On 23-24 October 2010, Pugwash convened a consultation on “Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East and Regional Security: The Task Ahead.” Thirty-three current and former officials and other experts from 14 countries met in their personal capacities in England, at Farnham Castle, to generate ideas in a relaxed and creative setting on steps that might be taken to create forward movement on a Middle East free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and related issues. It was noted that serious regional and international dynamics have created a unique convergence of interests in these areas at this time. It was further noted that while the potential for progress is real, the danger of a missed opportunity at this time is possibly catastrophic.
All participants were respectful of the long history and entangled arguments associated with nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and their interplay with regional security dilemmas. Without diminishing the importance of these points and the need for resolution of these complex and urgent problems, the main focus of the meeting was to better understand if there are areas where small forward steps may be possible, and to see how such steps might fit with proposed 2012 conference. This report focuses on these areas.
Speed bumps (if not roadblocks) on the road to 2012
At the time of the Farnham Castle meeting, six months had passed since many governments made promises in the final document[2] of the NPT Review Conference in May 2010 to work with states in the region to move toward a conference on a Middle East WMD Free Zone. Agreement of the final document contributed to what many considered to be a successful Review Conference. Crucially, it was considered a key indicator of progress on the seminal 1995 Middle East Resolution[3] which was critical in ensuring the indefinite extension of the NPT. However, half a year later, many participants at the Farnham Castle meeting expressed frustration that there had been no tangible progress since May. Some were concerned that this inaction might show a decreased commitment to the idea of a 2012 conference and limited prospects for the conference taking place at all.
Some believed this inertia contradicts the immediacy felt by many in the region and internationally to find some solution to the issues of WMD in the Middle East. This lack of movement is considered to be at odds with concerns over regional security, grave national threat perceptions, the urgency of establishing non-proliferation norms while respecting national right to pursue peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the generally recognized increasing (though nascent) international trends to seek ways to decrease the salience of nuclear weapons in national doctrines and postures. Worse yet, some felt that the inability to sit down and start the process to deal with these issues and the broader goals may inevitably lead to further security concerns
It was pointed out repeatedly that the goal of an eventual nuclear weapons or WMD free zone in the Middle East is a commonly shared goal and policy of all states in the region, and that working toward this goal presents the most promising means available to bring all states to the table on one of the most critical issues facing the region.
The goal is a Middle East free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction
Interestingly, some participants from divergent backgrounds said that the overall goal has less to do with a ‘zone’ per se, and more to do with the goal of ridding the Middle East of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. It was noted that there are several options for how to achieve that goal, the zone being just one of those options.
However, others disagreed strongly with deemphasizing the zone idea, and noted that the zone provides the most promising way to incorporate additional verification measures, benchmarks, linkages, timeframes and other processes and obligations in a comprehensive way that would remove concerns over potential loopholes.
Many participants shared the belief that the process for achieving the broader goal is not getting enough attention. They highlighted the need for creating a new political climate and a range of mechanisms for arms control and confidence building. This might include the creation of instruments and organizations in the region that deal with regional, political, and arms control issues, perhaps similar to the early 1990s Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group (ACRS) or even a more strenuous version of ACRS.
Toward a menu of ideas for 2012
Participants discussed an accumulated agenda of desirable actions that might be considered before, during and after the proposed 2012 conference. There seemed to be near consensus that, pragmatically speaking, a single conference in 2012 is not likely to achieve the goal of ridding the region of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. Rather, there was a deep understanding that the issues are complex, the history charged, and that there is an urgent need to consider how to structure discussions in a way that fuels a dynamic of forward and not retrograde movement.
Participants acknowledged there is a challenge involved in seeking to bring all regional parties to the table in 2012. This is complicated by any perceived attempt to single out a particular country in any way, and it is made more difficult by the fact that some of the calls for this conference, and the zone, emanate from a process that does not include all parties. However, it was the overwhelming view of participants in our meeting that options remain open for finding some ways to move forward with all parties engaged in various ways.
There was a general recognition that it would be helpful if public statements and actions by governmental officials could be kept as positive as possible to maximize the potential of this window of opportunity. Some felt that ‘business-as-usual’ approaches vis-à-vis long standing practices in various intergovernmental fora at this time were not necessarily helpful.
Questions that need immediate attention
To encourage relevant governments to begin this process of planning for the proposed 2012 conference, a series of questions were identified for immediate attention and further clarification based on the May 2010 Final Document (included here as Appendix 3).
- 1. What will be the division of labor between the UNSG, the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, the regional states, and the facilitator? Answering this question will begin to better clarify the regionalization versus the internationalization of the process leading to the conference.
- What progress can be made in identifying a facilitator? What are the qualifications needed (trust of the regional parties, expertise, profile level, etc). When will it be possible to begin to float names?
- Is it possible to identify ‘sherpas’ (‘shepherds’)—specific people in key countries—to help with organizing the conference? Would it help to work with a focus group of selected countries (‘friends of the facilitator’)?
- Which country will host the conference? Will it be in the region or outside the region? Will the host country pay?
- What are the budgetary arrangements? What is the impact of the UN budget cycle on hiring a facilitator (does this go through the normal UN budget cycle – meaning it is not possible until Nov-January 2012 – or can this be budgeted immediately if there is political agreement?)
- Guidance needs to be provided to IAEA and the OPCW regarding what is expected of them in terms of their support (documents).
- Likewise, there is need for clarification regarding the EU seminar mentioned in the May 2010 Final Document. Will it be before the 2012 conference? What can the EU do to promote this process? Will this seminar include NGOs?
- Input should be requested regarding the agenda for the proposed 2012 conference. What range of issues will it address: nuclear, chemical weapons, biological weapons, missiles, other weapons/fireworks, regional security, etc? How long will it run? Will it be one conference, but perhaps divided into different sessions?
- What options exist for building upon the unprecedented reference to civil society/NGOS in the May 2010 Final Document? Are there additional ways in particular civil society can help at this time of seeming governmental inaction?
- Is there a need for an early preparatory phase of the conference, to sort out these issues? Or, will the UN Secretary General raise the issues in consultation with parties concerned and co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution? Some highlighted the importance of bringing these issues to the attention of the UNSG early in the game, before they reach the conference. If there is no preparatory phase, then states will have to rely on UNSG as focal point.
- To jumpstart the process, it was suggested that the facilitator or some other entity might ask all regional parties for their preferences regarding the following sorts of issues relating to the proposed zone. In other words, is it possible to do some advance work, as one participant asked, to “identify some ‘green lines’ not just ‘red lines’?” Is it possible to begin to define process, benchmarks, timeframe, guarantees?
a) If a zone were to be established, what should be its geographical scope? (for example, would it include Turkey?)
b) What would be the scope of prohibition? Would it be like Tlatelolco before it was amended or like Pelindaba? Would it be one agreement or a series of agreements or regional measures?
c) What would be the mechanisms for monitoring and verification (the IAEA or something more?), and what would be compliance issues for the related aspects (depending on the scope)?
d) What sort of Entry Into Force provisions might be needed? (Would EIF require a certain number of countries, specific countries, or creation of a certain environment? Would a staggered entry into force be helpful?)
One participant summarized the challenges ahead by breaking them into the following four segments:
- 1. What immediate arms control steps are acceptable to all regional actors? Realistically, these are the only ones that will emerge from the conference. Identifying some such set of steps would indicate some minimum harmonization of interests if countries in the region could agree on concrete practical steps. It would be useful, although not easy, to try to think hard and realistically about what steps that might be considered in 2012 fall into that category.
- What expert groups should be formed as a concrete result of the conference? For example, if the goal is a regional verification system such a big, important, and constructive step would need a detailed hard assessment of related possible technical and political issues.
- What wider processes might be launched at the proposed 2012 conference? How will states progress the wider security contexts that will inevitably be present in the room – via ACRS or ACRS Plus? Perhaps there might be several regional settings for ongoing deliberative processes regarding doctrine, threat perceptions, etc. Lessons from ASEAN could be learned.
- What can be done to prevent 2012 from being a damaging experience? If this is a failure, it could be substantial setback or a permanent derailment of an idea many think is right track. It was noted that in other settings steps that were meant as confidence-building measures destroyed confidence instead (for example, the early interaction between the West and Iran left all embittered). If the goal is to barricade 2012 against damaging outcomes, it is essential to find some good answers to first three questions. There is a need to examine the range of possible measures and map the range of ideas versus the interests of states.
Is it time for an “ACRS Plus?”
Participants discussed options for broadening out discussions, possibly in an ‘ACRS Plus’ exercise that might be linked to the proposed 2012 conference (some said this might take the form of a pre-2012 ASEAN-type exercise). Topics might include all nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and other classes of weapons, possibly including missiles, rockets, fireworks, and other conventional weapons. Questions of asymmetry likely will need to be addressed in some way. There was some additional discussion on the need for some sort of progress on the Palestine issue (including the question of Hamas). The role of non-state actors may need to be incorporated. Some noted the possible importance of progress on the Israel-Syria track.
The need for further progress on and dialogue with Iran was noted. There was a general understanding that any possible military attack on Iran would have an extremely negative, if not potentially insurmountable, impact on hopes for the proposed 2012 conference.
Related confidence-building measures
Participants acknowledged that in order to achieve the goal of a Middle East free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction a spectrum of declaratory measures, national measures, and negotiated measures will be needed.
There is an extensive menu of options for states wishing to promote progress in these areas, and any one of the following (or a combination of several of them) would potentially contribute enormously to demonstrating seriousness of purpose and goodwill toward the goal all states in the region share. Some may be voluntary steps, which might perhaps be reciprocated. It is possible to start with some minimal expectations, and build slowly on the confidence that such a process might start to generate.
The following list includes ideas that surfaced during the discussion, though there was no attempt to discuss these in depth, nor to seek consensus on their merits. The list is by no means comprehensive, nor is it prioritized. Further discussion could be held on these sorts of issues, and Pugwash was encouraged to continue to help generate such options.
- Countries which have not yet ratified, or are not yet members of, certain regimes (NPT, CTBT, BWC, CWC, etc) could behave as if they were (and publicly reinforce this). They could possibly implement national legislation in accordance with the regime.
- Regional discussions might begin on how to manage transition to a region marked by reliance on nuclear power (and related proliferation issues). This might or might not include discussions on regionalizing or internationalizing enrichment and/or sensitive technologies.
- US nuclear weapons could be removed from Turkey as a goodwill gesture toward starting the process of denuclearizing the region and decreasing the saliency of nuclear weapons in the region.
- Discussions could be held on the role of extended deterrence in the region.
- Some felt relevant lessons might be drawn from the recent US experience on ways to gradually and systematically decrease the saliency and relevance of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the region. Some thought the US nuclear posture review language on declaratory policy might be well-suited to the region.
- Progress might be possible on fissile materials in the region. For example, if the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty is agreed, some thought it might be possible for Israel to join. Or perhaps the region might agree to an “FMCT Lite,” a regional FMCT, or another fissile materials agreement.
- Increased cooperation on nuclear security might be possible, seeking to prevent trafficking in WMD and related components, and involving more experts working with nuclear materials in the process. This might include collective visits to nuclear, chemical and biological facilities (not for verification purposes).
- A treaty or MOU banning attack on nuclear facilities might be discussed, based on the example of agreements between India and Pakistan.
- Progress might be possible on declaratory policy, by Israel and others, perhaps through quasi-negotiated unilateral statements. For example, a treaty on No First Use (or Non-Use) might be possible. (While some recognized that Israel might not be the first to agree to such a treaty, they wondered if conditions might be created where they might eventually consider it?)
- A regional ban on radiological weapons might be discussed, perhaps in conjunction with an agreement on non-attack on facilities.
- Perhaps all states in the region might generate White Papers and then meet to discuss mutual threat perceptions, etc.
- Perhaps, contrary to conventional thinking, it might be helpful to start from the form and mechanism, instead of substance. This might include creation of a Middle Eastern WMD prevention bureau (or Center of Excellence) for exchange of information, best practices, etc. There was some discussion about the confidence-building role of technical arms control discussions (transparency, etc), prior to consensus or agreement on the ultimate (political) goals. (Someone pointed out that history has proven that by their nature arms control agreements are agreements among adversaries, and that peaceful relations are not required before negotiating and securing arms control agreements.)
- Some wondered if a reduction in the number of Israel’s nuclear weapons might be possible as a confidence-building measure.
- Perhaps the Palestinian leadership (president) might consider a statement saying that when it becomes a state, it will join the NPT, CWC, BWC and CTBT as soon as it becomes a full state and will follow the (Japan-type) three non-nuclear principles straight away.
- All states in the region might agree, either unilaterally or in concert, to adhere to Open Skies.
- An agreement by states with nuclear weapons not to deploy nuclear-capable forces to the region might contribute to increased confidence in the region.
- Some raised the possibility of direct discussions between the Arab League and Israel, though others questioned whether the time is right for such discussions.
Conclusion
Participants in the Farnham Castle meeting recognized the many challenges involved in promoting forward movement on the goal of a Middle East free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Their collective experiences and insights indicate the road ahead will be bumpy and the roadblocks may seem insurmountable. However, there was a palpable sense of urgency and frustration that the current window of opportunity should not be missed due to bureaucratic inaction. They encouraged further discussions in Track 2 (or Track 1.5) settings for further iron out some of the sorts of topics that were initially addressed in Farnham.
A lot of this process can be done at Track 2 or Track 1.5 level, but at the end of the day, the governments need to take ownership and find the ways to talk to each other and iron out answers to some of these questions.
Someone pointed out that it would be possible to ‘wait a lifetime’ for all the stars (or states) to line up perfectly, and the clock is ticking. 2012 is an election year in the US. There are proliferation fears related to continued inaction. Some governments seem worried about getting behind this conference fully because they fear it will be a failure.
In Farnham Castle, there was hope that the conference might yet succeed if expectations could be managed. Some said the 2012 conference would be a failure only if it came out with no action plan, if the states failed to agree a continuous credible process as an outcome. Many believed success is possible if governments get behind this process and determine any number of small steps forward. Initial ideas for such steps have been put forward in this report.
Some participants at Farnham Castle expressed the hope that 2012 will start the region on the process toward arms control and an era in which the salience and relevance of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the region is decreased. If that potential is not realized, either because the proposed conference does not take place or if it results in failure, then many (if not most) fear it will be a turning point for the region toward a far more dangerous future.
