Security
and Defense Dilemmas in the Middle East:
The Nuclear Dimension
Mohamed Kadry Said*
*Military and technology advisor, Al-Ahram Center for
Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo, Egypt.
mkadrym@netscape.net
1. Introduction
The security dilemma arises from the ambiguity of military means,
postures and foreign policy intentions. In both the international
and regional systems, states keep careful watch on the military preparations
and foreign policies of other states before deciding how to respond
to these preparations and intentions. On the other hand, the defense
dilemma revolves around the possible security implications associated
with the holding of military means by states. Technological developments
have made modern and military means more and more lethal and destructive.
This is especially true for weapons of mass destruction (WMD), whose
actual use threatens inflecting unprecedented level of destruction
and devastation on the environment in which they are employed, far
beyond any acceptable measure.
The Middle East, for more than half a century, has been confronted
by the two dilemmas of security and defense without being able to
find a way out of them. It became a region of concern with regard
to not only nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their delivery
systems, but also as the World's largest recipient of conventional
weapons. Based on statistics, the Middle East with only 8% of world
population, has witnessed 25% of all the World's armed conflicts since
1945. It has known all sorts of conflicts such as regional wars, wars
of intervention, and civil wars with devastating consequences on the
human and material resources of the region. These conflicts were responsible
of more than one million fatalities, $450 billion of financial cost
and millions of displaced persons. The Arab-Israeli wars in 1948,
1956, 1967 and 1973 were alone responsible for 200,000 causalities,
$150 billion of financial cost, and 3 million displaced persons.1
Most notably in the past two decades the region witnessed two major
wars in the Persian Gulf: the Iraqi-Iranian War (1980 -1988) and the
Second Gulf War of 1991. The two wars revealed the considerable proliferation
level of WMD and ballistic missiles and their impact on the Middle
East security and stability.
Israel was the first state in the region that launched plans pursuing
an independent nuclear and missile capability. In the fall of 1956,
Israel attacked Egypt with prior agreement with France and Britain
in order to provide the two European nations with the pretext to occupy
the Suez Canal zone. In the same period of time, France agreed to
provide Israel with a 24mwt reactor and to build a chemical processing
plant at Dimona, which became the foundation of the Israeli nuclear
program. Intelligence and expert reports estimate that Israel has
produced 100 to 200 nuclear devices including warheads for its mobile
Jericho-1 and Jericho-2 ballistic missiles and for delivery by aircraft,
in addition to other tactical applications. 2
Israel has long been considered the only nuclear-weapons-capable
state in the Middle East, yet it has not overtly demonstrated a nuclear
capability, preferring instead a policy of "nuclear ambiguity".
The Arab states perceive the Israeli nuclear capability as a means
of deterrence, and also as a means of potential use in preemption
strike missions. Iran has been also suspected as having chemical and
biological weapons, and conducting nuclear research efforts. Iraq's
massive pre-Gulf War efforts in the WMD domain are now suspected to
allow Iraq for a new start once the international inspection and US
pressure cease to act. Syria, Libya and Egypt have been also reported
to possess chemical warfare capability.3
The Middle East has entered a new period of uncertainty after the
11th of September tragic events involving the terrorist suicidal attacks
on the twin towers in New York and on the Pentagon in Washington.
The Middle East is not far from these events. The suspects are likely
from the region, and the "root causes" of the crisis are
clearly linked to the region's security dilemmas. One of the important
fallouts of 9/11 is that terrorists and extremists may also acquire
WMD capability including nuclear one.
Bearing in mind all these intersecting factors, the nuclear threat
in the Middle East have not been perceived alone but rather linked
to other dangers of WMD and their delivery systems and conventional
military balance. It should also be seen from the perspective of perceived
intentions and accumulated historical practices. The conflict pattern
in the Middle East, while attracting the involvement of major powers,
is basically regional. The possible ambitions of the countries in
the area to acquire nuclear weapons are rooted primarily in this regional
context. The nuclear dilemma in the Middle East cannot stand-alone;
it should not be also left forever without solution, only with providing
vision and hope for the peace process the dangers of WMD including
nuclear weapons could be brought under control.
This paper provides a close focus on the Egyptian and Israeli position
concerning the nuclear problem and the associated weapons of mass
destruction proliferation issues in the Middle East. It also suggests
some thoughts of a possible road map to deal with the proliferation
issue targeting at the end freeing the Middle East from all weapons
of mass destruction. The process allows certain role for the "no-first-use"
policy in the interim initial phase of the process with the aim to
building confidence and preventing regional political deterioration.
2. Evolution of the Egyptian position
After the end of World War II, the Egyptian attitude towards arms
control was determined by two sets of conditions, which called for
two differing, and sometimes contradectory arms control policies.
The first stemmed from Egypt's position as a Third World country,
with all the attendant political, economic and social problems, and
as one of the founders of the United Nations (UN) and a leader in
the non-aligned movement. The second was a result of Egypt's leadership
position in the Arab World.4
The first set of conditions led to a policy of strong support for
all visions of disarmament, non-armament and arms control. Throughout
both the UN and non-aligned forums Egypt called and voted for a complete
and comprehensive dismantling of conventional as well as non-conventional
(nuclear, chemical and biological) weapons. Throughout most of the
cold war era the global arms race was considered as draining resources
that should be shifted towards world peace and development.
On the regional level, however, the Egyptian position was conservative,
restrictive and skeptical. At the 17th session of the UN General Assembly
(1963), Egypt suggested nine conditions for establishing nuclear weapon-free
zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. These conditions reflected Egyptian
fears of foreign domination, interference in its internal affairs
and high sensitivity over the issue of "sovereignty" in
any arms control measures. At the heart of this position were the
Arab-Israeli conflict and the concept of defensive and just war. From
1948 onwards, Israel was perceived as an aggressor on the Arab lands.
For Egypt, this aggression accelerated in the mid-1950s as a result
of the February 1955 Gaza raid and became particularly significant
in 1956 and 1967 when Egyptian territories came under direct Israeli
occupation. Within this context any arms control on the Middle East
regional level meant Egyptian acceptance of an unacceptable status
quo.
With continued western support to Israel in the area of armament,
Egypt began to fear that arms control arrangements in the Middle East
would be concerned only with restricting Arab and Egyptian capabilities,
particularly in the nuclear field, while allowing Israel to get away
with both its territorial gains and its achieving conventional and
nuclear superiority. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, therefore,
Egypt linked its acceptance of arms control arrangements in the Middle
East with the right of self-determination (the Palestinian question)
and the right of self-defense. Furthermore, Egypt called for international
control over Israeli nuclear reactors and total ban on exporting fissionable
material to Israel.5
After the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Egyptian position on arms control
issues began to shift as a result of the change in Egypt's leadership
from President Nasser to Sadat and the emerging peace process between
Israel and Egypt. Sadat realized that reaching a settlement to the
Arab-Israeli conflict is a precondition for Egyptian development.
To achieve this goal, Sadat concentrated his energy towards enhancing
US-Egyptian relations and to foster a peace process with Israel. He
worked hard to change the Egyptain domestic, regional and international
environment in a way conductive to peace. Changing Egyptian attitudes
towards arms control arrangements was one of the ways of realizing
his aims.6 Therefore, in the UN and non-aligned
movement Egypt became supportive of NWFZs, verification, inspection
arrangements and confidence building measures (CBMs). Furthermore,
Egypt and Iran introduced a resolution at the 29th session of the
UN General Assembly (1974), calling for the establishment of a NWFZ
in the Middle East. The resolution was adopted at the UN General Assembly
by a majority of 138 members, with only Israel and Burma abstaining.
From 1980 onwards, there was no opposition to, or abstention from
it including Israel.7
During the debates on the NWFZ resolution, Egypt stressed four basic
principles: (a) all states of the region should refrain from producing,
acquiring and possessing nuclear weapons; (b) the nuclear weapons
states should refrain from introducing nuclear weapons into the area
or using nuclear weapons against states in the region; (c) an effective
international safeguards system affecting both the nuclear weapon
states and the states of the region should be established; and (d)
the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East should not prevent
parties from enjoying the benefits of the peaceful uses of atomic
energy, especially for economic development.8
In fact, Egypt has gone as far as taking unilateral steps towards
arms control and considered the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1979
as a way to curtail, if not to eliminate, the Israeli nuclear arsenal.
Although this did not materialize, Egypt ratified the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) in 1982, and in 1986 froze all domestic nuclear programs.
Egypt then called in different forums for the establishment of NWFZ
in the Middle East. During the Paris Conference on chemical weapons
in January 1989, Egypt supported multinational efforts to impose a
total ban on chemical weapons, but asked that any chemical weapons
convention should include effective security guarantees for its members,
not only against the use or the threat of use of chemical weapons,
but also against the use or the threat of use of any weapons of mass
destruction. Nuclear weapons countries refused to accept this linkage.
The Egyptian position was based on a plan put forward by President
Mubarak, which called for an agreement making the Middle East free
of all weapons of mass destruction.
In spite of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, the Israeli
behavior continued to cause Egypt discomfort. With its southern flank
secured, in 1982 Israel turned its attention to its northern flank
and invaded Lebanon. Israel in addition increased its national security
domain to cover an area stretching from Morocco to Iran. More worrisome
to Egypt, however, has been the Israeli arms buildup. Israel became
the only nuclear power in the Middle East despite forecasts in the
1970s that more than one country would have nuclear weapons. Israel
also intensified its quantitative and qualitative edge in conventional
weapons through working to possess diversified family of delivery
systems including advanced aircrafts, missiles and submarines that
are capable reaching any of the Arab nation capitals. Finally, during
the 1980s Israel introduced the arms race in space.9
Israel conventional and unconventional arms superiority in the Middle
East triggered a new phase in the regional arms race. Countries such
as Syria, Iraq, Iran and Libya started to build non-conventional mass
destruction capabilities such as chemical and biological weapons.10
In addition to Saudi Arabia, these countries also acquired or developed
missiles of various kinds. Egypt, too, has participated in this deadly
race.
The Egyptian endorsement of a NWFZ in the Middle East reflects the
growing realism in Egyptian politics internally and externally. There
is a lack of consensus among the Egyptian elites over the strategic
value of acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities. In the 1960s, Egypt
was firmly committed to the search for strategic nuclear balance with
Israel. By the 1970s, however, Egypt had become less enthusiastic
about the issue. A new view emerged that possessing nuclear weapons
had no strategic value because Egypt could not use them in military
confrontation with Israel, where Palestinian Arabs live and many surrounding
Arab countries would be affected by nuclear fallout.
The establishment of the ACRS working group in October 1991 as a
multilateral forum for Arms Control and Regional Security was a direct
result of the Madrid conference and the American military campaign
in the Gulf War. The establishment of the ACRS meant an acceptance
of the "regional" approach to arms control but it also revealed
the fundamental differences between Egypt position and the Israeli
one about how to address the larger issues of arms control. By 1995,
it became evident that the ACRS forum was incapable of functioning
as a substantive arms control mechanism. In fact, the ACRS process
had broken down primarily due to major disagreements among the parties
over the nuclear issues. The negotiations showed that Arabs and Israelis
have opposite interests, approaches, priorities, and agendas of arms
control, and in particular on the nuclear issue. By 1995-96, in the
wake of the Egyptian-Israeli confrontation over the issue of the NPT
extension, it became evident that the ACRS process had reached a point
of complete impasse.11
The most elaborate Arab critiques of the Israeli nuclear doctrine
come from the Egyptian Foreign Ministry. It has been based on the
priciple of nondiscrimination which is antithetical to the notions
of "exceptionalism" that Israel has utilized to defend its
nuclear policy choices. The Egyptian military have similar concerns
and unlikely to accept a permanent Israeli monopoly of nuclear weapons
in the region.12 Moreover, and fuelled
by the deterioration in the peace process, the issue of Israel's nuclear
monopoly has become important in the domestic political discourse
in Egypt and in other Arab countries.
3. Is the Israeli bomb for deterrence or coercion?
For Egypt and other Arab states, the Israeli nuclear capability is
perceived not as a deterrence force, but as one of coercion. It is
considered a destabilizing factor in the Middle East triggering arms
race and weapons of mass destruction proliferation. The peace process
with Israel with its ups and downs and setbacks did not end the Arab
fears concerning Israel. These fears are based on political as well
as military reasons.
Politically, Israel continues to have a fanatic, fundamentalist right
wing, supported by a considerable portion of its public. This wing
refuses to withdraw from the Syrian occupied territories and puts
obstacles on the road to implementation of the Palestinian-Israeli
agreements. The assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak
Rabin is a testimony to this reality. Military superiority and the
use of force are the right wing parties preferred means to achieve
their political objectives.
Militarily, Israel has secured for itself a position of superiority
in both conventional and non-conventional weapons. Israel's nuclear
arsenal and its expanding space-based surveillance system have had
a profound impact not only on the strategic balance between Israel
and the surrounding Arab countries, but also between Israel and other
countries in the Mediterranean region. Israel has a sophisticated
nuclear military capability; active chemical weapons program and biological
warfare activities reportedly conducted at the Biological Research
Institute in Nes Tziyona.13 Israel missile
capabilities are ranging from theater ballistic missiles to orbital
delivery systems. Some reports refer to Jericho-3 program under development
using the Shavit system technologies with range up to (4800 km/1000kg).
Most of these systems are thought to be "nuclear capable".14
Israel is also building small satellites based on its Ofeq spy satellite
design with ground resolution around 1.5 meters, which means the ability
of identifying military valued objects existing on the Arab territories.15
From an Egyptian national security stand point, Israeli nuclear capability
should be understood within the framework of the Israeli intentions
determined by its politics, its superiority in conventional and non-conventional
weapons over all its potential adversaries, and the military constrains
imposed by the peace treaty on the Egyptian sovereignty in Sinai.
This imbalance in itself makes Egypt totally dependent on Israeli
good intentions not on a system of balance of power that guarantees
military stability. It has to be kept in mind that Israel had attacked
Egypt in liaison with colonial powers in 1956 and alone in 1967, which
led to the Israeli occupation of Sinai twice in a little more than
decade. In both occasions, Israel claimed parts of Sinai, and Egypt
had to pay a heavy price for the Israeli withdrawal in terms of its
dignity, development, and war costs.
The case of "Taba" presents a stark example indicating
that territory not security or survival that drives the Israeli policy.
On April 25, 1982 in the course of final withdrawal from Sinai, Israel
raised problems concerning the placement of border benchmarks and
refused to withdraw from a peice of land called Taba. During the negotiations
to solve this problem, which lasted "three years" to send
the case to arbitration, Israel built Sonesta Hotel, a tourist village
and a police station violating an agreement not to change the status
quo. On September 29, 1988, the international Arbitration Tribunal
ruled that Taba is an Egyptian territory. Four members of the arbitration
panel voted in favors with one member i.e. Israel, voting against.
The same trend continues with the Palestinians after Oslo when Israel
allowed accelerating building of new settlements in the occupied territories
in the West Bank and Gaza.
In the case of nuclear monopoly deterrence will be only dependent
on the political decision of the state having the bomb not on other
elements of strategic calculations outside the realm of the nuclear
state. Hence, the Israeli argument that its nuclear weapons capability
is for absolute deterrence and "last resort" weapon is not
convincing because it stands from the position of superiority. Under
this case other countries in the region will be tempted to seek balance
through clandestine efforts to acquire nuclear weapons or other types
of mass destruction weapons.
Source: Foundation for Middle East Peace
See: Henri Guirchon, "Alors que l'escalade militaire continue-Ces
colons qui barrent le chemin de la paix", Le Nouvel Observateur,
No. 1881, 23-29 Nov. 2000, p.33.
According to some analysts Israel needs 30 to 40 nuclear bombs to
destroy all imaginable targets in most of the Arab countries and return
them back to the stone ages. However, all intelligence estimates conclude
that Israel has no less than 100 nuclear warheads and this number
can go to 200. This discrepancy between capabilities and needs raises
serious doubts about the credibility of the Israeli intentions. Reports
indicate that Israel has developed tactical nuclear weapons, artillery
shills, and perhaps nuclear mines. This might be tempting to use in
the battlefield under circumstances of stress and uncertainty. As
low yield tactical weapons do not endanger Israel if used against
neighboring states, the decision to use them might be easier to make
than the case with more powerful strategic weapons.
Possessing an overwhelming nuclear superiority allows Israel to act
with impunity even in the face of worldwide opposition. A case in
point might be the invasion of Lebanon in 1982, led by Ariel Sharon,
which resulted in 20,000 deaths. Another major use of the Israeli
bomb is to compel the US to act in Israel's favor, even when it runs
counter to its own strategic interests. During the 1973 war, Israel
used nuclear blackmail to force Kissinger and Nixon to airlift massive
amounts of military hardware to Israel.16
4. The Israeli Position
There is no more controversial issue in Israel than its nuclear deterrent
and its policy of ambiguity. Many details of Israel's nuclear weapons
program and its delivery systems are uncertain and speculative. Israel
has long maintained that "it will not be the first to introduce
nuclear weapons into the Middle East". This declaration was adopted
by the Israeli leadership between 1967-73 and accepted by the US as
a strategy of ambiguity. Even after the dramatic revelations in 1986
of nuclear technician Mordechai Vanunu, Israel's nuclear status is
still regarded as inaccessible.17
A large number of western analysts see the culture of opacity is
rooted in the fundamental Israeli perceptions that developed over
decades of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This culture is based on the
following:
- Nuclear weapons are vital to Israel's security.
- Arabs should not be allowed to obtain these weapons.
- Israel should be allowed to keep a nuclear monopoly.
- Nuclear issues must be kept out of normal discourse and the whole
issue should be left to nuclear professionals.
- The opacity policy has served Israel and Israel has no alternative.
However, some credible Israeli analysts have expressed concerns that
under the culture of opacity, hawkish Israeli leadership might be
tempted to developed a different attitude regarding nuclear weapons,
namely their use in situations less than an existential threat to
the state. Such leadership might see them for example as an "appropriate"
Israeli response to an Iraqi chemical or biological attack. Such concerns
led Israeli analyst Ze'ev Schiff to propose a law "The Red Button
Law" that would place checks and balances on Israel's decision-making
system in this most sensitive field.18
From the Israeli perspective, the Hebrew State has been seeking nuclear
capability not for the sake of hegemonic aspiration or national prestige
but to develop an independent nuclear ultimate deterrent to balance
the fundamental geopolitical asymmetries in conventional military
power between Israel and the Arab states. Israel sees its nuclear
capability as the ultimate insurance policy enabling Israel to inflict
a holocaust on its enemies to prevent another holocaust on Israel.19
Although Israel acquired a nuclear option sometimes in the late 1960s,
it has not declared, tested, or made any other visible use of this
option, resulting in an "opaque" nuclear policy.20
Israel's strategic thinking has also led its government to contribute
to a vigorous nuclear denial strategy based on enhanced political
and intelligence coordination with other friendly states. To prevent
Iraq from pursuing nuclear weapons programs, Israel bombed and destroyed
the Iraqi Osiraq reactor in June 1981.21
In 2 February 2000, for the first time in Israel's history, the Knesset
held a discussion on Israel's nuclear program. Issam Mukhul, an Arab
member of the communist Hadash Party, spurred debate on the controversial
and previously off-limit subject. During the abbreviated debate, which
lasted only less than hour Chaim Ramon, the government's minister
for Jerusalem affairs, reiterated Israel's long-standing policy that
it would not be the first nation to introduce nuclear weapons into
the Middle East.22
Although Makbul's attempt to break the decades of silence sparked
off a flurry of articles in the Israeli press, most of these were
concerned with the safety procedures of the Dimona nuclear reactor
and avoided the strategic or philosophical issue. Other articles emphasized
the danger that any uncertainty over such sensitive issues in the
highly volatile Middle East may result in dangerous escalations.
The most that the Israeli nuclear discourse allows is to refer to
an Israeli "nuclear option" as a "capability"
consisting of "unsafeguarded nuclear facilities". Israel
made clear in the ACRS meetings that, as a matter of national strategy,
it will continue to insist on linking progress on the peace front,
as well as on linking the nuclear issue to visible progress in other
areas of arms control, both conventional and unconventional. On the
contrary, Israeli defense sources have publicly insisted that a leaner
peacetime Israeli army must have an even stronger strategic deterrent
component. It is the nuclear option in their view that will preserve
peace.
Former Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu in 1996 clarified the Israeli
position by noting that "lasting peace" could only mean
peace among democracies: until the region becomes democratic, Israel
is forced to maintain its strategic deterrence. Similarly, Prime Minister
Ehud Barak, stated that Israel would need to maintain its nuclear
option indefinitely. Such point of view only see peace based on the
presence of Israeli nuclear weapons. It seems that Israeli public
supports this view. Nearly all Israelis consider the nuclear option
indispensable to their security, a view that will not completely recede
once a comprehensive peace treaty is signed. This view does not see
that peace would not change Israel's fundamental geopolitical predicament.
Israel would still see itself as a small Jewish island surrounded
by a vast Arab sea. This view means that a NWFZ is not feasible for
the near future.
5. The Way Out
The situation in the Middle East requires a realistic perspective
and new formulas to address its nuclear dimension. Problems in the
Middle East include territorial disputes, the broader conventional
balance, and proliferation of other non-nuclear WMD weapons. The peace
process must be brought back on track on all fronts. Confidence and
Security Building Measures (CSBMs) should be encouraged as part of
a recommended step-by-step incremental approach in the Middle East.
Track-two talks could be a practical step towards resuming bilateral
and multilateral official talks. The chances for success of any resumed
talks will be better if countries absent in the past were included
(i.e., Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria).
To incorporate the nuclear issue within a regional architecture of
peace and arms control, as well as within the wider context of global
nuclear disarmament, the way out from the nuclear dilemma in the Middle
East should go through linking arms control measures with a political
time table for the overall settlement. Arms control talks in Europe
would not have accomplished anything without prior agreements on the
arms that talks intended to control. Consistent with these ideas,
at certain phase of the process transparency is required by all states
of the region concerning their conventional and unconventional arsenal.
The process of dealing with the nuclear issue can be looked at consisting
of three phases:
Phase one: CSBMs + "No-First-Use"
· This phase will target building confidence and preventing
deterioration of the region's proliferation conditions. In this phase,
states of the region will commit themselves to the creation of WMDFZ
as one of the fundamental outcomes of the process, by entering into
serious talks as to how a WMDFZ be established and what its components
might be. The task will represent a new challenge to establish in
the same zone inspection and verification regimes covering the three
kinds of mass destruction weapons: nuclear, chemical and biological.
In this regard, the talks will discuss the need to incorporate special
and additional verification measures if it is to be politically, technically
and publicly acceptable. In order to satisfy the concerns of some
countries, special verification regime might be proposed to allow
for mutual, reciprocal and intrusive inspections of both a routine
and challenge nature.
· Analyzing the conditions under which the states of the region
would be prepared to give up their WMD options and the interim steps
on the road to the creation of a WMDFZ.
· Considering of initial steps to prevent the regional WMD
situation from becoming worse. An example of such steps could be a
"no first use" of WMD declaration by the countries of the
region. To encourage countries of the region to give a pledge of "no
first use" of WMD some additional measures could be suggested
like a non-offensive redeployment of conventional forces near the
border areas or by taking voluntarily unilateral initiatives in selected
security areas.
· The interaction between missiles and some types of conventional
weapons with WMD weapons could be discussed in this phase of the work.
Phase Two: Capping of WMD Stock
· This phase will prevent the regional WMD situation from
becoming worse. In October 1990, a group of experts presented to the
United Nation secretary-general a study on effective and verifiable
measures, which would facilitate the establishment of a NWFZ in the
Middle East. The study suggested practical measures to cap Israeli
nuclear capabilities, such as putting the Dimona reactor under IAEA
safeguards within the NPT system. This would keep the Israeli nuclear
deterrent intact until further political steps be taken. What is interesting
about this study is that it does not confine itself solely to the
nuclear field, but instead seeks to limit other weapons of mass destruction
and conventional weapons as well, including missiles. Absent in this
study is a time frame during which Israel would be introduced to the
Middle Eastern NWFZ.
· Proposal to halt the production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons. The Bush proposal for arms control in the Middle East in
May 1991 contained an element prohibiting the production of fissile
material as a necessary step towards the establishment of a Middle
East NWFZ. The advantage of this proposal is that it can be future-oriented
and it makes no specific reference to nuclear weapons only panning
fissile materials for weapons. Applying this proposal will lead to
capping Israel's unsafeguarded nuclear program and impose quantitative
constrains on Israel's nuclear capabilities.
Phase Three: Establishing WMDFZ
· It is a long-term phase targeting a Middle East free of
all weapons of mass destruction. In this phase weapons of mass destruction
will be phased-out over a period of time. Some could be eliminated
as a result of international guarantees, while others should be traded
according to peace treaties between Israel and Arab countries. The
rest should be eliminated once full normalization of relations is
achieved and different types of economic and functional cooperation
are installed.23
· This overall linkage between the political and economic aspects
of ending the Israeli nuclear monopoly should be understood in the
light of absolutely accepting putting constrains on the attempts of
any country to acquire nuclear or other mass destruction capabilities.
Egypt for example participated in the international coalition that
finally destroyed Iraqi nuclear power, and has opposed Iranian attempts
in this regard. In the meantime, Egypt has been very flexible in dealing
with the issue of the Israeli nuclear capability by not using the
"nuclear issue" to create tensions in the Egyptian-Israeli
relations but rather raised it as a fundamental point of difference
that should be tackled through negotiations. Egypt also sugested to
having an agreement "in principle" on the creation of a
nuclear free zone in the Middle East and accepted a postponement of
the negotiations concerning Israeli nuclear capabilities until Israeli
signs peace treaties with its neighbors.
Footnotes
| 1. |
The Military Balance: 2001-2002. The
2001 Chart of Armed Conflict, The International Institute
for Strategic Studies, Oxford, University Press. |
| 2. |
See: Israel's Nuclear Weapons at Federation
of American Scientists
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/,
23 Oct. 2002, p.3 of 6. |
| 3. |
See: Anthony H. Cordesman, "The
Military Balance in the Middle East: an Executive Summary",
IGCC Policy Paper # 49, March 1999, p. 88. |
| 4. |
Abdel Monem Said Aly and Mohamed Kadry,
"Naval Arms Control in the Southern Mediterranean: An Arab
perspective", in Europe and Naval Arms Control in the
Gorbachev Era, Sipri, Oxford University Press, 1992, p.304. |
| 5. |
Khalifa, A. and Bakr, H., "Egypt
and disarmament in the UN", Al-Siyassa Al-Dawliya,
July 1978, p.17 (in Arabic). |
| 6. |
Sadat had shown more understanding of the security
problems and siege mentality of Israel. Moshe Dyan, minister of
foreign affairs of Israel at the time of peace negotiations with
Egypt has questioned himself in his book "Breakthrough: A
personal account of the Egyptian Israeli Peace Negotiations":
"What is the real reason that pushed Sadat to take his daring
step to go to Jerusalem ?..a question that I thought long to ask
Sadat about, and I did not get the chance during his visit to
Israel, because his time would not permit that. Afterwards, I
did not stop to think about this subject during the various occasions
that I had the opportunity to meet him in Camp David, in Egypt
and in Israel..even when we were alone. Such occasion was materialized
after one year and half in Ismailia, 4 of June 1979. Sadat's answer
was: the principle cause behind my decision to visit Israel was
that the Israeli have security problems, and they used to hide
behind them and ask for face-to-face negotiations. Well, I decided
to meet them directly and alone..me and Israel". [Queted
from the Arabic version of Dyan's book, Egyptian Information
General Authority translated books, book (764)]. |
| 7. |
Avner Cohen, "Regional Security
and Arms Control in the Middle East: The Nuclear Dimension",
in Middle East Security Issues in the Shadow of Weapons of
Mass Destruction Proliferation, Barry R. Schneider, ed., USAF
Counterproliferation Center, December 1999, p. 84. |
| 8. |
UN General Assembly Records, A/C.1/PV.2001, p. 32-36. |
| 9. |
See Abdel Monem Said Aly, "Quality
vs. quantity: the Arab perspective of the arms race in the Middle
East", ed. S.A. Stahl and G. Kemp, the Arms Race in the
Middle East and South Asia (Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace: Washington, DC, 1992), 61-74; and Talat Musalem, "Strategic
causes for Israeli participation in Star Wars", Drasat,
September 1987, p.3-11. |
| 10. |
Nadia Mustafa, "Egyptian politics
and the nuclear options: vision, behavior and constrains",
Al-Siassa Al-Dawlya (July 19890, P.24-59. |
| 11. |
See Cohen, Note (7), p. 88. |
| 12. |
Ibrahim A. Karawan, "Nuclear Temptations:
The Middle East as a Case Study" in US Strategies for
Regional Security, The Stanley Foundation, 2001, p. 108. |
| 13. |
See Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, Carnegeie Analysis, Chemical and Biological Weapons in
the Middle East, at:
http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/templates/article.asp?NewsID=2669. |
| 14. |
Lawrance Scheinman, "NBC and Missile
Proliferation Issues in the Middle East" in Barry R. Schneider
ed., "Middle East Security Issues: In the shadow of Weapons
of Mass Destruction Proliferation", USAF Counter-proliferation
Center, (AU Press, Dec. 1999), p. 25. |
| 15. |
Bill Sweetman, "Spy satellites:
the next leap forward-Exploiting commercial satellites technology",
International Defense Review, Vol. 30, January 1, 1997,
p. 26. |
| 16. |
See: John Steinbach, "Israel Weapons
of Mass Destruction: a Threat to Peace", at Website of the
nuclear Age Peace Foundation, at http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/02.03/0331steinbachisraeli.htm,
5 from 9. |
| 17. |
David Eshel, "Israel's nuclear
deterrent faces first public scrutiny", Jane's Intelligence
Review, Vol. 12, No. 7, July 2000, p. 14. |
| 18. |
See Cohen, Note No. 7, p.92. |
| 19. |
See Cohen, Note No. 7, p. 78. |
| 20. |
Some reports speculate that a suspected
nuclear explosion in the southern Indian Ocean in 1979 was a joint
South African-Israeli test. See Note No. (2), p.5 from 6. |
| 21. |
Ed Blanche, "Israel addresses the
threats of the new millennium-Part One", Jane's Intelligence
Review, Vol. 11, No.2, February 1999, p. 24. |
| 22. |
See Arms Control Association at: http//www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_03/brmr00.asp. |
| 23. |
Abdel Monem Said, "In the Shadow
of the Israeli Nuclear Bombs: Egyptian ThreatPerceptions",
The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Summer/Fall 1996, Vol.
III, Issue 2, p. 160. |
