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Indian Draft Nuclear Doctrine: Some Reflections

Paper by Jasjit Singh 1
Director, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi

THE draft Indian nuclear doctrine prepared by the 27-member National Security Advisory Board was released by Mr. Brajesh Mishra, India’s National Security Adviser on August 17, 1999 in New Delhi (attached as Annexure). The draft proposal was released to encourage public debate and would be considered by the government in due course for a final decision.

The draft has naturally attracted a great deal of comment which was the stated purpose of releasing it to public. Two basic points need attention. Firstly, this is NOT the doctrine accepted or endorsed by the Government of India as yet. It is, as the document says, a draft proposal of the National Security Advisory Board. Secondly, many comments in India and abroad have confused the very concept of a “doctrine” in spite of a clear statement in Preamble of the paper where in para 1.6 the document states that “this document outlines the broad principles for the development, deployment and employment of India’s nuclear forces.” (Emphasis added) A doctrine is expected to define broad principles and concepts for the guidance of policy makers after it has been approved by duly constituted authorities. It must not be confused with policy, strategy or even posture which no doubt may be expected to flow from it. This elementary fact seems to have been missed by most critics. For example, many people complain that the doctrine does not indicate the “cost” of India’s proposed doctrine. The issue of costs is very important. But should a doctrine paper go into costs? If it does, would it remain a document that outlines “broad principles?” On the other hand the document consistently states that India would pursue a doctrine of credible “minimum” deterrence. The concept of minimum is not merely related to a single aspect of, say, numbers, but also to costs and posture.

Much of the critique of the document has risen from two factors. The first is the rather unique approach of making the proposal public for discussion and debate. Unlike conventional weapons whose development, deployment and employment would remain restricted to military and defence establishments, nuclear weapons concern all citizens. In an established democracy the people have a right to know what principles will govern the nuclear policy. The second is even more important. The doctrine does not adopt the conventional wisdom of other nuclear weapon states. To that extent this is not only in contrast to the acknowledged wisdom of the main nuclear powers but seeks to chart a new path.

The central foundation of the doctrine is built on four principles:

  1. India’s nuclear weapons are meant to deter nuclear weapons threat/use. Unlike most other nuclear weapon states, India’s nuclear weapons are NOT meant to deter the use and threat of use of conventional weapons, chemical weapons, biological weapons or a generalised formulation of protecting national interests any time anywhere. The doctrine requires that the nuclear policy should seek to deter rather than fight a war with nuclear weapons. The orientation of the doctrine is thus completely defensive in philosophy. This also logically severely limits the potential development, deployment and employment of the nuclear arsenal. And hence the emphasis on “minimum.” It is unfortunate that in spite of repeated emphasis on minimum deterrence and even simple statements of intent to respond to a nuclear attack with punitive retaliation are interpreted as “massive retaliation” by reputed organisations well versed in the lexicon and concepts of nuclear strategy. 2


  3. The doctrine rests on the principle of “No First Use” even against nuclear threat or use. It commits Indian nuclear policy to one of retaliation only. Para 2.4 of the draft paper expresses it in the following terms:

    “The fundamental purpose of Indian nuclear weapons is to deter the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons by any State or entity against India and its forces. India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.”

    The only country to adopt a similar commitment is China although uncertainties have grown in recent years whether China'’ commitment is a political statement or a doctrinal precept. A retaliation only doctrine accepts the fact that India will not initiate a nuclear strike under any circumstance. On the other hand, in order to reduce the risk of an attack on India it promises in unequivocal terms that sure and certain retaliation will follow. Assuming that rationality operates, as indeed it is expected to in any deterrence equation, this prospect which would lead to unacceptable punishment to the aggressor is expected to function as a deterrent. This no doubt seeks to ensure security of India based on the promise of assured retaliation.



  5. As a defensive doctrine of no-first-use and limiting the use of nuclear weapons to retaliation only, India’s draft doctrine is in total harmony with the UN Charter. Article 51 of the Charter under Chapter VII clearly endorses “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United States.


  7. The doctrine emphasizes that global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament is a national security objective. This is to be expected from a country that has pursued the goal of complete abolition of nuclear weapons for decades. In fact the doctrine clearly states that the absence of nuclear disarmament has created the need for India to acquire its nuclear deterrent. It also makes it clear that India’s nuclearisation has emerged out of the failure of the international community to institute disarmament half a century after nuclear weapons came into use and more than three decades after the five nuclear weapons states were bound by treaty obligations to do so.

The draft doctrine makes it clear that India will not follow the disastrous route of the first tier nuclear weapon states who built up tens of thousands of nuclear weapons in a mindless arms race which they find difficult to even reverse. On the other hand, questions have been raised on the doctrine which needed to be addressed.

Apprehensions have been expressed that this doctrine would set off a nuclear arms race. It is indeed surprising that a doctrine that repeatedly affirms the principle of no-first-use and use in retaliation only is considered by some people to trigger an arms race! Any objective examination of the concept would reveal the reverse to be the case. For a moment let us assume that all nuclear weapon states follow the principle of no-first-use enshrined in the draft doctrine. In that case no country will initiate a nuclear strike. Logically this should trigger an arms race in reverse reducing arsenals to minimum levels and under-cut the necessity for deterrence if the doctrine is implemented honestly. The doctrine promises that India will work for an international treaty banning the first use of nuclear weapons.

The concerns about a potential arms race reflect a perception arising out of the prism of cold War mind-sets where first strike (and even “launch on warning”) was the order of the day. This necessitated large arsenals and potentially pre-emptive strikes with nuclear weapons. The result was the peak of 67,000 nuclear warheads. But China did not follow the same route and relied on minimum deterrence concept with a no-first-use commitment. There is no evidence that China’s nuclear posture led to any arms race. Even in future China’s nuclear arsenal is likely to be dictated by the size of US/Russian arsenals and issues like ballistic missile defences etc. rather than the defensive doctrine of India.

There is no doubt that India’s nuclear doctrine poses a serious challenge to the prevailing doctrines of offensive orientation and first strike strategic doctrines of the US/NATO and Russia. China has been demanding a treaty on no-first-use among the weapon states. The Chinese and Indian doctrines now indicate a counter view to the traditional aggressive doctrines of other nuclear weapon states who visualise use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear threats. It is not surprising therefore that the US responded to the draft doctrine by saying that India is “moving in the wrong direction.”? 3 But since the State Department spokesman acknowledged that the US had yet to examine the document, this appears to have been a reflect action to a doctrine which reflected thinking in total contrast to the US doctrine and belief system.

In conclusion it can be stated with a high level of confidence that the proposed doctrine denotes a serious effort at restraint in the principles for the development, deployment and employment of nuclear weapons. India exercised restraint for decades through its policy of keeping the nuclear option open. Unfortunately this was not adequately recognised and the noose of non-proliferation without disarmament was pursued by the nuclear weapon states and their allies who themselves are nuclear weapon states in security terms if not in legal terms. The draft doctrine promises restraint within the new framework of a state with nuclear weapons that only seeks to deter a nuclear attack rather than exercise nuclear hegemony.

In the final analysis we have to ask a question of our own. There would remain many in this world who for some reason or the other are opposed to India acquiring nuclear weapons. Their views must be respected. But now that India has declared itself to be a state with nuclear weapons and possesses an efficient nuclear arsenal, the proposed doctrine must be judged from the point whether a defensive doctrine of credible minimum deterrence which relies on no-first-use and use in retaliation only enhances peace and stability or an aggressive doctrine of first use seeking to use nuclear weapons even against non-nuclear threats would be preferred?


1 Jasjit Singh is a member of India’s National Security Advisory Board composed of non-governmental experts. The opinions in this paper do not reflect the views of the Board or any other organization.

2 Introduction to “India’s Nuclear Doctrine” 18 August 1999 in BASIC Publications, http://www.basicint.org/indiadoct.htm dated September 3, 1999 as distributed as Background Document at 49th Pugwash Annual Conference, September 7-13, 1999, Rustenburg, South Africa.

3 “Clinton writes to Vajpayee, US calls N-doctrine a wrong step” by Aziz Haniffa, India Abroad News Service, 19 August 1999.