Russia's
Doctrine on the Use of Nuclear Weapons
Yuri Fedorov
Introduction
This paper attempts to outline some basic provisions of Russia's
nuclear doctrine regarding the use of nuclear weapons. The latest
Russian official doctrinal documents, including The National Security
Concept and The Military Doctrine have been approved by the President
Vladimir Putin in the first half of the 2000. Since then Russian foreign
and security policies have changed dramatically; despite some serious
disagreements with the USA and other NATO member-states the Kremlin's
strategy is aimed at cooperation with the leading Western nations
in security area. Yet the nuclear doctrine remains as it was formulated
in the days when Russia's strategy has been overburden by anti-Western
attitudes and has exaggerated role of nuclear weapons in security
policy. Few days ago only, a number of signals come from the Kremlin
that some Russian strategic attitudes with respect to nuclear weapons
may be changed have. President Putin has instructed his lieutenants
to prepare a new version of the Russian national security concept
with the main focus on international terrorism as principal threat
to the security of the nation. If so, many believe, the current accent
on nuclear deterrence may be replaced by preemptive actions against
terrorist groups and regimes supporting them. Yet this is a kind of
guesswork up to now; nobody can make certain forecasts when discussing
formation of Russian security policy.
The Rise of Unpredictable World
The end of the political and ideological East-West conflict has changed
the nature of strategic stability. Proliferation of WMD and their
delivery systems, notably, missiles; local conflicts; and extremism
resulting in terrorist attacks become more and more important security
challenges making development of a stable and predictable global strategic
situation far from completing. Growing tensions in the Islamic world
from Indonesia to Algeria make developments in these regions hardly
predictable.
The international strategic scene may undergo further dramatic changes,
whatever improbable today they may look. In the mid-1980s no one regarded
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, or the unification
of Germany, as more or less probable events. The global unpredictability
implies that some scenarios, which threaten vital interests and the
very existence of many states, cannot be ruled out. Hence, in the
process of formulating the security policy, one has to base it on
the worst-case scenarios and do not rule out the possibility of emergence
of various military security threats.
During the Cold War the major mission of nuclear weapons was thought
as deterring nuclear or massive conventional attacks of a hypothetical
enemy from the other end of the East-West confrontation. However,
the most probable conflicts of the future, if the current trends do
not radically change, will hardly require such a mission of nuclear
weapons of any kind. At the same time, the aforementioned unpredictability
makes the nuclear powers to preserve some of their nuclear arsenals
to ensure national security, if dramatic military-political changes
occur. Meanwhile, the overestimation of the nuclear weapons and their
treatment as the absolute security means diverts the attention and
resources from the modernization of conventional armed forces, development
of the protection means against terrorism and information warfare,
which seem to be the most probable security challenges in the foreseeable
future.
The Array of Nuclear Strategies
Western nuclear nations preserve their nuclear arsenals mainly as
security assurances against the unpredictable challenges. Yet in the
wake of the 21st century their strategy is targeted mainly against
the challenges caused by local and regional conflicts. This requires
enhancing conventional armed forces and introduction of the achievements
of the information revolution to raise their combat efficiency and
implement the Revolution in Military Affairs.
China, India, Pakistan, and presumably Israel have a different view
on nuclear weapons. China modernizes its nuclear forces and develops
three new types of strategic missiles, new intermediate-range missiles,
and two new sub-strategic dual-use missile systems. Israel considers
the nuclear weapons to be a reliable deterrent against WMD attacks
on the part of Islamic states. India regards its missile and nuclear
arsenal as the means to contain China in case of war with Pakistan
and as the means to eliminate Pakistan's nuclear might. Pakistan resorts
to nuclear weapons as a tool to deter India against conventional or
nuclear attack.
Russia has yet to formulate a coherent nuclear policy, which would
adequately meet economic capabilities and security challenges. The
so called nuclear and missile lobby has proclaimed nuclear deterrence
with strategic forces as nearly the only way to maintain national
security. Another group in the Russian military establishment wants
to focus on the crisis of conventional forces, which may be employed
in low-intensity conflicts on the Russian territory and in the neighboring
states in the south of Russia.
Reductions of Russia's Nuclear Arsenal
In the 1990s, Russia's nuclear arsenal reduced in 4.5-5 times. There
were several reasons for such reductions. Firstly, it was the drastic
fall of Russian economy and industrial capabilities. Since 1991 Russia
has no resources to maintain the previous nuclear force of about 10
thousand warheads on strategic delivery vehicles and about 20 thousand
of sub-strategic nukes.
Another important factor was the downsizing in 3 times of the Russian
Armed Forces in the 1990s. So, the nuclear weapons were also reduced,
since their amount was related to the numerical strength and structure
of the Armed Forces. Besides, like in the United States, the nuclear
artillery projectiles and mines could be quite dangerous for Russia's
own troops due to the quickly changing combat environment. No one
wanted to risk the soldiers and expose them to radiation or nuclear
strike by its own units.
The 1990-1992 reductions in the Soviet nuclear arsenal coincided
with the process of nuclear weapons withdrawal to the Russian territory.
The demise of the Warsaw Pact resulted in accelerated withdrawal of
nuclear weapons from Central and Eastern Europe and the collapse of
the ex-USSR fueled the removal of strategic and sub-strategic nuclear
munitions from the former Soviet republics to Russia.
Despite the significant (4-5 times) reduction in nuclear weapons,
Russia is the second, or if to add tactical nuclear warheads, the
first nuclear power in the world. This coincides with the fact that
nuclear weapons continue to play an important part in the Russian
strategy. If so, Moscow has to elaborate and officially approve the
coherent guidelines concerning the development and potential use of
these weapons in armed conflicts under the current military-political
circumstances. If there is no such concept, the maintenance of large
nuclear arsenals may be accounted for by inertia of military construction
and adherence to the Cold War legacy.
Russia's Official Views on Nuclear Weapons
Russia's official nuclear policy is stated in a number of official
documents. Important concepts concerning practical approaches towards
these weapons are reflected in the scenarios of military exercises.
Finally, the official policy of the states in the area of defense
is reflected in the state decisions on key matters of military development.
The most important directives - the National Security Concept and
the Military Doctrine approved by Vladimir Putin in 2000 - establish
the general framework of the Russian nuclear policy, but do not answer
some key questions. These documents do not cover separately the issues
pertaining to strategic and sub-strategic nuclear forces (with one
exception) but normally speak about nuclear arms in general. This
may imply that officially stated guidelines for nuclear weapons relate
both to strategic and sub-strategic arms.
The aforementioned documents reiterate some basic principles formulated
in the early 1990s. They name the countries, against which Russia
will not use its nuclear weapons. These are non-nuclear weapon states
parties to the NPT, which have no allied commitments to nuclear-weapon
states and do not act together with them against Russia or its allies.
Nuclear weapons are regarded as the means to deter both nuclear and
large-scale conventional aggression against Russia and its allies.
Russia's nuclear arsenal should be sufficient to inflict pre-set damage
to any aggressor under any circumstances. For instance, the National
Security Concept notes,
"The most important mission of the Russian Federation is
to ensure deterrence in order to prevent the aggression of any scale,
including nuclear, against Russia or its allies. The Russian Federation
should possess nuclear forces capable of inflicting pre-set damage
to any aggressor - a state or a coalition of states - under any
circumstances." 1
This formula is reiterated in the Military Doctrine. However, in
a different section of the document (mission of the Armed Forces)
the doctrine focuses on other issues. The strategic forces are charged
with the mission of inflicting pre-set damage. Among key missions
of the Armed Forces are
"maintenance of the structure, strength, combat and mobilization
readiness and training of the strategic nuclear forces, forces and
means that ensure their functioning and use and command and control
systems at the level enough to inflict pre-set damage to an aggressor
under any circumstances." 2
Thus, one may assume that the Russian sub-strategic nuclear forces
are charged with a different mission, rather than with inflicting
pre-set damage. However, these missions are not stated in any open
source. At the same time, the 2000 National Security Concept and the
Military Doctrine were stripped of some provisions present in the
earlier versions. For instance, the Major Guidelines of the Military
Doctrine of November 1993 maintained that
"any, even limited, use of nuclear weapons in warfare even
by one of the parties may provoke a massive use of nuclear weapons
and lead to devastating consequences." 3
This provision was left out in 2000 and this proves the assumption
that Russian military thinking recognizes a possibility of limited
nuclear strike, which will not automatically escalate to a large-scale
nuclear war. It is not clear, however, if such strike should be made
with sub-strategic weapons or it is a matter of limited use of strategic
arms.
Russia's official documents approved in early 2000 do not clarify
the issue of nuclear threshold. Meanwhile, the evolution of the appropriate
provisions indicates that the Russian military elite thinks about
limited use of nuclear weapons and even about first use of them. The
1997 National Security Concept spoke about the terms of nuclear weapons
use,
"Russia keeps the right to use all means available to it,
if the aggression against Russia threatens its very existence as
an independent sovereign state." 4
Although the criteria for "existence as an independent sovereign
state" were not mentioned in the 1997 National Security Concept,
such provision provides for quite limited number of cases of nuclear
weapons use. Besides, this provision must have spoken about strategic
weapons. The threat to the existence of Russia may occur if the enemy
intends to use nuclear weapons and, hence, there is a need for deterrence
or pre-emptive strategic strike. However, the new National Security
Concept gave different interpretation and argued that Russia might
use
"all means available to it [Russia - Auth.], including
nuclear weapons, if it is necessary to repel the armed aggression
and if all other crisis management measures have been exhausted
or turned out to be inefficient." 5
This formula, in fact, expanded the opportunities for using nuclear
weapons in conflict. It did not define "crisis", "management",
did not identify any criteria for efficiency or non-efficiency of
crisis management measures, etc. The absence of such definitions enables
Russia to regard the measures as exhausted or inefficient at any stage
of the military confrontation. Such uncertainty makes us assume that
Russia may resort to strategic and sub-strategic nuclear weapons.
The same conclusion can be made if one analyzes the 2000 Military
Doctrine, which states,
"The Russian Federation keeps the right to use nuclear
weapons in response to the use of nuclear weapons or other WMD against
Russia or its allies, as well as in response to the large-scale
conventional aggression in critical situations for the Russian national
security." 6
This formula narrows the spectrum of conditions, when Russia is ready
to use nuclear weapons. However, some questions arise:
· Firstly, there is no clear notion of the "critical
situation for the national security" and this term may be interpreted
differently.
· Secondly, it is not clear whether Russia is ready to use
its nuclear weapons if one of its allies (like Belarus) is under WMD
attack or suffers from a large-scale conventional aggression.
· Thirdly, it is not clear what the correlation between "the
critical situation" and a large-scale aggression against the
ally is.
· Fourthly, WMD include chemical and biological weapons and
the aforementioned formula may imply that Russia is willing to use
the nukes against a small-scale use of chemical weapons in local conflicts
involving one of the Russian allies.
· Finally, the very fact that two documents approved nearly
simultaneously have different provisions concerning the principal
component of state military strategy seems strange. Meanwhile, Russia's
willingness to use nuclear weapons against the large-scale conventional
aggression replicates the logic of non-strategic nuclear deterrence
typical of the Cold War.
Actually, these documents state that Russia is ready to use nuclear
weapons first in armed conflicts (if Russia or its allies are involved
in such conflicts) and there are some uncertain terms for the use
of nuclear weapons. This might demonstrate Russia's desire to preserve
the freedom of maneuver (including the choice of nuclear weapons)
if the military-political situation exacerbates. Thus, Russian official
documents confirm indirectly the possibility of limited nuclear war
with the use of sub-strategic nuclear weapons, although they do not
mention this issue directly.
Nuclear Exercises
Some different conclusions can be made after analyzing the results
of the large-scale command and staff exercise "West-99".
The exercise took place in June 1999 immediately after the NATO's
operation against Yugoslavia and its scenario reflected some established
views of the Russian military. According to it, NATO forces launched
a massive air and missile non-nuclear strike against Belarus and Kaliningrad
district. The Russian-Belarusian armed grouping cannot stop the escalation
and repel the aggression. Under these circumstances, the Russian leadership
decides to make a demonstrative nuclear strike against the targets
in the deep rear of the enemy. The strategic bombers performed this
task .7
The other deduction may be concluded from command and staff exercise
took place in early Autumn 2002. Independent experts believed that
during these exercises Russian strategic nuclear forces have performed
not demonstrative yet massive nuclear strike.
Thus, military exercise normally reflecting the views of the military
leadership indicates Russia's readiness to use strategic weapons for
both demonstrative strike, which is a form of a limited nuclear war,
and also massive strikes. At the same time, there was no information
of using sub-strategic nuclear weapons in the course of the exercise.
Besides, according to some analysts, the April 1999 decisions of
the Security Council did not only lead to a substantially growing
role of nuclear weapons in Russia's military policy, but also indicated
the desire for limited use of strategic nukes in armed conflicts (including
local conflicts) within the concept of expanded nuclear deterrence.
Vladimir Yakovlev, then Commander-in Chief of the Strategic Rocket
Forces, gave the following definition to this term,
"[…] Expanded nuclear deterrence […] means that
the interests of the SMF and strategic nuclear forces will not only
include nuclear and large-scale conventional warfare, but regional
and even local conflicts." 8
Such ideas, according to the Russian press, were typical also of
Victor Mikhailov, former Minister of Atomic Energy, who tried to change
the vision of nuclear weapons only as a WMD. Pavel Felgengauer, a
Russian analyst, wrote in 1999,
"Their logic is simple: nuclear weapons will again become
an effective policy tool if the threat of nuclear strikes is more
realistic. For this purpose they need the opportunity to make point
low-yield nuclear strikes against the military facilities in any
part of the world. It is presumed that such point strikes will not
lead to an immediate nuclear war." 9
The decisions of the Russian leadership also indicate that strategic
weapons have certain priority over sub-strategic arms. Practically
all decisions concerning nuclear weapons dealt with strategic forces.
In general, the set of decisions approved in Russia in 1998-1999 reflected
the interests of the Strategic Rocket Forces. It resulted in a substantial
shift in military construction in favor of strategic nuclear forces
exacerbating the crisis of the general-purpose forces.
Nuclear Weapons as Compensation for
Degrading Conventional Forces
The Russian military and civilian experts mostly agree that Russia's
conventional forces are not able and will not be able in the foreseeable
future to ensure reliable national security and, therefore, the role
of nuclear weapons increases. This opinion was formed in the mid-1990s.
In 1996, Andrei Kokoshin, then First Deputy Defense Minister emphasized
that nuclear might, especially strategic forces, played an important
part in ensuring Russia's status on the global arena. Moreover, he
noted that nuclear forces, including sub-strategic weapons, could
compensate for the weakness of conventional armed forces. In mid-1996,
he pointed out that
"an important component of nuclear deterrence is not only
strategic nuclear force, but operational-tactical and tactical nuclear
weapons and delivery systems. Under the current circumstances, when
there is no opportunity to build substantial general-purpose force
at all azimuths, the nuclear shield becomes even more important
to prevent the aggression." 10
There is no doubt that degrading of Russia's general-purpose forces
takes place. But it cannot be a sufficient explanation for the targets
of Russia's nuclear policy - among potential enemies to be neutralized
with nuclear deterrence are NATO and the United States, but not China.
For instance, Gen. Victor Yesin, former Chief of the Directorate of
Military Construction of the Security Council's staff, maintained,
"In the large-scale war Russia will never (and this is
scientifically forecasted, whatever economic growth is) be able
to resist such organizations, as NATO, with conventional weapons
only. It will not be able to repel the massive conventional aggression
on the part of this bloc. This accounts for our focus on using nuclear
weapons to ensure Russia's security against external threats."
11
What Are The Targets?
Up to the September 11, the large part of the Russian elite regards
a new stage of confrontation with the West as an inevitable or, at
least, a probable scenario. Many of them still believe that the current
Putin's course towards cooperation with the West is either a wrong
strategy, or a tactical ruse. On the one hand, this reflects the adherence
to the intellectual and psychological legacy of the Soviet period.
On the other hand, this meets the interests of some groups connected
with the huge missile and nuclear complex formed in the Soviet Union
during the Cold War.
The majority of the Russian expert community shares anti-Western
views, but cannot agree on the role of different types of nuclear
weapons in deterring against the potential threat from the West, on
the terms and principles of their use. There are two major opinions
concerning this issue.
The first one presumes that sub-strategic nuclear weapons have lost
their significance, as a long limited nuclear war without use of strategic
weapons is not probable anymore. Therefore, strategic forces should
be responsible for deterrence and can prevent the conflict or ensure
the de-escalation of hostilities. Sub-strategic weapons may only be
regarded as some supplement to the strategic nuclear forces. Sergei
Rogov, the Director of the Institute for US and Canadian Studies,
argued that
"in case of war against the nuclear-weapon enemy enjoying
military superiority, TNW may be regarded as the means to demonstrate
Russia's readiness to nuclear escalation if the aggression continues.
TNW by themselves cannot determine the result of the war between
nuclear-weapon states or coalitions." 12
The natural consequence of such approach is the idea of seeking new
balance of strategic nuclear weapons with the United States. The establishment
of a new parity is regarded as the major way to ensure strategic stability
in its traditional sense of mutual nuclear deterrence.
The second view believes in the special role of sub-strategic nukes
in deterring a large-scale aggression against Russia. It presumes
that the greatest danger originates from the possible NATO actions
replicating the operations against Yugoslavia or Iraq. Alexei Arbatov
mentioned,
"The key strategic mission of the Russian Federation is
to rule out the possibility of NATO's unpunished series of selective
missile and air strikes of long duration. […] It would be justified
if Russia made a selective nuclear strike with the use of TNW against
the facilities that serve for the aggression […]. Then the
other side will have to face a difficult dilemma: to stop the aggression
and to accept the defeat, or to response with a nuclear strike,
which will be followed by escalation up to the level of strategic
nuclear exchange with devastating consequences for everybody. Since
there is no better option, in the foreseeable future this will be
an affordable and credible concept of expanded nuclear deterrence."
13
According to Alexei Arbatov, to accomplish this mission, Russia needs
several hundreds of air-launched and sea-launched tactical munitions
and missiles (such as Iskander-type missiles) . 14
The principal distinction between the two concepts is that the second
group of experts recognizes the possibility of conducting limited
nuclear war with sub-strategic weapons and achieve victory with a
relatively massed use of such weapons. It is presumed that NATO will
put up with large but acceptable casualties and will not escalate
the conflict further in order to avoid the catastrophe. However, the
implementation of this stratagem may involve Russia in a quite risky
situation. What if NATO decides to prevent the selective use of nuclear
weapons by Russia?
Thus, the key point of discussion on the role of sub-strategic nuclear
weapons is the issue of the possibility and prospects for limited
nuclear warfare at the Western theater of war. The use of such weapons
is regarded as a stage in escalating the conflict to a strategic level,
or as an instrument of preventing the aggression, notably massive
missile and bomb attacks. It is presumed that the potential enemy
will not run the risk of escalation, which may result in his total
destruction.
However, one should not forget about a fundamentally different approach,
which is quite widespread in the Russian elite. Its supporters believe
that the absolutization of nuclear weapons is counter-productive
in terms of Russia's security, for its scarce resources are diverted
from some really serious problems. According to Kommersant-Vlast,
"In the last ten years Russia has been trying to convince
everybody in its peaceful intentions, but the military strategy
has not changed a lot. The major mission of the armed forces is
still the retaliation of the large-scale aggression with the help
of nuclear weapons and inflicting devastating damage to the enemy.
However, no one, including the generals, has ever believed in the
possibility of large-scale aggression. It has always seemed unlikely
that someone would ever dare to attack Russia protected with the
nuclear umbrella. […] Russia will not be able to focus on nuclear
weapons. The major threat to the national security today are Chechen
militants and Islamic fundamentalists, rather than NATO with its
new members." 15
Such approach, perhaps, coincides with Putin's position. In April
2000, he emphasized that
"[…] major challenges to Russia, taking into account
the global situation, today will originate from local conflicts.
Russia will be pulled apart not with nuclear weapons or nuclear
threat. We witness today the attempts of pulling Russia apart -
local conflicts." 16
Nonetheless, the Russian military, military-economic and partly academic
communities believe that nuclear weapons (strategic, or strategic
and sub-strategic together) can ensure the national security under
the current circumstances, compensate for the weakness of conventional
forces and deter the aggressor.
What About China?
At present, there are no sources of direct military threat to Russia
in the Far East. The border settlement with China, the agreement on
confidence-building measures and conventional arms reduction in the
regions adjacent to the former Soviet-Chinese border and general normalization
of relations with China in the recent decade have stabilized the strategic
situation in the region. There are no more sources of tension, which
used to raise fair concerns of the Soviet Union. 17
China, on its part, is not interested in deteriorating relations
with Russia, bearing in mind Beijing's differences with the United
States and the potential exacerbation of the Taiwan problem. Russia
also is a source of high military technologies for Russia. Under these
circumstances, in the near future China will not be a source of military
threats to Russia. The Chinese foreign policy will be balanced and
Beijing will try to avoid needless tensions in relations with Russia
and the West.
Yet, China's tangible economic success and demographic potential
raise the issue of the nature and evolution of its activities beyond
the Chinese borders in the distant future. The questions (without
answer) are what the Chinese policy will be, whether Beijing will
successfully complete the modernization of its economy and armed forces.
In this light, China is often seen as a serious source of uncertainty
in the global system. This uncertainty does not necessarily mean an
automatic threat to Russia, but will make Moscow plan its security
activities to prevent any negative scenarios.
This, and a lot of other analyses, proves that key security challenges
to Russia are caused by local instability and conflicts. Russia's
persistent emphasis on nuclear deterrence limits Russia's maneuver
in local and regional wars (in the spectrum from low-intensity operations
to nuclear warfare). Limited or demonstrative use of nuclear weapons
in the armed conflict is unacceptable for the world public opinion.
The threat or use of nuclear weapons, when there is no threat or use
of such weapons against Russia, mean the breach of the limits of acceptable
use of military force. The targets of such demonstrative strikes will
do their best to prevent it with political and military means; this
increases the danger of total nuclear war.
Conclusion
The major conclusion is that Russia's nuclear weapons cannot perform
the mission of deterrence against the hypothetical aggression at the
regional level. Such aggression on the part of NATO or China is hardly
probable in the foreseeable future, whereas the major security challenges
to Russia originate from the conflicts in the Caucasus and Central
Asia. However, these are political calculations, which are not always
convincing in the process of military planning, since the latter normally
proceeds from the worst-case scenario. Nonetheless, if in the hypothetical
conflict Russia demonstrates its readiness for the limited use of
nuclear weapons, the potential enemy will have all reasons for making
a pre-emptive strike. And then the Russian leadership will have to
face a difficult dilemma - to agree to a devastating escalation of
a nuclear exchange or to recognize the defeat.
The only realistic option for deterring the new threats would be
to cooperate with the West, when it is possible and necessary, notably
to unite the efforts in combating extremist movements and regimes
in the Third World. The implementation of confidence-building and
transparency measures with respect to nuclear weapons would become
an important element of the new stable and predictable military-political
situation in Russia-American relationship. At the same time, the unpredictability
of global development encourages Russia to keep its nuclear arsenal.
And in this context, it would be useful to seek minimal nuclear deterrence
with the help of strategic forces.
Footnotes
| 1. |
National Security Concept, January 10,
2000. |
| 2. |
Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation.
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 22, 2000, p. 6. |
| 3. |
Key Provisions of the Military Doctrine
of the Russian Federation (Summary). Krasnaya Zvezda, November
19, 1993, Appendix, p. 5. |
| 4. |
National Security Concept of the Russian
Federation, December 17, 1997. |
| 5. |
National Security Concept, January 10,
2000. |
| 6. |
Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. Nezavisimaya
Gazeta, April 22, 2000, p. 5 |
| 7. |
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 24, 1999 |
| 8. |
Sergei Grigoryev, "The Military-Political Trump
Card of Russia. Interview with Vladimir Yakovlev, Commander-in-Chief
of the SRF". Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, No. 49, December
17-23, 1999, p. 1. |
| 9. |
Segodnya, May 6, 1999. |
| 10. |
Segodnya, July 7, 1996 |
| 11. |
Yaderny Kontrol, No. 2, Vol. 6, March-April 2000,
p. 33 |
| 12. |
Sergei Rogov, "Russia and Nuclear
Weapons". Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, No. 47, December
11, 1998, p. 4. |
| 13. |
Alexei Arbatov, Security: Russia's Choice.
M., 1999, pp. 370-371 |
| 14. |
Ibid. It is noteworthy that by speaking
about the possibility of arming Iskander missiles with nuclear
warheads, Arbatov calls for actual abrogation of the 1991-1992
TNW initiatives. |
| 15. |
Nikolai Petrov, "War Against an
Improbable Enemy". Kommersant-Vlast, July 25, 2000, pp. 18-19. |
| 16. |
Kommersant, April 15, 2000 |
| 17. |
The area of application of the Agreement
on Armed Forces Reduction contains the 100-km areas on both sides
of the borders of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and
China. The agreement covers only the Army, the tactical aviation
and the air defense aviation. The Frontier Guard units are not
subject to reduction. The SMF, tactical nuclear weapons, the Navy,
strategic aviation, air defense missile units, reconnaissance
aircraft and electronic warfare aircraft are not subject to the
reduction. The problem is that due to geographical reasons it
is difficult for Russia to station the appropriate forces beyond
100 km, whereas China can concentrate large contingents at the
distance of 100 km from the border with Russia. |
