What
Future for Arms Control?
(The Silent Spring)
Report by:
Jack Harris
Presentations by:
Steven Miller (USA)
Alexander Nikitin (Russia)
Hugh Beach (UK)
PREAMBLE
British Pugwash were hosts to an international workshop on 'No First
Use' of nuclear weapons from 15th to 17th November and for this would
be gathered in London some of the world authorities on nuclear warfare.
It seemed a good opportunity to invite three of these distinguished
delegates to address a public meeting in London, on a date adjacent
to those of the workshop. Accordingly, General Sir Hugh Beach (Formerly
Master General of the Ordnance), Dr Alexander Nikitin (Director at
the Centre for Political and International Studies, Moscow) and Dr
Steven Miller (Director, Centre for Science and International Affairs,
Harvard University) were asked to speak to the subject: 'What Future
for Arms Control' at the Royal Society.
The three speakers were requested to approach the subject as they
saw fit; there was to be no collusion, no attempt to complement each
other or to reach a common view. So it came about that we had three
very good brains addressing the same subject, Arms Control, and not
unexpectedly we had three very distinctive interpretations.
During his address Alexander Nikitin mentioned that he had that
very morning left Moscow, which was covered in snow, and here he was
in London in a typically late autumn afternoon. These observations
triggered some thoughts in Jo Rotblat's mind because at the end of
the three talks he congratulated each of the speakers and suggested
that the main thrust of each address could be best described by ascribing
to each a season. Hugh Beach with his irrepressible optimism and long-term
hopeful view of human affairs, was obviously Summer; Alexander Nikitin,
fresh from the Steppes of Central Asia, was not so optimistic but
he could at least detect some warmth in the current situation so he
was ascribed to Autumn; Steven Miller, with his more intimate knowledge
of the machinations of the Bush administration and his pessimistic
view on the developing scene, simply had to be awarded Winter.
Had Steven, during his perambulations around London looking for
malt whisky, had by some magic bumped into Percy Shelley, and been
asked 'When Winter comes can Spring be far behind?', would have replied
'Well as a matter of fact,.....Yes!'. Hence our sub-title 'Silent
Spring' for this account. The order present below has been dictated
by the sequence of the seasons rather than the order of presentation
of the lectures.
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Hugh Beach
"The way to ensure summer in England
is to have it framed and glazed in a
comfortable room"
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Letter to Sir Horace Mann
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The speaker began by giving some examples of arms control measures
which have been successful in the past, starting with:
The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty
The Treaty was signed in December 1987 and came into force in 1988.
It was a turning point for arms control; the first accord to eliminate
a complete class of nuclear delivery means, banning all ground-launched
ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges from 500 to 5,500 km. It
also prohibited launchers, equipment, support facilities and operating
bases, test flights and future production of missiles. (It did not,
however, cover warheads and guidance systems.) For the first time
the Soviet Union accepted on-site verification. To ensure smooth working
of the Treaty a Special Verification Commission (SVC) was set up to
address issues of compliance and implementation.
The Americans removed their missiles from Belgium, the Netherlands,
Germany and Italy and, of course Greenham Common, by May 1991, as
required. The Soviets removed theirs from East Germany and Czechoslovakia.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, negotiations in the SVC ensured
that Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan all implemented their share of
the Treaty satisfactorily. Some 1692 missiles were destroyed within
the three year time allowed, and on-site inspection went on for a
further ten years. Midnight on May 31st signalled the end of the on-site
inspection regime. Everyone agreed that the treaty had been successfully
verified and verification will continue indefinitely by National Technical
Means (NTMs), ie mainly by satellite.
So here is a story that has unfolded over the past 20 years and has
been a great unsung success. It was told because the treaty provides
a paradigm, it broke new ground and, unlike the SALT treaties of the
1970s, brought about for the first time an actual reduction in weaponry.
A summary is now given of the subsequent reductions in arsenals that
arms control measures have brought about.
START-I
This treaty was signed in July 1991 and entered into force between
the US and Soviet Union, plus Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan in December
1994. By December 2001 each side had to reduce to 1,600 ballistic
missiles and heavy bombers carrying not more than 6,000 warheads.
This was about one third of the then strategic nuclear arsenals on
either side. Completion was duly reported on December 5th 2001, but
the treaty runs till 2009 with the option to extend it indefinitely.
When negotiating the Moscow treaty last May (SOR Treaty) both sides
agreed that START I 'remains in force and will provide the foundation
for providing confidence, transparency, and predictability in further
strategic offensive reductions'.
Co-operative Threat Reduction (CTR) programme
In 1991 the US Congress directed the Department of Defence to help
secure former Soviet Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by way of the
CTR programme. In 1995-6 this programme helped Kazakhstan, Belarus
and Ukraine to become non-nuclear weapon states. Much of the initial
help to Russia was in implementing START I reductions, dismantling
submarines, deactivating warheads and reducing strategic bombers to
scrap. This activity presently costs the US about $1bn a year. The
following items are listed as having been eliminated: 5,800 nuclear
warheads; 450 ICBMs and their silos; 21 ballistic missile submarines
together with 290 of their missiles and 370 launchers; 95 strategic
bombers; 48 long-range Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs), and 195
test holes or tunnels. This work has spawned a series of co-operative
programmes: the Materials Protection Control and Accounting (MPC&A)
programme; the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) deal; the Initiative
for Proliferation Prevention: the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI);
and the Plutonium Disposition deal. All this is organised and paid
for by the US - what are the rest of us doing to help? Not very much.
The CFE treaty
This treaty was signed in November 1990, came into force in 1992
and was amended in November 1999. Its aim was to reduce conventional
forces between the Atlantic and the Ural Mountains, redressing the
great imbalance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It concentrated
on forces needed to launch a surprise attack and seize and hold territory
ie tanks, artillery, armoured combat vehicles, combat aircraft and
attack helicopters. The treaty has worked apparently satisfactorily
but sceptics argue the reductions in armament are no more than would
have been achieved by the peace dividend anyway, and actual holdings
were in any case well below the treaty limits. The operating of the
treaty however has led to diplomatic benefits.
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
This convention opened for signature in January 1993 and came into
force in April 1997. There are now 146 states parties covering 90%
of the world's population and 98% of its chemical industry. The Organisation
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has a full-time staff
of 500 and an annual budget of 60m euros.
Only four countries have declared CW stockpiles: the US, Russia,
India and South Korea. They hold a total of some 70,000 tonnes of
agent in 8.6m munitions or containers. The convention commits states
to dispose of all their CW holdings by 2007, but so far OPCW has supervised
the disposal of only 10% of the known stockpiles, together with 27
production facilities. Destruction is a costly business - getting
rid of America's stockpile will cost $15.3bn and for Russia's 40,000
tonnes, $5-6bn. It has recently been agreed to extend Russia's deadlines.
Antipersonnel landmines
The Ottawa Convention, which bans the use, stockpiling, production
and transfer, of anti-personnel mines, and requires their production
was adopted and opened for signature in 1997 and entered into force
in March 1999. There are now 125 states parties and another 18 who
have signed but not yet ratified. It is estimated that 34 million
stockpiled landmines have been destroyed by 61 countries and the export
of these mines has now almost ceased. Of the 90 countries affected
by landmines and similar ordnance, clearance is under way in 74. On
the other hand, India and Pakistan are in the process of laying huge
numbers of mines along the Line of Control. The International Campaign
to Ban Landmines (ICBL) have also criticised Myanmar, Russia (in Chechnya),
Nepal, Somalia and Georgia. The number of casualties from landmines
and related weapons is running at 15-20,000 per year, so the need
to universalise Ottowa is urgent. This is an appropriate point to
discuss the behaviour of the landmines ban most important non-conformist,
the USA.
The Recent Actions of the USA
Unlike all its predecessors of either party, the administration of
George W Bush seems sceptical of negotiated verifiable agreements,
preferring unilateral unverified declarations and vague confidence
gestures.
Before discussing the unhelpful actions of the Bush administration
it should be made clear that there is a place for unilateral unverified
actions. In September 1991 the earlier President Bush unilaterally
ordered the elimination of the entire American ground-launched short-range
nuclear weapons and the withdrawing of all tactical warheads from
ships, submarines and land based naval aircraft. A week later President
Gorbachev announced exactly parallel actions together with the elimination
of nuclear mines and the removal of nuclear warheads from army anti-aircraft
missiles. Subsequently the French cancelled their tactical nuclear
missile 'Hades' and the British did away with their nuclear warheads
on ships and aircraft. All this was hugely important and exposed the
fact that nuclear weapons were not much use for war fighting.
Turning now to the more recent negative initiatives of the current
Bush administration, the action taken by the American delegates in
July 2001, when they walked out of negotiations associated with the
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), is greatly to be regretted and
left the organisation of the Convention in complete disarray. As far
as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is concerned, the US delegates
have been accused of ousting the Director General of the OPCW, Jose
Bustani, in a somewhat bullying manner. On the other hand, his replacement
is generally regarded as a big improvement and hopefully something
can be rescued from the confusion.
In the case of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),
it is very unfortunate that it has not yet been ratified by the US,
but it is not fair to blame the Bush administration entirely for this
as President Clinton failed to get the Senates approval when he asked
for it. A more worrying sign is the Bush administration's decision
to allocate $15m to increase the ability of the Nevada test site to
be ready to resume testing at short notice. The possibility of renewed
nuclear testing initiated by the USA, and the general lack of restraint
on tactical nuclear weapons are two of the most important issues left
unresolved and both menace the future.
Another major worry is that the US's Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD)
programme will stimulate China to expand greatly its nuclear weaponry
and in addition, the BMD initiative will lead to weaponisation of
space. Preserving the 'global commons' of space from the mayhem resulting
from a battle between satellites is so strong as to amount to a moral
imperative.
A new approach is required. Rather than looking at these problems
from a traditional arms control perspective they could be viewed as
an exercise in arms co-operation, with the following aims and criteria:
(1) any system should be as inclusive as possible
(2) no participant should feel threatened by any other
(3) there should be no impediment to further nuclear build-down
(4) technical collaboration should be maximised
(5) costs should be properly controlled and fairly shared
(6) arrangements for cancellation of projects should be carefully
thought out and agreed in advance.
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Alexander Nikitin
"Autumn wins you best by this its mute
Appeal to sympathy for its decay."
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Robert Browning
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The speaker began his lecture by listing the important developments
in arms control and related matters since the beginning of the 2000s.
The CTBT has not been ratified by the US and hence has now no legal
force. The ABM Treaty of 1972 came to an end in 2002 on the initiative
of the USA who also launched a programme of National Strategic Missile
Defence, planned to extend to at least 2014. The US has introduced
important changes to its nuclear planning policy, putting emphasis
on unilateralism and modernization and the combination of offensive
and defensive strategies.
Russia has adopted a unilateral plan for the development of strategic
missile forces till the year 2010; this incorporates cuts in the triad,
and slow modernization of land-based ICBMs. China has accelerated
its nuclear forces modernization plan, possibly as a response to the
US anti-ballistic missile programme.
START II has not entered into force and attempts to agree a START
III have been abandoned. Instead the US/Russia signed in Moscow in
May 2002 the simplified Treaty on Strategic Offence Reductions (SOR)
which defines a ceiling of 1700-2200 strategic warheads for each side,
to be achieved by 2012. India and Pakistan have upgraded their mutual
regional nuclear deterrence capabilities.
International anti-terrorist campaigns have stimulated efforts throughout
the world to strengthen the security of fissile materials and to improve
the physical protection of nuclear facilities. No significant progress
has been made under NPT provisions or with Nuclear Weapon Convention.
At the same time, since the 90s, no serious violations of MTCR or
export control regimes have been occurred and no 'States of Concern'
(Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea) have made observable attempts to
violate the NTP.
Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SOR)
This Treaty lacks mechanisms of implementation and control, though
as these are gradually introduced they will probably be based on START-I
procedures. Even so, SOR has been created as a body separate from
the START series. SOR is in fact much more unilateralist than the
mirrored and mutually controlled START mechanisms. Within the negotiated
arms ceiling (1700-2200 strategic warheads) each side has full freedom
to define their reduction programme without even informing the other.
In fact the planned reductions in arms conform more or less to what
Russia and the USA would have carried out anyway as the 'peace dividend,
in the absence of any agreement.
The 'Death' of ABMT
The formal withdrawal of the US from the Treaty in June 2002 had
been 'sweetened' by the signing of the SOR Treaty in May, and this
helped to calm the storm which had threatened to follow the US's precipitate
and unilateral action.
Russia has not the economic capability to react to the creation of
NMD by a significant increase in its strategic offensive potential,
and indeed no such plans have been announced nor even discussed. At
the same time, after the simultaneous collapse of ABM and START-II
treaties, Russian military planners feel free from obligations not
to deploy MIRVed missiles.
In fact, the MIRVing of 'Topol-M', the most modern of Russian strategic
missiles (technically capable of carrying up to 10 warheads each)
is considered to be the most logical response to future deployment
of American national missile defence systems. Associated with this
will be the developments of decoys, 'false flying targets' but none
of this will be brought into service until after 2010, by which time
it is anticipated that the US will begin to deploy their NMD system.
In any event the first one hundred US interceptors located in Alaska,
and even the second echelon of 100-200 interceptors in North Dakota,
will not diminish significantly the Russia's deterring potential.
China
However, the first interceptor installations in Alaska are very likely
to undermine completely the deterrent capability of China, who possess
currently no more than two dozen, obsolete, liquid-fuelled ICBMs.
It is clear why the US's NMD programme has stimulated China to accelerate
its modernization programme in which a new generation of DF-31 ACBMs
(range 8000 km) and DF-41 (range 12000km) will be deployed. Mobile
bases will also be constructed, MIRVing developed and part of the
arsenal will be located in nuclear submarines.
The deployment of ICBMs to deter the US is in fact of less pressing
interest to China than its desire to bring about its reunification
with Taiwan. To further this aim China is constantly increasing its
non-nuclear tactical and short-range missile arsenal along the shores
of the Taiwan straits. This arsenal currently consists of about 350
missiles and this total is growing by about 50 missiles per year.
Against these weapons, Taiwan, with America's help, is developing
an apparently successful tactical missile defence system. Numbers
of PAC-2 tactical missile defence systems have already been supplied
and PAC-3's are on their way. A large American radar station for early
warning has been approved for sale, and 'Aegis' frigates may provide
the missing components for this emerging tactical missile defence
complex.
For the immediate future Sino-American relationships are heading
for stormier waters than Russian-American affairs. China is hit by
two major problems, the threatened emasculation of its ICBM system
by America's NMD programme, and the military strengthening, by America,
of Taiwan. As far as Chinese-Taiwanese tensions are concerned, Russia
tends to support China's position publicly, while continuing to trade
with Taiwan. It suits Moscow if Beijing's military concentration is
directed to the south, rather than to the north.
Terrorism and the leakage of fissile material
In Russian-American strategic relations only one area seems to remain
of extreme importance. It is the protection and processing of weapons-grade
fissile materials to ensure that such substances do not fall into
terrorist hands. In this area the task of expediting the sale to the
Americans of 500 tons of de-enriched HEU remains vital. It is curious
that in spite of the intensity of the current anti-terrorist campaign
steps were not taken to shorten the leisurely 20 year timescale of
the HEU programme, nor to expand the amounts of material involved
in the overall contract. This lack of new investment in an absolutely
critical programme contrasts with the billions to be spent by the
Americans on NMD in spite of the fact that the delivery of a nuclear
device by inter-continental-missile is the least likely of all possibilities.
Concluding remarks
It is very unlikely that in the current decade all P5 states, including
China will sit down at one negotiating table to promote comprehensive
nuclear disarmament and article 6 of the NTP. It is even less likely
that all the eight existing nuclear states, including India, Pakistan
and Israel, will see nuclear weapons as their common responsibility
and co-operate on their elimination. With the deconstruction of Soviet/Russian-American
arms control processes, and after losing the ABMT, CTBT and START-II,
nuclear issues become less negotiable, less hierarchical, less sharp
but more pluralistic, than they were during the Cold War and its immediate
aftermath.
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Steven Miller
"From winter, plague and pestilence,
Good Lord, deliver us!"
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Arms control is out of fashion. Clinton's Administration was the
first one since Eisenhower's to fail to have negotiated a major Arms
Control agreement. Today, Bush believes that arms control measures
are a relic of the Cold War and are not now necessary, nor even desirable.
In fact, the new administration is more concerned with dismantling
Cold War arms control structures than building a post Cold War framework;
to give but a few examples: the ABMT is finished, CTBT is dead, BWC
abandoned and the Land Mine Convention rejected.
Continuing this tour de horizon; for a broad swathe of the
US political elite in the current climate, multilateral arms control
is unacceptable - indeed many consider that the US is more often the
victim of many multilateral agreements, rather than the benefactor.
For example, the US feels that in some circumstances it is legitimate
to lay land mines to protect its combatants. More generally, many
in the new administration object to having US behaviour and actions
scrutinised by numerous less powerful countries. It is also often
pointed out that international conventions are in many cases unverifiable,
for example the BWC and CWC.
The new administration has been forced to the view that arms control,
especially multilateral arms control, simply does not work when viewed
from an American, or even a more general, perspective. An example
often quoted is Iraq violating its obligations under the NPT, and
similarly North Korea. When Saddam Hussein made the job of the UN
inspectors impossible in 1998 and they withdrew, there was little
international reaction, apart from those who complained about the
US imposing sanctions.
There are, the US claims, numerous cases in the past of the USSR
cheating on arms control agreements, for example their continuing
development of biological weapons. Following the chemical weapon convention,
America abandoned their work in this area, but there were plenty of
other countries who carried on with active research and development
in this field because they were confident that these activities could
not be detected by outside observers.
After 9/11 the feeling grew in the US that under such deadly threats
there was no time or energy to spare to bother with low grade international
agreements that simply didn't work in practice. To make arms control
more relevant to the current international scene, they concluded,
it is necessary to move in directions that are unprecedented and difficult,
for example issues involving human rights in China.
The US's withdrawal from the ABMT shortly after 9/11 did not generate
the furious response which had been anticipated, and this lack of
a reaction persuaded the Bush administration to continue its programme
of radical reform, and abandonment of international treaties.
These alternative approaches to multilateral agreements adopted by
the Bush administration can be classified as follows.
(1) Defences: the strengthening of missile, border and homeland
defence.
(2) Deterrence: a shift from preventing acquisition to preventing
use.
(3) Aggressive diplomacy: for example withdrawing oil supplies from
North Korea.
(4) Intelligence and isolation: as in the case of Iraq.
(5) Preventive use of force: as described in Bush's 'state union message,
including the development, and possible testing of mini-nukes.
(6) Newspeak and propaganda: to promulgate the view that such is America's
military superiority that it is a waste of time any nation standing
up against her.
What about the cost of all this? Bush thinks the price has been exaggerated
and there is still plenty of money in the national coffers. His administration,
for example, plans to spend $6-7b/yr on antiballistic weapons in spite
of the fact that $100b has been already been spent on such a programme
without tangible benefit.
Conclusion
The US has broken free from its old moorings and now cannot recover
its old strategic role. We are at the beginning of a long, slow-motion
melodrama which will determine what sort of strategic universe we
will live in 20-25 years from now.
General Discussion
Bas Pease started the ball rolling by saying how much he supported
the continuation of the NTP but questioned if Russia had any serious
intention of working towards a truly nuclear weapon free world. The
response was, probably not, but neither had the US. Kit Hill mentioned
recent Pugwash proposals that no attempt should be made to replace
Trident when its missiles became redundant, ie a phased but inexorable
run-down was advocated. In response, Steve Miller welcomed the roll-back
of actual or potential nuclear weapon powers, having in mind South
Africa, Brazil and Argentina, together with the Ukraine, Belarus and
Kazakhstan. For Britain and France to give up their nuclear weapons
would of course be generally welcomed by the world community but would
not necessarily persuade other nuclear nations to emulate them.
A question was asked about the G8 10 + 10 + 10 in which the remaining
countries of the G8 would match the US's contribution of $10bn to
be spent over a ten year period on assisting the former Soviet Union
countries with making safe the nuclear stockpiles and facilities and
other recovery processes. In response, Alexander Nikitin welcomed
the G8 initiative but warned of the dangers of backsliding and manoeuvring,
as illustrated by the past actions of the US Congress, who made every
attempt to ensure that as much of the available money as possible
is spent in the home country or state. Also, it was suggested that
a ten year timescale is far too leisurely - an expenditure of $20bn
over a two or three year timescale would more closely match the scale
of the problem.
Steve Miller drew attention to a recently-published Pugwash briefing
on the dangerous consequence should even a sub-national terrorist
group get hold of enough HEU to manufacture a nuclear weapon. He is
surprised that the ground-breaking HEU deal, whereby 500 tons of Russian
HEU is blended down to civil fuel enrichment levels and then sold
to the USA, has not been accelerated. He would like to see this programme
greatly speeded up and expanded. He thought it ironic that the US
is prepared to contemplate a war with Iraq, partly because it fears
terrorism, yet will not make more strenuous efforts to restrict the
terrorists' access to fissile material (the other G8 countries are
of course more culpable in this regard for they have forged no similar
arrangements with Russia).
In response to a more general question, Steve Miller believes that
there is a high probability that the US will restart nuclear testing,
the 'excuse' being that it is necessary to develop new 'bunker blasting'
tactical nuclear weapons in the fight against terrorism. He anticipates
that soon the US defence budget may exceed $400bn per annum and then
overtake the combined total defence budget of the rest of the world.
Should the Bush administration get its Iraqi war, and be successful,
these aggressive tendencies will be enhanced.
Hugh Beach has a much less apocalyptic view of the current world
situation. There have been examples of successful arms limitation
treaties in the past, some of which are still in existence, and there
will be more in the future. Administrations come and go, play their
part on the world stage, and then slide into obscurity. We must not
become despondent or lose our nerve.
Jack Harris
