At the close of the Gleneagles
Summit this week, Russia will take over leadership of the Group of Eight,
the "super club" of countries that in theory are driving the
world economy and political system. Even prior to Moscow's ascension,
that notion had been coming in for increasing derision. What about India
and China? commentators have been asking. And why should Canada, hardly
an international powerhouse, get a seat at the table?
These critical comments
have only grown louder at the fact that Moscow will be in the lead for
2006. Russia has been sliding backward in economic reform and democratic
development. Its president is consolidating power, its security services
are in the ascendant, and its own businessmen are afraid to invest in
its future. How can Russia, in these circumstances, lead the G8 through
a successful year? Is it not even possible that Russia's leadership
of the group will undermine the G8 so that its future will be doomed?
Russia, it must be noted,
is not responsible for all of the G8's problems. Trans-Atlantic tension
was the serious disease two years ago, and today quarrels among European
Union leaders over their abortive attempts to adopt a constitution and
a budget are causing the biggest problems. Under these circumstances,
the G8 will unlikely have the necessary cohesion and leadership to change.
But that is no reason to shut down the group or to forget about its
original goal: to provide top-level, focused and committed leadership
to resolve issues that threaten the world's progress and security.
So, given Russia's own serious
limitations, what can the Kremlin do in the coming year to ensure that
the G8 agenda is advanced? We can forget about economic and democratic
progress. Russia simply has neither the authority and legitimacy to
lead in these areas, nor the international experience, nor the desire.
Security is another matter, however, particularly in the urgent fight
against nuclear terrorism.
Since the break-up of the
Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has confronted the threat that the vast
Soviet nuclear arsenal -- tens of thousands of warheads and over 1,000
tons of fissile material -- would fall prey to terrorists or rogue leaders
intent on acquiring the illicit means to attack countries that they
consider to be their enemies. The G8 recognized this threat in 2002
when it formed the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons
and Materials of Mass Destruction. Russia was its first focus and, at
the same time, a founding member.
Over the past three years,
Russia has opened its doors to the Global Partnership, making it possible
to accelerate the destruction of nuclear attack submarines, speed up
the protection of nuclear warheads and materials, and ensure that the
vast Soviet stockpiles of chemical weapons are at last being destroyed.
Russia is a leader in this effort, despite the fact that it is also
an aid recipient. It is working to ensure better management of the projects
and to put its own resources on the table.
Beyond the Global Partnership,
Russia has taken a surprising international lead on several issues of
nuclear security and nonproliferation. For example, the fuel deal that
the Federal Atomic Energy Agency has worked out with Iran's Atomic Energy
Agency is a first step toward efforts to develop an international system
of guaranteed nuclear fuel services. U.S. President George W. Bush argued
in an important speech in February 2004 that most countries developing
nuclear power should depend on internationally guaranteed supplies of
fuel rather than developing their own means to produce fuel and reprocess
it.
This is precisely the concern
that the international community has had about Iran's efforts to develop
fuel enrichment facilities, which has led to serious disagreement with
the Tehran government and to threats to refer it to the UN Security
Council. Amid this controversy, Russia had established a fuel services
deal with Iran, essentially a pilot project for the very international
system that Bush proposed.
Another example is the return
of highly enriched uranium to safekeeping. During the Cold War, the
Soviet Union and United States competed to establish research reactors
in countries around the world, supplying them with highly enriched uranium
fuel, or HEU, that could be used in experiments or to produce medical
isotopes -- at the time, very worthy peaceful uses of the atom. In the
ensuing years, however, many of these research reactors have become
isolated in unstable states or, in some cases, have ended up in conflict
zones, where their HEU -- the most convenient material for an amateur
bomb-maker -- could fall into the hands of a nuclear terrorist.
Russia and the United States
have begun in recent years to redress this dangerous Cold War legacy.
Over the past few years, Russia was instrumental in removing nuclear
material from the Vinca reactor site in the former Yugoslavia, and from
Latvia and Romania. Moscow is currently working with Uzbekistan, the
site of recent unrest, to remove HEU from the research reactor in Tashkent.
In each of these cases,
Russia has been an important international leader. And so it could be
for the G8. If Russia chooses to use its G8 leadership to advance the
fight against nuclear terrorism and proliferation, then some important
progress can be achieved in the coming year. For one thing, Russia should
be able to clear away some of the bureaucratic brushwork that continues
to plague implementation of the programs. More importantly, however,
it will be able to set the pace and direction of the programs for years
to come. Some important goals should be accelerating the pace of HEU
"clean-out" from research reactors in vulnerable sites throughout
the world. The current 10-year deadline could be cut to four if the
Russians pushed for it. This would speed the efforts to keep easy bomb-making
material out of the hands of terrorists. Next, it is crucial to establish
a model for an international fuel-services program, drawing on the experience
of Russia's "pilot project" with Iran. This should include
mechanisms for incorporating other international fuel providers into
the equation, as well as providing critical assurances, in the form
of transparency and other safeguards, to the international community.
Finally, the G8 members could develop a clear agenda for action if the
six-party talks ever "get to yes" with North Korea. Russia
was involved in the early stages of the North Korean program and trained
North Korean scientists. Thus it is well-positioned to think in advance
about how to work with North Korea on shutting down its nuclear program,
decommissioning its sites and engaging its nuclear scientists.
The G8 has many problems
to deal with, including questions about its membership and legitimacy
at a time when the world is a much different place than when it was
created. The G8's problems, however, do not doom Russia to a failed
leadership year any more than do Russia's failings as a modern state.
If the Kremlin adopts an agenda of critical interest to the whole international
community -- nuclear security and the fight against nuclear terrorism
--it has a strong potential to succeed.
Rose Gottemoeller is
a senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
In 1999-2000, she was the U.S. deputy undersecretary of energy responsible
for nonproliferation cooperation with Russia. She contributed this comment
to The Moscow Times
