Preliminary Reflections on No First Use Doctrine for the Middle East*
Ariel Levite **
*Discussion paper intended solely for the personal use of the Pugwash
meeting participants. Any further dissemination or citation is subject
to a written consent by the author.
** The paper reflects solely the personal views of the author,
and does not represent either the official view of the Israeli government
or the IAEC
I. The general norm of nuclear
"no first use"
The goal underlying the idea of promoting the "no first use
(NFU) norm and obligations undoubtedly is a noble one, namely to diminish
the risk posed by nuclear weapons. NFU as further envisaged as interim
steps, designed also to degrade the utility derived from nuclear weapons,
relegating them to weapons of existential deterrence, and eventually
diminishing their appeal to the point that they become utterly dispensable.
It is when this idea is actually examined as a practical proposition,
however, that some fundamental questions arise as to its viability
and desirability. The first question is a contextual one, having to
do with the ability to implement NFU obligations in isolation from
developments in other domains, be they other Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) or the conventional balance of forces. The second question is
a strategic one, pertaining to the impact on stability of adopting
NFU obligations in the absence of other changes in the nature of the
relationships between the nuclear parties. A third question is a conceptual
one, namely whether NFU obligations inherently require reciprocity
or have some value and viability even when undertaken unilaterally.
The final question has to do with the form that NFU obligation take,
namely can or should they assume the character of political statements
or must they assume the form of legally binding obligations.
This paper seeks to address all of these questions in the Middle
East context.
II. Strategic Realities in the
Contemporary Middle East
Before turning to assess the practicality and desirability of NFU
in the Middle East, it is important to note some of the present characteristics
of the Middle East scene that have an immediate bearing on the NFU
idea.
First, notwithstanding a widespread belief that Israel enjoys a unique
nuclear status in the Middle East, there is no doubt that are quite
a few other states in the region that posses significant quantities
of WMD, both of the chemical and increasingly also of the biological
variety. It is also clear that several of them are also actively pursuing
nuclear weapons.
Second, it is just as important to note that several of the states
in the region have rather few moral inhibitions about employing tools
of terror and applying indiscriminate weapons, conventional and otherwise,
against any and all of their adversaries, foreign as well as domestic.
In this context, Egypt, Libya, and Iraq have all resorted to first
use of chemical weapons over the last 35 years, in the Iraqi case
not just against Iran but also against their own Kurdish citizens.
Third, and related to the earlier point, is a political culture among
many of these regimes that is quite tolerant of deceit (to its own
citizens, let alone to the outside world), even when it is practiced
consistently. This norm is further exacerbated by cavalier disregard
of political obligations, many of which are undertaken for temporary
gain with the explicit knowledge, even intention, to ignore or shake
loose of them as soon as it becomes expedient to do so. This attitude
commonly results in a profound disbelief becoming the dominant attitude
toward unverifiable obligations undertaken by one's adversaries.
Fourth, there is a growing level of frustration and anxiety among
the more extreme regimes in the region, about their inability to keep
up conventional military modernization. There is widespread exasperation
about their abject failure to close the widening capability gap, and
ever catch with or otherwise conventionally offset the growing high-tech
capabilities of the US, Israel, or other leading Western states. These
feelings are channeling their hostile energies toward asymmetric strategies
of warfare in general, and ever more lethal and sophisticated WMD
and their delivery means in particular.
Fifth, it is reassuring to realize that the crude old logic of deterrence
does still work in the Middle East, even against the more extreme
regimes. True, it is becoming increasingly apparent that there are
circumstances in which the reliability of deterrence can no longer
be taken for granted, just as there are non-state leaders who seem
unimpressed by threats of retaliation and punishment. But threats
of denial, and especially overwhelming punishment (against them and
their regime), do appear to resonate even with the leaders of several
of the most problematic states, ranging from Iran, and Iraq to Libya,
and Syria.
Finally, it is sobering to observe the impact of the implicit Western
threats of "an overwhelming and devastating response" against
those who unleash on them WMD. This oft-repeated threat, which implicitly
(or occasionally even explicitly) does not rule out resort to nuclear
weapons, has thus far at least proven especially potent in dissuading
WMD aggression against them and their allies. The special qualities
of nuclear weapons (sheer unprecedented destructive power coupled
with certainty of destruction) that have made them into the bedrock
of superpower stability during the Cold War are inherent in the weapons
themselves. Consequently, it is hardly surprising that their impact
appears to transcend the geographical and temporal domains of the
Cold War, powerfully resonating also with contemporary Middle Eastern
(and for that matter South Asian) regimes.
III. Nuclear No First Use in
the Middle East
In light of the above context, any serious consideration of the desirability
and practicality of introducing NFU obligations into in the Middle
East must address a few conceptual as well as practical issues.
First, at least insofar as Israel is concerned, it is clear that
it is highly undesirable to encourage it to undertake a NFU obligation.
This is the case because a NFU obligation would run against Israel's
long held commitment not be even the "first to introduce nuclear
weapons into the Middle East", a commitment that has weathered
the tests of time, political transitions within Israel, as well as
many crises in the region. A NFU obligation would require Israel first
to abandon this long held doctrine of extreme nuclear restraint, to
the detriment of its own ideological beliefs, and political and strategic
requirements. But just as seriously, such development is bound to
compel Israel's more moderate neighbors, those that have repeatedly
indicated their tolerance of Israel's posture so long as it refrains
from "crossing the nuclear threshold", to react harshly
to such change in Israel's nuclear policy. Thus, a NFU obligation,
were it to be undertaken by Israel, is in fact likely to prove highly
counter-productive to itself but even more so detrimental to its moderate
neighbors, regional stability as a whole, as well as to the interests
of those parties generally committed to the broader cause of nuclear
non-proliferation.
Second, we must consider the critical role played by (implicit and
at times even explicit) US, UK, and even French nuclear deterrence
in dissuading regional parties from WMD use as well as large-scale
conventional provocations. Thus, it will be most harmful to stability
to undercut this postures by encouraging them to adopt NFU obligations,
at least unless and until an obvious alternative presents itself.
At the minimum this suggests that NFU obligations must be tied to
the broader context of no first use of other WMD, and potentially
also conventional weapons as well.
Third, even if it were miraculously possible to promote NFU obligations
for all categories of WMD, this idea might still prove harmful to
the security and stability of the Middle East. This is partially a
consequence of the case the profound and deeply rooted disbelief in
any commitments undertaken by the more shady regimes, coupled with
the loose nature of NFU obligations, as well as their inherent unverifiability
and unenforceability. Taken together these are bound to put at a considerable
disadvantage those few parties within the region (or operating in
it) that do take their political obligations seriously.
The tentative conclusion that emerges from the above analysis is,
therefore, quite clear. The benefits offered by nuclear NFU in the
Middle East are presently uncertain at best, while the risks considerable.
The inevitable bottom line that follows is, therefore, that "
if it ain't broke, do not fix it".
IV. Thinking Beyond NFU
Returning to our point of departure, it might be useful to consider
whether the noble goal underlying the idea of NFU can somehow be attained
by other means. Alternatively, we might wish to reflect whether some
circumstances might arise in which NFU obligations might assume new
relevance for the Middle East region. Both of these issue lie generally
outside the scope of this paper. But in closing let me offer two parting
thoughts on these issue that may be picked up in the discussion.
It is by far better to prevent any nuclear proliferation in the Middle
East than to deal with its consequences. This is still possible to
do, although time is running out, given the intensity by which Iraq
and Iran, and possibly others in the region as well, pursue nuclear
weapons. The prospects for success will be considerably influenced
by a combination of domestic change and external incentives. In fact,
the domestic developments toward more democratic (or at least more
accountable and transparent) forms of government are a sine qua non
for any hope of cooperative security arrangements to be realized in
the region, in the nuclear domain as well as beyond it. And when such
time comes where CSBMs and other modest arms control measures as well
as broader political transformation pave the way for seriously exploring
cooperative nuclear security arrangements in the Middle East, the
first measures will have to be of the tightly verifiable and rigidly
enforceable type, as trust between the parties will still be a rather
scarce commodity. Only later might NFU obligations assume some relevance,
as they will then emerge in an atmosphere of a healthier regional
political climate produced by budding mutual confidence and reinforced
by the sincerity of intentions accorded by democratic and transparent
forms of governance.
