Pugwash Workshop on The Abolition of Nuclear Weapons: 11-13 October 1999, New Delhi, India

Pugwash Meeting No. 251

Pugwash Workshop on The Abolition of Nuclear Weapons
11-13 October 1999, New Delhi, India

Report by Paolo Cotta-Ramusino

THE Pugwash workshop, The Abolition of Nuclear Weapons, was attended by 26 participants from seven countries, and was hosted by the Pugwash Group of India.

Acquiring Nuclear Weapons

THE meeting began with a discussion of the motivations that induce states first to acquire nuclear weapons and then to retain them. Among such motivations one can include security concerns (particularly evident in the original American and Soviet decisions to develop nuclear arsenals), the desire to enhance and maintain international prestige, and several kinds of bureaucratic, technological and economic imperatives. The meeting included a cursory review of the different elements underlying the acquisition process of nuclear weapons by different countries (either "official" or "non-official" nuclear powers) but in the opinion of the rapporteur, a unified picture failed to emerge and more importantly the relationship between this analysis and the problem of identifying the common avenues of denuclearization remained unclear.

The rationale for retaining nuclear weapons has to do with nuclear strategy. While discussing the actual strategic thinking of nuclear states, it has been pointed out that the disappearance of the bipolar world did not imply the abandonment of Cold War strategic concepts: nuclear powers still think of first use of nuclear weapons, extended deterrence in its various meanings, and the possibility of nuclear responses to CW and BW attacks. The very existence of NATO was referred to by some participants as a relic of the Cold War bipolar world.

One problem that drew the attention of all the participants was the nature and the impact of the Non Proliferation Treaty. It was noted that India supports the non proliferation regime, but disagrees with the Non Proliferation Treaty. The view was also expressed that the NPT itself implies that 187 nations have decided that nuclear weapons are going to stay for the foreseeable future. Indefinite extension of the NPT has been equated by some participants with an indefinite legitimization of nuclear weapons. Others observed that quite the opposite is true, since the NPT is the only existing legally binding document that commits nuclear powers to nuclear disarmament.

The position of India was compared with that of countries which enjoy some sort of nuclear protection ("nuclear umbrella") by nuclear allies. India’s nuclearization has been justified on the grounds that, in contrast with Japan or Western Europe, India cannot count on any sort of nuclear protection, while at the same time it faces a powerful nuclear country like China. In this sense, India was "compelled" to nuclearize.

Other views stressed that nuclearization has neither increased India's security, as shown recently by the Kargill conflict, nor enhanced her international leverage and economic development. Nuclear weapons are expensive and India is only at the very early stage of a nuclear program that many see as very ambitious.

Indeed, one can maintain that international leverage and prestige are in fact enhanced by renouncing the possession of nuclear weapons; e.g., the recent cases of South Africa and the former Soviet Republics (Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus). One of Pugwash's goals may be precisely to address international public opinion and point out that a source of prestige comes from abandoning nuclear weapons projects. Moreover, when people speak of nuclear weapons as a source of prestige, they assume that those weapons will never be used, but the non-use of the past is unfortunately no guarantee for non-use in the future.

Security and Nuclear Weapons

IN considering the security motivations behind any decision to acquire nuclear weapons, one participant observed that countries fall into five categories, (1) nuclear weapons states; (2) states that are allied with nuclear weapons states and protected by these states; (3) states that belong to nuclear weapons - free zones for which some form of international guarantee is available; (4) parties to the NPT that do not belong to any previous category; (5) countries that did not sign the NPT. According to this participant, security concerns are highest for the last two categories of states.

The security that is effectively obtained by the possession of nuclear weapons was measured against the most recent cases of conflicts, with some asking whether the hypothetical possession of nuclear weapons by Iraq or Serbia could have spared those countries from the recent conventional warfare.

NATO strategy and particularly its nuclear strategy was considered in detail. It appears that NATO's behavior (its expansion, the decision to intervene in Kosovo without a UN mandate, the refusal to assume any no-first use policy, the continuous stress on extended deterrence and on a nuclear umbrella) had a significant impact on Indian informed public opinion. Some arguments in favour of India's nuclearization stem exactly from the fact that NATO seems to use its nuclear superiority for political and military goals. As one participant put it "NATO policy has its effects on former colonies". Someone pointed out that the dominance by NATO of world affairs with the help of nuclear weapons has a racist connotation and India is just drawing the relevant consequences.

Conversely, it was pointed out that NATO policy itself has been influenced by the Indian and Pakistani tests. The continuation of NATO nuclear policy reaffirmed during the April 1999 summit (50th anniversary of NATO) has been somehow influenced by the new risks of nuclear proliferation that are associated with the nuclearization of South Asia.

In discussing the security motivations for Indian nuclearization (or weaponization), the question of China was raised by several participants. What is at stake is not simply the Indian-Pakistani relationship. With China directly engaged in South Asia and with a significant nuclear arsenal, some felt that India had no alternative but to weaponize.

Others downplayed the security problems for India emanating from China, believing that China faces greater internal security concerns than it does those from India. Nonetheless, confidence building measures and the discussion of no-first-use policies would be very beneficial, especially in the form of bilateral discussions (India-China and India-Pakistan). Paradoxically, the no-first-use policy that both India and China claim to adopt would be a perfect precondition for the de-nuclearization of the region.

Among the confidence building and safety-enhancing measures discussed, many raised the problem of alert levels for current and future nuclear delivery systems. The US experience in the managing of nuclear weapons demonstrates such problems as defective command and control, ambiguous interpretation of intelligence data, people not obeying orders, difficult coordination between political and military leaders, and tensions between declaratory policies and actual reality. It is unrealistic to expect that nuclear weapons in South Asia will not be subject to the same problems, if not more so. In particular, concern was expressed about ?launch on warning? policies that might be adopted in the future.

Despite these concerns, there was consensus that negotiating confidence building measures is possible, that tactical nuclear weapons will probably not be introduced in the region, and that de-alerting (or non-alerting) measures are feasible. Yet uncertainty remains about future force configurations, since India (and even more so Pakistan) are just beginning their weaponization process.

It was pointed out that, although India has no plans to resume immediate testing, nonetheless India’s signing of the CTBT is problematic. Moreover, it is not clear that India will be able to carry out a full program of weaponization without resuming nuclear testing. While international action to bring the CTBT into force would put pressure on India and Pakistan to sign the treaty, current US policy points exactly in the opposite direction. As one participant noted, "if the US arms control community is unable to persuade US legislators, how can they pretend to convince India?"

In terms of the ultimate goal of abolishing nuclear weapons, the current situation is certainly discouraging, as arms control treaties and initiatives are stalled [editors note: this was before Russian ratification of START II and CTBT in April 2000]; India and Pakistan are now openly declared nuclear powers; the reduction of strategic weapons is going slowly; and the so called lesser nuclear powers (France, China, UK) do not intend to participate, for the time being, in disarmament talks.

It is nevertheless important to reiterate that security without nuclear weapons is possible and that, in fact, the claimed extra security that comes from nuclear weapons is questionable. For example, having a nuclear arsenal does not permit a country to reduce its conventional forces. And, as the Kargill experience shows, nuclear weapons do not guarantee peace and security in a nuclearized South Asia.

Much of the discussion stressed the necessity of separating nuclear weapons from particular security problems and from issues of prestige, yet such prestige is still embodied in the identification of the permanent members of the UN Security Council with the official nuclear weapons States. Accordingly, many participants agreed that a "worldwide revolt against nuclear weapons" is needed, but differences arose on the necessary intermediate steps.

The last day of the meeting was devoted to discussing the new draft Indian Nuclear Doctrine (IND). It was generally considered a positive event that India made public her nuclear strategy. It was stressed that the doctrine shows that India will adhere strictly to a policy of no-first-use and that the role of Indian nuclear weapons is only to deter others from using nuclear weapons against India. Some participants asked which countries India wishes to deter, as the answer to this question will be an indicator of the requirements that will shape the nuclear arsenal.

The Indian nuclear doctrine mentions the idea of building a triad of nuclear delivery systems (ground, air and sea based). This triad concept sparked several questions: will India really be able to have such a sophisticated panoply of nuclear weapons? At what price? What safety against unauthorized use will be implemented? And will this necessarily imply the resumption of nuclear testing?

While some argued that India only needs a small size nuclear deterrent and for this no further nuclear testing will be needed, others pointed out that deploying a triad will imply the adaptation of nuclear warheads to different types of delivery systems, a task very difficult to achieve without specific testing. Other participants pointed out that the sentence in the draft Indian nuclear doctrine: "India's nuclear forces?should be organized for very high survivability against surprise attacks and for rapid punitive response", implies a launch on warning posture that could be very dangerous.

Summarizing, some participants stressed that India's nuclear doctrine emphasizes restraint, the need for only a limited arsenal and strict adherence to a policy of no first use, while others implied that India's nuclear doctrine is both a recipe for a regional arms race and a serious impediment to global nuclear disarmament.

International Participants

Sir Michael Atiyah, President of Pugwash; Honorary Professor, University of Edinburgh, UK
Prof. Francesco Calogero, Professor of Theoretical Physics, University of Rome "La Sapienza", Rome, Italy; Chairman, Pugwash Council
Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Associate Professor of Mathematical Physics, University of Milan, Italy; Secretary General, Union of Italian Scientists for Disarmament (USPID); Director, Program on Science Technology and International Security, Landau Network - Centro Volta, Como, Italy
Ms. Thérèse Delpech, Directeur de la Prospective, CEA, Paris, France
Prof. Ryukichi Imai, Professor, Kyorin University, Tokyo, Japan; Distinguished Fellow, Institute for International Policy Studies, Tokyo
Dr. Liu Xuecheng, China Institute of International Studies, Beijing, China
Dr. Steven Miller, Director, International Security Program, Center for Science & International Affairs (CSIA), Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Member, Pugwash Council; Co-Chair, U.S. Pugwash Group
Prof. George Rathjens, Secretary-General, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs; Professor Emeritus, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA

Indian Participants

Dr. Kalpana Chittaranjan, Researcher, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), Old J.N.U. Campus, New Delhi, India
Shri G. Dharmendra, Deputy Secretary (D&ISA), Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, India
Amb. Arundhati Ghosh, former Permanent Representative of India to the UN
Dr. Thiagarajan Jayaraman, Reader, Institute of Mathematical Sciences, Chennai, India
Ms. Tara Kartha, Research Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), Old J.N.U. Campus, New Delhi, India
Dr. Amitabh Mattoo, Chairperson, Centre for International Politics, Organisation and Disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India
Dr. C. Raja Mohan, Strategic Affairs Editor, The Hindu, New Delhi, India
Dr. Savita Pande, Research Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), Old J.N.U. Campus, New Delhi, India
Shri Ashok Parthasarathi, Member, Executive Committee, Indian Pugwash Society
Dr. Rajesh Rajagopalan, Research Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), Old J.N.U. Campus, New Delhi, India
Prof. Ramamurthi Rajaraman, Professor, School of Physical Science, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India
Shri M. K. Rasgotra, Former Foreign Secretary, New Delhi, India
Ms. Manpreet Sethi, Research Officer, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), Old J.N.U. Campus, New Delhi, India
Shri Jasjit Singh, Director, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, India; Convener, Indian Pugwash Society; Member, Pugwash Council
Shri Krishnaswami Subrahmanyam, Consulting Editor, Times of India and Economic Times, New Delhi, India
Prof. Bhalchandra M. Udgaonkar, Senior Professor (Retired), Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, India
Shri N.N. Vohra, Director, India International Centre, New Delhi, India
Prof. Martin Zuberi, retired Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi, India

Pugwash Staff

Rome Office: Claudia Vaughn, Pugwash Conferences, via della Lungara 10, I-00165 Rome, Italy

Working Papers

Francesco Calogero (Italy): Remarks on Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine
Kalpana Chittaranjan (India): Abolition of Nuclear Weapons and NATO’s New Strategic Concept, including annex The Alliance’s Strategic Concept
Ryukichi Imai (Japan): Framework Convention on Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, The Draft Indian Nuclear Doctrine: A Preliminary Critique
Savita Pande (India): Motivations for Acquisition and Retention of Nuclear Weapons and their Impact
Rajesh Rajagopalan (India): Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures in South Asia
Manpreet Sethi (India): Practical Steps to Abolish Nuclear Weapons - Addressing the Belief Systems