

STATEMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

What was this debate about?
What has this body reacted to?
What were the motives?
What was the purpose?
What is the outcome?
What is at stake?

The issue at hand was simple: "Iran has commenced operation at a safeguarded facility to produce feed for nuclear fuel under full scope monitoring of the IAEA."

Let me state this again with a slight modification: "A NNWS party to the Treaty and the member of the Agency's Safeguards has commenced operation at a safeguarded facility to produce feed for nuclear fuel under full scope monitoring of the IAEA."

This is the core of the debate.

Was anyone able to explain how this could be an issue in the first place? Was anyone able to suggest why and under which pretext the Board had to convene urgently to deliberate on this matter? Was anyone able to describe what provoked an alarm that called for a quick-fix reaction?

I do not believe anyone here had a single convincing response to these questions. The reason is clear - because there is none. How can this body be called to react to an act which is in full conformity with the NPT and the Safeguards and constitutes a limited manifestation of the exercise of an inalienable right. A right, which by its own simple meaning, cannot be alienated from anyone.

The states who prompted this debate and were the proponents of this decision today imply that they do so under the precept of non-proliferation.

At the same time, these states either possessors of nuclear weapons or rely on them for their security in one form or the other, or are the exclusive producers of nuclear fuel, or have stood firm on not foregoing this capability under any circumstances.

The point is, how can a small amount of feed material for enrichment to produce nuclear fuel be a matter of concern whereas a number of these states, including non-nuclear weapon states amongst them, are sitting on many tons of separated plutonium which can be directly diverted to nuclear weapons, at any time of their choosing?

The conventional reply has been that these states have good standing with the Safeguards. What they forget to say is that these states have never been forcefully denied access to nuclear material, equipment and technology. Give us a fraction of that access and we will make an example of fullest possible transparency, and will be in exemplary standing.

It is evident that the motive is to apply pressure, to the victim of the denials. And the purpose, it is obvious, is to move from denial to deprivation. A prescription which is written for Iran but which will

be rolled for all other developing states too if Iran bends. Fortunately, Iran will not bend. Iran will be a nuclear fuel producer and supplier within a decade.

Iran like all other developing countries and member of the NPT, has rejected nuclear weapons, decisively and firmly. All Iran wants to do is to enjoy its right under the NPT, the right which has been denied to it for more than two decades, a denial that has been firm and decisive.

The Agency is founded on the premises of:

First: providing and facilitating nuclear material and technology for peaceful purposes.

Second: Safeguarding material and facilities

Third: Ensuring safety

The first obligation of the Agency is severely undermined, at the behest of the second. No wonder the Americans call this Agency the UN Watchdog, the term that is demeaning and condescending to the integrity of this Organization.

If you go by the book, the Agency should be assisting Iran to operate and improve its fuel production capability, including the segment of UCF, just as it should for all other developing states. Well, we understand that it has been disabled and prohibited to perform this obligation. But what is absurd is that a decision is passed here which betrays even the Agency's second, more revered objective. If this Body expresses concern over the operation of our facility which is under Safeguards and which is fully monitored, then what should this Body say about so many unsafeguarded facilities spread around in other parts of the world, and particularly in our region?

The Americans have for long maintained, demonstrated, and acted upon the conviction that assurances of non-diversion of the Agency are not credible. The same conviction lead that country to ignite a war in no less than two years ago. But is this déjà-vu again? I am sorry, not this time – Iran is not Iraq, and the United States is not that self-appointed policeman of the world anymore. The decision today is, après tout, a vote of no confidence to the Agency and its Safeguards system; It signals the beginning of the road to an unwanted and undue confrontation through which, in the words of the Director-General, all parties stand to loose.

We believe in the Agency and the Safeguards system.

We will continue to work with the Agency.

We will maintain our activities fully under Safeguards.

The operation at the UCF in Isfahan will remain under full scope monitoring.

The product will be sealed by Agency.

In one word, we will fully observe our obligations in our programme of producing nuclear fuel. So there is no point for concern whatsoever.

We will not heed to questioning of the Agency's credibility that this resolution stands for.

This resolution is, in essence, a vote of no confidence to the credibility of the Agency and its Safeguards system.

The appeal by the United Nations Secretary General and the Director-General here to revert to negotiations, we will be prepared, despite this hoopla, for negotiations, free of pre-conditions and with manifest good will.

**IAEA Board of Governors
August 2005
Implementation of safeguards in Iran
Statement by Brazil**

برازیل
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Madam Chair,

* which the Board has
just adopted

Brazil considers the resolution submitted by France, Germany and the United Kingdom, as contained in document GOV/2005/63^{REV 1}, as an important step to support the negotiating process based on the Paris agreement of November 2004. In this connection, my delegation reiterates its position that all issues pertaining to international peace and security should be preferably resolved through dialogue and cooperation.

With a view to arriving at a mutually acceptable and satisfactory solution, Brazil urges the Parties concerned to exercise maximum restraint and not to take decisions that might jeopardize the negotiating process.

Brazil commends the work of the IAEA in monitoring the voluntary confidence-building measures implemented by Iran. My delegation strongly believes that the maintenance of such confidence-building measures can greatly contribute to restore the confidence of the international community on the peaceful purposes of the Iranian nuclear program.

On the other hand, Brazil wishes to recall that unilateral and voluntary confidence-building measures cannot be put on the same standing as legally-binding commitments undertaken by Member States under international treaties and under their respective safeguards agreements with the IAEA. In this context, and having in mind the inalienable right of NPT Parties to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Brazil appeals to Iran to reconsider the decision announced on August 1st 2005 and to continue to cooperate fully and proactively with the IAEA, with a view to clarifying the still pending issues and to re-establishing the confidence of the international community on the peaceful nature of its nuclear program.

Brazil is confident that such a course of action is essential to arrive at a satisfactory solution to this issue within the IAEA, to the benefit of international peace and security.

Thank you.

نیوزیلینڈ

New Zealand statement on Iran at special IAEA Board of Governors' meeting 11 August 2005

Madam Chair

Along with others who have made statements at this Board meeting, New Zealand urges Iran to suspend the conversion activities it recently resumed at the uranium conversion facility in Isfahan.


We recognise Iran's right, under Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with Article II.

However, the resumption of activities at Isfahan runs counter to a number of previous Board resolutions which have called upon Iran to suspend enrichment-related and reprocessing activities as a voluntary confidence-building measure, essential to addressing outstanding questions relating to Iran's nuclear programme.

New Zealand fully supports the EU3/Iran negotiations on long-term arrangements.

We urge Iran to re-establish full suspension without delay so that these negotiations can continue and, we hope, produce agreement on objective guarantees that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes.

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ NAM's Statement after Adoption of Resolution on Iran at the
Special Session of the Board of Governors of the IAEA,
11 August 2005



Madame Chairman,

I have the honour to make this statement on behalf of NAM following the adoption of the resolution on Iran by vote/without a vote.

2. When addressing the start of the special session of the IAEA Board of Governors on Safeguards Implementation in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Related Board Resolutions, NAM had expressed the view that the special session should contribute to wards a fair and just solution consistent with the provisions of Iran's rights and obligation under its NPT safeguards agreement and the basic and inalienable rights of all member states to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

3. NAM continues to underline that all problems should be resolved through dialogue and peaceful means and in this regard calls on EU 3 and Iran to continue with their dialogue with a view to achieving a mutually long term agreement within the mandate of the IAEA...

4. NAM's ^{position} ~~call~~ echoes that of other mediators, including that of the UN Secretary General Mr. Kofi Annan, in calling for restraint on the part of all parties involved and the continuation of dialogue.

5. At the crux of the matter in moving towards any resolution, the international community must clearly distinguish between confidence building measures and safeguards obligation. NAM is concerned that if these two issues are not clearly distinguished, the IAEA which under its Statute of the IAEA is responsible to ensure compliance of member states to their respective safeguards agreement, may be obliged to enforce voluntary commitments of member states.

6. Finally ^{Madame} ~~Mr.~~ Chairman, I would like the statement that I have just made to be fully reflected in the record of this meeting.

Thank you Madame Chairman.

U.S. Statement
August 11, 2005 IAEA Board of Governors Meeting

Iran



Madam Chair,

The United States [supports the resolution proposed by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom][welcomes the resolution adopted by the Board]. I want to thank the delegations of France, Germany and the United Kingdom for their tremendous effort over the last two years to help resolve the ongoing crisis of Iran's nuclear program.

Today we are in the midst of a crisis. A crisis of confidence in the activities of one member state. And a crisis in our efforts to strengthen the nonproliferation regime.

One country is responsible for this crisis: Iran. Iran rejected the EU3 offer -- before even receiving it. Iran restarted conversion -- despite the Board's resolutions. And yesterday -- in the midst of our deliberations -- Iran broke the seals bearing the mark of this

organization.

There is only one way to resolve the crisis precipitated by Tehran: Iran must stop its activities and reconsider its course. And this can only happen if our countries, speaking collectively, make clear our serious concern. [We have done so with this resolution]

Iran's provocative activities and Iran's blatant disregard for past resolutions of this Board raise serious questions about its intentions. These build on questions already raised by Iran's record of hiding activities, withholding information, and breaching its safeguards obligations.

If we cannot convince Iran to step off this dangerous road, rest assured: we'll face yet another crisis created by Iran. Then the crisis won't be over Iran breaking seals at Esfahan. Then the crisis will be over Natanz.

We'll hear the same arguments. Iran will argue that it has the right to conduct enrichment at Natanz for peaceful purposes. But think

about Natanz. It was built secretly. It was built underground. It was disguised as an agricultural station. Some of you have seen it with your own eyes. Like Esfahan that feeds it, Natanz is not part of an infrastructure built for peaceful purposes.

Iran argues that it is promoting the peaceful use of nuclear technology. It is not. It is subverting peaceful use to pursue a dangerous course. Iran has no need for uranium hexafluoride. Unless – of course – it wants nuclear weapons. Iran has no need for its heavy investment in an indigenous fuel cycle. Unless, of course, it wants nuclear weapons. Iran doesn't even have enough natural uranium to enrich for a civil nuclear program. But it has enough for a small stockpile of nuclear weapons.

We all support the peaceful use of nuclear technology. Safe, secure, and proliferation-resistant nuclear power will be a critical source of energy for developed and developing countries alike. But Iran's activities are not the model of a peaceful program.

Today's resolution builds on seven previous resolutions. Together

they demonstrate the serious concern we share about Iran's intentions and its disregard of international concerns. And they strongly signal our collective conviction that Iran must stop and get off this dangerous path.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

DECLARACION DE LA DELEGACION DEL ECUADOR ANTE LA JUNTA DE
GOBERNADORES DEL OIEA DURANTE EL PERIODO EXTRAORDINARIO DE
SESIONES EL 11 DE AGOSTO DE 2004

Implementación de Salvaguardias en Irán

Señora Presidente,

الوادور

Permítame que empiece por recordar que mi Delegación expresó su complacencia por el acuerdo alcanzado en París, en noviembre del 2004, entre la República Islámica de Irán con Alemania, Francia, el Reino Unido y el Alto Representante de la Unión Europea, con el objeto de iniciar un proceso de negociaciones, y saludó la decisión, con carácter voluntario, por parte de la República Islámica de Irán, de continuar con la suspensión y ampliarla para que incluya todas las actividades relacionadas con el enriquecimiento y reprocesamiento, sobretodo porque esta decisión voluntaria contribuye a fomentar un clima de confianza internacional que favorece el dialogo.

El Ecuador es un defensor de los principios básicos y del Derecho Internacional y del derecho inalienable que todos los países tienen de acceder a las tecnologías nucleares con fines pacíficos, en el contexto de los derechos y obligaciones que adquieren los Estados suscriptores del Tratado de No Proliferación y Acuerdos de Salvaguardias.

El Ecuador lamenta que la República Islámica de Irán haya tomado medidas unilaterales, que aunque apegadas a sus obligaciones frente al TNP y Acuerdos de Salvaguardias con el OIEA, no contribuyen a mantener el clima de confianza necesario. La suspensión voluntaria de las actividades relacionadas con el enriquecimiento por parte de Irán permitió, en los últimos meses, dar pasos adelante en torno a conseguir un acuerdo a largo plazo mutuamente favorable.

Mi Delegación ha analizado con detenimiento los argumentos y reservas expresados por Irán respecto de la propuesta europea para un "Acuerdo Marco a Largo Plazo", presentada en días pasados. No obstante, mira que el proceso de negociación iniciado no ha terminado y por el contrario debe continuar. En este contexto, el Ecuador hace un llamado a ambas partes a continuar con las negociaciones y a no tomar medidas que puedan perjudicar las mismas, pues ello impedirá llegar a un acuerdo que concilie las posiciones divergentes en aras de la paz, seguridad y bienestar internacionales.

Durante el presente período extraordinario de la Junta, no se podrá hablar de éxito, si tanto Irán como E3-EU no vuelven a la mesa de negociaciones, por lo que mi Delegación desea poner de manifiesto su

apoyo a los esfuerzos a largo plazo que se realicen para la solución cabal del presente caso.

Finalmente, permítame manifestar el apoyo de mi Gobierno al Director General y al Organismo por la manera eficiente y profesional con la que ha venido manejando este tema y reitera su apoyo al trabajo del Organismo en la implementación de las salvaguardias en Irán.

Con estos comentarios, mi Delegación desea manifestar su apoyo al proyecto de resolución que nos ha sido sometido.

STATEMENT BY SOUTH AFRICA

MEETING OF THE IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS, 11 AUGUST 2005

Chairperson,

آفریقہ کی صندھی

At the outset, South Africa wishes to associate itself with the statement made on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Chairperson,

South Africa has participated, as in relation to previous resolutions in the negotiations on a resolution on Iran in a constructive manner. Although a number of issues contained in the Resolution adopted remain of concern to my delegation, we have in the spirit of compromise joined the consensus to maintain the unity within the Board. We can only resolve the issue of the Iranian nuclear programme for peaceful purposes if all parties involved contribute to maintaining the unity of the Board, strengthen the Agency and act within the statutes of the IAEA. No decision by this Board should be taken that could damage the integrity, authority and credibility of the Agency or the NPT.

Chairperson,

In this context, Chairperson, South Africa has consistently emphasised the importance of differentiating between the legal obligations of the Islamic Republic of Iran which arises out of the safeguards agreement of the Agency and the confidence building measures that it has voluntarily undertaken, without in any way negating the importance of such measures to build voluntary building .

Chairperson,

South Africa is please to note from the reports of the Director General as contained in documents GOV/2005/61 and GOV/2005/62 that the surveillance equipment at the UCF is fully functional and that the uranium ore concentrate referred to in document GOV/2005/61 has been verified by the Agency.

We call upon Iran to continue its co-operation with the Agency, and all other parties to also co-operate to assist the Agency to resolving outstanding issues.

Chairperson,

As a confidence building measure, South Africa encourages the Islamic Republic of Iran to re-establish the full suspension of all enrichment related activities including the production of feed material on the same voluntarily basis as requested in previous Board Resolutions.

Chairperson,

South Africa wishes to reiterate its principle position once again that it can not support any unwarranted restrictions on the NPT guaranteed access to such capabilities for peaceful purposes by States that are fully compliant with their obligations under the NPT. As my delegation has stated its principled position on various previous occasions: we recognize and support the inalienable right of all States to utilize the atom for peaceful purposes as provided for in Article IV and in conformity with Articles I, II and III of the Treaty of the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

No one can take away this right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy from NPT States Parties who are in conformity with their obligations under the Treaty.

Chairperson,

South Africa would urge all parties involved to exercise maximum restraint and to refrain from any action that would further complicate the current negotiations and dialogue between the EU3 and Iran. We urge all parties to continue to ensure that a final and long lasting resolution on the Islamic Republic of Iran's peaceful nuclear programme can be found. South Africa stand ready to assist.

I thank you

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The Nigerian delegation
wishes to ~~at~~ the ^{signature made by} ~~our~~ ^{the Arab - DS}
associate itself with Malaysia
on behalf of the NAM.

Nigeria has in the tradition
of the Board of Governors joined
the consensus on the resolution
which has just been adopted.

Nevertheless, I wish to explain the
position of my country concerning
obligations and commitments
undertaken under the

NPT and ^{the AEA} Safeguard Agreements

Nigeria wishes to emphasize that nothing in those two ~~other~~ documents prevents States from pursuing peaceful nuclear activities that are vital to ^{the} life of their populations and ^{their socio-economic} development ~~independently~~ ~~of them~~. In that regard, ~~no~~ voluntarily assumed measures should ~~be~~ ^{not} be transformed into legal obligations on all ~~cases~~ ^{a general} basis ~~for~~ ~~the~~ ~~AE~~ ~~the~~ ~~same~~ ~~purpose~~ ~~it~~ ~~is~~ ~~that~~ ~~Algeria~~ ~~considers~~ ~~it~~ ~~to~~ ~~be~~ ~~important~~ ~~that~~ ~~all~~ ~~states~~

The inalienable rights to ^{and}
~~access~~ ^{energy} to ^{use} states to ^{develop and use} nuclear
~~materials~~ ^{energy} and technology for
peaceful purposes should
^{not} be called to question ^{under}
~~any documents~~ ~~of the NPT~~
for any reason whatsoever
~~governing them~~.

At the same time, Nigeria
considers it important that
all states should comply with
their commitments and obliga-
tions under the NPT and all
other relevant agreements and
desist from diverting, under
any guise whatsoever, ~~of~~
their nuclear holdings to
weapon purposes.