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PUGWASH MEETING NO.257
By Jeffrey Boutwell The Pugwash workshop on Nuclear Stability and Missile Defense was held Sigtuna, Sweden from 26-28 October. Hosted by the Swedish Pugwash Group, the meeting was convened at the Sigtuna Foundation, with support provided by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Swedish Defense Research Establishment. The meeting was attended by 26 participants from 13 countries, all in their individual capacity. The meeting opened with welcoming remarks from Bengt Gustafsson, chair of Swedish Pugwash and director of the Sigtuna Foundation, and Jan Prawitz, organizer of the workshop. The main address was given by Annika Markovic, director of disarmament affairs of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There was also a dinner for conference participants hosted by Director General Sture Ericson of the Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning. United States
The first session reviewed the history of American plans for national missile defense (NMD), which under President Clinton called for deployment of 100 interceptors in Alaska by 2005 to counter emerging ballistic missile threats from so-called "states of concern" like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. Following two of three unsuccessful program tests and significant opposition to NMD from Russia, China, and many European allies, President Clinton deferred a deployment decision on NMD in August 2000, leaving the issue open for the next administration. An overview of the NMD plan stressed that is based on components (ground-based interceptors, early warning radars, X-band radars, etc.), many of which are well along in development and which could reconfigured in various schemes. The X-band radar sited in the Aleutians will be oriented towards Northeast Asia, while proposed upgrades to early warning radars in Massachusetts, Greenland, and the UK are designed to provide coverage of the Middle East. Ultimately, a third stage of NMD deployment calls for additional X-band radars (9), space-based IR radars (SBIRS), and a second deployment site in the continental US. In the weeks before the US Presidential election on November 7, Al Gore voiced support for Clinton’s deferral decision, adding that ultimate NMD deployment must be technologically viable, while not upsetting strategic stability or sparking a new arms race with Russia and China. George W. Bush criticized the Clinton NMD plan as too cautious, saying as President he would develop a more expansive system, including both naval and space-based assets. Upcoming tests in February, shortly after the new President takes office, will be important (symbolically as much as technologically) in determining momentum toward a deployment decision. The attitude in early 2001 of America’s allies, Russian policy, prospects for the ABM Treaty, are all additional important factors. Clinton’s delay of an NMD decision has spurred interest in other NMD options, especially in the Bush camp for sea-based and space-based assets. Yet the Clinton plan is the only feasible one for timely (i.e., 2005) deployment, and these other options (sea-based, boost-phase, TMD) should rather be seen as future complements to a land-based NMD. An early decision that President Bush could take is to increase the number of interceptors and deployment sites (e.g., in the northeast US).
Regarding the Thule (Greenland) and Fylingdales (UK) radars, there are alternatives if Britain and Denmark/Greenland say no to upgrading the radars; these include forward deployment of X-band radars on ships, or (less attractive), accelerating development of the SBIRS-Low missile tracking system. In any event, the Thule and Fylingdales radars are constrained by geography in providing any TMD capability; for this radars are needed in southern Europe to deal with theater missile threats from the Middle East and northern Africa. Claims by the Heritage Foundation and others that the US could quickly (2003) and cheaply ($2-3 billion) deploy sea-based midcourse missile defense, based on Navy Aegis capabilities, are wrong. Over the longer-term, such sea-based systems could be a supplement to land-based NMD. While sea-based systems would still be dependent on land-based sensor systems, they could represent a way to expand coverage to US allies. Boost-phase defenses, such as those proposed by Richard Garwin and Ted Postol, have their own inherent problems. One such is the call for joint US-Russian defenses based on Russian territory and the attendant difficulties of joint operational control. Moreover, the rapid response time and limited range of such interceptors will limit coverage to smaller countries like North Korea. A joint US-Israeli study on airborne laser systems for boost-phase defense is likewise years away from validation and development. Finally, discussion of theater missile defenses (TMD) systems stressed the point that, for countries like Japan and Israel, TMD is in effect national missile defense for strategic defense of the homeland. Russia Russian attitudes on NMD stem from concern with the importance strategic stability and the effect of NMD on additional substantial reductions of strategic forces, rather than any early threat that NMD could pose to the deterrent power of Russian nuclear forces. Moscow does feel that the US is exaggerating the missile threat from ‘states of concern,’ and that long-term prospects of an expanded American NMD threaten the viability of the Russian deterrent. Expert sentiment in Russia believes that Russia will not withdraw from arms control, even if the US proceeds with missile defense. Russia needs arms control constraints on US nuclear forces, as Russia will only have 800-1500 deployed warheads by end of decade. Yet, even if NMD did not exist, START III prospects are poor (in part because Senate and Duma ratification pre-conditions). Russia will wait for the US new administration to formulate its responses, so the re-emergence of the NMD debate probably won’t come until summer or fall of 2001. In the meantime, however, Russia may continue to stress TMD plans involving Europe, and a global monitoring system derived from the US-Russia joint missile surveillance system, as alternatives to NMD. In short, Russian policy is in flux, with Moscow feeling it has gotten short-changed in bilateral agreements but not wanting to totally do away with the constraints those treaties do impose on US forces. Russia has little leeway in expanding its strategic forces over the next decade (even with re-MIRVING). Substantively, then, in terms of constraints on strategic forces, the ABM Treaty is less important for the security it provides to Russia than as a debating point against the US. United Kingdom The main British concerns expressed about NMD focus on issues of strategic stability and the UK role in missile defense schemes. Since 1963, the Fylingdales radar has provided early warning capabilities and was upgraded in the early 1990s to a phased-array radar for 360 degree coverage. For NMD missions, Fylingdales would need software and informational technology upgrades. The RAF Menwith Hill facility would process data from space-based IR sensors (the SBIRS system will replace DPS for boost-phase early warning), but specific UK consent would be required. Phase two of the NMD program calls for three additional X-band radars, one of which could be in the UK which would also require UK permission (both at the national and local planning levels). In the absence of a firm US decision to proceed, the UK government has remained non-committal, saying the ABM Treaty is a matter for the US and Russia. The Blair government has stressed the value of the treaty for strategic stability and wishes to see it preserved, but adds that the Fylingdales radar upgrade is unlikely to be the step that breaches the treaty. The Conservative Party has come out in favor of NMD, while the Liberal Democratic shadow Foreign Secretary, Menzies Campbell, has said that NMD would be "profoundly destabilizing" and could provoke "a new nuclear arms race." In a July 2000 report, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons noted that a US request to upgrade the Fylingdales radar, having given notice to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, would present the UK government with an "acute dilemma," and that a UK refusal would have "profound consequences." In September, the Blair government responded by noting how allied concerns over NMD had been one of the factors in President Clinton’s deferral of an NMD decision. The next elections in the UK are likely in the spring of 2001, with the Labour Party likely to be returned to power. Germany There is widespread skepticism in Germany about American NMD efforts, both as a symbol of increasing American tendencies toward unilateralism and for the effect of missile defenses on east-west relations and nuclear stability. A particular fear in Germany is Russia responding with enhanced theater nuclear weapons that could increase German and European vulnerability. Or, emerging nuclear states could blackmail European countries. Germany is seeking to promote a common European position and supports bilateral US-Russian agreement on what to do about the ABM Treaty. Should the ABM Treaty be voided, however, there are concerns that Russia might repudiate the CFE and INF Treaties. While Germany favors a more pro-active policy regarding Iran, similar to that being pursued with North Korea, there is far more that Europe as a whole could do, including: new proliferation initiatives (missile free zones, disengagement zones, notification of launches), greater involvement in helping Russia dismantle nuclear warheads, and diplomatic initiatives focusing on the "states of concern," all of which could help create the conditions for a global prohibition of nuclear weapons. France From Europe, there is a feeling that much has been made of the ramifications of NMD for Russia and China, with little analysis on how it ultimately involves US allies (both European and other). While many Europeans feel their concerns played a part in Clinton’s deferral, there is ultimately no common European position. Why are the Europeans important? Several reasons include: (1) the US needs their political support, both at home and abroad (and this is understood by Russia, as well); (2) technological dimension, including radar upgrades, and (3) as partners in coalition interventions. Other considerations include: what are the benefits of NMD to the Europeans? Thule and Fylingdales are of no use for TMD; radars would have to be based in southern Europe. Also, these radars are convenient political targets for Russia and domestic opposition. By contrast, the US argument about a lack of European support consists of: a lack of support will weaken defense cooperation; US-European interests will diverge; and European vulnerability will compromise their support for coalition interventions. Does Europe need TMD? The answer is not clear, compared to more cogent rationales for TMD in the Middle East (for military reasons) and perhaps in East Asia (for insurance and political coupling). European TMD programs like the French ASTER are currently in limbo. For one participant, issues of decoupling are beside the point (Europe has always been more vulnerable), as is the effect on deterrence. It’s more difficult to say how NMD will affect arms control. The biggest impact of all would be the nature of changes on the international system if we truly move to a defense-dominant world. Tactically, one question is how to use the period before next summer or autumn to prevent Europe from being squeezed between US unilateralism and Russian pique. France and Europe need to encourage US-Russian talks on ABM renegotiation and to become more proactive on missile and CBW proliferation (especially in the Middle East and East Asia). Also helpful would be European work on surveillance, monitoring and intelligence assets related to weapons of mass destruction. Sweden Swedish concerns with NMD are similar to those voiced elsewhere: impact on strategic stability, undermining the ABM treaty, increased Russian deployment of theater nuclear weapons, and keeping the US coupled to Europe. The point was made that countries like Sweden can’t have it both ways – trusting the US to ensure European security but not trusting the US to take decisions on its own security. There does seem to be increased European interest in theater missile defenses, and a connection was made between TMD and protecting international (including Swedish) troops in peacekeeping missions abroad. While Swedish government criticism of NMD would complicate Sweden becoming a member of NATO, it would not probably kill it. Greenland An overview was given of the domestic impact of the NMD debate in Greenland, particularly the difficulty of obtaining information about NMD and the reality that ultimate decisions on upgrading the Thule radar will be made in Copenhagen. As a Danish colony until 1978, when it received home-rule powers, Greenland was subject to the US-Danish agreements in WWII (1941) giving the US air base rights, which were renewed in 1951. Despite the 1978 referendum on home rule, foreign affairs responsibility remains with Denmark, although Greenland’s parliament (the Landsting) and government do have a role in debating foreign policy issues. The three main political parties in Greenland are the Siumut (Social Democrats), Atassut (Liberals), and the Inuit Ataqatigiit. Though there are differences of opinion among the parties, sentiment in general (and especially among the majority Inuit population) on NMD is negative. For example, the Inuit party has called for the renegotiation of the 1951 military bases agreement, with the participation of the Landsting. Inuit issues also include compensation for loss of land at the US bases and the crash of a nuclear-armed aircraft near Thule in 1968. Debate on such issues is also shaped by the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC), an international NGO representing the 160,000 Inuit peoples living in Greenland, Canada, Alaska and Siberia. These and other concerns are part of a wider sentiment in Greenland for increased self-rule and more representation in Danish delegations to international bodies. The Danish government is keeping a low profile on NMD, wanting to defer any debate over the issue until the US takes a firm decision. There is some public sentiment in Denmark for a demilitarized zone in the Arctic and for having the European parliament debate the NMD issue. Some in Denmark are also concerned about the Thule issue generating increased tensions with Greenland. On the particular question of how Greenland could affect the debate in Denmark (with only two members from Greenland in the Danish parliament), the ICC is seeking to mobilize Danish public opinion on the Thule issue. Norway The Norwegian government maintains that the Vardø radar is for research and tracking space debris, having nothing to do with NMD. Nonetheless, doubts remain, in part because the Vardø radar was tested in California in an ABM-mode before being moved to Norway, and because of previous government disinformation on sensitive military installations in Norway. That being said, Norway is on record opposing NMD, in part for its effect in blocking further cuts in nuclear forces. As a neighbor, Norway is naturally sensitive to relations with Russia. In 2001, should the issues of NMD and NATO enlargement (there are nine candidates) come up simultaneously and should they be decided essentially unilaterally by the US, the effect on Russia would be formidable. One participant queried whether tradeoffs are possible between the two issues, for example by reaching an agreed amendment to the ABM Treaty while strictly limiting further NATO enlargement (Slovenia, Slovakia, and no others)? In the main, though, concern was expressed that we may be seeing the re-emergence of east-west strategic rivalry. The US, Europe, and Missile Defenses One participant thought that Europe needs to anticipate a different debate by mid-2001, one much broader in scope than the Clinton NMD plan. Such issues could include: expanding missile defense to the allies (Richard Armitage and Allied Missile Defense) and even re-evaluating the relevance of the ABM Treaty and traditional arms control. Along these lines, a fundamental re-thinking of deterrence and MAD is necessary among the global nuclear powers (e.g., the George W. Bush call for deep cuts and expanded missile defenses). Another view held that, while a unified European position on NMD would be ideal, this is unlikely to come about given various dividing lines between the European countries (NATO/non-NATO, nuclear weapons/no nuclear weapons, those hosting radars/those not, and differing sensitivities to ballistic missile threats). Perhaps the primary issue for the European states is, how willing are they are to risk rupture with the US over the NMD issue (in effect telling the Americans not to defend themselves). Europeans need to help the US find other solutions to problems posed by proliferation, and to which NMD is seen as a response (with Iran a particularly relevant example). Germany’s relationship with Iran was mentioned in this regard, both positive (independent German intelligence on Iran helped publicize Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation) and negative (the role of German firms in the past in supplying technology to Iran). Another issue of importance is the possible terrorist use of nuclear weapons, and here Europe could do far more to provide funds with which to soak up excess enriched uranium in Russia. In the end, the key question is: how would Europe react if it was clearly shown that a country like Iran was engaged in missile and nuclear warhead development? Would it do little or nothing? Middle East An overview was presented of the growing missile threat in the region. In addition to Israeli missile and nuclear weapons capabilities, countries acquiring advanced ballistic missiles (and the ability to produce them) include Iran, Egypt, Syria, Libya, and Iraq. Systems such as the Shihab-3 (Iran) and al-Hussein (Iraq) can reach Israel and Turkey, and it is estimated that there will be 2,500 to 3,000 ballistic missiles in the region by the year 2010. The possible emergence of additional nuclear powers in the region in the next 5-7 years is likely to produce a balance of terror in the Middle East that could well increase the likelihood of nuclear pre-emption in a crisis and a nuclear conflict. It is in this context that theater missile defenses (TMD) are specially relevant, and there was much discussion of the Israeli Arrow system. Some views held that, given Israel’s small size and the short warning times involved, Arrow will never be able to provide an effective defense against nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. Indeed, it was posited that, by stimulating a false sense of security, the deployment of Arrow could increase the chance of a nuclear conflict by reducing perceptions of a swift and assured Israeli nuclear response to a nuclear attack. Others disagreed, saying that, at the least, Arrow would permit Israel to avoid having to rely on launch on warning and launch under attack strategies, particularly as it strengthens its second-strike capability. Another view is that what is needed is a radical change of opinion in Israel, to the effect that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by others would be a disaster for Israel Instead of concentrating on Arrow TMD and second strike capability, Israel should work strenuously for the creation of a Middle East free of nuclear weapons as well as chemical and biological weapons. East Asia Changes in strategic relations to a post-Cold War environment characterized by asymmetric confrontations, various actors with different objectives, regional rather than ideological disputes, and above all proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, has produced greater interest in ballistic missile defense. If traditional deterrence is indeed eroding, what role could there be for ballistic missile defense, especially in facilitating a transition from mutual assured destruction to mutual assured security? In the context of East Asia, the US military wants TMD to protect forward-deployed forces, while Taiwan is interested in USN area defenses and Pac2/Pac3. For both these reasons, as well as because of NMD, China is extremely negative. South Korea, for both economic and political reasons, has little current interest in theater missile defenses. Japan’s involvement with missile defenses goes back to SDI collaboration with US in the 1980s, and extends up to work on NTW Block II interceptor (four components). In addition to this being a way of retaining close ties with the US, Japan was primarily motivated by the ‘defensive nature’ of the weapons, to the program’s emphasis on R&D and as a way of sustaining Japan’s defense technology infrastructure, and by the fact that NMD is a long-term program with potential broad applicability. There was much sentiment in favor of the proposition that North Korea poses little in the way of a missile threat to the US in the near, or even medium-term. Regionally, reducing offensive military capabilities and developing regional security frameworks could be positive moves. North Korea An overview of North Korea emphasized that the Pyongyang regime feels that it is still in a state of war, that the national goal of liberating South Korea remains. This underlies current North Korean policy towards the US, of placating Washington on issues of missile and nuclear technology and thus maneuvering the US out of Korea affairs. North Korea has gained both economic and political benefits from the export of its missile technology ($600m a year) to Syria, Iran, Egypt, Libya, Sudan (for Iraq) and Pakistan. Given this ‘export of instability’ to the Middle East, western countries now establishing contacts with Pyongyang have a special responsibility to take action on this issue. In particular, European countries were urged to consult among themselves and develop a common policy, or at least strategy, for pressuring North Korea on its missile exports. Recent events were summarized regarding North Korean missile development and attempts to acquire nuclear warheads, the 1998 missile test over Japan, and the attitudes of countries like China and the US. It was emphasized that North Korea achieved with its 1998 missile test what it couldn’t through negotiation – high-level recognition by the United States, culminating recently in the visit of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to Pyongyang. A by-product of this, worrisome to South Koreans, is that North Korea has frozen the reconciliation process with Seoul. Because the road to economic reconstruction runs through Washington, North Korea may well stop the export and testing of ballistic missiles as a means of being taken off the American list of states sponsoring terrorism in order to ultimately gain admission to the World Bank and IMF. In terms of the military threat it presents, one participant said that North Korean missiles only threaten South Korea (500 short-range Scuds, of 300-500 km). North Korea is using its longer-range missiles as a bargaining chip and presents little in the way of a long-term threat to either Japan or the United States (and in any event is having difficulty with re-entry technology). In that sense, American NMD efforts that posit a North Korean threat are misplaced. Tactical Nuclear Weapons From the security perspective of small and medium-sized states, theater nuclear forces are more immediately relevant than the strategic forces that currently dominate the focus of arms control and missile defense debates. Despite the accomplishment of the unilateral withdrawals of US and Russian theater nuclear forces by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev in 1991, more recent trends are worrisome, including renewed emphasis in Russian military doctrine on TNF to make up for shortfalls in its conventional forces and the development and deployment of Indian and Pakistani nuclear forces. In addition, the existence of large stockpiles of smaller TNF munitions, such as artillery shells and atomic demolition munitions (ADMs), which are particularly vulnerable to theft and use by terrorists, should stimulate efforts to eliminate them entirely. Accordingly, a range of proposed options for dealing with TNF would include:
An additional concern is the development of new tactical nuclear weapons, including those with low-yield warheads, that would be viewed as more suitable for actual use in conflict. There is thus an urgent need to conclude agreements prohibiting the development of new types of TNF, while simultaneously working to freeze and ultimately eliminate all current TNF stockpiles. There were several calls for the unilateral removal of the remaining American TNF from Europe, as some thought worries about decoupling are anachronistic in the post-Cold War period. Conversely, it was argued that de-nuclearizing NATO Europe could well lead to increased American unilateralism and perceptions of unequal burden sharing. Conclusions Is traditional arms control now at a dead end? Should we be thinking of new approaches that can deal with the security and proliferation challenges that give rise to interest in missile defenses in the first place? In the same vein, policies of denial to deal with nuclear proliferation have not worked, they have only slowed the rate at which new countries join the nuclear club. And they are unlikely to work, if a country has the motivation to acquire such weapons. Thus, to what extent do we need to be thinking of positive inducements – such as concrete security guarantees – that could reduce nuclear aspirations? There is little question that wider counter-proliferation measures are needed, given declining confidence in verification and monitoring measures (Iraq and others), globalizing technologies, the uncertain role of Russia, and "states of concern" who opt out of international norms. Traditional arms control is beneficial for the vast majority of participating states, but doesn’t ensure compliance on the part of outlier states. While recognizing the need to discuss the future utility of negotiated arms control, opinions were voiced that it is also important not to prematurely dismiss the future benefits of such efforts. For example, it was proposed that the US-Russian ban on INF systems be expanded worldwide, though in response, it was noted that for smaller countries, INF systems are strategic, not theater, missiles. It was also pointed out that a ban on missiles would make the world safe for manned aircraft and those who excel at them. Opinions were also expressed that more could have been done to strengthen the missile technology control regime. On NMD itself, has enough thought been given to constructing a limited NMD for small country threats which wasn’t inherently expandable against Russia and China and thus did not undermine strategic stability and block deep cuts in offensive forces? Whatever the appropriate mix of diplomatic, security and arms control measures needed to counter the proliferation threat, there was widespread sentiment at the workshop that a far more pro-active policy by European countries, whether individually or in concert, is needed to curtail the aspirations of those countries seeking nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. |
