or militarily unproductive, could be far more meaningful than simple declarations of intent. Discussion of what kind of measures might meet these criteria could be productive, and with eight nations now having nuclear capabilities -- and with more possibly in prospect -- this could be a subject where participation from at least the present and obviously aspirant nuclear powers could be useful.

The other is that of ballistic missile defense (BMD). While one hears talk of a transition to a defense-dominated world -- incredible as it may seem, given that societies are so fragile and nuclear weapons are so powerful -- one does not have to believe that this is the wave of the future to be convinced that questions of BMD are nearly certain to be important in international affairs for some years. At the very least, they will complicate international relations, and, if deployed, such defenses may be an impediment to reductions in offensive forces (as seems likely to be the case as regards implementation of START II) and/or they may make the use of offensive forces more likely in crises. Especially troublesome are the possibilities of action-reaction effects. If the United States deploys a national missile defense to cope with a possible "North Korean threat", but not with Russian missiles -- as it professes to be its intent -- Russia, might, nevertheless, react in the belief that the defense could have some capability -- or could presage a defense with capability -- against its missiles. Or, China might react. And, there are other chain-reaction possibilities. So, a large number of countries' military -- and diplomatic -- policies are likely to be affected by what might happen as regards BMD -- at least, those of the United States, Russia, China, Israel, Taiwan, Japan, both Koreas, India and Pakistan. Thus, there is a strong case for multinational discussions, such as Pugwash might undertake.

Participants

La Jolla, 15-16 January 2000

• Ms. Ruth S. Adams, Visiting Scholar, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California, San Diego, CA
• Chancellor Albert Carnesale, University of California, Los Angeles, CA
• Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell, Associate Executive Officer, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, MA
• Prof. Paul Doty, Professor of Biochemistry, Emeritus; former Director of Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
• Dr. Richard Garwin, IBM Fellow Emeritus, Thomas Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights, New York, USA; Senior Fellow for Science and Technology, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, NY
• Prof. Carl Kaysen, Emeritus, Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA
• Dr. Wolfgang Panofsky, Director Emeritus, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, and Professor Emeritus, Stanford University, Stanford, CA
• Prof. George Rathjens, Secretary-General, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs; Professor Emeritus, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA
• Ms. Jane Wales, Director, World Affairs Council of Northern California, San Francisco, CA
• Dr. Herbert York, Chancellor Emeritus, University of California, San Diego CA;

London, 3-4 March 2000

• Sir Michael Atiyah, President of Pugwash; Honorary Professor, University of Edinburgh, UK
• Dr. Vladimir Baranovski, Deputy Director, IMEMO (Institute of World Economy and International Relations), Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia
• Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell, Associate Executive Officer, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, MA, USA
• Prof. Francesco Calogero, Professor of Theoretical Physics, University of Rome "La Sapienza," Rome, Italy; Chairman, Pugwash Council, Italy
• Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, Swedish Ambassador, Washington, DC USA
• Ambassador Tanvir Ahmad Khan, Chairman, Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan
• Dr. Steven Miller, Director, International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Member, Pugwash Council; Co-Chair, U.S. Pugwash Group
• Prof. George Rathjens, Secretary-General, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs; Professor Emeritus, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA
• Sir Joseph Rotblat, Emeritus Professor of Physics, University of London; 1995 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate; Member, Pugwash Executive Committee, UK
• Air Commandor Jasjit Singh, retired, Indian Air Force, Director, Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, India; Convener, Indian Pugwash Society; Member, Pugwash Executive Committee